Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israel-Palestinian Conflict (January 27 – February 3, 2026)

The IDF

• IDF forces continued their activity to within the Yellow Line, the territory under IDF control, in the Gaza Strip. They located and destroyed terrorist facilities and weapons, including an attack tunnel, and eliminated terrorists who tried to attack the forces. A Hamas terrorist who planned to attack IDF forces in the southern Gaza Strip was eliminated (IDF spokesperson, January 29, 2026). Four armed terrorists who approached IDF forces in Yellow Line territory were attacked from the air and killed (IDF spokesperson, January 30, 2026). Hamas sources reported that a group of armed operatives from the Izz al-Din Brigades, Hamas’ military-terrorist wing, was attacked. They had been positioned in the center of the al-Maghazi camp as a precaution against infiltration attempts by Israeli special forces or militia operatives, part of heightened security measures following recent assassinations of security officers and terrorist operatives (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 30, 2026).
• Eight-armed terrorists who emerged from a tunnel in eastern Rafah were attacked by IDF forces; three of them were eliminated. During searches, a commander in Hamas’ East Rafah Battalion was located and detained while attempting to flee (IDF spokesperson, January 30, 2026). Following the incident, and due to a violation of the ceasefire agreement, IDF forces carried out a broad series of attacks, targeting four commanders and other Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) terrorist operatives, a weapons depot, a weapons manufacturing site and two Hamas launch facilities (IDF spokesperson, January 31, 2026). Israeli fighter jets attacked various sites, including an attack on the Sheikh Radwan police headquarters in western Gaza City. An estimated 30 Gazans were killed and others were wounded, including police officers and civilians present at the police station at the time of the attack (Palestinian Police Telegram channel, January 31, 2026).
• A Gazan was killed by a missile attack in the al-Maghazi refugee camp. The man was reportedly an aide of the commander of Hamas’ al-Maghazi Battalion (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 30, 2026).

The Situation in the Gaza Strip

• Palestinian sources continue to claim the situation in hospitals in the Strip is dire. Dr. Muhammad Abu Salmiya, director of the al-Shifa medical complex, claimed the hospital was “in a state of collapse,” with a shortage of more than 70% of medicines, including life-saving drugs. He said the hospital was operating at minimal capacity while the number of patients had increased following outbreaks of seasonal diseases (Shehab News Agency, January 27, 2026). He further claimed that during the war about 50% of Gazan dialysis patients died while waiting for medicines to arrive. According to him, al-Shifa Hospital currently operated only 34 dialysis machines and treated about 750 patients with intake exceeding capacity (Quds and Palestine News Telegram channel, February 1, 2026). Dr. Jamil Suleiman, director of the al-Rantisi Children’s Hospital, reported cases of meningitis in the southern Gaza Strip and said there was a risk the disease would spread to the north, as shortages of laboratory tests, medicines and medical supplies along with the erosion of manpower and resources could lead to loss of control (Telegram channel of Hamza al-Masri, January 28, 2026).
• The director of the ministry of health in Gaza, Dr. Munir al-Barsh, claimed that during 2025 about 50,000 babies were born in the Gaza Strip, a decline of 11% compared to pre-war averages. There was allegedly an increase of about 60% in childbirth complications compared to the pre-war period, and about 4,100 premature births, which he said were linked to psychological and physical distress and a lack of basic medical care (Munir al-Barsh X account, January 29, 2026).
• The Gaza City municipality reported a shortage of water, with a deficit reaching 90% of pre-war daily consumption, due to a break in the Israeli Mekorot line east of the city, which supplied about 70% of current needs, following IDF land-clearing activities. As a result, large areas of the city had no water. The municipality said it was working with the Palestinian Water Authority to reach the site and repair the damage to the pipeline (Gaza City municipality Facebook page, January 28, 2026).
• Many residents expressed anger over increases in the price of public transportation and vehicle ownership costs, and demanded reductions. Various companies and commercial factors were accused of exploiting their monopoly and calls were heard for public pressure to be exerted against unions and “responsible” bodies (Facebook pages of Youssef Abd al-Hamid Rayan, Fayez Ghabin, Central Area page, January 31, 2026).
• On January 27, 2026, the office of senior Shi’ite cleric and Iraqi political leader Muqtada al-Sadr announced the dispatch of a humanitarian aid convoy to the Gazans, including tents and blankets (Iraqi News Agency, January 27, 2026).
• On February 1, 2026 Israel suspended the activity of Doctors Without Borders in the Gaza Strip and demanded that the organization leave by February 28. The suspension followed the organization’s refusal to submit lists of its employees as part of a new registration procedure for aid organizations managed by the Israeli Ministry of Diaspora Affairs. The organization had promised to submit the lists at the beginning of January 2026 and did not do so. Since January 2026, the licenses of 37 organizations were revoked. Palestinian and international sources claimed that halting the organization’s activity could severely damage already limited medical services, as it operated and cooperated with 15 clinics and medical centers (Anadolu Agency, February 1, 2026).

