Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (July 1–8 ,2025)

The IDF in the Gaza Strip

• IDF forces continued air and ground operations in the Gaza Strip and now control 65% of the territory. The forces attacked hundreds of terrorist targets, primarily belonging to Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), some of whose operatives were fighting from civilian facilities. Terrorist squads and operatives were targeted, including the commander of the Hamas naval force in northern Gaza and two Hamas operatives involved in the killing of seven IDF soldiers in an APC explosion. Tunnels and underground infrastructure were exposed, including a 2.5-kilometer-long (1.6 miles) tunnel at a depth of about 39 meters (128 feet) connecting Khan Yunis and Rafah. Weapons depots, observation posts, military buildings, tunnels, and other terrorist facilities were destroyed. Eight IDF soldiers were killed in three separate incidents in the north and south of the Strip, including five who were killed when an explosive device detonated in Beit Hanoun (IDF spokesperson, July 1–8, 2025).
• “Palestinian sources” reported a significant escalation in IDF attacks throughout the Gaza Strip. “Medical sources” claimed that hundreds of Palestinians were killed and many injured by aerial attacks and artillery fire, among them Dr. Marwan al-Sultan, director of the Indonesian hospital in northern Gaza. The attacks reportedly targeted civilian areas, including the neighborhoods of al-Shuja’iya and al-Zeitoun in Gaza City, the al-Nuseirat and Jabalia refugee camps, and populated areas in Khan Yunis and Rafah (al-Jazeera Telegram, July 1–8, 2025). Hamas also claimed that nine released prisoners who were deported to Gaza as part of the 2011 Gilad Shalit exchange deal were killed in attacks (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram, July 3 and 8, 2025).
• Abu Obeida, spokesman for the Hamas military wing, praised the attack which killed five IDF soldiers in Beit Hanoun, claiming it occurred “in an area the occupation thought was safe after it left nothing there.” He added that “the war of attrition with the enemy will cause it further losses,” and warned that even if Israel succeeded in “rescuing its soldiers from hell,” it might fail in the future and more hostages could fall into their hands. He said leaving forces inside the Strip would be “the most foolish decision Netanyahu could make” (Abu Obeida’s Telegram channel, July 8, 2025).

Rocket fire

• This past week, the Israeli Air Force intercepted six rockets fired at communities near the Gaza Strip border and the southern Israeli town of Sderot. There were no reports of casualties or damage. In another incident, a mortar shell fell on Kibbutz Nirim and caused property damage. Following the attacks, the IDF ordered the evacuation of the areas from which the rockets had been fired (IDF and IDF Arabic spokespersons, July 1–8, 2025). The Hamas military wing and the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades – Nidal al-Amoudi Battalion claimed responsibility for the rocket fire (military wings’ Telegram channels, July 1–8, 2025).

