Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (April 28 – May 5, 2026)

• IDF operations continued within the Yellow Line in the Gaza Strip to locate terrorists and to destroy weapons, tunnels and terrorist facilities and assets. Terrorists who approached IDF forces or who attempted to infiltrate into the Yellow Line region were eliminated. Terrorist operatives who attempted to attack IDF forces were eliminated, among them the head of the operations department in Hamas’ military intelligence headquarters who was involved in orchestrating the October 7, 2023 terrorist attack and massacre (IDF spokesperson, April 28–May 5, 2026).

• Reportedly, hundreds of Gazans were displaced from the center of Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip, which is located more than 1,200 meters west of the Yellow Line, by the advance of IDF forces and daily shelling. Displacement was also the result the fear caused by the escalating clashes between armed elements supported by the IDF and Hamas forces, especially at the entrances to Jabalia and westward (al-Ayyam, May 3, 2026).
• Two sources in aid organizations operating in the Strip stated that in mid-March 2026 the IDF sent new maps of the Strip showing thousands of displaced Palestinians located within an expanded restricted area, marked on the maps with an orange line, which constituted about 11% of the area of the Strip beyond the Yellow Line. According to the sources, the IDF did not present the maps to the public. In response, the Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) stated that areas adjacent to the Yellow Line in which international organizations were required to coordinate their movements with the army had been designated and defined (Reuters, April 29, 2026).
• Hamas spokesperson Hazem Qassem said that the threats in the Israeli media of the renewal of the war in the Gaza Strip violated of the ceasefire agreement and the American plan. He claimed the threats negated the “positive atmosphere” Hamas created during the recent meetings with the mediators in Cairo (Hazem Qassem’s Telegram channel, May 4, 2026). Abd al-Jabbar Said, a member of the Hamas political bureau abroad, said that during negotiations Israel consistently threatened to renew the war, demonstrating that Israel’s approach was based on negotiations under fire to exert pressure and “extract concessions” from Hamas and the Palestinian organizations which it had not achieved on the ground (al-Araby al-Jadeed, May 4, 2026).

