Operation Iron Swords (Updated to 1 p.m., March 10, 2024)

Attacks on Hamas terrorist facilities in the Gaza Strip (IDF website, March 8, 2024)

Attacks on Hamas terrorist facilities in the Gaza Strip (IDF website, March 8, 2024)

The IDF attack in the Hamad neighborhood in northwestern Khan Yunis (Shehab X account, March 9, 2024)

The IDF attack in the Hamad neighborhood in northwestern Khan Yunis (Shehab X account, March 9, 2024)

Airlifting humanitarian aid into the northern Gaza Strip

Airlifting humanitarian aid into the northern Gaza Strip

UN trucks en route to the northern Gaza Strip (Wafa YouTube channel, March 8, 2024)

UN trucks en route to the northern Gaza Strip (Wafa YouTube channel, March 8, 2024)

Loading the aid onto the ship (Open Arms X account in English, March 8, 2024)

Loading the aid onto the ship (Open Arms X account in English, March 8, 2024)

Attack in Aitaroun (fado Bint al-Ard X account, March 7, 2024)

Attack in Aitaroun (fado Bint al-Ard X account, March 7, 2024)

Friday Prayer (@palestine_graph X account, March 8, 2024)

Friday Prayer (@palestine_graph X account, March 8, 2024)

The march in Ramallah, attended by PLO Executive Committee member Ramzi Rabah (pictured on the right) (al-Araby al-Jadeed, March 8, 2024)

The march in Ramallah, attended by PLO Executive Committee member Ramzi Rabah (pictured on the right) (al-Araby al-Jadeed, March 8, 2024)

Launching rockets and using explosive drones (Houthi combat information X account, March 9, 2024; September 26 website, March 9, 2024)

Launching rockets and using explosive drones (Houthi combat information X account, March 9, 2024; September 26 website, March 9, 2024)

Launching rockets and using explosive drones (Houthi combat information X account, March 9, 2024; September 26 website, March 9, 2024)

Launching rockets and using explosive drones (Houthi combat information X account, March 9, 2024; September 26 website, March 9, 2024)

Simulating taking over an American post (Houthi combat information X account, March 9, 2024; September 26 website, March 9, 2024)

Simulating taking over an American post (Houthi combat information X account, March 9, 2024; September 26 website, March 9, 2024)

Firing from a machine gun mounted on an SUV.

Firing from a machine gun mounted on an SUV.

The Palestinian delegation meets with the UN secretary-general and at a press conference at the end of the visit (al-Quds al-Arabi, March 7, 2024)

The Palestinian delegation meets with the UN secretary-general and at a press conference at the end of the visit (al-Quds al-Arabi, March 7, 2024)