• According to unofficial reports, a proposal presented to Israel and Hamas included a sixty-day ceasefire, guaranteed by the American president, during which all Israeli military activity would cease, including some aerial operations. Ten live Israeli hostages and 18 bodies would be released in pre-arranged phases, in exchange for the release of an agreed-on number of Palestinian prisoners held in Israel. Hamas would provide information on the remaining hostages, and Israel would provide information on Palestinian detainees. Large-scale humanitarian aid would begin to enter the Gaza Strip and the IDF would redeploy in the north and south of the Strip according to agreed-on maps. From the first day of the ceasefire, negotiations would begin, mediated by the United States, Egypt and Qatar, for a permanent arrangement which would include withdrawals, future security arrangements and the release of a further agreed-on number of Palestinian prisoners with the release of the remaining hostages. If a permanent agreement was not reached within sixty days, the ceasefire could be extended. The stages of the agreement would be monitored by envoys from the guarantor states (al-Majalla website, July 4, 2025).
• On July 4, 2025, Hamas announced that it had completed its internal consultations and consultations with the other Palestinian “factions and forces”^[1] regarding the latest proposal from the mediators to end the “aggression” in the Gaza Strip. The movement stated that it had conveyed its response to the mediators, which was “positive,” and it was fully prepared to begin a round of negotiations immediately regarding the mechanism which would be employed (Hamas Telegram channel, July 4, 2025). Husam Badran, a member of Hamas political bureau, said the consultations with the leaderships of the Palestinian factions and forces had been conducted seriously, had been highly coordinated and had led to national consensus, and all the factions and forces had welcomed the unified response (Hamas Telegram channel, July 5, 2025).
• A “senior Hamas official” said that the movement had presented a series of amendments to the document, including a request for additional guarantees regarding a swift transition to negotiations for ending the war beyond the sixty-day ceasefire, and the inclusion of additional international actors among the guarantors of the agreement; a demand to implement the humanitarian protocol that had been in effect under the previous ceasefire agreement of January 2025, emphasizing the need to bring in heavy equipment for removing rubble and recovering bodies and missing persons; and the return of IDF forces to the lines they held before the resumption of fighting on March 2, 2025. He said Hamas had related to the document as a continuation of the previous agreement in order to avoid being dragged into Israel’s attempts to engage it in negotiation after negotiation without achieving the main goals related to ending the war and Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip (al-Araby al-Jadeed, July 5, 2025).
• In addition, “sources close to Hamas” said the movement had demanded the entry of humanitarian aid at a rate of 400–600 trucks per day, through UN and internationally recognized organizations, rather than through the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF). The aid was to include food, medicine, tents, caravans, fuel, heavy equipment for civil defense and the public works ministry, and construction materials for rebuilding hospitals, bakeries, water desalination plants, and power and communication lines (al-Sharq TV, July 5, 2025).
• Following Hamas’ agreement, indirect negotiations between Israeli and Hamas delegations began in Qatar in an effort to reach understandings that would enable the formulation of a ceasefire agreement. “Sources involved in the negotiations” reported a positive atmosphere and noted that the American president was personally invested in reaching an agreement and was applying direct pressure on both Israel and Hamas through his special envoy, Steve Witkoff (Tadunya Telegram channel, July 8, 2025). A “source familiar with the details” said no breakthrough had yet been reached and the talks were focusing on the procedures for the IDF’s withdrawal from the Strip and the entry of humanitarian aid. The source claimed Hamas was serious about reaching an agreement, and expressed hope that the United States would pressure Israel to agree (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 8, 2025).
• Ziyad al-Nakhalah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) secretary general, arrived in Qatar at the head of a delegation to conduct discussions on the developments in the ceasefire talks (PIJ Telegram channel, July 6, 2025). PIJ spokesman Muhammad al-Hajj Mousa confirmed that Hamas had consultated with the organization before submitting its response and claimed its approach was “responsible and serious.” He added that they were “flexible” and wanted to move toward an agreement that would end the “aggression” and guarantee the rights of the “resistance.”^[2] He said the PIJ had raised several points regarding how the mediators’ proposal would be implemented, especially the distribution of aid, guarantees for withdrawal and the release of prisoners, and they wanted further guarantees to ensure that the “aggression” would not be renewed after the agreement had been implemented (Filastin al-Youm TV website, July 5, 2025).
• The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) welcomed Hamas’ agreeing to the proposal for a sixty-day ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. The DFLP said it had consulted with Hamas and the PIJ several times during the recent visit to Cairo of a delegation headed by the secretary general, and said the agreement with Israel, consistent with consultations with Hamas, had to ensure the opening of the crossings, the unconditional flow of humanitarian aid, the withdrawal of IDF forces to the lines agreed upon in the January 19, 2025 agreement, the provision of appropriate shelter for the displaced whose homes had been destroyed by the IDF, and the evacuation of the wounded and sick for treatment abroad. The DFLP also noted the need for guarantees from the mediators to oversee the indirect negotiations until the complete cessation of the war, full withdrawal of IDF forces from the Gaza Strip, and transition to the “day after” in accordance with the Palestinian national vision (DFLP central media Telegram channel, July 5, 2025).
• Meanwhile, Gazan activists and civilians were strongly critical of possible understandings perceived as a “humiliating ceasefire,” with calls for assertive negotiations which would ensure tangible achievements rather than temporary solutions. In response, Hamas claimed it had conducted the contacts while “fighting and bleeding,” with deliberation, not weakness, upholding its principles and the interests of the Palestinian people, to end the attacks, restore aid, and preserve the “resistance” as a central bargaining chip (Mutabaa min al-Midan Telegram channel, July 5, 2025).

