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Hamas Criticism of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad Revealed in Seized Documents from the Gaza Strip

The military wings of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) have cooperated closely in wars and rounds of fighting against Israel, including during the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre and the subsequent war in the Gaza Strip, and together they operated a joint operations room with the other terrorist organizations in the Strip; Despite the cooperation, in several instances the two movements have disagreed, mainly due to PIJ's independent rocket fire, which led to short rounds of fighting against Israel, contrary to the "controlled escalation" policy which Hamas tried to promote while making secret preparations for the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. Hamas documents brought back by the IDF from the Gaza Strip indicated that Hamas was displeased by the PIJ's independent conduct; The documents also confirmed that many of the rockets fired at Israel by the PIJ fell inside the Gaza Strip, killing civilians and causing damage, which was also a serious problem for Hamas; In an attempt to reduce the PIJ's "rogue" actions, Hamas tried to impose its will on the PIJ and even subjugate the organization to its direct control. The documents included information regarding problems the PIJ caused the "resistance," including immoral behavior and intelligence infiltration, and measures to ensure that the PIJ would act in accordance with Hamas' interests at the political and military levels. The documents reveal a pragmatic and interest-based relationship between Hamas and the PIJ. Hamas views the PIJ as undisciplined and in need of constant control and supervision, while the PIJ seeks to gain public support by being more active against Israel. Although it is not known whether Hamas succeeded in fully implementing its plans to take over the PIJ, the war in the Gaza Strip showed that the two movements were able to overcome their differences and cooperate in dealing with Israel, including the deals to release the hostages. In ITIC’s assessment, although Hamas will ostensibly relinquish political control in the Gaza Strip as part of the second phase of the ceasefire agreement, both organizations can be expected to refuse to disarm and continue to attack Israeli security forces and civilians in accordance with the vision of a jihad war until the "annihilation of Israel." However, if Hamas is pragmatic, in all probability the conflict between the two movements will resume and intensify, publicly as well. Read more...

The committee of Technocrats Who Will Manage the Gaza Strip

On January 14, 2026, Steve Witkoff, the American special envoy, announced the beginning of the second phase of the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip. Following that, the establishment of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza was announced, a Palestinian technocratic body intended to manage day-to-day affairs in the Strip in accordance with the American 20-point plan; Most of the committee's 12 members, headed by Dr. Ali Shaath, are affiliated with Fatah and the Palestinian Authority (PA), and some of them served in PA governments and public institutions. Committee members include Sami Nisman, a former official in Palestinian General Intelligence who was sentenced to imprisonment by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and Hana Tarazi, the only woman on the committee and a Christian lawyer specializing in Islamic law; The members of the committee are entrusted with establishing the Gazans' security, restoring essential services and fostering a society based on peace, democracy and justice. Committee chairman Shaath said its top priorities included providing shelter for residents and clearing rubble, and the cancellation of fees and taxes for Gazans and businesses in the Strip had already been ordered; Hamas claimed it was transferring governing authorities to the committee, while the PA noted the need to link institutions in the Gaza Strip with Judea and Samaria; In ITIC assessment, despite the committee's genuine desire to begin its operations, in all probability it will encounter difficulties in translating its vision into reality. First, Israel will prevent them from entering the Gaza Strip through the Rafah Crossing as long as the issue of the last murdered Israeli hostage is unresolved, forcing committee members to operate from Egypt. In addition, the degree of freedom of movement the committee will receive remains unclear, particularly in areas where Israel maintains security control. Moreover, despite Hamas' alleged willingness to transfer governance to the committee, it will have to rely on tens of thousands of employees who remain loyal to Hamas after nearly two decades of absolute Hamas control in the Strip. In such a situation, the committee will at best be able to carry out limited assistance and reconstruction activities, but most likely not to resolve core issues of control, security and demilitarization. Read more...

Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon (January 5-12, 2026)

The IDF continued attacking Hezbollah targets in south Lebanon and in the Beqa'a Valley to enforce the ceasefire agreement of November 2024 and to prevent the organization's renewed military buildup. The forces attacked weapons depots above and below ground, launch sites and launchers, and eliminated five Hezbollah operatives. Hamas military sites in south Lebanon were also attacked; Aoun, the Lebanese president, maintained "cautious optimism" and said the risk of a large-scale war had been almost completely eliminated despite the continued Israeli attacks, noting that reaching understandings with Israel would be a significant step toward peace; The Lebanese army announced it had achieved "operational control" in the area south of the Litani River as part of the first phase of achieving a state monopoly on weapons, but the government has still not set timetables for the continued disarmament of Hezbollah. The Lebanese foreign minister claimed the Lebanese army would be capable of confronting Hezbollah if necessary; The Iranian foreign minister visited Lebanon and met with the country's leadership and with Hezbollah's secretary general. He said Iran wanted to strengthen bilateral economic and political ties and claimed that Tehran supported Hezbollah as a "resistance" organization but did not interfere in Lebanon's internal affairs; A member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament said an American attack on Iran would lead to wide-scale regional escalation; According to reports, mid-level Hezbollah officials have begun moving their families and assets out of Lebanon, mainly to Latin America. Read more...

Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon (December 15-22, 2025)

Overview[1] The IDF continued attacking Hezbollah targets in south Lebanon to enforce the ceasefire agreement, which prohibited the organization’s presence south of the Litani. The IDF reported that in the year since the ceasefire, more than 370 terrorist operatives, most of them from Hezbollah, had been eliminated and there had been approximately 1,200 targeted ground Read more...

Iranian Activity in East Africa: A Growing Threat to Israeli and Western Interests

For years Iran has been working to advance diplomatic, economic and military objectives in East Africa as part of a strategy to position itself as a regional power, use the region to expand its geo-strategic influence and turn East Africa into a logistical backyard serving its efforts to build its network of terrorist proxy organizations; In recent years Iran renewed its relations with Djibouti and Sudan and tightened its ties with Ethiopia. That enabled Iran to expand its regional presence with the export of advanced weapons to conflict zones in East Africa, especially the civil war in Sudan; The ongoing relations between Iran and al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda-affiliated Somalian terrorist organization, have made them middlemen in Iran's chain of proxies: The Houthis transfer Iranian weapons to al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa, and al-Shabaab allows Tehran to use the ports under its control to smuggle weapons to the Houthis; In ITIC assessment, Iran's expanding presence in East Africa is a growing threat to Israeli interests because of Iran's ability to use the smuggling routes for weapons from Sudan to the Gaza Strip. Iran may also use the weapons it sends to conflict zones in East Africa and its official missions there to promote terrorist plots against Israeli targets in Africa. In addition, the threat to vital American and Western interests is increased by giving Iran the ability to attack shipping lanes in the Red Sea and through its dangerous proximity to the main American base in Djibouti. Read more...

The Gaza Strip Following the Killing of Yasser Abu Shabab

On December 4, 2025, the death of Yasser Abu Shabab was reported. He headed the Popular Forces, a militia in Rafah which receives Israeli support and is considered Hamas' most prominent rival in the Gaza Strip. According to the militia, he was killed while trying to resolve a family dispute and it denied Hamas' claim of responsibility for the elimination of Abu Shabab, the most senior wanted operative in the Strip; Abu Shabab's deputy, Ghassan al-Dahini, was appointed the militia's new commander and said they would continue the campaign against Hamas. Leaders of other militias in the Strip that had cooperated with Abu Shabab also said they were committed to continuing in his path; In areas of the Strip under Hamas control, Abu Shabab's death was celebrated with the distribution of pastry and candy. Hamas and the "resistance factions" claimed his death would be the fate of every "collaborator with the occupation." Hamas' ministry of the interior announced that it was granting all "collaborators" a ten-day period for "repentance" to turn themselves in; In ITIC assessment, Abu Shabab's death will encourage Hamas to consolidate its security governance in the Gaza Strip, and may affect the motivation of some operatives of the Popular Forces and other militias opposed to Hamas. However, the genuine fear of Hamas revenge and the execution of anyone who turns himself in, despite Hamas' promises of "leniency," is expected to deter many operatives from surrendering to the "resistance." In ITIC assessment, the militias will continue to operate as long as Israel controls the area of the Yellow Line and provides them with room to maneuver, and as long as there is a chance that international pressure will force Hamas to disarm, even though Hamas will seek to disrupt the militias' activity and attack their operatives, especially militia leaders. Read more...