Northern Arena, Israeli Casualties, Rocket Fire

Overview[1]
  • The southern arena: The IDF forces continued their activity in the Gaza Strip, focusing on the Hamad neighborhood in the northwest of Khan Yunis and Qarara, east of Khan Yunis. In the central Gaza Strip, attacks on armed terrorist squads continued. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) claimed responsibility for two rocket attacks on the cities, towns and villages surrounding the Gaza Strip, about an hour apart. IDF forces attacked the rocket launchers and the terrorists launching the rockets.
  • According to unofficial data, since October 7, 2023, approximately 1,500 Israeli civilians and security personnel have been killed, 588 of them soldiers and officers; 130 civilian and military hostages are still being held by the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip; 123 hostages have been released.
  • Negotiations for a hostage deal: On March 7, 2024, the Hamas delegation left Egypt for consultations with the movement’s leadership. “Egyptian sources” said that the mediating countries would strive to hold a new round of negotiations. “Senior Hamas members” reported that Yahya al-Sinwar, who until recently had been largely detached from the negotiations, demanded Israel commit itself to discussing a permanent cessation of hostilities, a position that contradicts the position of other senior Hamas members, in the hope that the differences of opinion between Israel and the United States would allow Hamas to cut a better deal. Hamas continues to insist that a hostage deal will be carried out only after Israel meets its demands regarding a ceasefire, the return of the displaced residents to their former places of residence and increased humanitarian aid for the Gaza Strip.
  • Aid for the Gaza Strip: The president of the United States ordered the construction of a temporary port on the shore of the Gaza Strip to bring in humanitarian aid. Less than 36 hours after the president’s announcement, a ship carrying equipment to build the temporary port sailed from the United States. Other countries are also trying to send aid to the Strip in various ways. Hamas welcomed the American initiative, but there were also those who attacked it. Abu Obeida, spokesman for Hamas’ military-terrorist wing, gave a speech relating to the fighting capabilities of Hamas’ military wing and those of the other “organizations” after more than 150 days of combat, and called on all Palestinians in Judea, Samaria, Jerusalem and inside Israel to mobilize and march towards al-Aqsa Mosque, and not to allow Israel to impose conditions on them.
  • The northern arena: During the weekend, Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 25 attacks. Hezbollah reported seven dead. Senior Hezbollah members referred to [alleged] threats (denied by Israel) that if a ceasefire was not reached by March 15, Israel would expand the attack on Lebanon.
  • Judea and Samaria: A combined shooting-IED attack against IDF soldiers was carried out in the Homesh area; the Jenin Battalion claimed responsibility for the attack, which was welcomed by Hamas and the PIJ.
  • The Palestinian Authority (PA): Mahmoud Abbas swore in six new district governors. His office expressed satisfaction with the State of the Union address, claiming it was in line with the Palestinians’ demands.
  • The pro-Iranian militias: The Islamic Resistance claimed to have attacked Israel three times. The Houthis increased their activity in the Red Sea and the United States military and the coalition countries increased their countermeasures. The Houthis and Hamas reported the ongoing, close and connections between the movements.
  • The UN: A delegation of the families of Palestinian casualties from the Gaza Strip visited the UN and met with the UN secretary general and members of the Security Council.
The Southern Arena
  • Palestinian media outlets reported on IDF activity during the past day. In the northern Gaza Strip, the forces attacked in Beit Lahiya. In Gaza City, according to the Palestinians, they [allegedly] shot at local residents waiting for the arrival of humanitarian aid in the west of the city. Heavy exchanges of fire were also reported in the Zeitoun neighborhood between IDF forces and “resistance members” [terrorist operatives]. In the central Gaza Strip, the Israeli Air Force attacked the Nuseirat refugee camp and the area between Deir al-Balah and Khan Yunis. In Khan Yunis, the IDF continued its attacks on the Hamad neighborhood (northwest of Khan Yunis), attacking high-rise buildings. The forces also attacked in the northern part of the city and in Qarara (east of Khan Yunis). In Rafah, the IDF attacked in the east (al-Jazeera TV, Ma’an, March 10, 2024).
 An al-Jazeera TV presenter describes the exchanges of fire in the Zeitoun neighborhood in Gaza (on the right) and the activity of IDF forces in the Hamad neighborhood, in the northwest of Khan Yunis (left) (al-Jazeera YouTube channel, March 9, 2024)    An al-Jazeera TV presenter describes the exchanges of fire in the Zeitoun neighborhood in Gaza (on the right) and the activity of IDF forces in the Hamad neighborhood, in the northwest of Khan Yunis (left) (al-Jazeera YouTube channel, March 9, 2024)
An al-Jazeera TV presenter describes the exchanges of fire in the Zeitoun neighborhood in Gaza (on the right) and the activity of IDF forces in the Hamad neighborhood, in the northwest of Khan Yunis (left) (al-Jazeera YouTube channel, March 9, 2024)
Attacks on armed Hamas terrorist operatives (IDF spokesperson, March 9, 2024)    Attacks on armed Hamas terrorist operatives (IDF spokesperson, March 9, 2024)
Attacks on armed Hamas terrorist operatives (IDF spokesperson, March 9, 2024)
Attacks on Hamas terrorist facilities in the Gaza Strip (IDF website, March 8, 2024)    Attacks on Hamas terrorist facilities in the Gaza Strip (IDF website, March 8, 2024)
Attacks on Hamas terrorist facilities in the Gaza Strip (IDF website, March 8, 2024)
  • The southern Gaza Strip: IDF forces continued their operations in Khan Yunis. In Qarara, they located tunnel shafts and killed about 15 terrorist operatives. In the Hamad neighborhood, northwest of Khan Yunis, they located large quantities of weapons and destroyed rocket launchers. An Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked armed terrorists seen leaving a weapons warehouse (IDF spokesperson, March 7-10, 2024).
The IDF attack in the Hamad neighborhood in northwestern Khan Yunis (Shehab X account, March 9, 2024)
The IDF attack in the Hamad neighborhood in northwestern Khan Yunis
(Shehab X account, March 9, 2024)
  • The central Gaza Strip: IDF forces continued operations in the central Gaza Strip, attacking armed terrorists with sniper fire, aircraft and fighter jets (IDF spokesperson, March 7-10, 2024).
Rocket fire from the Gaza Strip
  • On March 7, 2024, rockets were launched from the Gaza Strip at the Nahal Oz area. A few minutes later, IDF forces fired artillery at the launch area and attacked a munitions warehouse where rockets were apparently stored (IDF spokesperson, March 8, 2024). Another rocket launch attacked Sderot. Within a few minutes, artillery was fired at the sources of the rocket launch. Fighter jets attacked combat tunnels, a military structure, a shaft and a launching position (IDF spokesperson, March 8, 2024). The Jerusalem Brigades, the PIJ’s military-terrorist wing, claimed responsibility for two rocket attacks (Paltoday Telegram channel, March 7, 2024).
Israeli casualties
  • According to unofficial data, since October 7, 2023, approximately 1,500 Israelis have been killed. According to the IDF spokesperson, 588 of them are soldiers and officers (248 since the start of the ground maneuver on 27 October, 2023); 130 civilian and military hostages are still being held by the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip; 123 hostages have been released.
The Palestinian perception of the fighting
  • Osama Hamdan, a senior Hamas member, claimed daily contact existed between the territory and the Hamas leadership, and Hamas’ three most important messages were that the suffering of the Palestinian people could not be ignored, nevertheless they continued to stand firm, and what they needed was to have their burden lightened. The “resistance’s” command and control still existed on the ground, and all “resistance [terrorist] operatives” from all the organizations acted as one. He claimed the IDF soldiers were cowards, hiding in their vehicles and tanks and avoiding face-to-face confrontations with the “resistance [terrorist] operatives.” He claimed that the messages from the field were “reassuring” about the ability of the “resistance” and the Palestinian people to stand firm (al-Manar TV X account, March 7, 2024).
The issue of the hostages and a ceasefire agreement
  • Hamas said on March 7, 2024 that the Hamas delegation left Cairo for consultations with the movement’s leadership, while negotiations and efforts continued to stop the “aggression,” return the displaced persons to their former places of residence and bring aid to the Gaza Strip (Hamas Telegram channel, March 7, 2024).
  • “Egyptian sources” familiar with the details of the negotiations said that Israel did not relate positively to Hamas’ demand for a timetable for withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, while Hamas adhered to the demand. They reiterated Hamas’ demands yet again for guarantees for a comprehensive ceasefire after the end of the first phase of the ceasefire, for the return of displaced persons to their former places of residence in the northern Gaza Strip, the gradual withdrawal of IDF forces, and more humanitarian aid. According to the sources, the mediators will seek a new round of negotiations for a ceasefire agreement before the beginning of Ramadan. “Senior” Hamas sources reiterated yet again that Hamas had shown “great flexibility” in the negotiations for a ceasefire, an end to “aggression” and a “respectable deal” for the return of the hostages, but Netanyahu was delaying the negotiations for personal and partisan reasons. The sources reiterated that Israel’s initial responses did not meet Hamas’ minimum demands. According to the sources, Hamas’ demands would “ensure a sustainable peace,” and Hamas would not waive them (al-Sharq channel website, March 7, 2024).
  • “Senior” sources, familiar with the discussions, reported that Yahya al-Sinwar, head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, who until recently was largely not involved in the negotiations, demanded that Israel discuss a permanent cessation of hostilities, a position which contradicted that of other senior Hamas members. Egyptian officials said that al-Sinwar believed that Hamas currently had the upper hand in the negotiations in light of the internal political divisions within Israel. According to the Egyptians, al-Sinwar hoped that the differences of opinion between the United States and Israel would allow him to cut a more favorable deal for Hamas, and he was pushing to include a permanent ceasefire and the complete withdrawal of IDF forces from the Gaza Strip. It was reported that his demands put him at odds with Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, who was willing to accept a six-week ceasefire and use the time to examine the possibility of a permanent ceasefire and a full withdrawal of the IDF. The report also stated that Qatar threatened to expel Hamas leaders from Doha if they failed to convince Hamas leaders in the Gaza Strip to agree to the deal (The Wall Street Journal, March 7, 2024).
  • Mahmoud Mardawi, a senior Hamas member, said that the negotiations held in Cairo were faltering and did not proceed as they should for various reasons, including Israel’s refusal to commit to a permanent ceasefire. He claimed Israel did not want to completely withdraw from the Gaza Strip, and committed to a “certain withdrawal,” while Hamas wanted a full withdrawal. Israel also set conditions for the return of displaced persons to their previous places of residence in the northern Gaza Strip and restricted their return according to its own criteria. He added that among the issues discussed in Cairo were introducing aid and reconstruction, which had to meet the needs of the residents in the northern and southern Gaza Strip. Mardawi claimed that Hamas had “no problem” with the hostage deal, provided it was “respectable,” adding that Israel wanted to return its hostages and to release Palestinian prisoners, but not a suitable number, given the circumstances. He claimed Israel had not expressed a clear position regarding the issues, which led the negotiations to falter. He claimed that if the Americans did not intervene and exert pressure on Israel, in the current atmosphere it would be difficult to reach an agreement (Arab World Press News Agency (AWP), March 8, 2024).
  • Osama Hamdan, a senior Hamas member, said they had not come to the negotiations from a position of weakness, but rather were holding many trump cards. He claimed the resistance on the ground was “effective and influential,” and every day negotiations were conducted, IDF soldiers were killed and wounded. In addition, the Palestinian people were able to stand firm, and the “resistance axis”[2] stood by them, which reinforced their capabilities at the negotiating table, since is was one thing to be isolated and unable to defend yourself, and something else when you have you have allies who show you in word and deed that they will not stop supporting you. He said that before the “aggression” and “siege” ended they would not elaborate on the issue of the hostages, adding that Israel tried to talk about criteria, but the Hamas delegation refused to, as long as the “aggression” continued. Asked about reports that Hamas had submitted a list of 160 prisoners who would be released in the first phase, including Marwan al-Barghouti, Ahmed Saadat and Abdullah al-Barghouti, he claimed Israel recycled proposals and details that were brought up in the negotiations regarding the four Israelis (the bodies of Oron Shaul and the Hadar Goldin, Avra Mengistu, and Husham al-Said) after 2014 [Operation Protective Edge], and emphasized that they were not negotiating details related to the exchange deal (al-Manar TV X account, March 7, 2024).
  • On March 9, 2024, Husam Badran, a member of Hamas’ political bureau, was interviewed in Doha by The Wall Street Journal. He emphasized that Hamas has not announced that the negotiations had been stopped. He listed Hamas’ conditions and claimed that questions of how to ease the humanitarian situation and end the fighting took precedence over discussion of a hostage deal. He claimed at least 60 Israeli hostages had died in captivity. He denied the statements that Hamas had rejected Israel’s request for a list of hostages who were still alive, saying that no official Israeli request for such a list had been made. He claimed many of the hostages were being held by other “organizations,” making it “difficult to locate them.” He also claimed that Hamas’ political leadership had met in Doha to discuss negotiations. Responding to the report that Qatar threatened to expel Hamas leaders from Doha if they failed to convince Hamas in Gaza to agree to the deal, Badran claimed no such threat had been made. Responding to the report of a dispute between al-Sinwar and Haniyeh, Badran denied a disagreement existed within Hamas, claiming it was united in the desire for a permanent end to the war. He said he did not trust the United States to be an honest broker in light of its strong support for Israel, adding that Hamas had better chances with the mediation of European countries, including France, which was trying to be “more objective.” He said a lack of progress in the talks would lead to further unrest beyond the borders of Gaza during Ramadan, and the [alleged] “genocide” in Gaza could open a new arena in Judea and Samaria. He added that the continuation of the war would weaken regional stability (The Wall Street Journal, March 9, 2024).
  • Muhammad Nazzal, a member of Hamas’ political bureau, said there might be another round of negotiations but he could not specify the date, it depended on the position of the Hamas leadership and contacts with the mediators (al-Jazeera Mubasher website, March 8, 2024). He said that if there was nothing new and Israel continued to adhere to its position, the negotiations would not resume on March 10 (al-Araby TV YouTube channel, March 9, 2024).
  • Taher al-Nunu, media advisor to Isma’il Haniyeh, said the negotiations had not stopped the contacts continued, and so did the efforts of the mediators, but the obstacle was Israel’s “stubbornness.” He noted that if there was any progress or new proposals, it would be possible to discuss them anywhere (al-Jazeera Mubasher YouTube channel, March 9, 2024).

