Reactions to Hezbollah’s Attack in Retaliation for the Killing of Fuad Shukr

Overview^[1]

• On August 25, 2024, Hezbollah claimed responsibility for a combined rocket-UAV attack on military targets in Israel in retaliation for the killing of Fuad Shukr, the organization’s military commander, in an Israeli targeted attack in Beirut on July 30, 2024. Hezbollah claimed the attack had achieved its goals. Earlier, a hundred Israeli Air Force fighter jets carried out a pre-emptive strike against thousands of Hezbollah rocket and missile launchers in south Lebanon which were aimed at northern and central Israel.
• Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah secretary general, claimed 340 rockets had been fired at IDF bases in northern Israel, after which a large number of UAVs were launched deep into Israeli territory, hitting an aerial defense base and an intelligence base. He added that if the results were not “satisfactory” Hezbollah “reserved the right” to carry out further attacks.
  Contrary to Nasrallah’s claim, the aerial defense and intelligence bases were not attacked. Israel’s aerial defense forces, the Israeli Air Force and the Israeli Navy intercepted most of the rocket and UAV launches. One IDF soldier was killed and two were injured by an interceptor explosion near a Navy ship. A woman was injured by shrapnel in Acre and extensive property damage was caused.

• Hezbollah-affiliated commentators claimed that the objective of the retaliatory attack was to preserve the “equation” between Israel and Hezbollah and prevent an all-out war, and reiterated Hezbollah’s position that a cease-fire in the Gaza Strip would lead to the cessation of fighting in south Lebanon.
• Iran and the “resistance axis” organizations,^[2] including Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, praised Hezbollah for the attack on Israel.
• Social media users in Lebanon and the Arab world mocked Hezbollah’s attack, noting that the most effective hit was a chicken coop in northern Israel.
• Hezbollah propaganda outlets made an effort to establish the false narrative that the IDF’s preemptive attack was unsuccessful, did not cause significant damage to the organization, and claimed success in hitting important targets in Israel. That was because Hezbollah wanted to justify its activities to the citizens of Lebanon, hide the extent of the damage caused to the organization by the preemptive attack, and possibly because the extent of the damage had not yet been fully calculated.
• In ITIC assessment , after Hezbollah finishes retaliating for the death of Fuad Shukr, its attacks on the northern border will continue according to the organization’s initial use of force and “equations,” which includes proactive fire near the border and reactive fire further away with varying extent, depending on the strength and nature of the IDF’s proactive activity.^[3]

Israel’s Preemptive Strike and Hezbollah’s Attack

IDF Announcement

• Before dawn on August 25, 2024, about a hundred Israeli Air Force planes attacked more than 270 Hezbollah targets in south Lebanon, including thousands of rocket launchers. According to reports, most of the launchers were aimed at northern Israel; some of them were armed with long-range rockets and aimed at strategic targets in the center of the country. The IDF spokesperson stated that the objective of the attack was to prevent a broad Hezbollah attack (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 25, 2024).

   
Right: The sites which were attacked in Lebanon. Left: Picture of one of the attacks
(IDF spokesperson, August 25, 2024)

