Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (July 29 – August 4,2025)

The IDF

• IDF forces continued aerial and ground operations throughout the Gaza Strip, attacking hundreds of terrorist targets, primarily of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), some of which operated from civilian structures. The targets included terrorist squads and operatives, and buildings used for military purposes, weapons storage facilities, tunnels and underground facilities, rocket launch and sniper positions, and IED areas (IDF spokesperson, July 29–August 4, 2025).
• “Palestinian sources” reported heavy IDF airstrikes and targeted operations throughout the Gaza Strip, particularly in the south and center. Reports included strikes on residential dwellings in western Gaza, the al-Daraj neighborhood, the al-Nuseirat refugee camp, al-Zuwaida, and the Japanese neighborhood in Khan Yunis. Heavy fire was also reported at the Rafah coast, buildings near the Asda’a Prison and the al-Amal neighborhood in Khan Yunis (Quds News Network Telegram channel, August 1, 2025).

Rocket Fire

• On the night of August 2, 2025, a rocket was fired from the Gaza Strip at the western Negev, and was intercepted (IDF spokesperson, August 3, 2025).

• The mediators reportedly delivered Israel’s response to Hamas on July 30, 2025, in reply to Hamas’s response from July 24, 2025, regarding the 60-day ceasefire proposal. Israel’s response included opposition to some of the points concerning the redeployment of IDF forces, and exchanging Israeli hostages’ bodies for live Palestinian prisoners (al-Arabi TV X account, July 30, 2025). Hamas confirmed that the mediators had conveyed an oral Israeli reply to Hamas’s comments on the ceasefire proposal, calling it “not encouraging.” Israel reportedly insisted on continuing the mechanism of the American aid fund and on retaining the security points where IDF forces were present. Hamas claimed that Israel’s response “showed it had no genuine intention to end the war.” An Egyptian source added that the negotiations had been in crisis since Israel and the United States withdrew for consultations. According to the Egyptian source, neither side would budge from its positions or show flexibility which might have hinted at a potential breakthrough. The source added that America currently focused on increasing aid to the Gaza Strip without prioritizing the talks (al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 1, 2025).
• Hamas used the “hunger narrative” in the Gaza Strip to justify its withdrawal from the indirect negotiations, saying it was not prepared to renew the talks until humanitarian aid was significantly increased:
  • Hamas figure Mahmoud Mardawi said there was no point in negotiating as long as the [alleged] policy of “hunger and killing” continued. He claimed the [alleged] ongoing “humanitarian crimes” undermined the basis for negotiations and discredited the efforts invested in the previous 18 days of talks. He said reopening the agreement would automatically mean reopening all other clauses, as the agreement was an indivisible unit and was not managed according to one party’s discretion (Mahmoud Mardawi’s Telegram channel, July 30, 2025).
  • Hamas claimed it was prepared to return to negotiations immediately, but only after aid had been delivered to those in need and the “humanitarian crisis and hunger” in the Gaza Strip came to an end. Hamas also claimed it was meaningless and useless to continue negotiations in light of the war, especially after Israel had withdrawn from the talks, according to Hamas, “without justification,” when both sides were [allegedly] on the verge of an agreement (Hamas Telegram channel, July 31, 2025). Other sources reported that Hamas had ended its participation in discussions on a ceasefire and a prisoner exchange deal. Hamas political bureau member Bassem Na’im said that “it was essential to improve the ‘catastrophic’ humanitarian situation and receive a written response from the enemy to our reply.” That, he said, was a condition for returning to negotiations (CNN in Arabic, July 31, 2025).
• On July 31, 2025, the military wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ released a video of Israeli hostage Rom Breslavsky, whom they hold, showing him in poor physical and mental condition (Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, July 31, 2025). Over the following two days, the Hamas military wing published two videos of their Israeli hostage Eviatar David, showing him severely malnourished and in which he says he has not received food for several days and was digging his own grave in a tunnel (al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades Telegram channel, August 1–2, 2025). Hamas used the hostage videos to promote the “hunger” narrative in the Gaza Strip and claimed Israel was responsible for the hostages’ condition:
  • Abu Obeida, spokesman for the Hamas military wing, claimed they were prepared to cooperate with the Red Cross to bring food and medical equipment to the hostages, the condition for which was opening humanitarian corridors for the transfer of food and medical supplies to all Gazans and halting “enemy flights” during the receipt of aid packages. He claimed the hostages received the same amount of food as their captors and the rest of the Strip’s population (Abu Obeida’s Telegram channel, August 3, 2025).
  • Izzat al-Rishq, member of the Hamas political bureau, claimed that movement’s operatives were treating the hostages “fairly” and accused Israel and the “siege” of responsibility for their condition. He added that “Israel’s failure to locate the prisoners [hostages] caused them to be harmed, along with the Gazans” (Izzat al-Rishq’s Telegram channel, August 3, 2025).
  • The commentator and political writer Majed al-Zabdeh claimed that the pictures of the hostages “reflect the harsh humanitarian situation of two million Palestinians in besieged Gaza.” He said the pictures were “a response to Israeli policy” and were intended to send the message directly to Israeli society,” that if the “policy” continued, the “captives” would also not be immune to dying of hunger (Shehab Agency, August 2, 2025).