• Reportedly, the Palestinian terrorist organizations and Israel received a new 15-part document entitled “Roadmap for the Implementation of the Second Stage,” which was drafted by the mediators and Board of Peace representative Nikolay Mladenov. According to the document, the representative will appoint a committee to verify implementation, composed of the states guaranteeing the ceasefire agreement, the international stabilization force and the Board of Peace; Israel will have to meet all its remaining obligations from the first stage, fully and without delay. Israel must also complete its withdrawal to the Gaza Strip border in stages, according to an agreed-upon and sustainable timetable, subject to progress, verifiable, in collecting weapons; weapons will be collected according to an agreed-upon, phased timetable, and the weapons will be transferred to the national committee for managing the Strip and all “armed groups” will participate in collecting all weapons. The national committee will be given exclusive authority to register weapons, issue and revoke licenses and collect unlicensed weapons. The surrender of personal weapons will occur with the surrender of the weapons of the militias, while ensuring appropriate security conditions and the police’s ability to ensure personal security; there will be a call to sign a social peace agreement to prevent internal fighting and violence, a ban on shows of force, military displays and armed demonstrations and a halt to all acts of revenge; the international stabilization force will be deployed between the areas controlled by IDF forces and the areas under the control of the national committee. The force will not engage in policing, but will be allowed to support weapons collection operations and humanitarian operations and to provide them with protection; reconstruction of the Strip will be carried out by introducing materials into areas where weapons were collected and which are under the management of the national committee (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 28, 2026; al-Akhbar, April 30, 2026).
• Hamas claimed the talks held in Cairo with the mediators and with Mladenov were conducted in a “positive atmosphere,” and Mladenov was informed that it was not possible to move to a substantive discussion on the second stage of the agreement before the full implementation of the first stage. It was later reported that the Palestinian terrorist organizations responded positively to the 15-part proposal as a basis for beginning negotiations on an agreement for the second stage, but gave the mediators a five-point document with demands for the completion of the first stage, including the entry of the national committee for managing Gaza into the Strip, anchoring the Palestinian right to self-determination and to a state, linking any weapons arrangement to a full Israeli withdrawal, international guarantees and a solution to the issue of detainees, and ensuring that any arrangement in Gaza would be consistent with Palestinian Authority laws and would strengthen the national consensus. According to the sources, the terrorist organizations requested a response from Israel before entering into substantive negotiations, but Israel’s response was described as negative because of its refusal to provide guarantees for full implementation of the first stage, for stopping “violations” and for withdrawal from the Yellow Line. A source stated that Mladenov asked Israel to suspend airstrikes for 48 hours for “the success of the talks in Cairo,” but did not receive a response, although in practice a reduction of strikes was recorded, alongside an increased, but allegedly still insufficient, entry of humanitarian aid (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 30–May 1, 2026).
• Bassem Na’im, a member of the Hamas political bureau, said a ceasefire agreement could not be discussed because of Israel’s “violations” of the agreement, adding that full implementation of the first stage was required, including the entry of sufficient quantities of aid, before moving to the second stage. He claimed “resistance”^[2] was the right of the Palestinian people, its weapons were an integral part of the “resistance,” and that was the unified position of all the [terrorist] organizations. He said the Hamas delegation in Cairo refused to discuss the issue of weapons before a permanent ceasefire (al-Mayadeen, May 3, 2026). It was later reported that Gazans had expressed concern about the renewal of the war and called on Hamas and the terrorist organizations to reconsider the proposal for disarmament (al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 5, 2026).
• Sources in the Palestinian terrorist organizations stated their demands, which were the implementation of the first stage of the agreement, implementation of the humanitarian protocol, the entry of hundreds of thousands of caravans and tents and the beginning of reconstruction of hospitals and bakeries. The organizations also demanded the complete dismantling of the Israeli-supported armed militias, called a “non-negotiable red line” (al-Araby al-Jadeed, May 1, 2026).
• Hamas spokesperson Hazem Qassem criticized the statements of former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, a senior figure on the Board of Peace, who said in the UN Security Council that significant progress had been made in the implementation of the American plan for the Gaza Strip and emphasized that Hamas could not retain its weapons. Qassem claimed that Blair’s statements were biased in favor of the Israeli position, and accused Blair of ignoring Israel’s “violations” of the ceasefire, the death of more than 820 Gazans, the continued restrictions on aid, the prevention of reconstruction and the ongoing destruction. He claimed it was “regrettable” that Blair ignored the right of the Palestinian people to independence and self-determination, and the continuation of the occupation, and claimed he was using the “humanitarian disaster” in the Gaza Strip to promote political positions (Hazem Qassem’s Telegram channel, April 29, 2026).
• In a statement marking 200 days since the signing of the Sharm el-Sheikh ceasefire agreement, Hamas claimed that it and the other organizations had adhered to all the clauses of the agreement, while Israel “violated” them on a daily basis with continued attacks, killing, exacerbating the “humanitarian crisis,” closure or only partial opening of the Rafah Crossing and moving the Yellow Line westward in several locations. According to Hamas, the measures indicated an attempt by the Netanyahu government to evade its commitments and to sabotage the agreement. Hamas called on the mediators and the guarantor states to condemn Israeli policy, obligate Israel to meet its commitments, stop the escalation and ease the “humanitarian plight” of more than two million Gazans (Hamas Telegram channel, May 1, 2026).

The Palestinian Committee for Managing the Gaza Strip

• A member of the national committee for managing the Strip stated that Mladenov had recently informed the committee chairman, Dr. Ali Shaath, of a preliminary Israeli agreement to the committee’s entry into the Strip, adding that they were waiting for an agreement between Hamas and Israel on completing the implementation of the ceasefire agreement. He said consultations continued with Mladenov and the mediators, and the committee was ready to return to the Strip immediately. Another source said Mladenov had informed Shaath that he continued to act, with the support of the Board of Peace, to accelerate the return of the committee and the beginning of its work, which is expected in May 2026 (Sada News, April 29, 2026).
• However, a source in the committee said that without agreement between the parties on all the arrangements related to the work of the committee, it would not be able to operate and would be forced to remain in Egypt. He asked how the committee could operate in areas controlled by Hamas without agreements on all the details concerning police work, weapons and other matters, and how it could operate in areas occupied by the Israeli army without being subject to its authority (al-Sharq channel, April 30, 2026).