Hezbollah’s attack and reactions

• After the Israeli attack, Hezbollah fired rockets and launched UAVs at extensive areas of northern Israel. Hezbollah announced that to mark the arba’in,^[4] the 40^th day since the death of Fuad Shukr and the deaths of Lebanese civilians in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut on July 30, 2024,^[5] it had launched an “initial response.” According to reports, a large number of UAVs were launched at “the Zionist depth and an important IDF target” which would be announced later, and that “a number of posts, camps and Iron Dome positions” in northern Israel were also attacked with “a large number of rockets.” The message stated that the “Islamic resistance” in Lebanon was on high alert, would stand firm in the face of any “Zionist aggression” and would severely punish any harm incurred, especially by civilians (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 25, 2024).
• Shortly thereafter, Hezbollah issued an announcement claiming that “the first phase ended with complete success and included attacking Israeli camps and posts with 320 rockets, allowing the UAVs to fly towards their desired targets in the depths of the Zionist entity [sic].” According to Hezbollah, it attacked 11 IDF bases (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 25, 2024).
• Hezbollah later issued another statement, claiming that “all the UAVs which were launched at the preplanned times crossed the border towards the intended targets and from different routes, therefore our military operation for the day has been completed and achieved.” The statement added that the “enemy’s” statements about its preventive action, the goals it achieved and its interference with the “resistance” attack were empty claims and belied by the facts on the ground (Telegram channel of Hezbollah’s combat information arm, August 25, 2024).
• Hezbollah claimed that the response to the killing of Fuad Shukr was carried out “with great precision” and successfully achieved its goals, despite Israeli censorship and its “false claims” regarding the disruption of the attack. Hezbollah further [falsely] claimed that the essence of the “resistance” response was the UAVs, which hit a vital military target, and the 320 rockets which were launched to engage Israel’s Iron Dome aerial defense system and interception capabilities. Hezbollah denied that Israel had destroyed more than a thousand rockets or precision missiles. It further claimed [again falsely] that despite Israel’s ongoing high alert and its use of American intelligence and operational support, the attack succeeded in hitting a vital target deep in Israel (al-Mayadeen, August 25, 2024).
• “Informed sources” said that Hezbollah had ended its retaliation and the “exchange of blows” with Israel would once again be within the “rules of the conflict,” pending a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip (Lebanon 24, August 26, 2024).
• Muhammad Fneish, a senior Hezbollah figure, said that the objective of the “resistance” was to “punish the enemy and return it to the rules of confrontation.” He claimed Hezbollah had the capability to prepare for any future development, “but does not aspire to an all-out war,” and that if Israel “exceeds its borders or attacks civilians, the resistance is prepared and will respond accordingly.” He claimed they no longer feared Israel, adding that “the resistance has changed the balance of power in Lebanon, ‘Palestine’ and the entire region” and Israel would not be able to attack “without an appropriate response” (MTV Lebanon, August 26, 2024).

The IDF response

• Israeli Air Force aircraft, aerial defense systems and Israeli Navy vessels intercepted most of rockets. One IDF soldier was killed and two were injured by an interceptor explosion near a Navy ship. A woman was injured by shrapnel in Acre, and the attacks caused considerable damage to property, including the total destruction of a chicken coop near the border (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 25, 2024).

• According to the IDF, 230 Hezbollah rocket launches and 20 drone launches crossed into Israeli territory, 90% from the heart of the civilian population and near civilian facilities such as schools, mosques and UN sites (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 26, 2024).

   
Hezbollah launch sites near civilian sites in south Lebanon (IDF spokesperson, August 26, 2024)

Nasrallah’s speech

• On the evening of August 25, 2024, Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah secretary general, delivered a speech summarizing the attack, which he called the “Operation Arba’in” (al-Manar, August 25, 2024):
  • The reason for the delay in Hezbollah’s response: He claimed Hezbollah’s response was delayed because Israeli and United States forces were on high alert, and by the fear of failure. He added the members of the “resistance axis”^[6] had to consult as to whether the response would be joint or if each would act individually. He claimed Hezbollah also wanted to provide an opportunity for a ceasefire to be negotiated in the Gaza Strip.
  • Decision to hit a military target: He claimed that Hezbollah had decided to limit its response and not attack civilians, adding that the organization wanted to attack a military target related to the killing of Fuad Shukr, one that would be deep inside Israeli territory close to Tel Aviv. He also claimed they did not currently intend to use strategic missiles, but might in the near future.
  • Description of the attack: According to Nasrallah, at 05:15 a.m. Hezbollah operatives were supposed to fire 300 rockets at Israel, a number he claimed could disable the Iron Dome aerial defense system and the interception batteries for several minutes, allowing the UAVs to penetrate Israeli airspace. He claimed they first fired 340 rockets to paralyze Israel’s aerial defense systems, and then launched UAVs of various types, including from the Lebanon Valley for the first time. He also claimed that all the UAV launch positions were operative, had not been damaged before the operation and that all the UAVs “crossed the border safely towards their destinations.”
  • The results of the attack: He claimed that the two main targets were Ein Shemer base, an aerial defense base 72 km from the border and Gelilot base, an intelligence base 110 km from the border, near Tel Aviv. Nasrallah claimed that a “significant number” of UAVs reached their targets and accused Israel of being “silent” and that “day and night they will search for the truth about what happened.” Contrary to Nasrallah’s fabrications, the bases were not attacked.
  • The effect of the attack on Israel: He praised the operation, noting that it was the first major operation carried out by the “resistance” in the absence of Fuad Shakar, and that it had been carried out “flawlessly.” He sneered, “If Israel shut down Tel Aviv and the airports and opened shelters just because we used rockets and UAVs, what would happen if we used more than that?”