     
Right: Rom Breslavsky in a PIJ video (Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, July 31, 2025). Left: Eviatar David in a Hamas tunnel (Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, August 2, 2025)

Humanitarian Aid

• This past week, IDF forces, through the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), continued to bring large quantities of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip in cooperation with other countries with the objective of easing the distress in the Gaza Strip (IDF spokesperson and COGAT X account, July 29–August 4, 2025):
  • The COGAT reported that in the week ending August 3, 2025, over 23,000 tons of humanitarian aid had entered the Gaza Strip, and 1,200 trucks were collected by UN agencies and international aid organizations. On August 3, 2025, more than 200 trucks were collected, and UN fuel tankers were brought in. In addition, 4,000 tons of baby food and formula had recently entered the Strip.
  • Airdrop operations expanded with the participation of transport aircraft from the UAE, Egypt, Jordan, Germany, France, Belgium, and Canada. Throughout the week, hundreds of aid pallets were airdropped, with 136 pallets dropped on August 3, 2025, the highest number since the beginning of the air operation on July 26, 2025.

     
Humanitarian aid dropped by the Jordanian Air Force (Jordanian Army website, August 1, 2025)

• • The Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) reported that since the beginning of its activity in late May 2025, it had distributed 104.8 million meals in more than 1.738 million packages, supplied 133 trucks with 1,812 tons of potatoes and 16 trucks with 199 tons of onions (GHF X account, July 29–August 4, 2025).
• On August 1, 2025, United States president’s envoy Steve Witkoff visited a GHF distribution center in Rafah along with the American ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee. They met with representatives from GHF and other agencies and were briefed by IDF officers. Witkoff said he had remained in the Strip for five hours to assess the situation on the ground, collect data, and evaluate humanitarian conditions to provide the president with an accurate picture for formulating a plan to supply food and medical equipment to the Gazans (Steve Witkoff’s X account, August 2, 2025).

• The Australian government announced the transfer of an additional $20 million humanitarian aid package for the Gazans after new humanitarian corridors had been declared. The package supports organizations capable of rapidly providing food, medical supplies, and life-saving services to women and children, bringing Australia’s total aid since October 7, 2023, to over $130 million. The aid will reportedly be transferred in cooperation with the UK and international organizations, including the World Food Program, UNICEF, the Red Cross, and the Jordanian Hashemite Organization (Australian Foreign Ministry, August 4, 2025).

