Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (June 2-9, 2026)

The IDF

• The IDF continued operations within the Yellow Line and other areas in the Gaza Strip to locate and destroy Hamas underground facilities and assets and eliminate terrorists, including those involved in the atrocities of the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) terrorists promoting attacks on IDF forces were eliminated, including senior operatives in Hamas general security, the head of the PIJ’s engineering array and his deputy, and the PIJ’s anti-tank missile fire commander in the northern Gaza Strip. The Hamas naval police headquarters was also attacked (IDF spokesperson, June 2-9, 2026).
• The Palestinians reported IDF activity in the areas of Khan Yunis, al-Maghazi, Gaza City and Beit Lahia, including claims of attacks in areas sheltering displaced persons (Mutabaa min al-Midan Telegram channel, June 6, 2026; al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 7, 2026). Hamas spokesperson Hazem Qassem accused Israel of not meeting its commitments and failing to comply with the ceasefire agreement, claiming that the guarantor states, the mediators and the Board of Peace were not doing enough to stop the “violations.” He claimed the “attacks on the tents of displaced persons”‘ were intended to sabotage the Cairo talks for implementing the ceasefire agreement and to disrupt the mediators’ efforts (Hamas Telegram channel, June 5-6, 2026).

• Palestinian sources claimed Israel was expanding the boundaries of the Yellow Line after Israeli drones instructed residents of Block 2 in the Jabalia refugee camp, which lies outside the Yellow Line, to evacuate, and requiring the separation of men and women during the departure. An evacuation warning was reportedly issued for the Orphans Camp near the entrance to Abu Asi in the al-Bureij refugee camp in central Gaza (Mutabaa min al-Midan Telegram channel, June 5, 2026).
• Abu Obeida, spokesman for the Hamas military wing, said eliminating the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades’ leaders would not weaken it and “the blood of the shaheeds helps overcome difficulties.” He warned that “the blood account” would remain open until the occupation settled it, adding that the military wing still had commanders who “grew up in the field and were shaped by experience and wars” (Abu Obeida’s Telegram channel, June 3, 2026).

• Sources in Hamas in the Gaza Strip said the eliminations of all the leaders were being investigated by “specialists” to find security leads or specific vulnerabilities. They claimed “many collaborators” had been arrested and executed, although only a small number belonged to Hamas and the al-Qassam Brigades. They also claimed that an Israeli agent connected to the elimination of Izz al-Din al-Haddad was arrested after being seen at the scene of the attack. Interrogation allegedly revealed he had tracked al-Haddad on the instructions of an Israeli intelligence officer who provided him with specific locations where the military wing commander’s family could be found (al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 3, 2026).
• Hamas-affiliated Telegram channels warned Gazans not to believe reports circulated by Israeli intelligence social media accounts claiming that Hamas military wing spokesman Abu Obeida had been eliminated in an attack in Gaza on June 3, 2026. They said the objective of the reports was to collect intelligence from users’ reactions, adding that a senior Hamas general security figure who was eliminated, Abdallah Abu Kaloub, used the nom de guerre Abu Obeida, which might have been the reason for the reports (the al-Majd al-Amni website Telegram channel and the Khalik Wa‘i (Be Aware) channel, June 5, 2026).

