Operation Iron Swords (Updated to 1 p.m., January 14, 2024)

IDF forces in the Gaza Strip (IDF spokesperson, January 13, 2024)

IDF forces in the Gaza Strip (IDF spokesperson, January 13, 2024)

IDF forces in the Gaza Strip (IDF spokesperson, January 13, 2024)

IDF forces in the Gaza Strip (IDF spokesperson, January 13, 2024)

IDF attacks in the southwest of Gaza City (Shehab X account, January 13, 2024)

IDF attacks in the southwest of Gaza City (Shehab X account, January 13, 2024)

IDF attacks in the area of Batn al-Sameen and Qizan al-Najjar, in the south of Khan Yunis (Shehab X account, January 13, 2024)

IDF attacks in the area of Batn al-Sameen and Qizan al-Najjar, in the south of Khan Yunis (Shehab X account, January 13, 2024)

Reportedly, there is no communication or Internet in the Gaza Strip (QudsN X account, January 14, 2024)

Reportedly, there is no communication or Internet in the Gaza Strip (QudsN X account, January 14, 2024)

Attacking Hezbollah facilities in the al-Hiyam area (IDF spokesperson, January 11, 2024)

Attacking Hezbollah facilities in the al-Hiyam area (IDF spokesperson, January 11, 2024)

Israeli security force activity in the al-Far'a refugee camp (Wafa YouTube channel, January 14, 2024)

Israeli security force activity in the al-Far'a refugee camp (Wafa YouTube channel, January 14, 2024)

The marches in Ramallah (right: al-Araby al-Jadeed, January 12, 2024; left: @quds_feed X account, January 13, 2024)

The marches in Ramallah (right: al-Araby al-Jadeed, January 12, 2024; left: @quds_feed X account, January 13, 2024)

The marches in Ramallah (right: al-Araby al-Jadeed, January 12, 2024; left: @quds_feed X account, January 13, 2024)

The marches in Ramallah (right: al-Araby al-Jadeed, January 12, 2024; left: @quds_feed X account, January 13, 2024)

Attacking an Israeli town and headquarters.

Attacking an Israeli town and headquarters.

Abduction of civilians (Houthi Ansar Allah Telegram channel, January 13, 2024)

Abduction of civilians (Houthi Ansar Allah Telegram channel, January 13, 2024)