• Despite the increase in humanitarian aid, Hamas and its affiliated media outlets continued to promote “hunger” propaganda. Hamas accused Israel of carrying out a “deliberate policy of hunger,” and claiming the aid was insufficient and “encouraged looting and chaos:”
  • The ministry of health in Gaza continued to report daily deaths in hospitals caused by hunger and malnutrition. According to the ministry, as of August 4, 2025, the number of deaths [allegedly] stood at 180, 93 of them children, after five more people died in the past 24 hours (ministry of health in Gaza Telegram channel, July 29–August 4, 2025).
  • The Hamas government media information office in the Gaza Strip reported the entry of dozens of aid trucks into the Strip daily, but claimed that most of them were looted. It said Gaza needed 600 aid and fuel trucks per day to meet the minimum needs of the health, services, and food sectors (Hamas government media information office Telegram channel, July 29–August 4, 2025).
  • The director general of the government media information office, Isma’il al-Thawabta, claimed the Strip had entered the “catastrophic third stage of famine” according to international definitions. He claimed that only one percent of the required humanitarian aid had actually entered in recent weeks, while throughout the Gaza Strip there were severe food shortages, malnutrition-related diseases were spreading, and infant and child mortality had increased. He accused Israel of spreading false information about improvement (al-Risala, August 2, 2025).
  • Izzat al-Rishq, a member of the Hamas political bureau, condemned the American president’s accusation that Hamas stole and sold humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip. Rishq claimed the accusations were untrue and there was no evidence to support them, calling them an attempt to “blame the victim and exonerate the criminal.” He alleged that Israel, backed by the United States, used food and medicine as weapons. He called on the United States to stop its bias towards Israel, take moral and legal responsibility, condemn the “siege,” and ensure that aid entered the Strip freely only through the UN, and not through entities like the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, which he claimed served as a “death trap for the hungry” (Hamas Telegram channel, August 1, 2025). He claimed Israel’s objective was to break the “Palestinian national spirit and resistance,”^[3] and criticized the silence of the international community (Hamas Telegram channel, August 2, 2025).
  • The head of the Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO), Amjad al-Shawa, claimed airdropped aid endangered the lives of displaced people and did not meet the Strip’s needs. He alleged that Israel deliberately delayed aid entry through the Kerem Shalom crossing and obstructed it through bureaucratic procedures. He also claimed that Israel forced aid trucks to travel along routes controlled by “bandits” (Safa Telegram channel, July 30, 2025).
  • Hamas opposed the visit by American envoy Witkoff to aid distribution centers and called it “staged” with the intention of misleading the public. Hamas accused the United States of full partnership in the “hunger and killing” of civilians in the Strip and falsely claimed the distribution of aid was accompanied by deadly fire from IDF forces and GHF personnel, which had claimed the lives of more than 1,300 people. The movement called on the United States to reveal the “crime,” promote a ceasefire and an Israeli withdrawal, and help lift the “siege,” instead of continuing to support the “occupation policy” (Hamas Telegram channel, August 2, 2025).

The Situation in the Gaza Strip

• In addition to “hunger” propaganda, Hamas and its affiliated media outlets promote the “damage to the healthcare system” narrative:
  • The al-Aqsa Martyrs Hospital in Deir al-Balah said the medical and humanitarian situation at the hospital was intolerable. According to the hospital management, casualties from the fighting numbered in the hundreds, and the emergency room could not accommodate the stream of patients with severe injuries, wards were full and new patients could not be admitted. All departments were operating far beyond their limits, and operating rooms had ceased functioning due to a shortage of beds, to the point where some patients were left inside the operating rooms for lack of space. A severe shortage of medicines and essential medical supplies was also reported. The hospital’s management appealed to official, humanitarian, and international bodies to intervene to ensure continued medical services to save lives (Palestine Now Telegram channel, July 31, 2025).
  • The ministry of health in Gaza claimed that the number of wounded and sick exceeded hospital capacity. It stated that bed occupancy rates at al-Shifa Hospital had reached 240%, at al-Rantisi Hospital 210%, at Nasser Hospital 180%, and at al-Ahli Hospital 300%. According to the ministry, hospitals had to put patients in corridors and on the floor (ministry of health in Gaza Telegram channel, August 2, 2025).
• The Rafah municipality reported the beginning of digging and preparation work for 1,000 graves in the al-Mawasi area of Khan Yunis. Reportedly, the work was being carried out by the ministry of religious endowments, supervised by the al-Khair Foundation,^[4] with the participation of the Rafah municipality and funding from the al-Aqsa Association in Yemen (Rafah municipality Facebook page, August 2, 2025).

Hamas Governance and Chaos in the Gaza Strip

• Yasser Abu Shabab, head of the Popular Forces militia supported by Israel, stated that on July 29, 2025, his men evacuated dozens of Palestinian residents from Deir al-Balah, al-Nuseirat, and Khan Yunis to safe areas under their control in eastern Rafah. In addition, medical teams in Rafah examined the evacuees and the Popular Forces provided them with food, water, and clothing (Popular Forces Facebook page, July 30, 2025).
• A Popular Forces video showed militia operatives securing the entry of trucks carrying flour and aid (Popular Forces Facebook page, July 31, 2025).