• A Hamas delegation led by the head of the political bureau in the Gaza Strip, Khalil al-Hayya, arrived in Cairo for a new round of negotiations. Reportedly, the objective was to complete the implementation of the first stage of the ceasefire agreement, stop the Israeli attacks in the Gaza Strip and formulate mechanisms for entering the second stage (Hamas Telegram channel, June 5, 2026).
• After several days of discussions and internal meetings held by the “factions”^[2] and with the mediators, Palestinian sources described the Cairo talks as “positive” after understandings had been reached for 15 clauses of the road map presented by the Board of Peace commissioner, Nikolay Mladenov, particularly regarding the need for full implementation of the first stage before moving to the second stage. According to the reports, the terrorist organizations and the mediators reached understandings on revisions to the text, including the reformulation of the clause dealing with weapons to prevent them from being handed over to Israel or to a non-Palestinian entity, but instead would be gradually transferred to an agreed-on Palestinian body for storage and “suspension of use.” The terrorist organizations, including Hamas, conditioned the collection of weapons on the completion of Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, full implementation of the “humanitarian protocol,” the entry of aid and reconstruction assistance, the dismantling of armed gangs, the entry of the Palestinian committee for the administration of Gaza, the cessation of violations and eliminations and adherence to the agreed withdrawal lines. According to the sources, only the “final touches” remained and the ball was now in the court of Israel, the American administration and the Board of Peace (al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 8, 2026). Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem said the movement had responded positively to every reasonable demand presented in Cairo and hoped a solution could be reached soon (Shehab Agency, June 8, 2026).
• A Palestinian source reported that Hamas had informed the mediators that the “factions” had agreed to accept the proposal to restrict weapons to a unified Palestinian authority and rejected disarmament as Israel understood it. According to the source, the “factions” had demonstrated “maximum flexibility” to reach an agreement and that the ball was now in the court of the “occupation.” A senior Hamas figure added that “substantial progress” had been made towards formulating arrangements which would make it possible to reach an agreement combining the first and second stages of the ceasefire agreement and said he hoped a genuine breakthrough could be achieved if Israel did not undermine it (al-Sharq, June 9, 2026).
• A senior figure in Muhammad Dahlan’s camp denied reports that Dahlan was participating in the meetings in Cairo. A senior figure in one of the terrorist organizations participating in the talks also rejected claims that consideration was being given to granting Dahlan a broader role in administering the Gaza Strip as part of the transition to the second stage, stating that the issue was not on the agenda A Hamas source confirmed that there were currently no discussions about integrating Dahlan into administering the Gaza Strip or putting him in charge of the technocrat committee which would administer the Strip. The source added that active channels of communication existed between the Hamas leadership and Dahlan, but that did not indicate Hamas agreed to his involvement in administering the Gaza Strip (aljazeera.net, June 6, 2026).
• The Board of Peace welcomed Egypt into the international stabilization force expected to deploy in the Gaza Strip. The Board published photographs of an Egyptian military officer who joined the force (X account of the Board of Peace, June 4, 2026).

     
Egypt joins the international stabilization force (X account of the Board of Peace, June 4, 2026)

The Situation in the Gaza Strip

• The Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) announced a temporary closure of the crossings into the Gaza Strip due to tightened security following the Iranian missile attacks on the evening of June 7, 2026. He later stated that the Kerem Shalom Crossing would reopen on the morning of June 9, 2026 for the gradual entry of humanitarian aid, and that the Rafah Crossing would reopen for limited movement of people on both sides of the border. The COGAT said that despite the closure, humanitarian aid remained in hundreds of trucks on the Gaza side of the Kerem Shalom Crossing awaiting collection in coordination with the UN and international organizations (COGAT X account, June 8, 2026).
• Dr. Ahmed Shetat, director of planning and international cooperation in the Hamas ministry of health, and Zaher al-Wahidi, director of the medical information unit, claimed that between 16 and18 of the 38 hospitals in the Gaza Strip had resumed operations and that more than half of hospitalization capacity had been lost, making it difficult to treat more than 173,000 wounded Gazans. He claimed that since the ceasefire in October 2025, the ministry of health had partially rehabilitated hospitals and health centers and established field hospitals to provide essential services. Al-Shifa Hospital resumed operations with a capacity of more than 250 beds, as did al-Rantisi Children’s Hospital, the only hospital of its kind in Gaza City and northern Gaza, with a capacity of approximately 100 beds. He added that efforts were underway to reopen the eye hospital in Gaza City, establish a field hospital in northern Gaza, and expand services at the Nasser Medical Complex and at medical points in the Central District and Khan Yunis. An alleged shortage of medical equipment was again claimed, including a 50% shortage of medications and a 60% shortage of disposable medical supplies (al-Risalah, June 4, 2026; Arabi 21, June 4, 2026; Palestine Online, June 6, 2026).
• The UN claimed a funding shortage was forcing humanitarian partners in the Gaza Strip to reduce essential services. According to the UN, funding allocated to the humanitarian response plan for Gaza and the West Bank amounted to only about 15% of the total requirement of $4.1 billion. As a result, by the end of May 2026, four humanitarian organizations had begun reducing water deliveries by truck, which could affect more than 330,000 people who relied on the deliveries as their primary source of drinking water. In addition, the number of daily meals distributed in the Gaza Strip dropped from 1.5 million in mid-March 2026 to 678,000, a blow to food security, particularly because most of the approximately 2.1 million Gazans were still displaced and largely dependent on humanitarian aid for basic needs such as food, water and services (Palestinian Media Center, June 5, 2026).
• For International Day of Innocent Children Victims of Aggression, Hamas alleged that more than 21,000 children and infants had been killed in the Gaza Strip, there were tens of thousands of wounded children and children who had lost one or both parents. Hamas called for Israel to be prosecuted in international forums (Hamas Telegram channel in Judea and Samaria, June 4, 2026).