The Situation in the Gaza Strip

• The ministry of health in Gaza warned of the approaching shutdown of “the only oxygen station operating in the Gaza and northern Strip districts,” the main source of oxygen for patients, especially those suffering from chronic diseases, and which also provides medical oxygen to non-governmental health organizations. The ministry of health called on all relevant parties and international organizations to intervene urgently to bring new oxygen stations into the Strip and to ensure a continuous supply of oxygen to medical facilities (Hamas ministry of health Telegram channel, April 28, 2026).
• Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the WHO director-general, called for the entry of medicines, medical equipment and essential materials into the Gaza Strip without delay to begin the broad reconstruction of the healthcare system. He said the organization had helped establish a new family health center in the northern Strip, an area where healthcare services are very limited and access to treatment is difficult. He said the objective of the center was to bring healthcare services closer to the population (Wafa, May 1, 2026).
• For May Day, the Hamas ministry of labor reported that unemployment in the Gaza Strip has reached about 80% compared to 34% in Judea and Samaria, and that there were currently about 550,000 unemployed people in the Palestinian territories. According to the ministry, more than 250,000 workers in the Gaza Strip had lost their jobs, there had been a decline of more than 84% in the GDP and a drop of between 83% and 98% in economic activity in various sectors. More than 93% Gazans are defined as poor, more than 75% suffer from food insecurity and more than 95% depend on humanitarian aid (Hamas government media information office Telegram channel, May 1, 2026). Meanwhile, the Public Sector Workers’ Union praised the resilience of Palestinian workers, especially in Gaza, in the face of war, hunger, displacement and severe economic damage, loss of livelihoods, arrests, displacement, poverty and unemployment. The union condemned international silence and called on labor unions around the world to show solidarity, exert pressure for the “siege” to be lifted, the fighting to be stopped and aid to be transferred. It called on the technocratic government headed by Dr. Ali Shaath to shoulder its responsibility toward the Strip, and pledged to continue to defend workers’ rights in all arenas (al-Risalah, May 1, 2026).
• Reports continue about the harsh conditions in the displaced persons’ tents and shelters, where there is flooding, sewage, waste, lack of clean water and the spread of rodents, snakes and skin diseases. According to data from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), rodents or other pests were observed in 81% of displacement sites affecting about 1.45 million people, alongside more than 70 thousand reports of rodent and parasite infestations in 2026 (al-Akhbar, May 1, 2026).
• The Khan Yunis municipality warned of a health and environmental disaster following the shutdown of central sewage pumping stations. According to the municipality, the shutdown of the stations could lead to the flow of sewage into streets and nearby residential areas, increase the risk of disease and epidemics and create environmental pollution (al-Arabi channel Facebook page, May 1, 2026).

• Turkish involvement in the Gaza Strip continues as the education department of western Gaza inaugurated the Mavi Marmara 3 school, established on the site of the former Suleiman Sultan school, in cooperation with the Turkish Mavi Marmara^[3] foundation. Present at the ceremony were the head of the education department, Jawad al-Sheikh Khalil, and a delegation from the Turkish foundation headed by the director general Ma’man Oudeh. Khalil said education in the Strip continued despite the challenges, adding that they would continue to support education with [the help of] various partners (western Gaza education department Facebook page, May 2, 2026).

     
Inauguration of the school (western Gaza education department Facebook page, May 2, 2026)

• The COGAT reported that the departure of patients and escorts from the Gaza Strip continued via the Kerem Shalom Crossing, from there to the Allenby Bridge Crossing and onward to Jordan, for medical treatment. Since February 2026, more than 2,000 patients and escorts have departed via the Rafah Crossing; the number of those departing depends on requests submitted by the WHO and Egypt, which are responsible for coordinating the arrival of patients from the Strip to the Crossing. So far about 44,000 people have left the Strip to third countries through the various crossings (COGAT Facebook page, May 4, 2026).

Civilian Governance

• The Hamas ministry of the interior opened an office in the Nuseirat refugee camp in the central Strip, the first time since the beginning of the war (journalist Mahmoud Amar’s Telegram channel, May 4, 2026).

• Hamas said it had received notification that Fatah’s 8^th Conference would be held in the Gaza Strip. Hamas welcomed the decision and promised it would not take “security measures” against Fatah in the Strip. Fatah reported that Egypt and other countries had exerted pressure on Hamas during talks in Cairo not to prevent the conference’s being held. Munther al-Hayek, the Fatah spokesman in Gaza, said Fatah would be responsible for the security arrangements of the conference, adding that 600 people from Ramallah were expected to participate in the conference (al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 3, 2026).