• The Hamas “resistance security” Raad Force revealed information about one of the “most dangerous agent networks” operating in northern and southern Gaza and linked to Yasser Abu Shabab. The Force alleged that the group was involved in a series of “serious crimes” on behalf of Israeli intelligence, including the theft of weapons, distributing drugs, preparing areas for IDF operations, looting humanitarian aid, threatening displaced persons, and assassinating those opposing their activities, all in direct coordination with Israeli intelligence officers. According to the Force, targeted operations were recently carried out to eliminate some group members, including burning vehicles used in “espionage and looting,” and the Force continued to pursue the remaining individuals, stating that “the noose is tightening by the day and judgment day is near.” Reportedly, some of those involved had expressed remorse and surrendered themselves after realizing, according to them, that they were exploited by Israel as “disposable tools” (Raad Force Telegram channel, August 1, 2025).
• Looting was reported at the Turkish Hospital in Gaza, where medicines and IV supplies were stolen despite a severe shortage of medical resources. The looters also reportedly drained oil from electrical transformers and sold it outside the hospital. The report was accompanied by growing public outrage on social media, with complaints that while patients were fighting for their lives, others were exploiting the humanitarian chaos for personal gain. The public’s reaction was clear: “While we beg Allah for mercy, we don’t show mercy to each other” (Bureij Tajamana Telegram channel, July 31, 2025).
• Hamas “security units” in northern Gaza prevented tuk-tuks, vehicles, and carts from entering and traveling to the humanitarian aid crossing zone at Zikim, and banned carrying any kind of weapons, knives, or even empty bags. Upon residents’ return from Zikim, they were searched and anyone who took “more than necessary” had their aid confiscated and redistributed on the spot. Anyone who brought baby formula had it taken and given to women in the street, provided they showed the child and birth certificate. The “security units” reported that thanks to their actions, no cases of assault or looting of civilians by thugs or thieves had occurred (al-Siyad Telegram channel, July 31, 2025).
• The Hamas ministry of interior and national security in the Gaza Strip accused Israel of creating chaos around the distribution of humanitarian aid. According to the ministry, Israel [allegedly] attacked security personnel who worked for the interior ministry and were securing aid trucks distributed under international organization supervision. The objective of the attack was allegedly to prevent the aid from being delivered to civilians. After the interior ministry allowed local initiatives by families and clans in the Strip to secure aid convoys, those were also targeted. The ministry alleged that Israel fostered networks of looters and thugs to seize the aid. The ministry rejected Israel’s claims about food distribution through the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation and called it a “dangerous deception” (Gaza interior ministry Telegram channel, July 31, 2025).
• In a Gazan Facebook group for Hamas government workers, one of the group admins, Mahmoud Abu Bakr, a healthcare worker in the Strip, wrote that health workers, such as doctors, nurses, pharmacists, and lab technicians, were the most important but also the most neglected group in terms of aid. He wrote, “We continue working and providing healthcare services to our great people with full dedication. However, unfortunately, no one remembers this most important group, not in aid, and not even in decent support for their families so that they can continue helping the people. There are no proper salaries, and for two months, only a small and devalued sum has been paid and it isn’t even enough to buy flour for a week.” He added that the public health workers were very frustrated, a serious issue which could harm the entire healthcare system. The few comments on his post expressed support for what he said, noting that workers received a small advance after three months of delay, but it was not sufficient to buy a week’s worth of flour (Government Workers in Palestine Facebook group, July 31, 2025).

