Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (June 30-July 7, 2026)

• The Hamas government media office in the Gaza Strip announced the dissolution of its emergency committee and the resignation of Muhammad Abd al-Khaliq al-Farra, the committee chairman and Hamas de facto prime minister, in preparation for transferring administrative authority to the Palestinian national committee for the administration of Gaza, chaired by Ali Shaat. The government institutions in the Gaza Strip had reportedly completed the administrative and legal preparations for the transfer and presented them to representatives of the “factions,” tribes, civilian society and UN observers to demonstrate seriousness in advancing internal governance arrangements and alleviating the suffering of the population. Only technical and professional personnel would continue to be employed by the system and would continue providing essential services and operate under the authority of the national committee once it assumed its responsibilities, to prevent an administrative vacuum. Palestinian sources said the move was one of the understandings ahead of the next phase and the expected meetings in Cairo, as Hamas sought to facilitate arrangements for administering the Gaza Strip while currently freezing discussion of the sensitive issues concerning Gaza government employees and the weapons portfolio until a new document could be formulated with the mediators (Quds Agency, July 6, 2026).
• Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem represented the move as positive step to remove Israeli pretexts and shift responsibility to the mediators and the states guaranteeing the ceasefire agreement (Al Jazeera Breaking, July 6, 2026).
• The Board of Peace said its assessment would be based on actions rather than promises to meet the critical Gazans’ needs. The Board added that all decisions had to comply with the requirements set out in the roadmap for advancing governance, security and the transfer of control in the Gaza Strip. The Board said it expected the completion of discussions on the roadmap, including a mechanism that would enable the Gaza administration committee to assume full governing authority, and further noted that the fundamental principle would be “one authority, one law and one weapon,” meaning that all weapons had be collected under the control of the administration committee (X account of the Board of Peace, July 6, 2026).
• Board of Peace representative Nikolay Mladenov also said the announcement noted the need to successfully complete the talks on the roadmap, which would bridge the gap between declarations and actual implementation. He added that the sooner an agreement was reached, the sooner the administration committee would be able to assume responsibility, weapons would be collected and the Israeli withdrawal could begin (X account of Nikolay Mladenov, July 6, 2026).

Security Governance

• On July 2, 2026, Mustafa Mahna, a former officer in the Palestinian Authority preventive security service, was executed in Gaza after allegedly collaborating with Israel. He was accused of providing Israel with information on the movements of Hamas military wing commander Izz al-Din al-Haddad and of helping confirm his death following his elimination in May 2026. He was also accused of assisting in the elimination of 37 Hamas operatives and figures (Sahm al-Thaqib Telegram channel, July 2, 2026). Mahna’s family in the Gaza Strip and in the diaspora said they completely disowned Mustafa Mahna and he did not represent the family, its values or its history. The family said he had been punished according to the law for collaborating with Israel (Ilam Gaza Telegram channel, July 2, 2026).
• Subsequently, a source stated that “resistance operatives”^[2] had arrested another alleged collaborator, who was accused of involvement in the elimination of Muhammad Odeh, who had been appointed commander of the Hamas military wing after the elimination of al-Haddad and was himself eliminated at the end of May 2026. The source said the suspect would also be executed (al-Siyad, July 6, 2026).
• According to reports, Hamas has recently been using the funerals of military wing operatives to restore public symbols of power and presence by turning funeral processions into armed demonstrations of force, displaying Hamas flags and chanting jihadist slogans. The objective has been to convey both an internal and external message that the movement remains active, organized and undefeated despite the military pressure and the Israeli and American plans for the future of the Gaza Strip. Hamas sources said the decision to demonstrate was circulated to the various regions and intended to emphasize the continued presence of the “resistance,” while the appearance of armed men at funerals was represented as an “unofficial initiative” by relatives and friends (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 4, 2026).

   
Mass funeral of a Hamas military wing operative eliminated in an Israeli strike. His body is wrapped in an Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades’ flag (Quds Agency, July 6, 2026)

• The Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) reported that Israel had allowed more than 100 civilians from the Gaza Strip to leave through the Kerem Shalom Crossing for medical treatment in a third country. However, en route to the crossing they were delayed for more than an hour at a checkpoint erected by Hamas operatives. The report proved Hamas continued to spread falsehoods worldwide by claiming Israel prevented patients from leaving the Gaza Strip to receive medical treatment (COGAT X account, June 30, 2026).