Civilian Governance

• Unofficial reports circulated of the appointment of new district governors in the Gaza Strip: Ahmed al-Masri in the north of the Strip, Riyad Halas in Gaza City, Faten Harb in the central camps, Jihad Abu Khalib in Khan Yunis and Suhail Moussa in Rafah. The public reacted with skepticism about the credibility of the report and anger. Some questioned who had appointed the governors, and what the criteria and their political affiliation were. Meanwhile there was public doubt regarding the practical benefit of the move and what a “governor” could actually do when people lived in the streets, institutions were collapsing and basic services were barely functioning (Facebook pages of al-Maam Ghazawi, Gaza Time, January 30, 2026).
• The Gaza Strip ministry of transport and communications announced that starting Tuesday, February 3, 2026 services at the Gaza vehicle licensing office would partially resume at its new location at the Imam al-Shafi’i Center in Gaza City (Hamas government media information office, February 3, 2026).

Security Governance

• In response to a call for volunteers to enlist the “resistance,”^[2] many Gazans said they would be “proud to join the struggle” and some also said they were “prepared for sacrifice.” There were also critical and cautious responses, including warnings it was a scam advertisement attempting to “hunt” people, “trade in blood” and ridicule the resistance (Facebook page of the City of Khan Yunis, January 29, 2026).
• A senior “resistance” [terrorist] security official said Israel’s objective in the recent attacks was to hit detention facilities holding Palestinians involved in cooperation with the “occupation” to disrupt Hamas’ “security efforts.” He said some collaborators were killed during attacks on detention facilities where they were held. He added that the “resistance” security forces had recently prevented “several hostile actions whose objective was to sow chaos in Gaza” or collect intelligence on the ground, and several collaborators who were about to carry out such missions had been arrested (alresala.net, February 1, 2026).

A Hospital Director Who Is a Hamas Terrorist

• The New York Post revealed the direct link between Hamas’ military-terrorist activity and medical institutions in the Strip, reporting that the director of Kamal Adwan Hospital, Hussam Abu Safiya, whose detention by Israel sparked a wave of international protests and who published two op-ed pieces defaming Israel in The New York Times, was in fact a colonel in Hamas’ military-terrorist wing. In a photo from 2016 published on the Facebook page of the Gazan directorate of military medical services, subordinate to Hamas’ ministry of interior, Abu Safiya appears in uniform at an event marking the completion of Kamal Adwan Hospital (New York Post, January 31, 2026).

     
Right: Abu Safiya in senior officer uniform during a meeting of Hamas military-terrorist wing officers. Left: The civilian disguises of Hamas terrorist operatives (X account Real Estate “OG,” January 31, 2026).