• Egyptian foreign minister Badr Abdelatty said his country had formulated a plan for security and governance in the Gaza Strip after the war. He said Egypt was training hundreds of Palestinians to fill security roles in the Gaza Strip (al-Arabiya, July 30, 2025).
• Given Egypt’s concern that Israel might take unilateral action to annex parts of the Gaza Strip, Egyptian foreign minister Badr Abdelatty tried to promote a dual initiative which included disarming Hamas alongside establishing a Palestinian state. According to reports, during his visit to Washington, Abdelatty tried to promote the initiative among decision-makers in the American political parties. However, “Egyptian sources” said the United States and Egypt did not have the same priorities, as Egypt and Qatar sought to advance an agreement in preparation for the day after the war, while Washington and Jerusalem were focused on the return of the hostages and the disarmament of Hamas. “A diplomat who accompanied the visit” stated that Egypt was aware of the limitations of international pressure on the United States and was trying to leverage the existing diplomatic space to achieve political gains in cooperation with Qatar (al-Akhbar, August 1, 2025).
• Mahmoud Habbash, advisor to the PA chairman, said that regardless of what happened, Hamas would not rule the Gaza Strip. The PLO and the PA, he said had the mandate over the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria, and all the Palestinian organizations fell under their umbrella. He added that anyone who wanted to be involved in political and national activity under PLO aegis, in accordance with international decisions based on one government, one authority, one law, and one weapon, would be welcome. Those who were unwilling would not have a place in the Palestinian political system. He added that elections during war were meaningless and had no value, but after the war ended general elections were a democratic national duty and had to be held, based on commitment to the PLO’s programs. He reiterated Mahmoud Abbas’ position that they did not seek an armed state, but a state in which Palestinians lived in security, they want a peaceful state and to “resist the occupation” peacefully. He questioned why weapons were needed “if with them we cannot defeat our enemies,” when there was peace and commitment to international law, and added that “an open armed confrontation with Israel will be doomed to defeat from the first moment” (al-Hadath, August 2, 2025).
• The leadership of the Alliance of Palestinian Forces, led by Hamas and the PIJ, sharply criticized Mahmoud Abbas for saying that the upcoming elections for the Palestinian National Council would be limited to those who accepted the PLO’s program, international decisions, and the concept of “one legitimate weapon.” The Alliance rejected any attempt to exclude “resistance” forces,^[5] to consider a demilitarized Palestinian state a national goal, or to turn the elections into a tool to impose a single political line. The Alliance called it a dangerous attempt to dismantle the “resistance,” serve the “occupation,” and leave the Palestinian people defenseless against IDF attacks. It further claimed that Abbas’ statements contradicted the principle of national partnership, negated the spirit of reconciliation achieved in recent years, and weakened the National Council, which was supposed to represent all Palestinians. The Alliance claimed “resistance” and the right to bear arms were legitimate under international law and called on Arab nations and all the Palestinian “organizations” to overcome any attempt to drain the national project of its substance through sham elections and turn it into a rule without sovereignty (Hamas Telegram channel, August 2, 2025).
• Hamas denied media reports claiming it had expressed willingness to disarm, stating that “resistance” and weapons were a national and legal right as long as the “occupation” continued. Hamas claimed the right was anchored in international conventions and norms and it would not give it up until the full national rights of the Palestinian people had been realized, first and foremost the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state with Jerusalem [sic] as its capital (Hamas Telegram channel, August 2, 2025). Ghazi Hammad, a member of the Hamas political bureau, called the weapons of the “resistance” “a national Palestinian issue and the essence of the Palestinian cause,” claiming there was national consensus on retaining weapons. He said, “We are committed to the weapons, and they will remain in our hands as long as the occupation continues. We will not hand over even a single empty magazine” (Al Jazeera, August 2, 2025).

• A delegation of the Hamas leadership headed by the chairman of the Hamas leadership council, Muhammad Darwish, and the head of Hamas’s political bureau in the Gaza Strip, Khalil al-Hayya, met in Istanbul with Turkish foreign minister Hakan Fidan to discuss efforts to reach a ceasefire and increase aid to the Gaza Strip. Darwish expressed willingness to return to negotiations as soon as the humanitarian crisis ended and sufficient aid entered. He said the “Palestinian resistance” would continue to fight until an independent state with Jerusalem [sic] as its capital had been established. Fidan expressed unreserved support for Palestinian rights and strongly opposed the policies of “expulsion and annexation.” He claimed Israel was intentionally prolonging ceasefire negotiations to break the spirit of the “resistance” and force Palestinians to leave their homes (Hamas Telegram channel, August 1, 2025).

• Following Hamas political bureau head Khalil al-Hayya’s criticism of the Egyptian authorities, accusing them of involvement in the “hunger” of the Gaza Strip population by keeping the Rafah Crossing closed, the Egyptian foreign ministry issued a response to the “false allegations.” The ministry said they were deliberate attempts to distort perception of the situation and undermine Egypt’s central role in mediation and aid, while trying to sow division among Arab states and weaken Palestinian solidarity. It stated that the Rafah Crossing was open on the Egyptian side but closed on the Palestinian side; Egypt had not prevented solidarity visits and had allowed access to organizations and international leaders; and Egypt had provided about 70% of the aid transferred to the Gaza Strip since the fighting began. The ministry claimed that Israel bore sole responsibility for the “siege” and that all other crossings were under its control. The ministry added that Egypt had invested an enormous effort for the Palestinian cause and worked toward a ceasefire, but Israel had failed to implement the understandings (Egyptian foreign ministry Facebook page, August 1, 2025).

Terrorist Attacks

• Suspected stabbing attempt in Kibbutz Metzer: A Palestinian from the Tulkarm refugee camp went to the entrance to Kibbutz Metzer, near the Green Line in Israel’s north, holding a knife. Local residents subdued him without resistance and he was taken for questioning (Israel Police Force spokesperson and Israeli media, August 2, 2025).