Civilian Governance

• The Gaza Strip land authority issued a strongly-worded statement rejecting what it called a “social media rumor campaign” directed at its activities and its chairman, particularly allegations concerning forged deeds of sale and demands to evacuate the tents of displaced persons in the al-Mawasi areas of Rafah and Khan Yunis. The authority claimed there was no basis for the claims of illegal land sales or land document forgery, the land registration system was secure and operated under “reliable legal supervision.” It added that the suspension of services at the authority’s headquarters in recent days resulted solely from a “technical malfunction” following the theft of its Internet antenna, and services resumed after a replacement antenna had been installed. The authority sought to reassure displaced persons that extortion and harassment would not be tolerated and the authorities would provide them with full protection, while taking severe legal action against anyone who spread or fabricated rumors intended to undermine internal stability and social peace (Facebook page of the Gaza Strip land authority, June 30, 2026).

• IDF forces continued operations to destroy terrorist infrastructure, facilities and assets and eliminate terrorists within the Yellow Line area and in other parts of the Gaza Strip. More than 20 Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) terrorist operatives were eliminated after promoting terrorist activities, rebuilding terrorist infrastructure and posing an immediate threat to the forces. Among them were operatives involved in the atrocities of the October 7, 2023 and massacre and who had held Israeli hostages in tunnels. In addition, rocket launch shafts, rocket launchers and tunnels with a total length of more than one kilometer were destroyed, and systematic drilling operations were conducted in Khan Yunis to locate and destroy other tunnels (IDF Spokesperson, June 30-July 7, 2026).
• The Gazans claimed IDF forces continued to move the Yellow Line and expand the area of the Gaza Strip under IDF control. Sources in the Gaza Strip said that in most parts of the Strip the area under IDF control had been expanded as far as Salah al-Din Street, which runs the length of the Strip from south to north, resulting in the complete cessation of Gazan movement along the road. According to the sources, al-Rashid Street, on the western side of the Strip, remained the only route connecting the northern and southern parts of the Gaza Strip (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 3, 2026).
• Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem claimed that the escalation of Israeli rhetoric regarding the accelerated military buildup of Hamas, both in terms of manpower and armament, was anti-Hamas propaganda to justify Israel’s ongoing “aggression” against the Gaza Strip, the daily killings and the violations of the ceasefire agreement (Hamas Telegram channel, July 5, 2026). Hamas also accused Israel of continuing its strikes, which it alleged killed Gazans, while the movement and the Palestinian “factions”^[3] were working to stabilize the ceasefire agreement and implement its provisions (Hamas Telegram channel, July 6, 2026).

