Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (December 30, 2025 – January 6, 2026)

The IDF

• IDF forces continued operating within the Yellow Line (the area under IDF control) in the Gaza Strip and eliminated terrorist operatives who approached the line or attempted to cross it to attack the forces. A launcher with five rockets ready for firing was located in the Beit Hanoun area in the northern Gaza Strip, and a tunnel shaft with a loaded rocket launcher was destroyed, which according to the IDF had been prepared by Hamas after the ceasefire went into effect. In an attack in the al-Mawasi area of Khan Yunis, outside the Yellow Line, a Hamas operative who planned to attack IDF forces in the immediate future was eliminated. An IDF soldier was injured in an operational accident in the southern Gaza Strip (IDF spokesperson, December 30, 2025–January 6, 2026).

• “Palestinian sources” reported ongoing IDF activity in various areas of the Gaza Strip, especially northern Gaza City and Khan Yunis. Allegedly, the IDF continued the demolition of buildings in northern Gaza Strip and in Khan Yunis, shot from military vehicles and helicopters in eastern Gaza City, carried out aerial attacks in the al-Tuffah neighborhood and within the Yellow Line, and fired artillery at eastern Khan Yunis (Telegram channel of activist Hamza al-Masri, January 1-4, 2026; journalist Ismail Abu Omar, January 3, 2026; al-Jazeera, January 1-4 2026).

The Situation in the Gaza Strip

• The director general of the ministry of health in Gaza, Munir al-Barsh, claimed Israel’s decision to halt the activity of more than 30 international organizations in the Gaza Strip was “illegal” (Telegram channel of journalist Firas Abu Sharakh, December 31, 2025). The Palestinian network of civilian organizations claimed it was an attempt to isolate the Gaza Strip from its surroundings, calling the decision “dangerous and a direct threat” to life in the Strip (al-Arabi channel, December 31, 2025). The Israeli Ministry for Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism said licenses were revoked from organizations which had failed, within the allotted time frame, to provide full transparency regarding the identity of their employees, and in light of evidence of aid organization employees’ involvement in terrorist activity or the delegitimization of Israel (Facebook page of the Ministry for Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism, January 1, 2026).
• The Khan Yunis municipality claimed there was shortage of fuel for essential services, with a daily need of approximately 3,000 liters of diesel to operate water and sanitation facilities, while it received “at most about one-third of the required amount.” According to the municipality, the operational capacity of water and sewage systems had been reduced to about 40%, while other services to about 20% (Telegram channel of the late “journalist” Hassan Aslih, December 31, 2025).
• The Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani Rehabilitation and Prosthetics Hospital resumed operations in northern Gaza after being suspended by the Israeli attack in September 2025. The Qatar Fund for Development, which finances the institution, claimed the hospital had the only CT scanner of its kind in northern Gaza and had the departments of prosthetics, hearing and balance, and medical rehabilitation, as well as dedicated clinics and rehabilitation hospitalization for war casualties. The fund noted Qatar’s commitment to continued support for the Palestinian people and to strengthening the resilience of the medical system in the Gaza Strip (Facebook page of Hamad Hospital, January 1, 2026).
• The ministry of health in Gaza Strip denied reports of an outbreak of leptospirosis, a disease spread by the urine of infected animals (Weil’s Disease), claiming that the results of laboratory tests for the disease were negative and that there were no cases of the disease in the Strip. The ministry said it was the only body authorized to announce the outbreak of an epidemic and called on medical institutions and media outlets to act responsibly regarding the dissemination of medical information (Safa News Agency, January 3, 2026).
• According to the Palestinian ministry of communications, the GDP in the Gaza Strip declined by 84% in 2025 compared to 2023, and that during 2025 an additional decline of 8.7% was recorded, even though it was expected to be a year of recovery. It was further noted that the unemployment rate reached 80%, the poverty rate exceeded 95%, and the labor force participation rate fell to 38%. Also reported was an almost complete collapse in most sectors, construction (99% decline), industry (94%), agriculture (92%), and services (82%) (Palestinian communications center, January 2, 2026).