Counterterrorism Operations

• This past week, Israeli security forces continued extensive counterterrorism activity in various areas of Judea and Samaria. The forces detained wanted Palestinians and terrorist operatives, and seized weapons and funds used to finance terrorist activity. A terrorist cell operative was eliminated and another and two aides were detained in the Jenin area (IDF spokesperson, July 29–August 4, 2025). Palestinian media reported that IDF forces had carried out a broad wave of raids and detentions in various towns and villages, including Burin south of Nablus, Tamun south of Tubas, Abud west of Ramallah, Qalqilya, al-Bireh, Hebron, and Samua south of Hebron (Quds News Network Telegram channel, August 1, 2025.) IDF forces continued activity in the Tulkarm refugee camp, destroying houses and opening new roads inside the camp (Ramallah News, August 1, 2025).

       
Right: Weapons found in the possession of wanted persons in the Jenin area (IDF spokesperson, August 4, 2025). Left: The Tulkarm refugee camp before (above) and after (Ramallah News, August 1, 2025)

Friction between Populations

• According to reports, on July 31, 2025, Khamis Abd al-Latif Iyad, 40, from the town of Silwad, died of smoke inhalation while trying to extinguish a fire after Jewish settlers torched vehicles during riots in Silwad and the villages of Abu Falah and Ramon east of Ramallah (Wafa, July 31, 2025). The mayor of Silwad said Iyad had American citizenship (Radio Alam Telegram channel, July 31, 2025). Hamas flags were waved at his funeral and people chanted slogans praising for the late Muhammad Deif, commander of the Hamas military wing (Quds Network X account, August 1, 2025). The United States State Department confirmed that a Palestinian with American citizenship died from smoke inhalation during settler riots in the village of Silwad (CBS News, August 3, 2025).
• “Palestinian sources” reported an escalation in violent acts by Jewish settlers throughout Judea and Samaria, especially in the Nablus, Ramallah, and Jericho districts, including throwing Molotov cocktails into a house in the village of Jalud near Nablus; attempted assaults on Palestinian lands in Qabalan and Usarin; motorcycle provocations in the village of Burqa near Ramallah; and an attempted intrusion into the village of Deir Jarir, which led to clashes with residents during which IDF soldiers fired live rounds and tear gas. The most serious incident occurred in northwest Jericho in the middle of the night, where dozens of settlers, set fire to six homes in the Bedouin community of Arab al-Malihiyat, which had returned to the area after a long absence. The arson and violence forced about 20 families to evacuate again. Palestinian organizations accused the Israeli government of promoting an organized policy of “ethnic cleansing” and called for immediate international intervention (Wafa, August 1, 2025; Nablus Gil al-Nar Telegram channel, August 1, 2025).
• Nabil Abu Rudeineh, spokesman for PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas, condemned an incident in the town of Aqraba near Nablus on August 2, 2025, in which one Palestinian was killed and seven injured in clashes with Jewish settlers. He called it a dangerous escalation, continuing the war being waged against the Gazans (Wafa, August 3, 2025). Following the Palestinian’s death, Hamas accused the settlers of “murder” in Judea and Samaria and called for a broad popular mobilization and to ignite the “flames of rage” to halt the “occupation and settlement activity” (Hamas Telegram channel, August 2, 2025).