Civilian Governance

• There was criticism in the Arab media and among Palestinians, including Gazans, following revelations that funds allegedly raised by Hamas in Mauritania and Algeria for the Gaza Strip did not reach needy families or Hamas “fighters”^[3] but instead ended up in the pockets of senior movement figures abroad. Palestinian journalists and commentators reported that Hamas exploited the emotions of the Arab public and the generosity of donors, particularly in poor countries, while creating the false impression that the money was intended for humanitarian assistance. According to the report, attempts to transfer large sums into the Gaza Strip were not practical because of financial restrictions and oversight, leading to claims that the funds were absorbed by the Hamas leadership. Criticism was also directed at the Muslim Brotherhood, which was accused of exploiting Palestinian suffering and the struggle in the Gaza Strip for fundraising, fraud and political enrichment (The Peacecomms Newsletter, June 8, 2026).
• Palestinian journalists and social media activists in the Gaza Strip, led by journalist Abd al-Hamid Abd al-Aati, announced a new movement called the June 26 Revolution and called for a Day of Rage against Hamas. According to the first statement issued by the organizers, the revolution sprang from the will of the people and was based on “dignity, justice and hope, out of a belief in people’s right to a safe and dignified life and rejection of the continued reality of war, hunger, displacement and deprivation.” They added that war was not the only destiny for the Gaza Strip and the Gazans had rights, dreams and a future. They said Gaza had already proven its ability to “rise again,” adding, “Let us turn this moment into the beginning of a new era” (June 26 Revolution Facebook page, June 9, 2026). Hamas-affiliated accounts circulated counter-posters calling for demonstrations against Nikolay Mladenov, the commissioner of the Board of Peace, on June 26 and claimed Abd al-Aati was working in the service of Israel and the United States (Ahl al-Sitr Facebook page, June 8-9, 2026).

• The Hamas ministry of interior and national security issued a video entitled “Increase Your Awareness and Lay Down Your Weapon,” calling on Gazans not to fire weapons during family disputes, celebrations and mourning events in order to allow the security forces to fulfill their role and protect the homeland (Telegram channel of the Hamas ministry of interior and national security, June 6, 2026).
• The Khan Yunis district police issued a statement calling on the public to maintain quiet during nighttime celebrations and events. The statement noted that the right to express joy was legitimate, but not when it infringed upon the rights of others to rest and quiet. The public was urged to stop noisy gatherings and not to use loudspeakers after 23:00 out of consideration for infants, students, the elderly and local residents. It was further stated that nighttime noise could result in legal liability because it disturbed public order (Khan Yunis Police, June 6, 2026).

Security Governance

• The Hamas security forces claimed that despite the elimination of senior figures, Hamas would continue to “project continuity and resilience,” adding that the killing of commanders would not damage the “resistance” security forces because every commander had many replacements. They claimed they had previously operated against collaborators, infiltrated Israeli security systems and preserved “operational”^[4] capabilities despite the blows they had sustained (Mutabaa min al-Midan Telegram channel, June 6, 2026).
• The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued footage from the funeral of Hamas military wing head Izz al-Din al-Haddad and noted what appeared to be a particularly low turnout despite his high rank, calling it evidence of eroding public support for Hamas and the desire of many Gazans not to identify with it. The post received numerous responses rejecting the IDF’s position, portraying al-Haddad as a shaheed with religious and national status and arguing that the small number of participants was the result of fear of Israeli airstrikes rather than public abandonment (Facebook page of Lieutenant Colonel Ella Waweya, “Captain Ella,” June 5, 2026).