• • Israel’s preemptive attack: He accused Israel of “aggression,” not “preemptive action,” and denied Israeli reports that thousands of missiles and launchers had been destroyed. He said Israel began its attacks half an hour before the response operation was carried out after perceiving movement of the organization’s operatives, not based on intelligence information. He claimed that the Israeli attack had no effect on Hezbollah’s operation or operatives, and that no strategic or precision missiles had been hit, with the exception of two positions which were hit after Hezbollah’s operation.
  • Threat of further attacks: He said Hezbollah would monitor “the results of the enemy’s silence” regarding events at the two bases targeted in the operation. He stated that “if the response appears satisfactory, we will consider whether it is sufficient” as retaliation for the killing of Fuad Shukr in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia, adding “if the response does not appear satisfactory, until further notice, we reserve the right [sic] to respond.”
  • Support for the Gaza Strip and the “resistance axis:” He said Hezbollah would not abandon the Gaza Strip and its residents, regardless of the circumstances, challenges or victims. According to him, Hezbollah activity could benefit the Palestinian side or the Arab side in the negotiations. He added that the message to Israel and the United States was that the “support fronts,” especially Lebanon, could not be silenced, despite the victims. He said that Israel had be wary of Lebanon, as it was no longer weak.
• Immediately after the speech, Hezbollah issued a video showing satellite images of the two bases the organization claimed had been its two main targets. In addition, a video was issued of a simulation of some of the buildings at one of the bases (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 25-26, 2024).

Reactions from Hezbollah-affiliated commentators

• Ibrahim al-Amin, editor-in-chief of the Hezbollah- and Nasrallah-affiliated Lebanese daily al-Akhbar, stated that Hezbollah’s action “had been completely coordinated with the strategy used by the organization since day one.” He claimed Hezbollah was not interested in an all-out war and therefore would never take any action that would lead it to one whose timing, arena or methods the organization had not chosen. If Hezbollah were interested in a war, he claimed, it would fire sporadic shots at the suburbs of Haifa, or Nahariya or Safed. However, the organization did not want to give the enemy a minute of the calm it needed to concentrate its efforts on Gaza and the West Bank, but wanted to drag it into using a third of its military, security and political efforts against Lebanon.” Al-Amin stated the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel would return to its framework, which had greatly changed over the past three months, and could be changed daily, but that would not actually change anything. He also noted that the attack provided another example of Hezbollah’s position since the front in south Lebanon opened on October 8, 2023, which was that the only way to stop attacks in the north was to stop the attacks in the south [i.e. the Gaza Strip]” (al-Akhbar, August 26, 2024).
• Al-Akhbar published an article entitled, “Hezbollah establishes the Tel Aviv-Dahiyeh equation.” According to Ali Haydar, a reporter for the newspaper, Hezbollah carried out its threat to respond to Fuad Shukr’s death and it “contains multiple messages and dimensions concerning the courage and wisdom of the decision, and the willingness to deal with all the consequences that could arise.” Haidar also claimed that “the ‘ceiling’ of attacks that the enemy wanted to set failed, because Hezbollah countered with a suburb of Tel Aviv for a suburb of Beirut.” He added that “not to be ignored is that the failure of American intimidation and the Israeli threat to launch a destructive war on Lebanon following the response are another variable to strengthening the resistance’s position in the deterrent equation, even when the other side is Washington and Tel Aviv” (al-Akhbar, August 26 2024).