Back To Top

The Gaza Strip
Palestinian casualties
  • The Hamas-controlled ministry of health in the Gaza Strip reported at 10:45 a.m., March 10, 2024, that during the past day 85 Gazans had been killed and 130 wounded, bringing the number of dead since the beginning of the war to 31,045 and the number of wounded to 72,654 (ministry of health in Gaza Facebook page, March 10, 2024).
  • The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (AAMB) issued a mourning notice for the death of commander Taysir al-Saqa (Abu Muhammad), one of the most prominent commanders in the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, who was killed with his family in an Israeli attack on his home in the town of Qarara in the Khan Yunis district (elaqsa_1965, AAMB Telegram channel, March 8, 2024). According to his Facebook page he had been an officer in the Palestinian preventive security  forces since 2000 (Taysir al-Saqa’s Facebook page).
Taysir al-Saqa (Abu Muhammad) (Facebook page of his friend Abdulhadi Hamada Shaat, March 8, 2024)
Taysir al-Saqa (Abu Muhammad)
(Facebook page of his friend Abdulhadi Hamada Shaat, March 8, 2024)
Aid for the Gaza Strip
  • Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, sent a communiqué to the leaders of the Islamic nation for the month of Ramadan, calling for them to take political and legal action to protect the Palestinians and introduce aid that met their needs. He said pressure should be exerted on countries that supported Israel to force it to unconditionally stop its “aggression.” He also stated that as many efforts as possible should be taken to prosecute Israel and boycott it politically for its [alleged] “war crimes it commits” (Hamas’ Telegram channel, March 9, 2024).
  • Pir-Hossein Kolivand, president of the Iranian Red Crescent Society, announced that so far tens of thousands of tons of humanitarian aid, including food and medicine, had been sent from Iran to the Gaza Strip (al-Alam, March 7, 2024). Meanwhile, recent pictures from the Gaza Strip indicate that the Iranian Red Crescent set up shelters for the residents of Gaza in the northern and southern Gaza Strip; the Iranian flag can be seen on the shelters (Israeli Kan 11 TV, March 7, 2024).
  • On March 8, UN aid trucks were seen driving to the northern Gaza Strip (Wafa YouTube channel, March 8, 2024). On March 9, 2024, aid was airlifted into the al-Sudaniya region in the northern Gaza Strip. Crowds stormed the aid and five deaths were reported, apparently caused the impact of the packages after parachutes had not opened properly. One of the residents interviewed claimed that to a certain extent the airlift was an attack on Muslim dignity (Wafa YouTube channel, March 9, 2024).
Local residents storm the aid (Wafa YouTube channel, March 9, 2024)    Airlifting humanitarian aid into the northern Gaza Strip
Right: Airlifting humanitarian aid into the northern Gaza Strip. Left: Local residents storm the aid (Wafa YouTube channel, March 9, 2024)
 UN trucks en route to the northern Gaza Strip (Wafa YouTube channel, March 8, 2024)
UN trucks en route to the northern Gaza Strip (Wafa YouTube channel, March 8, 2024)
  • Open Arms,[3] a Spanish NGO, announced that its ship Open Arms, which docked in Larnaca in Cyprus three weeks ago, was prepared to leave at a moment’s notice, loaded with tons of food, water and essential supplies for Palestinian civilians. The founder of the organization, Oscar Camps, said that the shop would tow a barge loaded with items provided by the American charity organization World Central Kitchen. The organization’s spokeswoman, Laura Lanuza, said that the Israeli authorities had begun to inspect the cargo, which included 200 tons of basic food products, rice, flour, and cans of tuna. Camps said it would take the ship about two to three days to reach an undisclosed location off the coast of Gaza, where a team from the World Central Kitchen had built a pier to receive the aid. The organization reportedly has sixty kitchens across the Gaza Strip where it could distribute the food (Open Arms X account in English, March 8, 2024; BBC, March 9, 2024).
Loading the aid onto the ship (Open Arms X account in English, March 8, 2024)      Loading the aid onto the ship (Open Arms X account in English, March 8, 2024)
Loading the aid onto the ship (Open Arms X account in English, March 8, 2024)
  • Jordanian Air Force planes dropped humanitarian aid at several sites in the northern Gaza Strip, in cooperation with American, French, Belgian and Egyptian planes (al-Jadeed TV, March 9, 2024).
  • Al-Jazeera TV aired a program about the benefits of airlifting aid. It showed aid being airlifted sporadically and without planning, and a considerable amount was observed falling into the sea or beyond the borders of the Gaza Strip. In addition, some of it has fallen on local residents and killed and injured a number of them. Furthermore, according to report, the aid does not resolve the shortage because it constitutes only 25% of the contents of one truck. A resident of the northern Gaza Strip who was interviewed said that at most the aid was only “a drop in the ocean.” He said aid was scarce and many residents who go to the beach returned home empty-handed (al-Jazeera YouTube channel, March 10, 2024).
  • Mazen al-Najjar, the mayor of Jebalya, also said that the airlifted aid did not meet the need and the solution was to open the crossings. He said food was very expensive, even if it had passed its expiration date (al-Jazeera YouTube channel, March 9, 2024).
The American initiative to construct a temporary dock for unloading humanitarian aid
  • American President Joe Biden announced that he had directed the army to lead an emergency mission to construct a temporary dock on the Gaza shore where humanitarian aid could be unloaded from ships. He noted that American forces would not be present inside the Gaza Strip during its construction or the transfer of aid. He also addressed Israel’s leaders and said that humanitarian aid could not be subject to negotiation (Reuters, March 8, 2024). According to experts, the construction of the temporary dock will take about 60 days and involve more than 1,000 American troops. Patrick S. Ryder, department of defense press secretary, said that once the new facility was established would be able to provide more than two million meals a day (Agence France-Presse, March 8, 2024). Senior American officials said that they would seek to coordinate with Israel regarding the transfer of aid, but the mission would move forward even if Israel did not participate in it (The Wall Street Journal, March 7, 2024).
  •   The United States military’s Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that in fewer than 36 hours after President Joe Biden’s announcement, forces sailed for the eastern Mediterranean in the Besson logistics ship. The ship is carrying equipment to establish a temporary dock that will provide “vital humanitarian aid” to the Strip (CENTCOM X account, March 10, 2024).
The Besson sails toward the eastern Mediterranean (CENTCOM X Account, March 9, 2024)    The Besson sails toward the eastern Mediterranean (CENTCOM X Account, March 9, 2024)
The Besson sails toward the eastern Mediterranean (CENTCOM X Account, March 9, 2024)
  • In response to reports of Biden’s intention, Stephane Dujarric, spokesman for the UN secretary general, said that the international community should focus on increasing humanitarian aid to the Strip by land, but “of course” any way to bring aid into the region was “welcome.” He emphasized that the entry of aid by land was economical in terms of costs and volume and that what was required was additional land entry points in the field (Reuters, March 7, 2024). David Cameron, the British foreign secretary, said that the plan would take time and therefore, in his opinion, Israel had to open the port of Ashdod (Reuters, March 8, 2024).
  • Meanwhile, Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, announced that she expected the maritime aid route between Cyprus and the Gaza Strip to start operating early next week. She said the first food aid shipment through the route might leave Cyprus immediately as an experiment (Reuters, March 8, 2024).