• Hamas and the other Palestinian armed organizations welcomed the Iranian missile attack on Israel in response to the IDF on Hezbollah headquarters in Beirut, calling the attack “an expression of regional solidarity and the concept of unity of the arenas:”
  • Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem said the Iranian response showed the solidarity required for the Islamic nation to confront Israel (Hazem Qassem Telegram channel, June 7, 2026).
  • Hamas said it “deeply appreciated” the responses by Iran and the Houthis to the “crimes of the Zionist entity” against Lebanon and its people, and noted the need for regional and global solidarity to end “Zionist aggression” (Hamas Telegram channel, June 8, 2026).
  • The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) welcomed Iran’s response to the “crimes of the Zionist entity” against targets and sites in “occupied Palestinian,” as well as the Houthi attacks and their declaration of a complete naval blockade on the movements of the “enemy” in the Red Sea. The PIJ said the Iranian strikes were an opportunity to defend Arab national security, regional security and the “resistance forces”^[5] (Telegram channel of PIJ’s Information Office, June 8, 2026).
  • The Resistance Committees and the Mujahideen Movement issued similar statements praising Iran and claiming the Iranian attacks established “new equations,” proved Israel understood only the language of force and “resistance,”^[6] and undermined what “Netanyahu’s illusions and the Israeli sense of superiority” (Resistance Committees Telegram channel, June 7, 2026).
• The head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, Khalil al-Hayya, received a phone call from Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. Al-Hayya reiterated his condolences for the death of Iran’s leader, Ali Khamenei, and senior Iranian officials at the hands of “American and Zionist aggression,” and praised Iran. He reviewed the situation in the Gaza Strip, accused Israel of continuing its strikes and obstructing implementation of the ceasefire agreement and noted the commitment of Hamas and the other Palestinian “factions” to “continued steadfastness” until “national goals” had been achieved. Al-Hayya also praised the position of the Iranian delegation in its negotiations with the United States demanding a simultaneous end to the war on all regional fronts, and thanked Iran for its support of the Palestinian “struggle.”^[7] Araghchi offered condolences to al-Hayya on the death of his son in an Israeli attack in May 2026 and on the deaths of senior Hamas figures in the Gaza Strip, and praised the steadfastness of the Palestinians and the “resistance factions” in confronting Israel. He described Iran’s efforts to bring about an end to the war in the region and said Iran would continue supporting what it called the “legitimate resistance” of the peoples of the region, especially in “Palestine” and Lebanon (Hamas Telegram channel in Judea and Samaria, June 4, 2026).

• Police in Greece arrested a 37-year-old Palestinian from the Gaza Strip on the island of Crete on suspicion of membership in Hamas and planning to attack Israeli targets. The suspect, who resides legally in Greece and works as an electrician at a hotel in Crete, was arrested following information gathered during the investigation of four Palestinian suspects arrested in Cyprus in May 2026. He admitted that he had been in contact with at least one of the suspects and had gone to Malaysia with him for explosives training. He further stated that he had been involved in efforts to advance attacks on Israeli targets in a European country, although he claimed that the plan was still in the planning stages and he was still trying to obtain the “required materials.” According Greek security, the intended target was an Israeli cruise ship (Greek media, June 7, 2026).

Terrorist Attacks

• This past week Arab-Israeli terrorists carried out two attacks inside Israel, killing a reservist soldier and wounding five other people:
  • Stabbing near a police station in the Galilee: On June 5, 2026, an Arab-Israeli terrorist armed with a knife charged toward a Border Police fighter at the entrance post of the Western Galilee police station in Kafr Yasif. The fighter overpowered the attacker unharmed, and the terrorist, a resident of Jadeidi-Makr, was detained (Police Spokesperson, June 5, 2026).
  • Shootings along the Israeli-Palestinian Authority border: On June 7, 2026, an Arab-Israeli terrorist from Tayibe shot at several locations in Israel. He began at the gas station in Kokhav Ya’ir and then opened fire at the entrances to the communities of Tzur Yitzhak, Tzur Natan and Sal’it. Israeli security forces conducted a manhunt and killed him near the Tayibe quarries. An Israeli reservist fighter was killed and five other people were wounded, some critically. An accomplice of the terrorist was detained without casualties after he attempted to stab the detective team that overpowered him (IDF spokesperson, Israel Police Telegram channel and Israeli media, June 7, 2026). Hamas military wing spokesman Abu Obeida praised the “heroic operation” carried out by “one of our people’s fighters from the occupied interior” (the Arabs of Israel) (Abu Obeida Telegram channel, June 7, 2026).