Security Governance

• Ghassan al-Dahini, commander of the Popular Forces militia and head of its “counterterrorism apparatus” [military wing], claimed that during the first stage of the operation to deter the aggression, which began on April 19, 2026, militia forces took control of about 11% of the territory which had been under Hamas control. He called on Gazans to distance themselves from operatives of Hamas’ military wing (Ghassan al-Dahini’s Facebook page, May 5, 2026). Meanwhile, clashes continued between militia forces supported by Israel and Hamas operatives:
  • The Rada Force of Hamas’ “resistance security” said “resistance operatives” had lain in ambush for members of collaborating gangs in southern Khan Yunis after they advanced from the Yellow Line region, killing and wounding them. According to the statement, Israeli Air Force and artillery shelled the area, killing a “resistance fighter,” while the other operatives withdrew safely (Rada Force Telegram channel, April 29, 2026). Reportedly operatives of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the Hamas military wing, detonated an explosive device to attack militia operatives and then fought them at close range, and during the withdrawal of Hamas forces one operative was killed by Israeli fire (Qassam_martyrs Telegram channel, April 30, 2026). Ghassan al-Dahini, however, said the militia’s counterterrorism apparatus had foiled the ambush, exposed the explosive device waiting for his men and killed the Hamas operatives (Ghassan al-Dahini ‘s Facebook page, April 29, 2026).
  • Claims were issued that an attempt by “collaborating gangs” to sabotage a civilian facility in Gaza City under the direct guidance of Israeli intelligence had been prevented. An operative in the Rada Force said that had been made possible when a Gazan reported one of his sons, who was a member of a gang and among those assigned to participate in the sabotage operation (Rada Force Telegram channel, April 28, 2026).
  • The Rada Force praised the residents of the al-Bureij refugee camp who confronted operatives from the gangs, who were claimed to have attacked civilians and their property near the Yellow Line area in the east of the camp (Rada Force Telegram channel, April 29, 2026).

Halting the International Flotilla to the Gaza Strip

• On the night of April 29, 2026, Israeli Navy forces halted the boats participating in the Global Resilience Flotilla which had departed from Barcelona and Italy and attempted to reach the Gaza Strip. The operation was carried out at a distance of about 1,000 km from Israel, in the area of Crete, where the forces took control of more than 20 boats of more than 50, and more than 170 activists were transferred to Greece. Two of the flotilla organizers were detained and brought to Israel on suspicion of ties with a terrorist organization. They were Saif Abu Khashk, a Spanish citizen, who was reportedly a leading member of the PCPA,^[4] which operates in coordination with Hamas and assists in transferring funds to the movement; Tiago Avila, a Brazilian citizen who participated in the funeral of former Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah and is also wanted for questioning in Tunisia in connection with money laundering and financial irregularities (Israeli media and Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Facebook page, April 29–May 4, 2026).

• Hamas praised the flotilla participants, calling on them to continue their “humanitarian mission,” and condemned the “piracy on the high seas” and alleged harm to civilian activists while ignoring international law. The movement called on the international community to condemn the event, take action for the release of the detained activists and make Israel responsible for their safety (Hamas Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, April 30, 2026). The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) also strongly condemned the Israeli “attack on unarmed solidarity activists” (PIJ Telegram channel, April 30, 2026).

• Sources in Hamas stated that the movement had renewed the process of selecting a new head of the political bureau. According to a Hamas source in the Gaza Strip, the conditions that kept the elections from being held, which were related to internal organizational disputes in the Strip, had been removed (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 30, 2026).
• It was later reported that the voting in the Gaza Strip for the head of Hamas’ political bureau had been completed, and later elections will be held in Judea and Samaria and abroad. Sources also stated that Hamas in the Gaza Strip had selected a replacement for the current head of the bureau in the Strip, Khalil al-Hayya, should he win the race for bureau head against Hamas leader abroad Khaled Mashaal (al-Arabi channel, May 2, 2026).
• According to reports, the three heads of Hamas’ regional political bureaus were re-elected to their positions: Khalil al-Hayya in the Gaza Strip, Khaled Mashaal in Hamas abroad and Zaher Jabarin in Judea and Samaria (al-Akhbar, May 4, 2026).

Counterterrorism

• Israeli security forces continued counterterrorism activities throughout Judea and Samaria and east Jerusalem, detaining more than 80 wanted Palestinians, among them a terrorist who shot at IDF forces. Three lathes for manufacturing explosive devices and weapons, and seven drones and ready-to-use explosive devices were seized. In the village of Arrana, near Jenin, seven ready-to-use explosive devices were located which were intended to be used against Israeli security forces. In the village of Silwad in the Ramallah area, two IDF soldiers were stabbed and superficially wounded by two terrorists during an operational activity. One of the terrorists was shot and killed and the other was detained (IDF spokesperson, April 28–May 5, 2026).

     
Weapons located in Judea and Samaria (IDF spokesperson, April 29, 2026)

• An Israeli citizen from the village of Nahf was charged with swearing allegiance to ISIS and attempting to purchase a handgun to attack IDF soldiers in Karmiel (Israel Police spokesperson, April 30, 2026).