  • A spokesman for the Hamas government said that the United States’ plan to build a temporary dock off the coast of Gaza to provide humanitarian aid was a step in the right direction, and Hamas government bodies were prepared to help distribute the aid. However, he added that the proposed plan was not the shortest or easiest way to provide aid and that several questions remained regarding the logistics and who would operate the dock. He claimed the United States had to pressure Israel into opening all land, sea and air borders to allow the residents to receive what they needed. He rejected Israel’s claims that aid entering the Strip would benefit Hamas fighters, and said that Israel, as an occupying power, had an obligation under international law to care for the lives of civilians. He claimed Hamas was not a group of fighters but a “legitimate representative” of the “vast majority” of Palestinians, and its main goal was [allegedly] to ensure aid reached the Palestinians (al-Jazeera TV English website, March 9, 2024).
  • In Hamas, there were those who welcomed the United States initiative but there were also those who attacked it:
    • Muhammad Nazzal, a member of Hamas’ political bureau, claimed it was all difficult to understand. He said that they welcomed the construction of the dock, but did not understand how the American administration would force Israel to agree to its construction while it did not pressure Israel to open the crossings. He claimed the American position was very contradictory and incomprehensible. He later added that all the details regarding the operation of the dock, and the dispersal and distribution of the aid after its arrival, were unclear (al-Jazeera Mubasher TV website, March 8, 2024).
    • Osama Hamdan, a senior Hamas member, said there was a political plan behind President Biden’s statement about establishing a dock in Gaza, where regional forces would enter and cooperate with Israel in establishing control and managing the affairs of the Gaza Strip. He claimed that if the United States wanted to help, it should not build a dock, it should stop the supply of weapons to Israel and stop vetoing [anti-Israeli] Security Council resolutions (al-Manar TV X account, March 7, 2024).
    • Mahmoud Mardawi, a senior Hamas member, said that Hamas had not received details about the proposed dock and could not comment or present a position on something that had not reached them officially through the mediators. He said when the details arrived officially Hamas would convey its position. However, he reiterated yet again that “the day after” would be determined by the Palestinian people, and the Palestinians would have no objections if someone wanted to provide aid, subject to the sovereignty of the Palestinians on their land (Arab World Press News Agency (AWP), March 8, 2024).
  • Taher al-Nunu, media advisor to Isma’il Haniyeh, said they did not have sufficient information about the matter. He said that in principle they were in favor of any aid that reached the Palestinian people without negative consequences (al-Jazeera Mubasher YouTube channel, March 9, 2024).
  • Ramzi Rabah, a member of the PLO Executive Committee, claimed it was an American “lie and fraud.” He said he did not believe the United States could not open a safe passage to bring aid into the Gaza Strip through Egypt or open other crossings for the entrance of trucks carrying humanitarian aid (AWP website, March 8, 2024).
Making fun of Biden's decision to establish a dock in Gaza, which will ultimately be under Israel's full supervision and surveillance (al-Quds, March 9, 2024)
Making fun of Biden’s decision to establish a dock in Gaza, which will ultimately be under Israel’s full supervision and surveillance (al-Quds, March 9, 2024)
Enlisting leadership in the Gaza Strip as an alternative to Hamas
  • Rami Abdo[4] a member of the PLO’s Executive Committee, claimed that international institutions were playing with fire in the Gaza Strip and meeting with clans to convince them to form militias to secure the arrival of American, Israeli and UAE aid. He said they were crossing the borders of their work and role, and engaging in the blatant implementation of the Israeli agenda (Rami Abdo’s X account March 8, 2024). Surfers who responded asked to know which organizations he was referring to, but he did not specify.
  • Isma’il al-Thawabta, the general director of Hamas’ government media office, who shared the above tweet, wrote the “So far, international officials, under the direction of Israel, have held 12 meetings with mukhtars and clans in the Gaza Strip to find someone to manage the Gaza Strip after the war. All the clans to which the proposal was made announced their absolute refusal because they opposed Israel’s plots aimed to harm the Palestinian internal front” (al-Thawabta’s X account, March 9, 2024).
  • Taher al-Nunu, Isma’il Haniyeh’s media advisor, asked about Israel’s efforts to support alternative forces that would govern the Gaza Strip instead of Hamas, said that getting rid of Hamas was not feasible and there was no future for any government that Israel tried to impose on the Palestinian people (al-Jazeera Mubasher website, March 10, 2024).
Speech by Abu Obeida
  • On March 8, 2024, Abu Obeida, spokesman for the Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ military-terrorist wing, gave a recorded video speech. He claimed that the Palestinian people, who were facing Zionist-American “aggression” unprecedented in history, carried out the “October 7 attack” [the October 7, 2023, terrorist attack and massacre] in response to [alleged] “aggression” that had been ongoing for decades, culminating in an [alleged] attempt to Judaize and “destroy” al-Aqsa Mosque. He claimed that before October 7 Israel had planned what it was currently doing in the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria, and in Jerusalem, based on a [nonexistent] biblical “tradition” that “openly called for the burning of other nations.” He emphasized that Operation al-Aqsa Flood laid the foundations for a “new phase on a global level,” entitled “a right can only be taken by force.”
  • He claimed that the “fighters” [terrorist operatives] of Hamas and the military wings of other “organizations” were fighting for the 154th day, causing the IDF heavy losses in officers and soldiers, “mercenaries” and armored vehicles. He claimed that as long as the “aggression” on their land continued, Israel would not enjoy peace or bring security to its people before it gave the Palestinian people their rights and ended the occupation of their land and holy places. He claimed that the “fighters” were in their positions and continued to face “aggression” wherever there was combat, their morale was high and their fighting sprit second to none. He claimed that during the last three weeks select military wing units had carried out a large number of “high-quality” operations.
  • Abu Obeida said that on the occasion of the beginning of the month of Ramadan, the Islamic nation, which has two billion people, was facing an enemy who did not care about the sanctity of al-Aqsa Mosque, and planned, even if it claimed otherwise, to impose restrictions on worship, in continuation of its “declared religious war.” He called on all Palestinians in Judea and Samaria, in Jerusalem and in Israel to mobilize and march towards al-Aqsa Mosque, and not to allow Israel to enforce its conditions. He emphasized that al-Aqsa Mosque was part of their faith, and that for its sake Operation al-Aqsa Flood “began,” and for its sake every house in the Gaza Strip sacrificed a martyr, someone wounded or prisoner. He called for the declaration of mobilization to confront Israel’s “arrogance” on every battlefield and confrontation and in every scene of protest and demonstration, under the call “At your command, al-Aqsa,” and emphasized that the month of Ramadan should be as it always was, a continuation of the Battle of Badr and the conquest of Mecca, and the escalation of Operation al-Aqsa Flood in the arenas and on the fronts inside ” Palestine” and outside of it (almayadeen.net, March 8, 2024; aljazeera.net, March 8, 2024; Hamas Telegram channel in Judea and Samaria, March 8, 2024).
  • After Abu Obeida speech, Khaled Safi, a Palestinian who emigrated from the Gaza Strip and defines himself as “a social media influencer” (his X account has 238 thousand followers), published a picture from his October 16, 2023 speech and a photo from his March 8, 2024 speech, and wrote that the size of his body had changed in 145 days. He said it “proved” he was living in the tunnels in conditions more difficult than those who lived above ground, and the claims that people who lived in the tunnels enjoyed good food, or stole humanitarian aid, or had prepared shelters for themselves and left others to deal with the destruction were “Zionist lies” (Khaled Safi’s X account, March 9, 2024).
Abu Obeida. October 16, 2023 (right), March 8, 2024 (left) (Khaled Safi's X account, March 9, 2024)     Abu Obeida. October 16, 2023 (right), March 8, 2024 (left) (Khaled Safi's X account, March 9, 2024)
Abu Obeida. October 16, 2023 (right), March 8, 2024 (left)
(Khaled Safi’s X account, March 9, 2024)