Security Governance

• A “senior source in the resistance” reported that a “collaborator” had been executed. He had allegedly worked with Israeli security services during the war and was involved in harming and eliminating several “resistance” commanders, including the former commander of the military wing, Mohammad al-Deif (al-Sayad, December 31, 2025).
• A “security source” reported that the “resistance^[3] prevented an assassination by booby-trapped motorcycle, which was allegedly brought by traders in Gaza from a company in Israel. The “resistance security” al-Akhres channel called for extreme caution when using tools and equipment imported from Israel, especially those used for transportation and communications (al-Akhres Telegram channel, January 1 2026).
• The Popular Defense Forces (Abu Shabab clan) announced that they had begun building shelters in Rafah for residents of the Strip, stating it was a safe area, free of terrorism, which would be under Arab and international protection. The camp will ensure housing, food, medicine and full daily life services while enabling residents to live in stability and security, “without oppression or humiliation” (Facebook page of The Popular Defense Forces January 2, 2026).

• Videos circulated on social networks showing armed militias, allegedly cooperating with Israel, marking the 61^st anniversary of the founding of the Fatah movement with chants of “death to Hamas.” The celebrations took place in areas under IDF control within the Yellow Line (Gaza News Telegram channel, January 1, 2026).
• According to “sources close to Hamas,” exchanges of fire took place in the al-Tuffah neighborhood of Gaza City between the militia of Rami Halas and Hamas operatives and “armed factions,”^[4] after Halas’ men advanced toward the al-Sanafour Junction, located west of the Yellow Line. The exchanges lasted more than 20 minutes, until Halas’ men withdrew to the Yellow Line region under Israeli control. According to reports, membership in the armed militias is increasing daily, as are attempts to recruit additional youths, especially among the unemployed (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 4, 2026).

Civilian governance

• The Hamas ministry of the economy reported that consumer protection teams operating in the central camps during 2025 had conducted 2,657 inspection tours, of them 194 in markets, 1,434 of stalls, 561 in stores, 240 in frozen food shops, 231 at points of sale, 72 in warehouses, 51 in restaurants, 43 in bakeries, and 25 in factories and workshops. About 150 reports were issued to merchants and 120 tons of food were confiscated. The ministry said its personnel operated in Deir al-Balah, al-Nuseirat, al-Bureij, al-Maghazi and al-Zawayda, in cooperation with the municipalities, the supply investigations department of the Hamas police and the ministry of health in Gaza (Telegram channel of the Hamas ministry of national economy, January 3, 2026).

• Hamas police in Khan Yunis provided data on the activity of their “intervention and order maintenance” forces during 2025. The forces carried out more than 450 assistance missions for police units and stations and 1,200 routine missions including the establishment of checkpoints. The officers also conducted 400 security patrols and 1,400 traffic regulation missions on main streets and handled 834 family disputes (Telegram channel of Khan Yunis Police, January 5, 2026).
• A graduation ceremony was held in the courtyard of the Shifa Hospital in Gaza City for 230 male and female students from medical faculties in the Gaza Strip (Safa News Agency, January 3, 2026).

     
Graduation ceremony near al-Shifa Hospital (Quds News Agency, January 3, 2026)

• In Jabalia al-Nazla in the northern Strip, a ceremony was held to open the Maradiya School, which will provide an educational framework for approximately 3,000 children living in tents in the area. The opening of the school, defined as a “tent education campus,” was made possible through cooperation between the Hamas ministry of education in the Gaza Strip and two Turkish educational organizations (Shehab and Quds news agencies and the Turkish ruling party’s daily Yeni Şafak, January 5, 2026).

     
School inauguration ceremony
(Left: Shehab News Agency. Right: Quds News Agency, January 5, 2026)

• Osama Hamdan, Hamas representative in Lebanon, claimed there was no leadership vacuum in Hamas and that a five-member council was managing the movement’s affairs (Shehab News Agency, January 1, 2026).
• “Hamas sources” reported that following the blows to the movement’s leadership during the war, a new core of leadership had taken shape in the Gaza Strip, composed of associates of the former head of the political bureau, Yahya al-Sinwar. According to the report, Ali al-Amoudi, a member of the political bureau who was released from an Israeli prison in the 2011 Gilad Shalit exchange deal and previously managed the communications apparatus, was effectively appointed to manage the political bureau in the Strip. The appointment reportedly sparked controversy, criticism and anger among local figures in the Strip and within Hamas’ leadership abroad, as al-Amoudi made extensive personnel changes in the administrative mechanisms and replaced officeholders. In contrast, the report stated that the military wing remained stable, with an orderly process of appointing replacements and regulating the command structure under the leadership of Izz al-Din al-Haddad. It was further reported that Hamas was also coping with relentless economic pressure, the need to pay salaries, organizational fatigue and political confusion (al-Sharq al-Awsat, December 31, 2025).

