Preparations for “the Day After” in the Gaza Strip: The Palestinian Organizations Meet in Cairo

Dr. Igal Shiri

Overview^[1]

• On October 23 and 24, 2025, the Palestinian organizations met in Cairo at a conference sponsored by Egypt with Qatari and Turkish support, to formulate a unified Palestinian position, regarding the administration of the Gaza Strip and the disarmament of Hamas and other armed organizations in preparation for the next phase of the ceasefire. Most of the organizations sent representatives, including Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP): Fatah was not represented.
• According to the closing statement issued after the conference, the organizations agreed to continue the ceasefire, demanding the withdrawal of the IDF from the Gaza Strip, the lifting of the “siege,” the opening of the crossings and the beginning of a reconstruction of the Strip. They agreed that the administration of the Strip would be transferred to a temporary committee of independent professionals in cooperation with Arab and international actors, along with an international committee for funding and supervision, and a temporary international force along the borders.
• In addition to the conference, a meeting was held between a Hamas delegation, led by the head of the movement in the Gaza Strip, Khalil al-Hayya, and a delegation of the Palestinian Authority (PA), headed by the deputy chairman, Hussein al-Sheikh. The Egyptian intelligence chief also met separately with representatives of the organizations.
• Senior Hamas figures claimed the movement was committed to relinquishing control of the Gaza Strip and to reaching understandings with other Palestinian organizations regarding a joint vision for the ceasefire agreement, but would not state that Hamas was prepared to give up its weapons or to accept PA responsibility for the Strip. Fatah, however, said the PA had to assume responsibility for the Gaza Strip, including the administrative committee to be established to manage the territory and for maintaining security, and called on Hamas to act within the framework of the PLO.
• In ITIC assessment, the Palestinian organizations have realized that there is a narrow window of opportunity to form a national consensus and an interim framework acceptable to all sides, chiefly Hamas and Fatah. The outcome of the war and the pressure from the United States and the mediators have caused a cautious shift within Hamas toward relinquishing formal rule in favor of technocratic civil administration and elections, with the understanding that the proposed governance model, i.e., technocratic management under Arab and international oversight, would allow the movement to retain influence in the Strip. Hamas also understands that disarming would determine its fate, and in ITIC assessment, the movement will attempt to obscure and postpone the issue of disarmament within any future agreement. However, even if understandings are formally reached and the sides announce a joint decision without binding commitments or a practical plan for disarming the organizations, Israel will face a dilemma regarding the implementation of a full withdrawal, the opening of crossings and approval for Gaza’s reconstruction.

The Meetings in Cairo

• On October 23 and 24, 2025, the Palestinian organizations held a conference in Cairo with delegations from Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Palestinian National Initiative [headed by Barghouti], and the Democratic Reform Bloc [headed by Dahlan]. The meeting was mediated by Egypt and supported by Qatar and Turkey, and its objective was to form a unified national Palestinian position for the next phase of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, which includes demands for the disarmament of Hamas and the other armed organizations^[2] and for Hamas to relinquish control of the Gaza Strip to a Palestinian technocratic committee (Al Jazeera, al-Qahera al-Ekhbariya, October 23–24, 2025).

• When the conference ended, the organizations issued a joint statement according to which what was currently required was “a unified national position and a national political vision based on unity of word and destiny.” The participants agreed to the ceasefire, which included the withdrawal of “occupation” forces from the Gaza Strip, lifting the siege, opening all crossings, allowing humanitarian aid to enter and initiating a comprehensive reconstruction process. The administration of the Gaza Strip would be handed to a temporary Palestinian committee of independent technocrats from the Strip, responsible for daily management and public services, in cooperation with Arab entities and international institutions and an international committee would be established to oversee funding and reconstruction. The organizations agreed on the need to take all necessary measures to preserve security and stability in the Gaza Strip and to seek a UN decision to deploy a temporary international force to supervise the ceasefire. They also agreed on the need to work jointly to unify positions to “confront the challenges” and called for an urgent meeting of all parties to agree on a national strategy in which the PLO would act as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, while safeguarding the right to self-determination, the establishment of an independent state with Jerusalem [sic] as its capital, and ensuring the [so-called] “right of return” (Hamas Telegram channel, October 24, 2025).
• A “senior Palestinian source” said the organizations would resume talks within less than a month to continue discussing the future administration of the Gaza Strip. According to the “source,” the Strip would be administered by a technocratic committee whose members had remained in Gaza during the war. He added that the organizations had informed Egypt of their preliminary agreement to the proposed names of the administrative committee members (Al Jazeera, October 24, 2025).