Recognition of a Palestinian State

• This past week, various countries joined France in announcing their intention to recognize a Palestinian state in the near future. The UK foreign secretary told the UN that his country was planning a Palestinian state in September 2025 unless Israel took significant steps to end the severe humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip and committed to a long-term peace, including allowing the UN to resume humanitarian aid deliveries to civilians in the Strip without delay to end the “hunger,” agreeing to a ceasefire, and committing not to annex parts pf Judea and Samaria (UK government website, July 29, 2025); Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney announced that his country would recognize the “State of Palestine” during the UN General Assembly in September 2025 (Canadian PM website, July 30, 2025); foreign ministers of 15 countries, including France, Canada, Australia, Spain, and Norway, called on other countries to recognize a Palestinian state to promote the two-state solution (French Foreign Ministry X account, July 30, 2025); Maltese Prime Minister Robert Abela said his country would recognize a Palestinian state at the UN meeting (Robert Abela’s Facebook page, July 30, 2025); the Portuguese PM’s office said the country was considering recognizing a Palestinian state in September 2025 (AFP, July 31, 2025).
• Palestinian Authority chairman Mahmoud Abbas held talks with the prime ministers of the UK and Canada, who briefed him on their intention to recognize a Palestinian state. Abbas praised the position of both countries and called on other states to recognize the “State of Palestine” to “give hope of a real international will to end the occupation and achieve peace based on international legitimacy decisions and the Arab Peace Initiative, and to establish an independent Palestinian state along the June 4, 1967 lines with east Jerusalem as its capital, living in security and peace with its neighbors.” He said his priority was to achieve a ceasefire, bring in aid, end “hunger,” lift the “siege,” release prisoners and hostages, prevent “displacement,” allow the “State of Palestine” to assume full responsibility for the Gaza Strip, and secure a full Israeli withdrawal. He reiterated his commitment to hold general elections in which only Palestinian organizations which recognized the PLO program and its international commitments, and adhered to the principles of one government, one law, and one legitimate weapon, would participate. He also stressed the need to release Palestinian clearance funds and to stop “settler terrorism” and [alleged] attacks on Islamic and Christian holy sites (WAFA, July 29 and 31, 2025).
• PA deputy chairman Hussein al-Sheikh welcomed the intentions of Canada, Malta, and Portugal to formally recognize the “State of Palestine” during the UN General Assembly session in September 2025. He said he hoped the announcements would be translated into concrete steps leading to sustainable peace and international legitimacy for the “State of Palestine” (Hussein al-Sheikh’s X account, July 31, 2025).
• Hamas Ghazi Hammad claimed that the initiative by several countries to recognize a Palestinian state was “one of the fruits of October 7” (Al Jazeera, August 2, 2025).

The Two-State Solution Conference

• The UN conference to promote the two-state solution, held in New York and led by France and Saudi Arabia, issued its concluding statement on July 29, 2025, calling “to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the basis of the two-state solution.” The statement, signed by 17 countries in addition to the European Union and the Arab League, said the participants reaffirmed their support for Israel and “Palestine” as two sovereign, democratic states living side by side in peace and security with secure, recognized borders. The participants praised the claims by PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas that “the Palestinian state” would be demilitarized and that he intended to hold general elections. Regarding the Gaza Strip, the participants condemned the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre and called for the release of the hostages. They also called on Hamas to end its rule in the Gaza Strip and to transfer its weapons to the PA under international supervision. The statement called the Gaza Strip an integral part of the PA and expressed support for the temporary deployment of international forces under the auspices and invitation of the UN and the PA, according to a mission defined by the UN Security Council (Wafa, July 29, 2025). The Palestinians welcomed the conference’s concluding statement:
  • PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas praised the success of the conference and expressed appreciation for the concluding statement promoting the two-state solution. He said he was convinced the practical steps agreed on would be implemented and that the conference would lead to tangible progress toward establishing an independent Palestinian state (Wafa, July 30, 2025).
  • PA foreign minister Farsin Shaheen said “work has begun to establish our state.” She called the conference a turning point that authorized the PA to manage its affairs and stated it was no longer sufficient to merely support the two-state solution publicly, concrete steps were needed to implement it. She said the Palestinian state-building process was set for a 15-month period but added that although the process could take longer, there was now a mission and they expected countries around the globe to state how they would contribute to its implementation and the empowerment of the Palestinian state (Independent Arabia, July 31, 2025).
  • The Palestinian Authority’s foreign ministry welcomed the declaration as a historic milestone toward recognizing a Palestinian state and ending Israeli occupation. It emphasized the need for concrete, time-bound steps aligned with UN resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative. The ministry praised the broad international support for Palestinian statehood, resolving core issues, and aiding Gaza (Wafa, July 30, 2025).
  • Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist organizations welcomed international calls to recognize a Palestinian state, presenting them as the result of the people’s “enduring struggle.” They expressed willingness to address the hostage issue as part of a ceasefire agreement, conditional on a full IDF withdrawal from Gaza, the reopening of crossings, and the launch of reconstruction efforts. They said ending the war was a moral obligation, not to be tied to political negotiations. They claimed the “resistance” was a “legitimate response to occupation and essential” for achieving national liberation, statehood, and “the return of refugees.”^[6] They also rejected regional normalization with Israel, denouncing it as a reward for its crimes (Hamas Telegram channel, July 31, 2025).