Back To Top

The Northern Arena
Hezbollah attacks
  • Over the weekend of March 8-10, 2024, Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 25 attacks using anti-tank missiles, cannons, Katyusha, Falaq 1 rockets and Burkan rockets, whose warheads weigh between 300 and 500 kilograms (between 660 and 1,100 pounds) and UAVs (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, March 8-10, 2024).
IDF response
  • In response to Hezbollah’s attacks, Israeli Air Force fighter jets attacked Hezbollah targets in south Lebanon, including a military building in the Mirwaheen area, a terrorist infrastructure in the Labouneh area and a military post in the Aita al-Sha’ab area, from which rockets were launched at Israeli territory. Fighter jets also attacked a Hezbollah military headquarters in the Mansouri area and another headquarters in the Bint Jbeil area. Also attacked were a military building in the Tallouseh area, a military building in the Majdal Kafra area, and a terrorist infrastructure in the Mhaibib area (IDF spokesperson, March 8-9, 2024).
  • IDF forces intercepted a Hezbollah explosive drone detected crossing from Lebanese territory in the Upper Galilee. An unmanned Hezbollah aircraft from Lebanon fell in the Hermon area (IDF spokesperson, March 7, 2024).
 Attack on a headquarters in the Kafra area (IDF Spokesman, March 9 and 10, 2024)    Attack on a terrorist facility of Hezbollah in the Aita al-Sha'ab area.
Right: Attack on a terrorist facility of Hezbollah in the Aita al-Sha’ab area. Left: Attack on a headquarters in the Kafra area (IDF Spokesman, March 9 and 10, 2024)
Attack in Majdal Zoun (Lebanon News X account, March 9, 2024)      Attack in Kafra (Fouad Khreiss' X account, March 9, 2024).
Right: Attack in Kafra (Fouad Khreiss’ X account, March 9, 2024). Left: Attack in Majdal Zoun (Lebanon News X account, March 9, 2024)
 Attack in Aitaroun (fado Bint al-Ard X account, March 7, 2024)     Attack in Bar'asheet (X account of Fouad Khreiss, March 8, 2024).
Right: Attack in Bar’asheet (X account of Fouad Khreiss, March 8, 2024). On the left: Attack in Aitaroun (fado Bint al-Ard X account, March 7, 2024)
Hezbollah fatalities
  • Hezbollah reported the deaths of seven operatives, all from south Lebanon (Hezbollah’s combat information Telegram channel, March 7-10, 2024). According to the names of three of the operatives, they were apparently a father and his two sons, all three Hezbollah operatives. In ITIC assessment, they were killed in an attack on their temporary home in Khirbet Selem, where they had moved from Balida.
    • Fadi Mahmoud Dawi, aka Jihad, born in 1976, from Aitaroun.
    • Hadi Mahmoud Hijazi, aka Haidar, born in 2004, from Balida.
    • Fadel Abbas Kaour, aka Jawad, born in 2003, from Balida.
    • Ali Amin Marji, aka Falah, born in 1974, from Balida.
    • Ja’far Ali Marji, aka Radwan, born in 1968, from Balida.
    • Ali Ja’far Marji, aka Abu Ja’far, born in 1993, from Balida.
    • Hassan Ja’far Marji, aka Baqer, born in 1996, from Balida.
Hezbollah fatalities (Hezbollah's combat information Telegram channel, March 10, 2024)
Hezbollah fatalities (Hezbollah’s combat information Telegram channel, March 10, 2024)      
  •  An Israeli attack was reported in Khirbet Selem (al-Akhbar X account, March 9, 2024). A father, a mother and their two sons were reportedly killed, and nine people were wounded (al-Mayadeen, March 9, 2024). They were displaced persons from one of the villages in south Lebanon (Fouad Khreiss’ X account, March 9, 2024).
Attack in Khirbet Selem (al-Akhbar X account, March 9, 2024)    Attack in Khirbet Selem (al-Akhbar X account, March 9, 2024)
Attack in Khirbet Selem (al-Akhbar X account, March 9, 2024)
Residents of south Lebanon
  • The United Nations International Organization for Migration (IOM), which monitors the movements of displaced persons around the world, issued a report saying that the number of displaced persons from south Lebanon since the beginning of the tension in the region stood at about 91,000, about half from the Bint Jbeil area (website of the International Organization for Migration, March 7, 2024).
  • Hezbollah reportedly allocated about $20 million a month for the needs of the displaced persons. The organization pays their rent and gives each family between $100 and $200 a month. Regarding material damage. about 1,300 houses have been completely destroyed, 2,000 severely damaged, and about 3,000 slightly damaged. In addition, about 100,000 dunams (about 25,000 acres) and 500,000 trees were damaged (Huna Lubnan / This is Lebanon, March 10, 2024).
Hezbollah-Hamas relations
  • According to Osama Hamdan, a senior Hamas member, Hezbollah entered the war on October 8, 2023, without waiting for Hamas to ask. He said there was contact and constant consultation between the Hamas and Hezbollah leaderships. He described the relationship as “a partnership of brothers, not the hegemony of one but a partnership of equals.” He also said Israel was threatening that after the Gaza Strip, it would expand its activity to other arenas. However, Israel knew, he said, that it could not and if it did the results would be disastrous (al-Manar TV X account, March 7, 2024).
The Lebanese government
  • According to the Lebanese daily al-Akhbar, Israel set a deadline for a political agreement with Lebanon and informed Western countries that if an agreement with Lebanon was not reached by March 15, Israel would prepare to escalate in Lebanon while increasing military activity in the region. Israel denied the report.
  • “Sources” reported that Amos Hochstein, the American mediator, stopped his mission, decided to return home, and instructed his aide to monitor the contacts in Beirut. They said Hochstein would not return to Lebanon unless there was an agreement for a truce. They said Hochstein’s proposal had been abandoned due to the collapse of the negotiations in Cairo for hostage deal and a ceasefire. The “sources” claimed that Israel’s threats to start a war on March 15 were a recurring theme in its psychological warfare against the “resistance.” They claimed Hezbollah was not interested in war, but not at any cost, and would not turn a blind eye to Israel’s attacks (al-Akhbar, March 8, 2024).
  • Na’im Qassem, Hezbollah’s deputy secretary-general, speaking at a ceremony in Beirut, addressed Lebanese reports that Israel would attack Lebanon on March 15 if an agreement was not reached, saying that if Israel attacked, they would “break Israel and its allies’ legs.” He said Hezbollah was not threatening, but rather preparing for the day when Israel decided to expand its campaign (Na’im Qassem’s X account, March 7, 2024).
  • Hassan Fadlallah, a member of Hezbollah’s parliamentary faction, referring to Israeli threats to start a war, said they understood Israel wanted to end the war, but the “resistance” was prepared for all scenarios. He added that they did not see a large-scale war on the horizon, but the “resistance” was preparing as if the war would begin tomorrow (al-Nashra, March 9, 2024).
  • Ali Hassan Khalil, political aide to Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese parliament, reportedly went to Qatar to meet with senior Qatari officials to discuss the issue of the Lebanese presidency and the situation in south Lebanon (al-Joumhouria, March 8, 2024).