Meeting of PA and Hamas Representatives

• Fatah did not participate in the meetings but according to reports received updates on developments. “Palestinian sources” said Fatah’s refused to attend the Cairo meetings because its position was that the PA was the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and therefore it called on all organizations and groups to take responsibility and end the division while reaffirming the PLO as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinians in all forums (al-Arabiya, October 24, 2025).
• Despite Fatah’s absence from the meeting, representatives of the PA arrived in Cairo as part of the effort to coordinate positions for the next stage of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. On October 23, 2025, a Hamas delegation led by the head of its political bureau in the Gaza Strip, Khalil al-Hayya, met with a delegation from the PA headed by the deputy chairman of the Authority and the PLO Executive Committee, Hussein al-Sheikh, and the head of Palestinian General Intelligence, Majed Faraj. They reportedly discussed issues of “the day after” the war in the Gaza Strip (al-Hadath, October 23, 2025).
• A “well-informed Palestinian source” called the meeting “positive,” stating that understandings had been reached on certain issues, primarily regarding the administration of the Gaza Strip and the assumption of its responsibilities by the PA. According to the source, Hussein al-Sheikh would update PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas in order to formulate a position in preparation for a broader dialogue of the organizations in Cairo (al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 24, 2025).

Egyptian Involvement

• In addition to the direct meetings between Palestinian organizations under the auspices of Egyptian intelligence, Egyptian representatives also held separate meetings with the Palestinian delegations. Egyptian Intelligence Chief General Hassan Rashad met with Hussein al-Sheikh and Majed Faraj on behalf of the PA and a Fatah delegation, and with the Hamas delegation headed by Khalil al-Hayya, with PIJ Secretary General Ziyad al-Nakhalah and his deputy Muhammad al-Hindi, and with the secretaries general of other Palestinian organizations (al-Akhbar, October 24, 2025).
• “Egyptian sources” reported that Egypt offered several scenarios and timelines to achieve progress in plans for “the day after,” including in them individuals and entities not directly affiliated with Hamas, who would gain international legitimacy and enable them to administer the Gaza Strip in the postwar period. It was noted that Egypt’s objective was to achieve a definite agreement between Fatah and Hamas before announcing the date of the “reconstruction” conference in Cairo next month (al-Akhbar, October 24, 2025).
• An “Egyptian source” admitted it was still too early to reach final agreements, but Egypt would work for progress toward the second phase of the ceasefire through a gradual plan. According to the “source,” there was “optimism” that the organizations’ presence and their willingness to reach an initial agreement would advance a Palestinian dialogue on security arrangements. He added that it was impossible to determine when the second phase would begin unless the United States exerted strong pressure on Israel (al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 24, 2025).

Reactions to the Conference in Cairo

• Senior Hamas figures reiterated that they were ready to give up control of the Gaza Strip in favor of a Palestinian management committee without external interference. They also noted the need for broad Palestinian consensus on the issues related to the second phase but would not commit to the demand to disarm the movement:
  • Husam Badran, a member of Hamas political bureau and head of the movement’s national relations office, said that the movement was serious in its intention to advance the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. He claimed there was a consensus among the Palestinian organizations on a joint vision for implementing the agreement in the interests of the Palestinian people, adding that Hamas’ position on ending the war represented all Palestinians. He called for continued national dialogue and prioritizing the Palestinian interest over organizational interest, with emphasis on aid and reconstruction of the Strip (Cairo News, October 24, 2025).
  • Khalil al-Hayya, head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, claimed Hamas had agreed with the other organizations and with Fatah on the establishment of a committee to manage the Strip and on the list of names proposed by the mediators. According to him, the movement told the mediators that it granted them the freedom to choose suitable people to manage the Strip from among the Palestinians. Al-Hayya said the movement had no objection to any national figure residing in the Gaza Strip’s taking responsibility for its administration and Hamas sought to move toward elections as a preliminary step toward unification. He further noted that the weapons of the “resistance” were related to the very existence of the “occupation” and its “aggressive” actions and that if the “occupation” ended, the weapons would be transferred to state authority. He said the issue of weapons was still under discussion with the organizations and mediators, and agreement on the matter was still in its early stages. He said that Hamas accepted a UN deployment to serve as a separation force, to monitor the borders, and to oversee the ceasefire in Gaza (Al Jazeera Mubasher, October 26, 2025).