Militia Activity

• Ghassan al-Dahini, commander of the Popular Forces in eastern Rafah, called on those arriving in the Gaza Strip, including those who opposed the “terrorist rule,” who wanted to join efforts of the “fight against terrorism” and sought to reside in Rafah, to go to the Popular Forces checkpoint in the Rafah Crossing area (Ghassan al-Dahini Facebook page, January 27, 2026).
• The “counterterrorism mechanism” of the Popular Forces under al-Dahini issued footage showing Ghassan al-Dahini humiliating a naked Hamas operative sitting on the ground. The operative was Adham Attallah al-Akar, a company commander in the al-Qassam Brigades and a muqaddam (lieutenant colonel) in the Hamas police. The video was widely criticized online. Gazans denounced the arrest and humiliation of the detainee, called al-Dahini a collaborator and even warned of a coming Izz al-Din Brigades “day of revenge.” Individuals affiliated with Hamas called it propaganda to damage the image of the “resistance” and portray its operatives as broken and defeated. The National Association of Tribes, Clans and Families condemned the arrest, saying “gang” actions did reflect not Palestinian society (Facebook pages of the “counterterrorism mechanism,” al-
  Nazla News, Khalik Wa’i, January 30, 2026).

• Ghassan al-Dahini reported that the Popular Defense and Counterterrorism forces in al-Shuja’iyya [Rami Halas’ militia, known as the Popular Defense Forces operating in the area] had conducted a security operation on February 1 as part of the Shield of Peace plan against terrorist checkpoints in the Jahar al-Dik area. They caused fatalities and dismantled control shelters engaged in the theft of goods from trucks (Ghassan al-Dahini Facebook page, February 1, 2026).
• A security source in the Rada Force said that during the arrest of a militia operative cooperating with Israel, Captagon was found in his possession. According to the source, the detainee admitted to regular use of the drug, especially while carrying out hostile actions, and claimed that senior militia figures supplied operatives with drugs before missions (Rada Force Telegram channel, January 30, 2026).
• Hussam al-Astal, commander of an armed militia in the Khan Yunis area, said he would take action against Hamas in the Strip and called its operatives to renounce the movement and leave it. He pledged to assist families who left Hamas, adding that the militia would begin rehabilitating areas under its control (Hussam al-Astal Facebook page, February 3, 2026).

• The Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) announced that in accordance with the ceasefire agreement and directed by the political echelon, the Rafah Crossing was opened on February 1, 2026 in both directions for the limited movement of people only. Entry and exit will be coordinated with Egypt, subject to prior security approval of Gazans by Israel and under the supervision of the European Union mission, similar to the mechanism operated in January 2025. The return of Gazans from Egypt to the Gaza Strip will be permitted only for those who left Gaza during the war, and only after prior security approval. Initial identification and screening will be conducted at the crossing by the European Union mission, followed by additional screening and identification at a checkpoint operated by Israeli security in territory under IDF control (Israeli media, January 31, 2026). The chairman of the technocrat committee, Ali Shaath, announced that after completion of the required arrangements, he was officially announcing the opening of the Crossing in both directions starting February 2, 2026. He said February 1 was a trial day for operating the Crossing (Ali Shaath’s Facebook page, January 30, 2026).

• Hussam Badran, a member of the Hamas political bureau, claimed Hamas and the “resistance”^[3] had fulfilled all the clauses of the first phase of the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip, and accused the Prime Minister of Israel of stalling and using excuses to evade commitments, particularly regarding the opening of the Rafah Crossing and withdrawal from areas under Israeli control. He claimed the delay in transferring the body of the last hostage was due to technical reasons, without any attempt to gain benefits, and alleged that Israel had delayed coordination for political considerations. He added that Netanyahu addressed the issue of the hostages with personal calculations and electoral considerations, and “military decisions” had led to the deaths of hostages during the war. Regarding the second phase, he said it should include a full withdrawal from the Strip, a serious start to rehabilitation and the entry of aid, while rejecting “demilitarization” demands as an attempt to undermine the agreement (Hamas official Telegram channel, January 27, 2026).
• Riyad al-Sawafiri, coordinator of the economic committee at the Gaza chamber of commerce, said that at the current stage there was no discussion of the commercial operation of the Rafah Crossing, and the crossing would be managed in a Palestinian-Egyptian format without Israeli involvement. Reportedly, more than 50 patients and wounded had arrived on the Egyptian side of the crossing and teams were preparing to receive them upon their arrival in Gaza. The National Committee for the Management of Gaza said in the near future it would announce mechanisms and travel dates, registration methods and criteria for passage, to ensure transparency, order and equal opportunity among citizens. The committee called the opening of the Rafah Crossing a significant step to ease the burdens on the Gazans (Radio Alam, February 2, 2026).