• Taher al-Nunu, media adviser to the chairman of the Hamas political bureau, said a delegation headed by Zaher Jabarin, Hamas leader in Judea and Samaria, had arrived in Cairo to continue discussions with the Egyptians and the mediators on implementing the ceasefire agreement (Hamas Telegram channel, June 30, 2026). In the absence of Khalil al-Hayya, head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, who usually leads the delegation to the Cairo talks, “activists from the Palestinian factions” claimed it reflected Hamas’ frustration with the numerous amendments introduced by Board of Peace representative Nikolay Mladenov to the factions’ latest response, which had been submitted in mid-June (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 1, 2026). It was later reported that Jabarin left Cairo after delivering the Gazans’ response to the latest amendments proposed by Mladenov, without negotiating with the mediators or representatives of the Board of Peace. Reportedly, the delegation was not authorized to conduct negotiations and was instructed only to deliver the response. It was also reported that the response was submitted following a meeting held in Ankara, which had not previously been disclosed, attended by the head of Turkish intelligence, Ibrahim Kalin; the head of the Egyptian General Intelligence Service, Hassan Rashad; Khalil al-Hayya; and the head of Hamas abroad, Khaled Mashal (aljazeera.net, July 2, 2026).
• According to sources in Hamas and the other terrorist organizations participating in the negotiations, the new response included minor amendments to their previous response. The main published points were the following (al-Quds al-Arabi, June 30, 2026; al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 1, 2026; Al Sharq website, July 2, 2026):
  • Agreement to the concentration, collection and storage of heavy weapons instead of disarmament, while discussion of personal small arms would be postponed to a later stage. Hamas also removed the term “dismantling of infrastructure,” which included tunnels, weapons depots and production workshops. Reportedly, the transfer of heavy weapons was the maximum concession agreed to by the movement’s leadership and the other terrorist organizations, and they refuse to hand over “military infrastructure” to the international stabilization force.
  • The Palestinian national committee for the administration of Gaza will supervise the process, which will proceed in parallel with Israeli withdrawals from the Gaza Strip and will be linked to the full implementation of the first phase of the ceasefire agreement.
  • The terrorist organizations demanded that the clause dealing with weapons be implemented gradually and sequentially according to a timetable to be carried out within 14 days from the date of agreement on the document. They said the issue had to be linked to a political process leading to a comprehensive solution which guaranteed the Palestinian right to self-determination and safeguarded their sovereignty.
  • Hamas demanded the integration of its civilian sector employees and police into the governmental sector to be managed by the Palestinian national committee, and payment of all salaries and other funds owed to its employees that had not yet been paid.
• The Palestinian national committee for the administration of Gaza said it had held a series of working meetings in Cyprus over two days with teams, experts and advisers from the Board of Peace, the office of the representative for the Gaza Strip in the Board of Peace, and the Tony Blair Institute. It claimed the meetings had been “highly productive” and focused on the next phase and efforts to alleviate the suffering of the Gazans. It was further reported that they reviewed reconstruction, security and governance plans and stated their commitment to the overall plan and their readiness to take all necessary steps, in coordination with the Board of Peace and the office of the representative, so that the Palestinian national committee for the administration of Gaza would be able to assume responsibility and carry out its duties once the appropriate conditions had been met. The meetings were a continuation of the workshop held in Cairo on June 23-24, 2026, part of a broader process to ensure the committee had all the tools necessary to serve the Gazan public (X account of the Gaza administration committee, July 1, 2026).
• A Hamas source related to reports in Israel that the Board of Peace was expected to begin a pilot program for managing humanitarian shelters in areas of the Gaza Strip not under Hamas control. The source said Gazans would not agree to move to the areas, which would amount to a large prison. The source added that without an agreement with Hamas regarding the future of the Gaza Strip, any alternative plans would fail. A source in Gaza said the objective of the plan to establish humanitarian zones was to undermine the movement, but added that the deployment of international stabilization force positions was important to advance the original American plan, regardless of what the representatives of the Board of Peace tried to impose through the roadmap (al-Sharq al-Awsat July 1, 2026).
• Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem related to the arrival of tactical vehicles at the Endurance logistics support site of the international stabilization force at Kerem Shalom. He said he hoped the Board of Peace announcement regarding the beginning of the arrival of international forces for deployment in Gaza marked the start of implementing their assigned missions, i.e., separating the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip from the IDF and acting to stop what he called IDF “violations.” He called on the Board of Peace to begin the practical implementation of the ceasefire plan by bringing in the Palestinian national committee for the administration of Gaza, providing genuine assistance, compelling Israel to withdraw and beginning the reconstruction process (Hazem Qassem’s Telegram channel, June 30, 2026).

• The Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) reported that as part of the ceasefire agreement, a pilot program had begun to relocate the Israeli security screening of residents returning from Egypt to the Gaza Strip through the Rafah Crossing. The screening and identification procedures were transferred from the IDF’s Regavim checkpoint to Kerem Shalom, where they would be carried out by the Land Crossings Authority in the Ministry of Defense, together with other security agencies. The change will apply only to streamlining the Israeli screening process, while movement through the Rafah Crossing will remain unchanged (COGAT X account, July 1, 2026).
• As part of the UAE initiative to assist Gaza, equipment for 80 water tankers was brought into the Gaza Strip to support the ongoing efforts to establish water storage facilities and improve access to water for the civilian population (COGAT X account, July 1, 2026).