• • Hamas spokesperson Jihad Taha said that the movement viewed the committee managing the Gaza Strip as a national interest, and it would deal with the social and humanitarian consequences of the war and ensure the entry of sufficient aid to meet the Gazans’ needs. He claimed that Hamas and the “resistance” believed in national cooperation and were working to strengthen Palestinian unity. According to him, Hamas affirmed its ability to formulate a unified national program that would protect the rights of the Palestinian people (al-Aqsa TV, October 26, 2025).
• However, PA and Fatah representatives stated that although they were willing to engage in dialogue with the organizations, the PA had to assume responsibility for the Gaza Strip, including the administrative committee to be established to manage it and to maintain security, the PLO was the only body representing the Palestinian position and that all organizations, including Hamas, had to be part of it:
  • According to a Fatah statement following the organization conference, which the movement did not attend, the guarantee for a Palestinian vision was the recognition of the national legitimacy represented by the PLO and the “State of Palestine.” Therefore, Fatah rejected any side-stepping of the framework and called for translating the principle of sovereignty into practical steps based on the reiterated priorities, i.e., a ceasefire, full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, entry of aid, reconstruction, prevention of displacement, and exchange of prisoners and hostages. Fatah stated that it supported the establishment of a professional administrative committee for a limited time to manage the Strip, under PA authority, and warned against any move that widened the division between the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria, and East Jerusalem. Fatah also stated that security in the Gaza Strip had to be the responsibility of the PA security forces, and any international force, if established, would be deployed only along the borders of the Strip with a UN Security Council mandate limited to supervision without infringing on sovereignty. Regarding Hamas disarmament, Fatah emphasized the principle of one government, one weapon, and one law (Wafa, October 25, 2025).
  • Fatah spokesperson Iyad Abu Zneit said they were open to dialogue with all the organizations and that achieving Palestinian consensus was “a supreme interest in confronting Israel and organizing the Palestinian home.” He pledged they would work for the success of an intra-Palestinian dialogue and to formulate a joint position within the PLO, adding that the organizations’ Cairo agreement met Fatah’s requirements and that there was Palestinian consensus against international trusteeship over the Strip. Abu Zneit rejected the legal separation between the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria and said that in his opinion, the Palestinian organizations’ agreement would prevent the “occupation government” from reigniting the situation in the Strip (Al Jazeera, October 24, 2025).
  • However, Fatah spokesperson in the Gaza Strip, Mondher al-Hayek, was more reserved regarding the outcome of the Cairo meetings and said that the organizations’ statement was vague and unclear and did not directly address the PA’s authority over all Palestinian territories. He expressed hope that the disagreements between Fatah and Hamas could be overcome in order to “unite against the Zionist project,” but accused Hamas of always seeking division rather than unity (al-Hadath, October 25, 2025). On another occasion, al-Hayek said Fatah rejected any foreign administration in the Gaza Strip originating outside the Palestinian territories and the PLO was the sole framework guaranteeing and representing the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria. He said that Fatah supported comprehensive Palestinian elections after the war, with mutual recognition between Fatah and Hamas, and sent Hamas the message that regarding Palestinian geography they had to choose between unification and separation (Sky News, October 26, 2025).
  • Abd al-Fattah Doleh, also a Fatah spokesperson, denied that the movement had approved the appointment of the chairman of the committee to manage the Strip. He said Fatah’s position was that whoever was appointed as chairman had to be a minister in the PA government, as it was the legitimate body responsible for managing the affairs of the Palestinian people. He said that their position was the result of the movement’s commitment to “the unity of the homeland and the people” and to a single political authority represented by the PLO and the PA, whose objective was to prevent the widening of division or the legitimization of groups parallel to national authority (Aman News Facebook page, October 26, 2025).
• Palestinian commentators were also optimistic after the Cairo talks and said progress could be made toward forming a unified Palestinian position:
  • Dr. Iyad al-Qarra, a Hamas-affiliated Gaza-based commentator, said that in the Cairo talks Hamas had shown its willingness to immediately give up the administration of the Strip and to transfer all portfolios, including institutions and aid, to the PA. He said Egypt had proposed the establishment of a professional and independent management team without Hamas representatives, and Hamas did not object, but reiterated the usual demands, including full Israeli withdrawal, rejection of any security or international presence coordinated with Israel, ensuring the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and preventing emigration (alresala.net, October 24, 2025).
  • Commentator Dr. Ayman al-Raqab said that Egypt had created a situation for the Palestinians which would lead to consensus and dialogue arrangements, and the Hamas-Fatah meeting could serve as an important step toward forming a comprehensive vision for Palestinian unity (al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 24, 2025).

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] For further information, see the October 2025 ITIC report, The future of Hamas’ weapons and its efforts to rebuild the military wing

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