The situation in the Gaza Strip

• The Hamas ministry of religious endowments in the Gaza Strip accused the “Israeli blockade” and attacks of preventing the entry of shrouds, construction materials and burial equipment, making it difficult to conduct burials according to Islamic law. The ministry claimed that more than forty cemeteries had been partially or completely destroyed, and the IDF was preventing access to cemeteries in areas under its control, leading to a severe reduction of burial space. As a result, hospitals, schools, and tents for the displaced were being used as temporary burial sites. The ministry was forced to use stones from destroyed buildings, mud instead of concrete and metal sheets instead of marble to cover graves, but even those materials were in critically short supply. According to the ministry, the cost of a single grave ranged from 700 (about $200) to 1,000 shekels (about $300), placing a heavy burden on families. In light of this, the ministry launched a campaign for free, dignified burials and called on Arab states, aid organizations, and “individuals of conscience” to donate funds and urgently provide shrouds and burial equipment (Shehab News Agency, July 2, 2025).

• Tariq Shaheen, head of the Deir al-Balah municipality, said municipal services in the Gaza Strip were nearly completely paralyzed due to shortages of diesel and other fuels, which had lasted more than four months. As a result, water wells and sanitation facilities had been shut down, and sewage was being discharged into the sea, posing a severe health threat in summer. He claimed Israel had destroyed about 50% of the water wells, particularly in eastern Gaza, and had directly damaged local authority equipment and facilities. Municipalities were trying to find partial solutions, such as purchasing fuel on the local market, using private wells, and solar energy, but they were insufficient (al-Aqsa betwork Telegram channel, July 5, 2025). The spokesman for the Gaza City municipality accused the IDF forces of preventing municipal maintenance teams from reaching eastern Gaza to repair damaged water wells, worsening the crisis. He claimed thousands of families in eastern Gaza had gone without water for a week, and the situation threatened to become a severe health crisis in light of the heatwave and mass displacement. He also claimed that Israel had deliberately targeted a water desalination plant, precisely when it was already extremely difficult to provide the population with water (journalist Hani al-Sha’er’s Telegram channel, July 5, 2025).
• Hamas continued to promote the narrative of “damage to the health system” in the Gaza Strip:
  • The ministry of health in Gaza reported that after distress calls were sent to the UN and other international organizations, 3,000 liters of diesel were delivered to al-Shifa Hospital. Thereafter, the dialysis center, which shut down on July 1, 2025 due to the fuel shortage, resumed operations. The ministry again called on international and humanitarian organizations to ensure a continuous fuel supply to hospitals to protect the lives of the wounded and the sick (Safa Agency, July 2, 2025).
  • Dr. Ragheb Warsh Agha, head of the pediatric department at al-Nasr–al-Rantisi Children’s Hospital in Gaza City, reported that the hospital had registered hundreds of cases of meningitis and warned of the spread of the disease would increase because of the collapse of the health system and Gaza’s harsh humanitarian conditions. He claimed the number of infections was rising daily, especially because the severe shortage of clean water and personal hygiene supplies (Telegram channel of Sa’ed al-Sweirki, RT Arabic correspondent in Gaza, July 1, 2025).
  • Dr. Munir al-Bursh, director general of the ministry of health in Gaza, said that more than 2.4 million people had been squeezed into less than 18% of the territory of the Gaza Strip after the “Israeli occupation” destroyed their homes, bombed their areas and forced them to relocate to the south. He claimed the area where people now lived was less than 60 square kilometers, population density exceeded 40,000 per square kilometer, and more than 1.9 million displaced people lacked real shelter or basic services. He added that the situation caused the spread of infectious diseases and a significant decline in nutrition and immunodeficiency, especially among children and infants, due to a lack of food and the absence of cooking and refrigeration facilities (Dr. Munir al-Bursh’s X account, July 2, 2025).
  • Mohammad al-Hajj, spokesman for al-Aqsa Hospital in the Gaza Strip, the only government hospital serving more than half a million people in the center of the Strip, reported that due to prolonged power outages, critical departments had been shut down for many hours, and claimed medical teams were forced to use manual ventilators and mobile phone flashlights to perform surgeries (Radio Alam, July 8, 2025).
  • The ministry of health in Gaza reported that medical aid convoys from the World Health Organization were expected to enter the Strip, bringing medicines and medical equipment. The supplies were intended to provide immediate essential care for the wounded and sick in hospitals. The ministry called on the public, families and relevant parties to act responsibly, refrain from obstructing the convoys, and ensure their safe arrival at hospitals to save lives, noting that the trucks were not carrying food (Telegram channel of journalist Hani al-Sha’er, July 7, 2025).