Disarming Hamas

• A member of the Hamas political bureau, Musa Abu Marzouk, said Benjamin Netanyahu had no reason to boast about the return of the hostages, since the release was carried out as part of an agreement and in accordance with the conditions set by Hamas. He further said the movement had not agreed in the past and would not agree to hand over its weapons in any format, and that any future arrangement concerning the Gaza Strip had to be coordinated with Hamas (Al Jazeera, January 30, 2026).
• A member of Hamas’ political bureau, Hussam Badran, claimed the issue of Hamas’ disarmament was an internal Palestinian matter and the weapons of the “resistance” were intended for defense against the occupation (Hamas Telegram channel, January 27, 2026).
• During a Security Council session, the United States ambassador to the UN said Hamas could not have any role in the governance of Gaza, directly or indirectly, in any form whatsoever. He added that all military, terrorist and offensive facilities, including tunnels and weapons production facilities, would be destroyed and not rebuilt, and that international and independent inspectors would oversee the process of demilitarizing Gaza, which would include permanently taking weapons out of use through an agreed disarmament process supported by an internationally funding (Reuters, January 28, 2026).
• Reportedly, Hamas recently agreed to discuss disarmament with other Palestinian “factions”^[4] and with the mediators, but two senior Hamas figures told Reuters that neither Washington nor the mediators had presented the movement with a concrete proposal for disarmament. A Palestinian figure close to the disarmament talks said the United States had contacted Hamas to examine possible mechanisms for disarmament, including Israel, Qatar, Egypt and Turkey. He said Hamas had spoken about the possibility of disarmament within the framework of a truce of five years or perhaps slightly more, but believed it was essential that disarmament be accompanied by a political process for a Palestinian state, at which point the weapons and “fighters” would be under the state’s authority. According to a source in a Gaza terrorist organization close to Hamas, other “groups” were discussing disarmament but were concerned that they would remain unarmed (Reuters Arabic, January 27, 2026).
• Another Hamas source said that the issue of the “weapons of the resistance” was still at the stage of “general consultations, both among the ‘factions’ and with the mediators.” The source revealed that “the movement has again raised several ideas and approaches, such as the possibility of transferring the weapons to the trusteeship of an agreed Palestinian body, or under the guarantee of the mediators, in a manner that would prevent their disarmament according to the American or Israeli approach, or their transfer to either of them.” Hamas sources inside and outside the Strip noted that “to date the issue has not been seriously discussed.” According to them, the movement wanted agreement on the weapons issue to be achieved within a comprehensive national framework. They added that consultations were being held with Palestinian “factions,” and “a proposal is being formulated to be presented to the mediators during serious talks on the issue.” They said the issue of weapons had been raised by several of the mediators during recent meetings, including the meeting between the movement’s leadership and the Turkish foreign minister a few days previously. According to one of the sources, “there is agreement among the mediators and some parties with the approaches presented during the general consultations, emphasizing the right of Palestinian factions to possess what enables them to resist the occupation” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 29, 2026).