Reactions in Lebanon

• Najib Mikati, prime minister of the Lebanese interim government, convened a meeting of ministers to discuss developments and the preparedness of the country’s emergency services. The meeting was attended by the ministers of foreign affairs, justice, health, environment, economy, transport and energy, the president of the South Lebanon Council and the secretary general of the Supreme Security Council. Mikati said he was in contact with Lebanon’s partners to stop the escalation, stating that Israeli “aggression” had to be stopped and UN Security Council Resolution 1701 had to be implemented. He also stated that Lebanon supported the international efforts to achieve a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip (Lebanese prime minister’s X account, August 25, 2024).

The Lebanese government meeting (Lebanese prime minister’s X account, August 25, 2024)

• Najib Mikati spoke on the phone with David Lammy, the British foreign minister, to discuss the latest developments and the situation in south Lebanon. According to reports, they said the top priority was to prevent the situation from escalating into an all-out war. Mikati said that “the way to a solution is the implementation of international resolutions,” adding that Israel had to be forced to stop its “continuous violations and attacks” (al-Nashra, August 25, 2024).
• Samy al-Gemayel, chairman of the Phalanges Party, said that “after a reaction and a reaction to the reaction and a reaction to the reaction to the reaction,” it was clear that none of the parties wanted to expand the war. Therefore, he called on Hezbollah and Israel to immediately stop the military operations on the border, promote a cease-fire agreement (hudna) and implement all international resolutions concerning Lebanon, especially UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which states that weapons will be only in the hands of the state and that Lebanese government would be sovereign throughout the entire country. He also criticized Nasrallah’s speech and said that “not even a Lebanese would believe the lies of the speeches and the claims of imaginary victories” (Samy al-Gemayel’s X account, August 25, 2024).

Reactions of Iran and the “Resistance Axis”

Iran

• Nasser Kanaani, spokesman for Iran’s foreign ministry, claimed that Israel had lost its deterrence. He claimed that despite the support of its allies, Israel could not predict even the time and location of the “resistance’s” limited, organized attack. He claimed that “the occupying regime now must defend itself from within the occupied territories” (Nasser Kanaani’s X account, August 26, 2024).
• According to the Nour news agency, affiliated with Iran’s National Security Council, Hezbollah’s “success” was made possible because it surprised the “Zionists,” a formula that will most likely be used again in the future (Nournews X account of Nour News, August 25, 2024).