The humanitarian aid distribution centers

• The Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) reported that over 65 million meals had been distributed since its distribution centers in the Gaza Strip opened on May 27, 2025. It also stated that on July 3, 2025, a record was set when for the first time, more than one million food packages were distributed in a single day at one of the foundation’s distribution centers, with each package sufficient for a family for one week (GHF Facebook page, July 1–8, 2025).
• “Two American contractors securing aid distribution in the Gaza Strip” said that other American contractors distributing aid as part of the initiative were using live ammunition and stun grenades to attack “hungry Gazans struggling for food.” One claimed to have seen live fire “in all directions, into the air, at the ground, and sometimes even toward people,” and that at least one civilian had been injured. Videos allegedly documenting the event were also published. The contractors said they had decided to speak out because they were disturbed by the dangerous and irresponsible behavior they had witnessed. A spokesperson for Safe Reach Solution, a subcontractor of the American company responsible for aid distribution, claimed there had been no serious injuries at any site, and that in a few isolated incidents security personnel had fired live rounds at the ground far from civilians to get attention. A spokesperson for the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation said, “Some people have a vested interest in our failure and are willing to do or say almost anything to make that happen” (AP, July 3, 2025).
• The Hamas ministry of interior and national security in the Gaza Strip issued a warning against any direct or indirect cooperation with the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation or its local and foreign affiliates. The warning claimed that the foundation had become an Israeli tool for carrying out “war crimes,” turning the aid centers into sites of “humiliation, killing, injuries, and detentions, without any legal or international oversight.” The ministry accused the foundation of recruiting civilians for logistical and security activity which served the enemy, and announced that strict legal measures, including severe penalties, would be taken against anyone found to have cooperated with it. The ministry called on the public, families, and the media to act with national responsibility and reject the foundation’s activity, claiming that it posed an internal threat to Palestinian society (Hamas ministry of interior Facebook page, July 3, 2025).

• On July 5, 2025, American aid workers were attacked near Food Distribution Center No. 3, located between Khan Yunis and Rafah. According to the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, at the end of distribution at the center, two Hamas terrorists threw two fragmentation grenades, injuring two of the American workers. The attackers immediately ran back into the crowd which had gathered near the distribution center (GHF X account, July 5, 2025). The IDF confirmed the incident and emphasized that the terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip continued to attempt to prevent the distribution of humanitarian aid at centers designated for the local population, harming Gazan civilians (IDF spokesperson, July 5, 2025).

Hamas governance

• A “senior Hamas security officer” stated that the movement had lost about 80% of its control over the Strip and added that armed clans were filling the vacuum. He said almost nothing remained of the movement’s security structure and about 95% of its leadership had been killed since the beginning of the war. He added that Hamas had attempted to “reorganize” its political, military, and security bodies during the 57-day ceasefire at the beginning of 2025, but the end of the ceasefire left the movement in disarray and Hamas had no control anywhere. He said the Ansar facility, Hamas’ most important security facility, used to control the Strip, had been looted without the intervention of the police or security forces. The officer said, “The security situation is zero; Hamas control is zero; there is no leadership, no command, no communication. Salaries are delayed, and when they arrive they are barely usable. Some people die just trying to collect them.” He noted that six armed groups affiliated with strong local clans had taken advantage of the vacuum and had access to money, weapons, and manpower (BBC website, July 6, 2025).
• Hamas security forces and those loyal to them increased pressure on Yasser Abu Shabab and his Popular Forces militia, which according to reports receives support from Israel:
  • The Hamas revolutionary court issued a decree granting Yasser Jihad Mansour Abu Shabab a period of ten days, starting July 2, 2025, to surrender to the authorities for prosecution. He was accused of treason and collaboration with hostile elements, forming an armed gang and armed rebellion. The court warned that if he did not present himself on time, he would be considered a fugitive and tried in absentia. The court called on anyone who knew his whereabouts to report him and said that failure to do so would be considered harboring a fugitive (Hamas ministry of the interior Facebook page, July 2, 2025).
  • The Sheikh Hamad Basha al-Sufi Units,^[3] composed of members of the al-Tarabine tribe to which Abu Shabab belongs, announced the beginning of operations against members of “the traitor Yasser Abu Shabab’s gang” and claimed responsibility for killing one of its operatives who was a “collaborator.” According to the Units, their objective was to “protect the honor and preserve the legacy of the al-Tarabine tribe,” claiming that the killings were not part of a political or partisan struggle but rather an internal tribal initiative (al-Siyad Telegram channel, July 3, 2025).
  • The joint operations room of the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip sharply attacked Abu Shabab’s militia and called it “a rogue, treacherous group that refuses to do anything but act as a tool in the hands of the occupation.” In its first statement since October 2024, it claimed that the group was trying to achieve “part of what the enemy had failed to achieve” and emphasized that “Abu Shabab and his group are outcasts, they will not be spared, they will be treated as traitors, and their blood is forfeit” (joint operations room Telegram channel, July 6, 2025). Shortly afterward, the Sahm Unit of the Hamas ministry of interior claimed that three members of Abu Shabab’s gang had turned themselves in to the leadership of the “resistance” in the Gaza Strip (al-Siyad Telegram channel, July 6, 2025).