Transfer of Responsibility for the Strip to the Technocrat Committee

• Isma’il al-Thawabta, director general of the Hamas government media information office, said that the process of transferring management of government work to the National Committee for the Management of Gaza was being carried out orderly, based on prior preparation and professional coordination aimed at ensuring the continuity of work and preventing an administrative vacuum or the disruption of services. He said professional and administrative bodies in government ministries and public institutions were working to facilitate the handover, with meetings having been held for weeks at the administrative, professional and service levels to organize the transfer of government work smoothly and in an orderly manner across all sectors (Sunud News website, January 27, 2026).
• A Palestinian source said that recently a national operations room had been established to monitor the transfer of governance in the Gaza Strip, headed by Khaled al-Batsh, a member of the PIJ political bureau and coordinator of the supreme committee of Islamic forces and “factions” in the Strip. According to the source, the forum includes representatives from the Gaza government’s emergency committee and from the National Committee for the Management of the Strip. In addition, there are representatives of the UN and of Palestinian power centers and “factions,” including the PIJ, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Dahlan trend and the Palestinian National Initiative, as well as a representative of Palestinian clans in Gaza. Egypt’s role is limited to “supervising the transfer process.” The source noted that the forum had held its first meeting, and the Egyptians were directly supervising its work as part of support and oversight to ensure a successful transfer process (Sunud News website, January 29, 2026).
• Hezbollah’s Lebanese newspaper al-Akhbar reported that activity in the Strip under the direct supervision of Hamas’ deputy chairman in Gaza, Ali al-Amoudi, with the participation of representatives of national and Islamic forces, in preparation for transferring governmental responsibility to the National Committee for the Management of the Gaza Strip. The newspaper reported that the Supreme National Committee to supervise the transfer included representatives from PIJ, the Popular Front, the National Initiative and the Dahlan faction, along with members of the Gaza government emergency committee and the Gaza management committee. The committee also includes a UN representative and a representative, not yet appointed, from Egyptian general intelligence (al-Akhbar, January 29, 2026). Khaled al-Batsh said the Palestinian “factions” would not merely support and assist the national committee, but would monitor its performance and work, (Sunud News website, January 22, 2026).
• The German News Agency (DPA), citing a senior Hamas figure, reported that the movement wanted to integrate 10,000 of its “security personnel”^[5] into the police force of the future Palestinian administration in the Gaza Strip. The individual said agreement had been reached with American representatives and that all candidates would undergo security screening. He claimed the Hamas police had “the best understanding of the situation,” and their integration would help prevent dismissed police officers from joining extremist groups (al-Quds al-Arabi, January 27, 2026), Reuters reported that the Hamas government in Gaza had sent a letter to more than 40,000 of its “civilian employees” and members of the security forces, calling on them to cooperate with the National Committee for the Management of Gaza and promising it would to integrate them into the new government. Four sources familiar with the matter said Hamas wanted the integration to include the Hamas police force, about 10,000 persons, a demand which had not previously been made public. Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem told Reuters that they were fully confident that the committee would utilize expertise and not harm the rights of those who had worked in the previous period, referring to the 40,000 employees. The sources said Hamas was open to reorganizing ministries and retiring some employees, adding that mass dismissals could create chaos. A Palestinian official said that the movement and the head of the National Committee for the Management of Gaza, Ali Shaath, had not yet met directly to discuss the issue. A senior Palestinian said another problem was whether Sami Nasman, the former Palestinian Authority officer in charge overseeing security in the National Committee for the Management of Gaza, would be able to work effectively (Reuters in Arabic, January 27, 2026).
• A knowledgeable source said the Hamas government was preparing to hand over government buildings and headquarters to the Gaza Management Committee, after the committee had been provided with information regarding the condition of offices and existing buildings which remained standing and undamaged by the war. The source said Hamas was in contact with the committee in preparation for an orderly handover of the buildings as soon as the committee arrived in the Strip, including the ministry of interior and national security complexes. He expects that committee members to enter the Strip on Thursday, February 5, 2026, except for the holder of the security portfolio (X account of the Arab21 website, January 28, 2026). Al-Akhbar also reported that Sami Nasman, who holds the security portfolio in the committee, would not accompany the technocrat government delegation to the Gaza Strip. He will remain in his office at the Rafah Crossing “to avoid confrontation with Palestinian families accusing him of involvement in the killing of their sons during his previous work in Palestinian Authority general intelligence.” Nevertheless, Nasman will hold a handover ceremony at the Rafah Crossing with the representative of the Palestinian police in the Strip (al-Akhbar, January 29, 2026).

Hamas’ International Activity

• On January 26, 2026, a delegation of the Hamas leadership headed by Khalil al-Hayya met in Ankara with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and briefed him on efforts to stabilize the ceasefire. According to Hamas, the movement had fulfilled all its obligations under the agreement and transferred all the bodies of the “prisoners of the occupation,” despite what it described as repeated Israeli violations. It also briefed him on progress toward implementing the second phase of the agreement, including the establishment of a national administrative committee, which required the completion of Israel’s withdrawal from the Strip, the opening of the Rafah Crossing in both directions and the entry of aid and shelter supplies for the population. The Turkish foreign minister said Ankara continued to protect Palestinian rights and invest efforts to deliver humanitarian aid and respond to the Gazans’ need for shelter (Hamas Telegram channel, January 27, 2026).