• A “source” in Hamas said they planned to elect a new political bureau chairman once the situation in the Gaza Strip became more stable and implementation of the second phase of the ceasefire agreement began. If the plan goes through, the new chairman will lead the movement in place of the five-member leadership council, which, said the “source,” would continue to exist. He added that the term of the head of the bureau would last until the end of 2026, as Hamas decided to hold general elections at the end of 2026 for a new four-year term, first at the lower levels of the movement and later for the position of chairman, in accordance with the Hamas internal election law. He noted that during the war the movement had decided to extend the term of the Hamas leadership by two years, as the current term was originally due to end in March 2025 (al-Quds al-Arabi, January 1, 2026).
• “Sources” noted that the current Hamas election process, described as a “transitional phase” expected to last a year, did not necessarily require direct elections and could be managed through other mechanisms such as appointments, delegation of authority, consensus or elections. Hamas in Judea and Samaria is set to complete its election process in a way will preserve the status quo, so that Zaher Jabareen will continue as regional chairman, following full agreement that he remain in the position. According to reports, several senior figures, prisoners released and deported abroad in exchange deals during the war, have recently joined the political bureau of Judea and Samaria (Ultra Palestine website, December 31, 2025).

• Hamas continued to defy Israeli and American demands to disarm as part of the ceasefire agreement:
  • Hamas political bureau member Muhammad Nazzal condemned the American threat, issued in his meeting with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, warning that Hamas would pay a heavy price if it did not agree to disarm within a short time. According to Nazzal, the language used was unacceptable in complex matters related to the agreement in the Gaza Strip. He said transition to the second phase would remain stalled because Netanyahu was avoiding completion of the first phase. However, he still expected the United States to pressure Netanyahu to allow a minimal transition to the second phase, especially after the meeting of the mediating states in Miami. Nazzal added that no country had agreed to take part in disarming Hamas, so how could the movement be expected to disarm within a limited timeframe? (al-Ghad Network, December 30, 2025).
  • Osama Hamdan, Hamas representative in Lebanon, said he would not talk about disarming Hamas until Israel had met its commitments. He claimed that Israel was deliberately obstructing the work of humanitarian institutions and delaying aid in violation of the ceasefire agreement, and called on the American administration to pressure Israel to implement the agreement’s clauses, allow the entry of aid and fuel, and open the Rafah Crossing (al-Jazeera Mubasher, December 31, 2025).
  • “Hamas sources” accused Israel of using disarmament as a pretext to delay the transition to the second phase of the ceasefire. According to “the sources,” mainly “light weapons” remained in the hands of the “armed factions,”^[5] such as Kalashnikov and M-16 rifles, alongside a “very limited quantity” [sic] of anti-tank weapons and explosives, while most rockets, mortars and heavy weapons were worn down during the war or destroyed. They added that Israel’s demand to extend disarmament to the level of personal weapons was intended to prolong the Israeli presence in the Strip east of the Yellow Line (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 2, 2026).
• Turkey agreed to accept 20 Palestinian prisoners released from Israeli prisons and deported to Egypt under the ceasefire agreement, prisoners who had been selected from a list of 42 names submitted by Hamas. There are currently 240 released prisoners in Egypt under security and movement restrictions and without support or funding from the Palestinian Authority. The addition of the new group will raise the number of deportees absorbed by Turkey to 69, most of whom are affiliated with Hamas. In addition, many Arab states have reportedly reneged on their agreement to accept released prisoners, and at present only Brazil, Malaysia, Iraq and Iran are willing, in principle, to receive prisoners (Ultra Palestine, January 1, 2026).

Palestinian Authority (PA) Involvement in Gaza

• A Palestinian delegation headed by the PA deputy chairman, Hussein al-Sheikh, and the head of the General Intelligence Service, Majed Faraj, met separately in Cairo with Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty and with the head of Egyptian General Intelligence, Hassan Rashad. They discussed ways to establish “stability in the Palestinian territories” and advance toward the second phase of the American plan for the Gaza Strip (Wafa, January 4, 2026).
• According to a “Palestinian source,” the role of the PA at the start of the second phase of the agreement will be limited to managing the Rafah Crossing. Two hundred operatives the “Presidential Guard” and PA intelligence agencies, along with technical and logistical teams, will be deployed at the crossing in civilian clothing (Sky News Arabic, January 4, 2026).
• The PA’s ministry of public works and housing, in cooperation with the Arab Rehabilitation Authority, reopened al-Nasr–al-Eyun Street in Gaza and cleared it of rubble, and also cleared the entrance to the al-Rahma charitable association near al-Quds Open University (Facebook page of the PA ministry of public works and housing, December 31, 2025).