• • Interviewed by the Israeli media, Abu Shabab said that after Hamas had killed many members of his clan, he established the militia with the support of the Palestinian Authority and with the assistance of Mahmoud al-Habbash, an advisor of Mahmoud Abbas. He denied any connection to Israel and rejected Hamas accusations that he was a “traitor,” noting that the movement had no legitimacy after kidnapping and killing Israeli children. He said he was angry at Hamas operatives who were hiding in tunnels and lacked for nothing, while residents of the Strip had lost everything because the October 7, 2023, attack. In his opinion, Hamas had become very weak, its new recruits were mostly teenagers who did not know how to use weapons, and he was confident that the movement’s end was near (Ynet and Yedioth Ahronoth, July 7, 2025).
• In addition to Abu Shabab’s militia, according to reports two armed groups affiliated with Fatah were operating in the Gaza Strip in coordination with and with assistance from Israel, and were receiving salaries from the Palestinian Authority. One was active in the al-Shuja’iya neighborhood in Gaza City, led by Rami Halas, a Fatah operative from Tel al-Hawa in the southwestern part of the city. The other operated in the Khan Yunis area, led by Yasser Hanidak, a local Fatah operative from the Barbakh clan (Ynet, July 3, 2025). In response to the report, the Halas family published an open letter without naming specific individuals, in which it strongly condemned and disavowed all forms of “treason, collaboration and coordination with the occupation” or with any party hostile to the Palestinian people and its national cause (Halas family Facebook page, July 3, 2025). Yasser Hanidak also published a video of himself saying he was surprised by the reports in Israel about him, denied any connection to Israel or to the Palestinian Authority, and declared that he supported “the resistance” and that Hamas knew him well (Palestine Post X account, July 3, 2025).
• The Radea (deterrence) force of the “resistance” security forces in the Gaza Strip announced that it had recently killed 12 agents and thieves who had collaborated with Israel, looted humanitarian aid, and committed armed robberies as part of the Abu Mughzib gang in the central Gaza Strip. The force said in a statement that it would pursue anyone who endangered the security or sustenance of the people, and would show no mercy to those who had betrayed Gaza or collaborated with “the enemy” (Radea force Telegram channel, July 4, 2025).
• Amid assessments of an imminent ceasefire and the internal stabilization of the Gaza Strip, senior Hamas figures held meetings with some of the clans to arrange the status of young men who had not supported the home front, whether by looting, internal gunfire, or collaboration with hostile entities. Some families, led by local mukhtars, were willing to cooperate and submitted the names of their sons to the security services of the ministry of interior in the Strip for investigation and resolution of their cases. Hamas said that only those who returned stolen property or expressed genuine remorse would be shown leniency, while criminals who had caused death or bloodshed would not be forgiven (Telegram channel of journalist Muhammad al-Sharif, July 4, 2025). The Radea force claimed that dozens of those involved in security offenses had voluntarily turned themselves in to the “resistance” security forces after realizing that Israel had “abandoned” them and that they had no refuge. Their status was reportedly resolved quietly and away from the media, in a manner that served stability and the national interest (Radea Telegram channel, July 6, 2025).

International activity to “break the siege” on the Gaza Strip

• The Freedom Flotilla Coalition announced its intention to launch another voyage to break the “illegal Israeli siege.” According to reports, the ship Handala was expected to set sail from Syracuse, Italy, on July 13, 2025, and would carry “life-saving humanitarian aid and a message of solidarity from people around the world.” The coalition stated that they were people acting where institutions had failed, stating, “We will not back down,” given the Israeli Navy’s interception of the previous flotilla ship Madeleine on June 8, 2025 (Freedom Flotilla Coalition Telegram channel, July 6, 2025).

• A Hamas delegation led by Muhammad Darwish, head of the movement’s Shura Council, met in Ankara with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin. They discussed developments in the Gaza Strip, international efforts to end the Israeli offensive and lift the “siege,” and ways to provide humanitarian aid. Hamas reportedly praised Turkey’s consistent support for the Palestinian people, while the Turkish officials caimed that the Palestinian issue was at the top of the country’s regional and international priorities (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, July 3, 2025).