Back To Top

Israel, Judea and Samaria
Terrorist attacks
  • On the afternoon of March 8, 2024, shots were fired at an IDF checkpoint near Homesh (northwest of Nablus). An IDF force at the scene chased the shooters and entered the nearby village of Silat ad-Dhahr. When the force entered, an IED was detonated and seven fighters were wounded (Israeli media, March 8, 2024).
Detonation of the IED against the IDF force in Silat ad-Dhahr (QudsN X account, March 8, 2024)
Detonation of the IED against the IDF force in Silat ad-Dhahr
QudsN X account, March 8, 2024)
  • The Jenin Battalion of the PIJ’s military-terrorist wing claimed responsibility for the attack in the Homesh area and reported that the battalion operatives had lured several IDF soldiers into an ambush and attacked them by detonating an IED. Reportedly, there were dead and wounded (Jenin Battalion Telegram channel, March 9, 2024). The PIJ praised the attack, saying “This heroic act strikes the occupation again.” The PIJ said they would continue operations against Israel, which should prepare itself for what was coming during Ramadan (PIJ Telegram channel, March 9, 2024).
  • Hamas praised the attack, saying it showed the Palestinian people’s firm belief in the “resistance” as the only way to respond to the [alleged] “crimes of the occupation and massacres in the Gaza Strip” and its threats against worshippers at al-Aqsa Mosque during Ramadan. Hezbollah claimed its operatives were always ready to inflict painful blows on Israel, which would intensify during Ramadan (Hamas Telegram channel, March 8, 2024).
Counterterrorism activities
  • The Israeli security forces continued their counterterrorism activities in Judea and Samaria, detaining three wanted Palestinians. Since the beginning of the war, about 3,500 wanted Palestinians have been detained, including about 1,500 Hamas operatives (IDF spokesperson’s X account, March 10, 2024).
  • On the night of March 9, 2024, Israeli security forces operated in Silat ad-Dhahr and al-Fandaqumiya (northwest of Nablus), where on March 8, 2024 an IED was used to attack an IDF force. The forces also operated in al-Bireh and Birzeit (north of Ramallah), where they detained three wanted Palestinians (IDF spokesperson’s X account, March 10, 2024). Before dawn on March 8, 2024, the forces operated in al-Sila al-Harithiya, northwest of Jenin, killing Muhammad Adel Muhammad al-Shalabi, a PIJ terrorist operative involved in planning and carrying out terrorist attacks, including shooting attacks, the detonation of IEDs and the transfer of funds to finance terrorist activity (IDF spokesperson’s X account, March 8, 2024). The Palestinian media reported that Muhammad al-Shalabi was wanted by Israel and was killed after his house was surrounded and there were exchanges of fire with the Israeli forces (Palinfo X account, March 8, 2024).
Muhammad al-Shalabi (Palinfo X account, March 8, 2024)
Muhammad al-Shalabi (Palinfo X account, March 8, 2024)
Friday prayers
  • According to an Anadolu News correspondent, about 20,000 worshippers attended Friday prayers on the Temple Mount on March 8, 2024, despite continued Israeli restrictions and checkpoints placed in and around east Jerusalem. Sheikh Muhammad Salim, the al-Aqsa Mosque preacher, called on worshippers to come to al-Aqsa Mosque during Ramadan and the rest of the year (Anadolu News, March 8, 2024).
Friday Prayer (@palestine_graph X account, March 8, 2024)
Friday Prayer (@palestine_graph X account, March 8, 2024)
Solidarity with the Gaza Strip
  • In Ramallah and al-Bireh, after Friday prayers, a march was held in support of the Gaza Strip and the “resistance,” attended by dozens of Palestinians. The participants chanted slogans in support of the “resistance,” against the Oslo Accords and security coordination with Israel, and praise for Lebanon and Yemen. Palestinian and Hamas flags were waved. Ramzi Rabah, a Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine member of the PLO’s Executive Committee, who participated in the march, said what was currently necessary was to use the dialogue in Moscow as a basis for the unification of all the Palestinian forces in confronting and resisting Israeli “aggression.” He called for pressure to be exerted on the United States administration and Arab countries to lift the “siege” and provide safe corridors to bring aid into the Gaza Strip. He called on them to use all possible means to exert pressure on Israel and send a message to the Americans that otherwise, their interests would not be safe (al-Araby al-Jadeed, March 8, 2024).
The march in Ramallah, attended by PLO Executive Committee member Ramzi Rabah (pictured on the right) (al-Araby al-Jadeed, March 8, 2024)     The march in Ramallah, attended by PLO Executive Committee member Ramzi Rabah (pictured on the right) (al-Araby al-Jadeed, March 8, 2024)
The march in Ramallah, attended by PLO Executive Committee member Ramzi Rabah (pictured on the right) (al-Araby al-Jadeed, March 8, 2024)