Counterterrorism

• Israeli security forces continued extensive counterterrorism operations in Judea and Samaria, detaining more than 60 wanted persons, including terrorists who had been planning an attack in the immediate future, wanted Palestinians who had weapons or were involved in rock-throwing and Molotov cocktail attacks, and suspects accused of incitement. In addition, in the village of Baytin, a terrorist who had thrown Molotov cocktails at Israeli vehicles was killed. Numerous weapons were seized, including rifles, improvised Carlo-type firearms and large quantities of ammunition, and the smuggling of ten handguns across the eastern border was prevented (IDF spokesperson and Israel Police Spokesperson, June 2-9, 2026).
• The ministry of health in Ramallah claimed a seven-month-old infant had been killed and his parents wounded after “occupation forces” shot at their vehicle in the Tel Rumeida area in southern Hebron (Wafa and Quds Agency, June 5, 2026). The IDF stated that forces conducting operational activity in Hebron identified a vehicle accelerating toward them and one of the soldiers opened fire, injuring three Palestinians. An investigation determined that the Palestinians were uninvolved, and the IDF expressed regret over the incident (IDF spokesperson, June 5, 2026).
• An 18-year-old Arab-Israeli from the community of Ibillin in the Galilee was detained on suspicion of planning to attack a Jewish community and attempting to acquire weapons. Interrogation revealed that he supported Hamas and wanted to carry out missions and attacks on behalf of the movement (Israel Police Spokesperson, June 8, 2026). An Arab-Israeli from Kafr Qasem was accused of joining the Hamas “influence apparatus” and attempting to undermine Israeli resilience through propaganda he distributed under a fictitious social media account (i24News, June 8, 2026).

Settler Terrorism

• This past week reports of Jewish settler violence against Palestinians in Judea and Samaria continued. In Masafer Yatta, settlers were reported to have stolen crops from Palestinians, and in the town of Adhna there were reports of road blocks and attacks on Palestinians, including one man who was seriously wounded by a gunshot to the abdomen (Sama, June 5, 2026). In Qabalan, south of Nablus, roadblocks were erected to prevent Palestinians from reaching their land. In al-Duyuk al-Tahta, west of Jericho, a young Palestinian was reportedly assaulted (Hamza al-Masri Telegram channel, June 5, 2026). In Shuqba, west of Ramallah, a Jewish settler reportedly attacked dozens of children in a playground, threw stones and sticks at them and [allegedly] chased them with his vehicle. Soldiers reportedly later fired tear gas grenades at Palestinians who came to protect the children (Wafa, June 4, 2026). In Huwara, south of Nablus, armed Jewish rioters attacked residents, set fire to agricultural lands and injured nine young Palestinians. The Palestinian foreign ministry condemned the incident and called it a “terrorist attack” (Al Jazeera “Palestine,” June 6, 2026). The IDF said Israeli security forces arrived at the scene to disperse the disturbances and the police opened an investigation. An investigation was opened into the behavior of a soldier who was documented acting violently toward a Palestinian (IDF spokesperson, June 6, 2026).

• The 114^th annual conference of the UN’s International Labour Organization (ILO, by a vote of 394 against, 17 in favor and 42 abstentions, rejected a request submitted by Israel, with the support of the United States and Argentina, to revoke the decision granting Palestine observer status with certain rights within the UN agency (Wafa, June 3, 2026).
• The chairman of the Palestinian Prisoners’ Club, Abdallah al-Zaari, commented on the Israeli Supreme Court’s decision to accept the petition against the ban imposed by Israel after the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre on Red Cross visits to more than 9,000 Palestinian security prisoners and detainees. He claimed the ruling would have no practical effect unless it were translated into concrete measures that ensured the immediate resumption of visits and guaranteed the protection of the prisoners and their basic rights in accordance with the rules of international humanitarian law (Wafa, June 4, 2026).