• Reportedly, his past week 1,272 trucks entered the Gaza Strip through the Kerem Shalom Crossing, including 721 commercial trucks, 502 aid trucks and 49 fuel and gas tankers. The Zikim and Kissufim Crossings were closed. It was also reported that the Rafah Crossing operated on only one day out of seven, during which 261 people crossed, including 182 who left the Gaza Strip and 79 who entered (Sama, July 3, 2026).
• Sami al-Amsi, chairman of the general federation of trade unions in the Gaza Strip, claimed the unemployment rate among workers exceeded 90%, causing a poverty rate of no less than 90%. He added that approximately 400,000 workers in Gaza were unemployed because of the continuing war. He said employment opportunities were limited and some employers exploited the situation, with many workers laboring between 10 and 12 hours a day for low wages, sometimes as little as three to four shekels an hour, and in some cases working between 14 and 16 hours a day (Palestine Online, June 30, 2026).
• The Palestinian businessmen’s association warned that economic recovery efforts in Gaza faced unprecedented challenges because of the continuing shortage of raw materials, production inputs and basic goods. It said the situation delayed the recovery of small and medium-sized businesses and undermined opportunities to revive the local economy after the war (Facebook page of the Palestinian businessmen’s association in the Gaza Strip, July 1, 2026).
• The municipality of Khuza’a in southern Gaza published a legal notice declaring the town a “disaster area no longer fit for human habitation,” claiming that 100% of the residential areas had been destroyed, 4,250 housing units had been wiped out, 13,800 residents had been displaced, the water, sewage, health, education and municipal infrastructure had been destroyed, and 4,000 dunams of agricultural land had been destroyed (Sama, July 3, 2026).

• Hamas condemned the statements of the Board of Peace and the United States position that there would be no place for UNRWA in the “new Gaza.” Hamas claimed it was part of an Israeli policy to damage and undermine UNRWA. Hamas claimed UNRWA was “international testimony” to the nakba and the world’s “commitment” to the Palestinian refugees, and any attempt to replace it or reduce its authority was an attempt to undermine international legitimacy, erase the refugee issue and damage the [so-called] “right of return.”^[4] Hamas called on the UN, donor countries and the international community to ensure the continuation of UNRWA’s activities, particularly in light of the crisis in Gaza (Hamas Telegram channel, July 2, 2026).
• Ahmed Abu Holi, a member of the PLO Executive Committee and head of its department of refugee affairs, said the position of the Board of Peace regarding UNRWA exemplified the adoption of and alignment with the Israeli narrative, an attempt to eliminate the Palestinian refugee issue, and a renunciation of the legal, political and moral responsibility borne by the international community. He said UNRWA operated according to the mandate granted to it under UN General Assembly Resolution 302^[5] as long as no just and comprehensive political solution to the Palestinian issue had been reached. He added that the Board of Peace, which was established and granted specific and exclusive powers under UN Security Council Resolution 2803, had neither the right nor the mandate to terminate the agency’s role in the Gaza Strip (Wafa, July 2, 2026).

• A Hamas delegation headed by the chairman of the Shura Council, Muhammad Darwish participated in the funeral held for Iran’s leader, Ali Khamenei, in Tehran. The delegation also included Hamas leader in Judea and Samaria, Zaher Jabarin; head of the international relations office, Mousa Abu Marzouq; political bureau member Izzat al-Sharq; deputy head of the Arab and Islamic relations office, Basem Naim; Hamas representative in Lebanon, Osama Hamdan; and the Hamas representative in Iran (SND website, July 3, 2026).^[6] An official Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) delegation, headed by secretary general Ziyad al-Nakhalah, also attended, and included political bureau members Ihsan Ataya and Ali Abu Shaheen, as well as the PIJ representative in Iran (al-Mayadeen, July 3, 2026).

     
Right: The Hamas delegation. Left: The PIJ delegation (al-Mayadeen, July 3, 2026)

• The Hamas delegation met with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Tehran. Araghchi reiterated Iran would continue to support the Palestinian cause until the Palestinian people realized their right to self-determination and established an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem [sic] as its capital (Araghchi’s Telegram channel, July 4-5, 2026).