Back To Top

Palestinian Authority (PA)
  • Mahmoud Abbas, PA chairman, appointed Hussein Hamail governor of the Jericho and Jordan Valley District (Wafa, March 7, 2024). On March 9, 2024, Abbas swore in the new governors of the districts of Jenin, Hebron, Nablus, Jericho and the Jordan Valley, Bethlehem and Tubas (Fatah Telegram channel, March 9, 2024).
  • Hussein al-Sheikh, secretary of the PLO’s Executive Committee, met in his office in Ramallah with a small committee of members of Fatah’s Executive Committee and Central Committee, a committee recently established at a meeting of the Palestinian leadership. Those present discussed ways to end the war in the Gaza Strip, help its residents and prevent their emigration, and to increase its activity in the international arena (Wafa, March 9, 2024).
Meeting of the small committee in Hussein al-Sheikh's office in Ramallah (Wafa, March 9, 2024)
Meeting of the small committee in Hussein al-Sheikh’s office in Ramallah (Wafa, March 9, 2024)
  • Following American President Joe Biden’s State of the Union Address, Mahmoud Abbas’ office expressed its satisfaction and appreciation, stating the speech was in line with the Palestinian situation and demands as conveyed by Mahmoud Abbas (Wafa, March 8, 2024).
  • Mahmoud al-Habbash, Mahmoud Abbas’ advisor on religious affairs and Islamic relations, said Mahmoud Abbas would be the one to form the new government, which would be a technocratic government composed of independent people not affiliated with the Palestinian organizations. He called on Hamas to hand over control of the Gaza Strip to the PA. He added that the new government had to please all Palestinians, but that its source of authority would be the PA chairman, the PLO, and no one else inside or outside the Palestinian arena. A senior Palestinian source assessed that in March 2024 Mahmoud Abbas would entrust Muhammad Mustafa, chairman of the Palestinian Investment Fund, with the task of forming the new government (al-Sharq News, March 10, 2024).
Iran
  • Hossein-Amir Abdollahian, Iranian foreign minister, spoke with his Qatari counterpart, Badr Albusaidi, to discuss regional and international developments, including the situation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The two discussed the emergency meeting of the foreign ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in Jeddah and stressed the need for a collective effort by Muslim countries to stop the war in the Gaza Strip and transfer humanitarian aid to the Strip (Mehr, March 8, 2024).
  • The Iranian foreign minister also spoke with his Qatari counterpart and prime minister, Mohammad bin Abdulrahman, and discussed the latest developments in the Gaza Strip and the region. They discussed proposals for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and stressed that efforts and political activities had to be intensified to help the Palestinians (IRNA, March 9, 2024).
  • During a visit to Qatar, Ali Bagheri, Iranian deputy foreign minister, met with Mohammad al-Khulaifi, minister of state in the Qatari foreign ministry, to discuss developments in the Gaza Strip and Qatar’s efforts to promote a ceasefire. During his visit to Doha, Bagheri also met with Enrique Mora, the EU’s deputy foreign policy chief, and with Sven Koopmans, the EU’s special envoy to the Middle East, to discuss developments in the Gaza Strip (Fars, March 8, 2024).

Back To Top

Pro-Iranian militias
Iraq
  • During the past few days, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for several attacks “in Israeli territory,” part of what it called “the second stage of the resistance activities in support of our people in the Gaza Strip and in response to the [alleged] Zionist massacres of Palestinian civilians” (Islamic Resistance Telegram channel, March 7-9, 2024). Among the attacks that it mentioned [which in reality did not occur] were:
    • UAV attack on a “military camp” at the airport in Rosh Pina
    • UAV attack on the oil refineries in Haifa
    • UAV attack on “Intelligence Base No. 1” in the northern Golan Heights
Yemen
  • There has recently been an increase in Houthi activity. Yahya Saria, spokesman for the Houthi armed forces, said the Houthis had carried out an attack against the American ship Propel Fortune with naval missiles, as part of an operation against American destroyers in the Red Sea. He said the objectives of the operations had been achieved, and their operations would not stop until the “aggression” ceased and the siege of the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip was lifted (Yahya Saria’s Telegram channel, March 9, 2024).
  • There has also been an increase in the reactions of the United States military and coalition countries to these attacks. The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) reported several attacks against anti-ship missiles and UAVs launched from Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen at the Gulf of Aden. In total, the forces intercepted 28 UAVs (CENTCOM X account, March 7-9, 2024). American and British military forces also carried out airstrikes on Yemen’s al-Hudaydah Airport (al-Masirah Network, March 7, 2024).
  • Grant Shapps, the British defense secretary, said that on March 8, 2024, the British destroyer HMS Diamond intercepted two UAVs launched by the Houthis (British defense secretary’s X account, March 9, 2024). The French military announced that they had destroyed four assault UAVs in the Gulf of Aden, contributing to protecting the True Confidence, which was towed after it was attacked on March 6, 2024, as well as other ships in the area. The Danish defense ministry said the Danish warship Iver Huitfeldt had intercepted four Houthi UAVs in the Red Sea (Reuters, March 9, 2024).
  • Houthi leader Abd al-Malik al-Houthi gave a speech regarding developments in the Gaza Strip and condemning Israel’s actions and the American support of Israel. Referring to Houthi operations in the Red Sea, al-Houthi claimed that “these actions caused heavy economic damage to the Israeli enemy.” He stressed that the only way to stop Houthi naval operations was to stop the “aggression” against the Gaza Strip. Al-Houthi noted that since the beginning of the war, the Houthis had carried out 96 operations, 32 of them directly against Israel, including attacks on 61 ships. He noted that new weapons had been used in the Houthis’ recent operations, surprising the United States and Britain. He also praised the attack on a ship that killed three people, claiming that the precise strike had shocked the Americans (Abd al-Malik al-Houthi’s Telegram channel, March 7, 2024).
Houthi-Hamas Relations
  • According to a “senior member” of Hamas’ military-terrorist wing, the Houthis (Ansar Allah) informed them that their latest escalation in the Red Sea was the result of Israel’s intentions to attack Rafah and the continuation of Israel’s [alleged] “policy of starvation.” According to the source, the Houthis asked Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades for their opinion regarding mediation for the release of the ship’s crew, claiming that any decision regarding the ship and its crew would be made by the Brigades. The Houthis also informed the Brigades that their “strategic decision” was to continue the Red Sea campaign until the “aggression” ceased and the siege on the Gaza Strip was lifted. The source claimed that contact and coordination between the Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades and the battlefronts in Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq had been ongoing since the first hours of Operation al-Aqsa Flood on October 7, 2023 (al-Jazeera TV website, March 7, 2024).
  • Senior Hamas member Osama Hamdan said the “brothers” in Yemen had made contact at an early stage with the Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades leadership, and when attempts were made to negotiate the return of the ship held by the Houthis, the Houthi leadership informed the negotiators that the decision on the issue rested with Hamas, and discussions were held between Hamas and the Houthis. He noted that the Houthis’ “resistance” [terrorist] activity was not an emotional reaction but rather a calculated one (al-Manar TV X account, March 7, 2024).
Houthi military exercise
  • The Houthis’ 35th Armored Brigade conducted a combined exercise of armored, artillery and infantry force dubbed “High Morale,” which, according to the organization, was intended to prepare the forces for the “war of victory and holy jihad.” The exercise included an attack on enemy concentrations and positions, combining artillery forces, explosive UAVs, armored forces, snipers and infantry units; setting up an ambush and planting IEDs. It also included simulating the takeover of Israeli positions using machine gun fire, explosive drones and rockets, as well as kidnapping soldiers from armored vehicles and the detonation of IEDs to attack vehicles. The exercise ended with chants, “Allahu akbar, death to America, death to Israel, a curse on the Jews, victory for Islam, at your command, al-Aqsa!” (Houthi combat information X account, March 9, 2024; September 26 website, March 9, 2024).
Launching rockets and using explosive drones (Houthi combat information X account, March 9, 2024; September 26 website, March 9, 2024)      Launching rockets and using explosive drones (Houthi combat information X account, March 9, 2024; September 26 website, March 9, 2024)
Launching rockets and using explosive drones (Houthi combat information X account, March 9, 2024; September 26 website, March 9, 2024)
Simulating taking over an American post (Houthi combat information X account, March 9, 2024; September 26 website, March 9, 2024)    Firing from a machine gun mounted on an SUV.
Right: Firing from a machine gun mounted on an SUV. Left: Simulating taking over an American post (Houthi combat information X account, March 9, 2024; September 26 website, March 9, 2024)
 Simulating taking over an American military vehicle (Houthi combat information X account, March 9, 2024)    Simulating the capture of an Israeli soldier.
Right: Simulating the capture of an Israeli soldier. Left: Simulating taking over an American military vehicle (Houthi combat information X account, March 9, 2024)