“Resistance axis” organizations

• Hamas said that they welcomed the “great, excellent response” of the Hezbollah fighters in attacking a number of vital, strategic targets in the depths of the “Zionist entity” in retaliation for the crime of the “Zionist” killing of “Fuad Shukr, the great jihadi commander,” and for the “Zionist” crimes and ongoing aggression in the Gaza Strip and in Lebanon (Hamas Telegram channel, August 25, 2024). Hamas called the retaliation a “slap in the face” of the Israeli government and a message that its “crimes” against the Palestinians and the Lebanese would not achieve their goals and would not go unanswered. Hamas blamed the United States for the consequences of being Israel’s partner in its aggression in “Palestine,” Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and Iraq (Hamas website, August 25, 2024).
• Abu Obeida, spokesman for Hamas’ military wing, congratulated Hezbollah on its “response” to Israel. He claimed Hezbollah had again confirmed the change in the “entity’s strategic situation” since Operation al-Aqsa Flood, to one in which the “enemy” could be hit from anywhere and from any front. He stated that all the fronts would continue to “burn” as long as the “aggression” against the Palestinian people continued (Abu Obeida’s Telegram channel, August 25, 2024).
• Ahmed Abd al-Hady, a senior Hamas figure in Lebanon, claimed Hezbollah’s response “proved that Lebanon is not tricked by American deceptions regarding the calming of the fronts and negotiations.” He claimed the response “proves that the support fronts continue [operating] and all options will be open as long as the aggression against the Gaza Strip continues” (al-Mayadeen, August 25, 2024).
• Mahmoud Mardawi, a senior Hamas figure, wondered if it made sense from a military point of view to attack and destroy 6,000 rockets “without the response going beyond the southern Lebanese region and not being aimed at Hezbollah’s capitals and targets, which were parallel to targets that Israel believes Hezbollah wanted to hit?” He added that “during 11 months, the enemy failed to eliminate Hezbollah’s medium and long range rocket power, and now manages to do it in an hour?” Mardawi also wrote that “the enemy’s statement related to the restoration of deterrence. What deterrence does not break the rules of the conflict and leaves the enemy subject to them in the ongoing conflict?! However, at every stage the enemy exaggerates its messages and achievements” (Mahmoud Mardawi’s X account, August 25, 2024) .
• The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) congratulated the “brothers” in Hezbollah for the attack in the depth of the “thieving entity” and its success in delivering “brave blows [and a display of] courage,” noting that it firmly maintained its positions and had kept its promise [to retaliate]. The PIJ added that “the blows emphasize that the Zionist enemy only understands power and is deterred only by the strikes of the resistance and jihad fighters” (PIJ Telegram channel, August 25, 2024).
• Ahsan Ataya, PIJ’s representative in Lebanon, head of the organization’s department for Arab and international affairs and a member of the political bureau, that the Hezbollah attack “confirms the policy of the resistance in its response to the elimination of its leaders by the enemy.” He called the “initial response” to killing Fuad Shukr a “strategic achievement for the resistance” (al-Mayadeen, August 25, 2024).
• The Hezbollah Brigades in Iraq congratulated the Hezbollah fighters and Hassan Nasrallah for “Operation Arba’in, in which UAVs crossed all the defense lines of the global arrogance front and reached intelligence bases and military bases in the depths of the entity.” According to reports, the “Islamic resistance” once again proved that it could attack the “enemy” despite its extensive armament and technology, and that it was capable of attacking any area. It also claimed that “despite the protection and support of all the countries that what themselves on the Zionist entity, Hezbollah fighters destroyed its bases with hundreds of missiles and UAVs” (Hezbollah Brigades Telegram channel, August 25, 2024).
• Qais al-Khazali, the secretary general of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, congratulated Hassan Nasrallah for “the great heroic operation, which coincided with Arba’in Day, and hit important vital targets in the depths of the thieving entity.” He added that “despite all the enemy’s preparations, the support of the Arab countries whose cooperating governments normalized relations [with Israel] and the foreign countries which have been taken over by the Zionist lobby, the resistance had the last word, and the people of Allah held to their firm position that the answer would inevitably come, and no crime committed by the thieving entity will not be properly punished” (Qais al-Khazali’s Telegram channel, August 25, 2024).
• The political bureau of the Houthis in Yemen welcomed Hezbollah’s attack, “which proves that the resistance has powerful capabilities and keeps both its promises and threats.” According to reports, the Houthis support the “heroes of the resistance” and “all options and actions as part of the response to the Zionist enemy.” The Houthis claimed that their response to the Israeli attack on the port of al-Hudaydah on July 19, 2024 “would definitely come” (al-Masirah, August 25, 2024).

International Reactions

• Jake Sullivan, American national security adviser, said the United States was “concerned” that the crisis in the Middle East would escalate into a wider war. He noted that the Biden administration was in constant communication with Israel regarding the current situation with Hezbollah (Reuters, August 25, 2024).
• American Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin spoke with Israeli Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant, to discuss “Israeli actions protecting against Hezbollah attacks.” According to reports, Austin reiterated America’s firm support for Israel’s right to defend itself and the American commitment to help Israel’s defense against threats from Iran and its regional partners and proxies (United States Department of Defense website, August 25, 2024).
• Antonio Guterres, UN secretary general, said he was “deeply concerned about the increase in the exchange of fire” along the Israel-Lebanon border. He added that “such actions put the populations in Lebanon and Israel at risk, and threaten regional security and stability.” He called on the parties to “avoid escalation and immediately cease hostile actions” (Antonio Guterres’ X account, August 25, 2024).
• The Egyptian foreign ministry stated that Egypt was following the latest escalation on the Israel-Lebanon front with concern. Egypt called on the international community to act together to reduce tension and instability. It also warned against the dangers of opening a new front and emphasized the importance of maintaining Lebanese stability and sovereignty. Egypt reiterated the need for a comprehensive ceasefire and an end to the war in the Gaza Strip in order to save the region from threats to international peace (Egyptian foreign ministry Facebook page, August 25, 2024).
• The Jordanian foreign ministry noted the importance of maintaining Lebanon’s stability and security, as well as the need to implement Resolution 1701 to prevent further escalation. The ministry stated that the continuation of “Israeli aggression” in the Gaza Strip and the failure to reach an agreement that would lead to a ceasefire put the region in danger of an expansion of the conflict (Jordanian foreign ministry X account, August 25, 2024).