Settler Terrorism

• Palestinian media reported a series of violent incidents carried out by Jewish settlers in Hebron, Ramallah, Tubas and Nablus. Armed settlers reportedly shot at Palestinian homes in the al-Arroub camp north of Hebron, attacked a farmer in Deir Dibwan and stole his tractor, beat two youths in the Aqbat Tayseer area, attempted to set fire to a vehicle belonging to farmers in al-Lubban al-Sharqiya and prevented Palestinians from accessing their lands in Masafer Yatta, Huwara and al-Burj (Nablus News Telegram channel, May 1, 2026; Wafa, May 1, 2026).
• Christophe Bigot, the European Union representative to the Middle East peace process, participated in a tour in the village of al-Mughayyir, which is subject to ongoing attacks by Jewish settlers. During the tour, he said the EU launched a program to assist victims of settler attacks with the objective of providing them with proactive protection through volunteer groups on the ground and to establish a comprehensive system to improve their security (Wafa, April 30, 2026).

• PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas met in Amman with King Abdullah II of Jordan to discuss developments in the Palestinian arena and joint regional and international issues. Abbas praised Jordan’s support for the Palestinian cause, the humanitarian assistance it provides to Gaza and its role in the Hashemite custodianship over the holy sites in Jerusalem. He also briefed the king on the “Israeli escalation” in Judea and Samaria and east Jerusalem, the expansion of settlements, annexation attempts and settler violence, and called for the release of Palestinian tax funds held by Israel. They noted the need to maintain the historical and legal status quo of the holy sites in Jerusalem, promote stabilization of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, the entry of aid, the transition to the second stage, reconstruction and a two-state solution in accordance with international decisions. Abbas reiterated the “unity” of the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria and east Jerusalem under the principle of one state, one law and one legitimate weapon, and presented the Palestinian reform plan for strengthening state institutions, transparency, rule of law, the education system, security, the judiciary and democratic processes. They agreed to continue coordination and consultations between the Palestinian and Jordanian leaderships (Wafa, April 28, 2026).

• The deputy PA chairman, Hussein al-Sheikh, led a Palestinian delegation to Damascus where he met with the president of Syria, Ahmad al-Sharaa. They discussed recent regional developments and ways to strengthen bilateral relations in a manner that would serve the interests of both peoples. Al-Sheikh noted the consistent Palestinian position in support of Syrian territorial unity and briefed al-Sharaa on the latest developments in the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria and Jerusalem (Hussein al-Sheikh’s Facebook page, April 29, 2026).

• Muhammad Mustafa, PA prime minister, met with Christophe Bigot, the EU representative for the Middle East peace process, and briefed him on political developments, especially Israel’s alleged “escalation” in Judea and Samaria, the “systematic settler terrorism,” and the difficult humanitarian situation in the Strip. Mustafa reviewed the PA’s economic and financial hardships and called for increased political and financial support and for pressure to be exerted to stop all Israeli measures, including the release of tax clearance revenues. They discussed advancing the implementation of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, increasing aid efforts, recovery and reconstruction of the Strip and Judea and Samaria and arrangements for implementing the transition stage which will lead to the “unification of Gaza, Judea and Samaria under PA rule” (Wafa, April 29, 2026).
• The European Parliament called for freezing or conditioning European funding for the PA’s education system, noting that Palestinian textbooks continued to include antisemitic content, incitement to violence, glorification of jihad and martyrs and the rejection of peaceful solutions. The decision was adopted as part of the parliament’s annual budget oversight for the seventh consecutive year, and received broad cross-party support, including from left and center parties. The decision does not directly bind the European Commission, but constitutes a significant pressure mechanism to condition continued funding on aligning the textbooks with UNESCO standards (Israeli media, April 29, 2026).
• An incident occurred at the FIFA Congress, when the chairman of the Palestinian Football Association, Jibril Rajoub, refused to be photographed or to shake hands with the representative of the Israeli association, Bassem Suleiman, despite an attempt by FIFA President Gianni Infantino to arrange a joint photograph (Israeli and Palestinian media, May 1, 2026).
• The Jerusalem district in the PA warned of a “systematic escalation” at al-Aqsa Mosque by “extremist settler organizations, which were allegedly trying to establish new facts on the ground by increasingly storming into it and attempting to bring in animals and materials intended for sacrifice ceremonies. According to the district, since the beginning of 2026 eight such attempts have been documented, the highest number since 1967, including three cases in which activists arrived with animals at the entrances adjacent to the mosque. Reportedly, two dates have particularly explosive potential: Jerusalem Day on May 15, 2026 and Shavuot on May 22, 2026. The district called for an increase in the permanent Palestinian presence at the mosque, to strengthen the steadfastness of Jerusalem residents in the compound and to keep the issue of al-Aqsa at the top of the local and international media agenda to prevent moves on the ground without sufficient public oversight (Wafa, May 1, 2026).