Counterterrorism

• Israeli security forces continued extensive counterterrorism operations throughout Judea and Samaria, detaining more than 60 wanted suspects, including terrorists who had been planning to carry out attacks, suspects affiliated with Hamas and ISIS, rock- and Molotov cocktail-throwers and suspects who possessed or trafficked in weapons. They also confiscated 162,000 shekels (about $53,500) designated for financing terrorist activity, five drones, materials for manufacturing explosive devices, incitement propaganda materials, ammunition and weapons, including pistols and rifles (IDF and Israel Police Spokespersons, June 30-July 7, 2026).
• Israeli security forces detained four Palestinians involved in the assault and wounding of three young Israeli shepherds near Mikne Avraham, southeast of Jerusalem. In a separate incident, an Israeli vehicle driven by a Palestinian entered Havat Keren near the community of Karmei Tzur and the driver attempted to attack one of the farm’s residents before trying to run him over. The attacker was detained later (Israel Police Spokesperson, July 2-3, 2026). In the village of Mukhmas, northeast of Jerusalem, Israeli security forces detained eight suspects who attacked ten Israelis whose vehicle had entered the village (IDF Spokesperson and Israeli media, July 3, 2026).

Settler Terrorism

• Palestinian reports continued regarding attacks by Jewish rioters in Judea and Samaria: in the village of Beitillu, in the Ramallah area, rioters attacked the farmer Kamal Radwan, injured him and sprayed him with pepper spray; in Qusra, near Nablus, Jewish rioters uprooted approximately 500 olive trees; five foreign activists were injured in an attack by Jewish rioters in the Turmus Ayya area, north of Ramallah; greenhouses were vandalized in the Shufa area near Tulkarm; in the village of al-Taybeh, near Ramallah, a house was attacked and there was an attempt to introduce toxic material into the family’s water tank; in the village of al-Maniya, near Bethlehem, the electricity line supplying the village was destroyed for the second time within a week; and in Anata, near Jerusalem, Jewish rioters took control of the Ein Rawabi Spring, a major water source for shepherds and their flocks, used to water approximately 1,300 head of livestock (Wafa , July 3, 2026; Nablus News Telegram channel, July 3, 2026).

International Activities

• The Palestinian Authority foreign ministry categorically denied the statements made by Nasser al-Qudwa, the former PA foreign minister and representative to the UN, who claimed the PA had asked South Africa to withdraw the case it filed against Israel before the ICJ under the Genocide Convention. The foreign ministry said it was “deeply concerned” by over what it called a series of “misleading and distorted narratives” from al-Qudwa which weakened the Palestinian position, and called on media outlets, podcast hosts and social media users to be accurate, objective and responsible concerning such statements (Wafa, July 2, 2026).
• The chairman of the Palestinian National Council, Rawhi Fattouh, condemned the preliminary approval by the Israeli Knesset of a bill to restrict or prevent the call to prayer from the minarets of mosques in Jerusalem and Israel. He called on the international community and the UN to stop what he called a “racist policy,” and demanded Israel be held accountable for its [alleged] continuing violations (Wafa, July 1, 2026). Hamas represented the bill as escalation and a “religious war” against the holy sites and “Islamic identity,” part of a “Judaization policy ” and an attack on al-Aqsa Mosque and the Islamic status [sic] of Jerusalem. Hamas said the call to prayer in mosques was “an eternal symbol of Islam and part of the identity of Palestine and Jerusalem,” and called on the Palestinian public, the Arab and Islamic worlds, and religious and human rights institutions to intensify efforts to defend al-Aqsa and freedom of worship (Hamas Telegram channel, July 1, 2026).
• Palestinian sources reported that in one of the Gulf States the PA leadership had restricted the activities of Palestinian activists who opposed its policies and operated outside the official PA and PLO frameworks. According to the report, the Palestinian ambassador in the specific country submitted security and political observations to the local authorities regarding two Palestinian activists residing there, claiming they were connected to independent pro-Palestinian initiatives who did not operate under official PA auspices. Following repeated approaches and memoranda submitted by the ambassador over several months, a decision was made to deport the activists (Quds Agency, July 6, 2026).

PA Elections

• A Palestinian source close to Marwan Barghouti, who is serving five life sentences in an Israeli prison for involvement in terrorist attacks, Barghouti had informed his attorney he intended to run in the PA presidential election scheduled for the first quarter of 2027 (Sky News Arabia, July 2, 2026).