Other Diplomatic Activity

• Mahmoud Abbas hosted German foreign minister Johann Wadephul at his office in Ramallah. Abbas reviewed recent developments in the Palestinian arena and stressed the need to immediately establish a permanent ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, accelerate the entry of humanitarian aid, release “captives” and prisoners, and transfer control of the Gaza Strip to the “State of Palestine” with Arab and international support, alongside full Israeli withdrawal, halting settlement activity, ending “settler terrorism,” and releasing Palestinian funds held in Israel. He expressed willingness to hold general elections but emphasized that they would not include entities or individuals who do not commit to the PLO program, international legitimacy, one state with one government and one law, and a monopoly on legitimate weapons. He claimed his goal was a two-state solution based on international legitimacy, the Arab Peace Initiative, and the international New York conference, including the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state, including in the Gaza Strip. Wadephul reiterated Germany’s support for the two-state solution and the building of Palestinian state institutions, stressing that Palestinian control over the Gaza Strip after the war was essential for reconstruction. He expressed Germany’s readiness to assist in reconstruction, condemned the settlements and Israel’s policy of “annexation,” and called on Israel to release Palestinian funds, warning that continued delay poses a risk to regional stability (Wafa, August 1, 2025). After the meeting Wadephul visited the Palestinian town of Taybeh and condemned the damage caused by Jewish settlers to local residents and the village church. He blamed the Israeli security forces for not preventing the attack on the village, and called on Israel to act in accordance with international law and provide protection for the Palestinians (Wafa , August 1, 2025).

• Abbas spoke on the phone with Dutch Prime Minister Dick Schoof to discuss the humanitarian and political situation in the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria, reiterated his familiar talking points, and praised the Netherlands’ position in support of international law as the basis for the two-state solution, as well as the sanctions the Netherlands imposed on Jewish settlers (Wafa, August 1, 2025). He also spoke with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese to discuss recent developments in the Palestinian territories. Abbas praised the results of the New York conference and called for building on its results ahead of the leaders’ summit during the UN General Assembly in September 2025. He also thanked Albanese for his country’s support of the Gaza Strip and UNRWA and praised Australia’s commitment to the implementation of the two-state solution and its positive approach to recognizing a Palestinian state (Wafa, August 4, 2025).
• PA minister of local government, Sami Hajawi, met in Ramallah with Ramiz Alakbarov, assistant UN secretary general and deputy special coordinator for the Middle East peace process, and discussed the challenges facing local authorities in the PA. He claimed that demolitions, closures, and settler attacks forced the authorities to divert budgets toward rehabilitation at the expense of development, which delayed local progress, and he called for international intervention to end the fighting in the Gaza Strip and provide future assistance for its reconstruction (Palestinian ministry of local government Facebook page, July 30, 2025). In another meeting, Palestinian minister of health Dr. Majed Abu Ramadan briefed Alakbarov on the health and humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria, which he said also included damage to health institutions in northern Judea and Samaria due to checkpoints and the destruction of camps. He called for an immediate ceasefire, opening of crossings, and establishment of field hospitals and mobile clinics (ministry of health in Ramallah Facebook page, July 31, 2025).
• PA interior minister Ziad Hab al-Rih visited Bahrain and met with the crown prince and prime minister of Bahrain, Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa, reiterating the familiar Palestinian talking points. In response, the crown prince emphasized that the rights of the Palestinian people were “engraved in the heart of every Arab” and expressed support for a just and comprehensive solution to realize those rights. He praised the increasing cooperation between Bahrain and “Palestine” in various fields, including security cooperation, and expressed hope for continued regional and international collaboration and coordination (Wafa, July 31, 2025).

      
The Palestinian delegation in Bahrain (Wafa, July 31, 2025)

United States Sanctions Against the PA and the PLO

• The United States State Department announced that it would revoke entry visas to the United States for members of the PLO and officials of the PA, stating that “it is in our national security interest to enforce consequences and hold the PLO and the PA accountable for failing to meet their commitments and for harming the prospects for peace.” According to the statement, the State Department notified Congress that the PLO and the PA were not fulfilling their obligations under the PLO Commitments Compliance Act of 1989 (PLOCCA) and the Middle East Peace Commitments Act of 2002 (MEPCA). It said they initiated and supported actions in international organizations that undermined and contradicted previous commitments to support Resolutions 242 and 338, pursue internationalization of the conflict with Israel through the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and continued to support terrorism, including incitement and glorification of violence (especially in textbooks), and the provision of payments and benefits to support terrorism for Palestinian terrorists and their families (State Department website, July 31, 2025). In response, PLO Executive Committee member Wasel Abu Yusuf said the decision was blatant support and bias toward Israel and the war in the Gaza Strip, and that the sanctions were an attempt to eradicate the Palestinian issue following the New York conference and the intention of a group of countries to recognize “Palestine,” which had become a top international priority (Anadolu Agency, July 31, 2025).