• Following the Israeli attacks in Gaza on January 31, 2026, Hamas reported that the movement’s leadership had held contacts with the mediators and other international actors, and opposed and condemned Israel’s actions and its continued aggression against the Gaza Strip “under false claims.” Hamas claimed Israel bore responsibility for the failure to reach a solution regarding the issue of Hamas operatives in Rafah, who are in areas under IDF control. According to the statement, Khalil al-Hayya, Hamas chairman in Gaza, warned of the repercussions and consequences of the [alleged] “crimes” carried out by Israel almost daily in the Gaza Strip, and the “blatant violations” of the ceasefire agreement. He noted that Hamas’ commitment to the agreement and compliance with it required obligating Israel and preventing it from continuing its activities (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, January 31, 2026).

Terrorist Attacks

Stabbing Attempt at the Tunnels’ Checkpoint

• On January 28, 2026, a stabbing attempt was carried out at the Tunnels’ Checkpoint, and the would-be attacker was eliminated. He was identified as Qusay Maher Halaika, from the town of al-Shaykh in the Hebron district (IDF spokesperson, January 28, 2026; Wafa, January 28, 2026).

Counterterrorism Activity

• During an operational activity by IDF forces in al-Dahariya, a terrorist threw a Molotov cocktail at them, he was shot and killed. Another terrorist threw rocks at the forces. The fighters responded with gun fire (IDF spokesperson, January 27, 2026). The ministry of health in Ramallah reported that the terrorist killed by IDF fire was Muhammad Rajeh Nasrallah, 20, from the town of al-Dahariya (Wafa, January 27, 2026).
• On January 28, 2026 Khader Shahadeh was detained in the Tulkarm area; according to information he planned to carry out an attack. The building in which he was hiding was encircled and he attempted to flee; he was shot in his lower extremities (police and ISA spokespersons, January 28, 2026). Shahadeh is the son of the head of Fatah in the Tulkarm refugee camp, Muhammad Shahadeh (Wafa, January 28, 2026).
• In Nur Shams near Tulkarm, five explosive devices were neutralized (IDF spokesperson, January 31, 2026). In the village of Halhul, IDF forces demolished the home of terrorist Mahmoud Abed, who with another terrorist carried out the shooting on July 10, 2025 at the Gush Etzion Junction, murdering Shilo Zevuloni (IDF spokesperson, February 2, 2026).

Friction between Palestinians and Israelis

• On January 27, 2026 IDF forces were called to the village of Khirbet al-Halawah in the Yatta area, south of Hebron, following a report that several Palestinians had attacked an Israeli civilian, stolen part of the flock and taken his personal equipment. Another report was received about the arrival of Israeli civilians the village of Khirbet al-Fakhit, where friction developed at several points. Security forces dispersed the incidents and restored order, during which an Israeli civilian and three Palestinians were injured and evacuated for medical treatment. It was further reported that during the dispersal of the confrontations an IDF female officer was attacked by a Palestinian woman who wounded her face, and two Palestinian women were detained (IDF spokesperson, January 27, 2026).
• On January 28, 2026 IDF forces were called to the area of Mikhmas in the Binyamin region north of Ramallah following a report that several Israeli civilians had set fire to two structures near the local Bedouin community. The arson suspects fled and no additional evidence was found (IDF spokesperson, January 28, 2026).

Political Activity

• The Palestinian foreign minister, Farsin Shaheen, met in New Delhi with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and senior officials in the administration. The meeting took place on the sidelines of the Arab-Indian ministerial meeting. Modi stated India’s firm position in support of the Palestinian issue and the Palestinian people, while the minister praised Indian support, particularly at the United Nations and the UN Human Rights Council, and thanked India for its ongoing economic assistance (Palestinian foreign ministry Facebook page, January 31, 2026).