Back To Top

The Arab Arena
Egypt
  • Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi gave a speech at a ceremony marking Martyrs’ Day, saying they were working for Egypt’s security and stability. Referring to the Palestinian situation, he said the events in the Gaza Strip were a challenge for Egypt and the entire region, and they could not turn their backs on the Palestinians. He stressed that the Rafah Crossing was open 24 hours a day and that they wanted to bring large quantities of aid into the Gaza Strip. He also said they would not hesitate to work to achieve a ceasefire and transfer aid, and would continue to act until the Palestinians established a sovereign state. He also noted that the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip could cost more than $90 billion (al-Qahera, March 9, 2024).
  • Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry spoke with American Secretary of State Antony Blinken about coordination between Egypt and the United States regarding developments in the Gaza Strip. They discussed joint efforts for a ceasefire and a hostage deal. They also discussed developments in the Red Sea and their threat to international trade (Egyptian foreign ministry Facebook page, March 8, 2024).
Morocco
  • On March 9, 2024, a demonstration was held in support of the Gaza Strip in front of the Moroccan Parliament building in Rabat. The demonstrators chanted slogans in condemnation of “Israel’s [alleged] crimes” against Palestinian civilians (al-Arabi TV, March 9, 2024).
Demonstration in support of Gaza in front of the Moroccan Parliament building (al-Arabi TV, March 9, 2024)
Demonstration in support of Gaza in front of the Moroccan Parliament building
(al-Arabi TV, March 9, 2024)

Back To Top

The International Arena
United States
  • American Secretary of State Antony Blinken spoke with Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan to discuss efforts to achieve a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip for at least six weeks as part of a deal that would include the release of hostages and the increase of humanitarian aid. Blinken pledged to continue close coordination with regional and international partners to promote calm during Ramadan and prepare for the post-conflict phase. He also affirmed the ongoing cooperation between international partners to protect freedom of navigation in the Red Sea (American Department of State website, March 9, 2024).
United Nations
  • On March 7, 2024, a delegation of bereaved families from the Gaza Strip visited UN headquarters in New York, the visit having been arranged by the Palestinian mission to the UN. They met with UN Secretary-General António Guterres, who said after the meeting that he had been greatly influenced by the “terrible stories” he heard from the families, some of whom had lost “more than a hundred relatives”. He said a humanitarian ceasefire could not be delayed. Amar Bendjama, the permanent ambassador of Algeria, which is a member of the Security Council, arranged for the families to meet with the 15 Security Council members, who heard their testimonies about “the [alleged] barbarism of IDF forces and their crimes against defenseless civilians in the Gaza Strip.” The families also met with the ambassadors of the Arab group and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) at the United Nations and held a press conference. They were accompanied at all meetings by Riyad Mansour, the PA’s permanent representative to the UN, Majed Bamya, the PA’s deputy permanent representative, and Ambassador Fida Abdel-Hadi Nasser. Some of the families were Gazans who left the Strip during the war (Dr. Imad al-Tamimi, a physician at the European Hospital in Khan Yunis; Adam Abu Sharia, an engineer and pharmacist from Gaza; Fifi Saba from the Rimal neighborhood) and Palestinian residents of the United States who have families in the Gaza Strip (Jamila Abu Dalal, who has a family in the Zeitoun and Tal al-Hawa neighborhoods; Hala Hejazi from San Francisco; and Dr. Rula al-Fara from Texas) (al-Quds al-Arabi, March 7, 2024).
The Palestinian delegation meets with the UN secretary-general and at a press conference at the end of the visit (al-Quds al-Arabi, March 7, 2024)       The Palestinian delegation meets with the UN secretary-general and at a press conference at the end of the visit (al-Quds al-Arabi, March 7, 2024)
The Palestinian delegation meets with the UN secretary-general and at a press conference at the end of the visit (al-Quds al-Arabi, March 7, 2024)
UNRWA
  • Philippe Lazzarini, UNRWA commissioner general, said he believed many people expected a very harsh response after October 7, 2023, which was an unprecedented massacre, but he did not think anyone expected them to “reach such levels of [alleged] inhumanity.” Regarding the ties of UNRWA workers to Hamas, he said they were aware of the risk of violating neutrality, and claimed they had invested heavily in awareness, policy and prevention of such phenomena, due to the fact that their staff members had a “dual identity.” Regarding the findings of the investigations into UNRWA, he said that it would be a “terrible betrayal” if his team were found guilty (The Telegraph, March 8, 2024).
  • According to an UNRWA report, agency employees were [allegedly] threatened and coerced by the Israeli authorities while in detention and pressured to “make false statements against the agency,” including about ties to Hamas and that agency’s employees had participated in the October 7 atrocities. UNRWA’s media director said the agency had planned to disclose the information in an unpublished report to agencies inside and outside the United Nations that specialized in documenting possible human rights violations (Reuters, March 9, 2024).
  • After Canada suspended its aid to UNRWA at the end of January 2024, a Canadian government source said the country would lift its temporary cessation of funding to the agency because UNRWA played a vital role in the Gaza Strip (Reuters, March 8, 2024).

[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
[2] Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Shi'ite Houthis in Yemen and the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq.
[3] An NGO from Badalona, Spain, whose main mission is to protect illegal immigrants at sea fleeing from war, persecution or poverty, and trying to reach Europe, and to rescue the immigrants' boats.
[4] Rami Abdo was born in the Gaza Strip and is the founder and chairman of the Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor), which he established in Geneva in 2011. He holds a doctorate in law and finance from the University of Manchester. In September 2020, former Defense Minister Benny Gantz signed an order to restrict the transfer of property and funds to Rami Abdo, since he was a member directorate of IPALESTINE, a designated terrorist organization which operates in the UK, belongs to Hamas and works on its behalf. Abdo denied these accusations and said that he would take legal action