• Hamas spokesman Jihad Taha stated that the Palestinians should determine the nature of “the day after the war.” He said Hamas believed in political and national cooperation in managing the Strip and had said so in the contacts it had held before submitting its response to the ceasefire proposal. Taha added that Hamas was open to internal agreements among the Palestinian “factions,” such as the July 2024 Beijing agreement or the committee for managing the Gaza Strip. He called on the Palestinian people and all “factions” to unite efforts to confront the challenges, adding that they expected a “real national partnership” and were prepared to consult with national and Islamic figures, forces, and “factions” in order to “restore order to the Palestinian house” (al-Risalah Telegram channel, June 6, 2025).

Terrorist Attacks

• There were no terrorist attacks in the past week.

Counterterrorism operations

• This past week Israeli security forces continued their broad counterterrorism operation in northern Samaria, alongside routine activity in other parts of Judea and Samaria. They eliminated terrorist operatives, detained wanted individuals, seized weapons and explosives, and confiscated funds used to finance terrorism. Operatives affiliated with a terrorist network in the Balata refugee camp were detained, along with members of a terrorist squad who threw Molotov cocktails and rocks in the Gush Etzion area. Israeli security forces also detained members of a terrorist squad who were staying in Barta’a, inside Israeli territory, in preparation for carrying out an attack (IDF and police spokespersons, July 1–8, 2025).
• The governor of Tulkarm, Abdallah Kamil, claimed the IDF had recently destroyed 48 buildings in the Nur Shams refugee camp and 58 in the Tulkarm refugee camp. He said Israel had warned that any building rebuilt after demolition would be demolished again.The municipality announced that a warning had been issued about the intention to demolish 104 additional buildings in the Tulkarm camp, each of which contained an average of four dwelling units (Radio Alam, July 2, 2025).

International activity

• On July 1, 2025, Dr. Farsin Aghabekian Shaheen, the PA foreign minister, met in Ramallah with Austrian Foreign Minister Beate Meinl-Reisinger. He briefed her on the latest developments in the Palestinian territories and presented the PA’s plans for reform, reconstruction, strengthening governance and transparency, as well as its preparedness to assume responsibility for the Gaza Strip at the end of the war, as part of an agreed-upon emergency aid and reconstruction plan. Meinl-Reisinger emphasized her country’s opposition to any attempt to “forcibly displacet” Palestinians from the Gaza Strip or other areas, calling it a “serious violation of international law” (PA foreign ministry Facebook page, July 1, 2025).

• The office of the PA chairman strongly condemned the remarks of Israeli Justice Minister Yariv Levin regarding the application of Israeli sovereignty over Judea and Samaria, calling the statements a “serious violation” of international law and of international resolutions which stipulated the need to “end the occupation in all Palestinian territories” occupied in 1967, including Judea, Samaria and east Jerusalem. Nabil Abu Rudeineh, spokesman for PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas, claimed the statements were part of the “comprehensive war” Israel was waging against the Palestinian people and an attempt “to erase the Palestinian issue.” He said such statements endangered regional stability and undermined the international efforts of the Americans, Egyptians, and Qataris to end the war in the Gaza Strip and restore calm to Judea and Samaria (Wafa, July 2, 2025). Ahmed Abu al-Gheit, secretary general of the Arab League, joined the Egyptian and Saudi Arabian condemnations of Levin’s statements, calling them “dangerous and irresponsible” and warning that Israel was acting out of “a forceful approach that violated international law and dragged the region into a cycle of violence” (Wafa, July 3, 2025).
• Mahmoud al-Habbash, Mahmoud Abbas’ advisor for religious affairs, and Muhammad Najem, the PA minister of religious affairs, met in Cairo with Egypt’s Grand Mufti Dr. Nazir Ayyad and briefed him on the “Israeli violations” of the holy sites in “Palestine.” They notied the “severity of the damage” to al-Aqsa Mosque, the Cave of the Patriarchs and other mosques, and claimed that it constituted a “serious violation” of international law and freedom of worship. They also presented the efforts of the Palestinian leadership to preserve the religious and national identity of the Palestinian people. The Egyptian mufti expressed full support for the Palestinian people and called for coordination among religious institutions in the Islamic world to address the challenges (Facebook page of the PA ministry of endowments and religious affairs, July 6, 2025).