Social Media Reactions

• Hezbollah’s response to the killing of Fuad Shukr and the false claims of damage to strategic facilities deep in Israel provoked ridicule among surfers in Lebanon and the Arab world, when most of the reactions on social media focused on the damage to a chicken coop in northern Israel:
• Raymond Hakim, an activist in Lebanon for the implementation of resolution 1701 (with about 100.7 thousand followers), uploaded a photo of a rooster to his X account and wrote, “The commander of the enemy’s air force who was killed in a targeted attack this morning” (Raymond Hakim’s X account, August 25, 2024). In another tweet, he wrote that “At the end of the day, something caught my attention: our Photoshop will remain stronger, truer and smarter than theirs” (Raymond Hakim’s X account, August 26, 2024).

• Omar Madaniah, an exiled Syrian journalist who opposes the Shi’ites and Hezbollah (with about 273 thousand followers), posted a picture on his X account of the organization’s logo with a rooster instead of the word “Hezbollah,” and asked “What do you think of the new symbol of the Lebanese Hezbollah militia?” (Omar_Madaniah’s X account, August 25, 2024).

• Hatem al-Shammary, a Saudi Arabian network celebrity who stated that he was interested in Iranian affairs (with about 239 thousand followers), wrote on his X account that “the result of Hezbollah’s response was the killing of 34 Zionist chickens and the destruction of 65 egg trays. Beware the chickens’ revenge” (Hatem al-Shamari’s X account, August 25, 2024).

      
Right: A chicken coop damaged in a Hezbollah attack. Left: “The Avenging Rooster” (Hatem al-Shammary’s X account, August 25, 2024)

• The Syrian journalist Nour Golan (with about 10.4 thousand followers) posted an illustration of a rooster to her X account, wearing a Hezbollah uniform in the style of Hezbollah’s mourning notices for its terrorist operatives killed fighting against Israel. The rooster’s name is The Rotten Egg, aka Jihad, and he was “the commander of the Little Rooster group.” While the Hezbollah mourning notices read “Martyrs on the way to Jerusalem,” this time it read “Martyrs on the way to the egg carton” (Nour Golan’s X account, August 25, 2024).

• Muhammad al-Rouqy, a Saudi Arabian who opposes Iran and the Houthis (with about 8,240 followers), posted an AI [apparently] picture of Hassan Nasrallah to his X account, wearing Western clothing and riding a rooster, with the KFC logo changed to HFC (Hezbollah Fried Chicken) (Muhammad Rouqy’s X account, August 25, 2024).

• The Saudi network activist Noura (with about 16.9 thousand followers) posted a picture on her X account of Hassan Nasrallah. To the left is a damaged chicken coop and to the right, a cartoon chicken and the “Chicken Hunter.” She wrote, “Hezbollah: The response to the Israeli army, which attacked south Lebanon, ended our retaliation against. And if you repeat [it], we’ll repeat [it].” Hezbollah retaliated against a chicken coop (Noura’s X account, August 25, 2024).

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, the Palestinian organizations, the Shi'ite Houthis in Yemen and the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq.
^[3] For further information, see the July 2024 ITIC report, "Hezbollah's Policy of Using Force Against Israel."
^[4] Arba'in: The day of mourning for the Shi'ites, which marks the 40th day after the death of Imam Hussein bin Ali and other members of the Ali bin Abu Taleb family in the battle of Karbala' in the year 680 C.E. Traditionally, pilgrimages were made to the tomb of Imam Hussein in Karbala in Iraq on the 40th day.
^[5] For further information, see the August 2024 ITIC report, "Reactions to the Deaths of Fuad Shukr and Isma’il Haniyeh."
^[6] Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, the Palestinian organizations, the Shi'ite Houthis in Yemen and the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq.

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