• This past week IDF forces continued counterterrorism activities throughout Judea and Samaria, detaining dozens of wanted individuals and suspects involved in terrorist activity and arms trafficking, confiscating weapons and dozens of illegally-held drones, and seizing more than one million shekels (about $315,000) for financing terrorist activity. The forces eliminated a terrorist who attempted to ram into IDF soldiers operating in the village of Einabus and another who threw rocks. In addition, the home in Qabatiya of the perpetrator of the vehicular and stabbing attack in which two Israeli civilians were murdered in Beit She’an and the JezreelValley on December 26, 2025 was sealed (IDF spokesperson, December 30, 2025–January 2026).

     
IDF forces in the market in Nablus (Nablus News Telegram channel, January 1, 2026)

• IDF forces began demolishing houses in the Nur Shams refugee camp near Tulkarm. Palestinian reports claimed that about 100 families were left without shelter (Telegram channel of the late “journalist” Hassan Aslih, December 31, 2025). The governor of Tulkarm, Mustafa Taqatqa, called it a “serious escalation and evidence of a nakba,”^[6] and “collective punishment of civilians and a violation of international law, international conventions, and the principles of human rights” (Radio Alam, December 31, 2025).
• After Israeli security forces shot a Palestinian who attempted to infiltrate Israeli territory at a crossing over the separation barrier in the al-Ram area near Jerusalem, social media users expressed the sense of economic and social distress of Palestinian workers who were pushed to climb the wall despite the risks. Condemnations and calls for revenge appeared against those perceived as responsible for the situation, including criticism of parties exploiting workers through mediation, transportation and housing (Ramallah News Facebook page, January 3, 2026).

• Zaher Jabareen, the Hamas leader in Judea and Samaria exiled to Turkey, speaking on the occasion the second anniversary of the killing of Saleh al-Arouri, former deputy head of the Hamas political bureau and leader of the movement in Judea and Samaria, called the situation in Judea and Samaria “open war” and an Israeli attempt to impose new facts and to break “the Palestinian spirit and the continuation of resistance.”^[7] He called on the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria to ramp up their steadfastness and “struggle,” and to defend the land and holy sites, and urged all “factions” to unite and adopt a “national program” based on a shared path of “resistance” (Hamas Telegram channel, January 3, 2026).

Friction Between Palestinians, the IDF and Settlers

• Majed Shaaban, head of the Wall and Settlements Resistance Commission, claimed that in 2025 there were 23,827 “attacks” by Israeli forces and settlers against Palestinians and their property in Judea and Samaria, representing an annual record. He claimed Israeli forces had carried out 18,384 “attacks” and settlers about 4,723, while Israel expanded settlements and increased its control, claiming it controlled about 41% of Judea and Samaria. He further claimed that 14 Palestinians were killed in “settler attacks,” 35,000 trees were vandalized, settlers set 434 fires on Palestinian land, and 1,400 structures were demolished while 991 more were slated for demolition (Wafa, January 5, 2026).

• The PA deputy chairman, Hussein al-Sheikh, met in Riyadh with Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan. They discussed recent developments in the Palestinian areas, especially the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip. According to reports, they noted the need to maintain the ceasefire, allow the entry of humanitarian aid without restrictions and release tax revenues. Al-Sheikh thanked Saudi Arabia for its support of the Palestinian cause and its efforts to halt the war, adding that the second phase of the plan for the future of the Gaza Strip should begin, there should be a full withdrawal of Israeli forces, reconstruction should start, and full responsibility for the Strip should be transferred to the PA (Wafa, December 31, 2025).
• PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas spoke with Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and praised the PA’s relations with Lebanon, noting his desire to develop and extend them. Salam reiterated Lebanon’s unwavering support for the Palestinian cause and the Palestinians’ right to establish an independent state (Wafa, January 1, 2026).