Northern Arena, Israeli Casualties, Rocket Fire

Overview[1]
  • The southern arena: The IDF continued its integrated ground maneuver, focusing on the northern Gaza Strip, where rocket launchers were located and destroyed; the central Gaza Strip, mainly the area of the al-Maghazi refugee camp; and the southern Gaza Strip, mainly in the area of the city of Khan Yunis (according to the Palestinians, in the southeast and north of the city). The IDF spokesperson noted that since the beginning of the fighting, the forces had destroyed about 700 rocket launchers. Egyptian and Palestinian figures expressed concern about the IDF’s intention to take control of the Philadelphia Axis on the Egypt-Gaza Strip border of Egypt. According to reports, Egyptians have begun conducting ground and air patrols along the route. Hamas warned against an Israeli move to occupy the Philadelphia Axis, because, Hamas claimed, it would mean a practical step towards displacing the Palestinians from the Strip
  • According to an unofficial estimate, since October 7, 2023, approximately 1,300 Israeli civilians and security personnel have been killed, 522 of them soldiers and officers; 132 civilian and military hostages are still being held by the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip; 121 hostages have been returned to Israel. According to Egyptian officials, talks are taking place between Egypt, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), as well as with the Israeli government, regarding an agreement. The Palestinians continue to insist that any settlement is conditional on a ceasefire and the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip.
  • The Gaza Strip: Palestinians, as well as UN officials, report a worsening situation in the Gaza Strip, especially in the public health sector, and call for increased humanitarian aid.
  • The northern arena: Hezbollah continues attacking IDF posts and concentrations of forces on the Israeli border. Between January 11 and 14, 2024, Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 28 attacks. On January 14, 2024, an anti-tank missile was fired at a house in Kfar Yuval, killing two Israeli civilians. On the night of January 13, 2024, an IDF force clashed with a terrorist squad which came from Lebanese territory in the Mount Dov area; three operatives were killed. A group calling itself the Islamic al-Izz Brigades claimed responsibility, claiming they had come in response to the killing of Saleh al-‘Arouri.
  • Judea and Samaria: On the night of January 12, 2024, a terrorist squad infiltrated the settlement of Adora, west of Hebron; the operatives were killed by IDF forces. The al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed responsibility for the incident. The Israeli security forces continued their counterterrorism activities.
  • The pro-Iranian militias: In response to the Houthi attacks on maritime traffic in the Red Sea, United States and British forces attacked more than 70 Houthi targets in Yemen. Iran and the Arab countries strongly condemned the American and British attacks. At the initiative of Russia, the UN Security Council convened to discuss the issue.
  • The International Court of Justice (ICJ) trial instigated by South Africa against Israel began. On the first day of the deliberations, South Africa presented its main claim, that the war was part of a “decades-long systematic campaign designed to oppress the Palestinians;” the following day Israel presented its case and rebutted the accusations. The court is expected to determine shortly whether to issue urgent warrants against Israel.
The Southern Arena
  • The northern Gaza Strip: Operating in the al-Atatra area, one of the areas from which rockets are launched to attack Israel, IDF fighters located and destroyed launch pits (IDF spokesperson, January 13, 2024). In al-Mughraqa area, southwest of Gaza City, the fighters located and destroyed two compounds where dozens of launchers were located, some of which were loaded and ready for use (IDF spokesperson, January 13, 2024).
Launch pits located and destroyed in the al-Atatra area (IDF spokesperson, January 14, 2024)    Launch pits located and destroyed in the al-Atatra area (IDF spokesperson, January 14, 2024)
Launch pits located and destroyed in the al-Atatra area (IDF spokesperson, January 14, 2024)
IDF forces in the Gaza Strip (IDF spokesperson, January 13, 2024)    IDF forces in the Gaza Strip (IDF spokesperson, January 13, 2024)
IDF forces in the Gaza Strip (IDF spokesperson, January 13, 2024)
  • The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) military wing claimed it had attacked Israeli aircraft with an anti-aircraft missile while they were attacking residents’ houses in the Tel al-Hawa area of Gaza City on the night of January 13 (Safa Telegram channel, January 14, 2024).
IDF attacks in the southwest of Gaza City (Shehab X account, January 13, 2024)
IDF attacks in the southwest of Gaza City (Shehab X account, January 13, 2024)
  • The central Gaza Strip: IDF forces operating in the al-Maghazi refugee camp killed about 20 terrorists, including a commander of Hamas’ nukhba force. They also found large quantities of weapons (IDF spokesperson, January 12, 2024). An al-Jazeera TV correspondent reported an exchange of fire between the IDF forces and “resistance members” [terrorist operatives] near Shuhadaa al-Aqsa Hospital in Deir al-Balah. According to the correspondent, the IDF forces operated close to the hospital (al-Jazeera YouTube channel, January 13, 2024). The media reported on residents and evacuees who fled the hospital after learning that IDF forces were nearby (Shehab, January 13, 2024).
  • The southern Gaza Strip: IDF forces continued to clash with terrorist squads. An Israeli Air Force fighter jet attacked a Hamas military structure in Khan Yunis; seven terrorists were killed in the attack. Among them was a nukhba commander who had taken part in the attack and massacre in the cities, towns and villages surrounding the Gaza Strip on October 7, 2023. The forces located large quantities of weapons (IDF spokesperson, January 12, 2024). The IDF destroyed a shaft that was located inside a building which contained a large number of weapons and IEDs (IDF spokesperson, January 13, 2024).
IDF attacks in the area of Batn al-Sameen and Qizan al-Najjar, in the south of Khan Yunis (Shehab X account, January 13, 2024)
IDF attacks in the area of Batn al-Sameen and Qizan al-Najjar, in the south of Khan Yunis (Shehab X account, January 13, 2024)
  • The military wing of Hamas announced that its forces had launched a surface-to-air missile at a IDF helicopter in eastern Khan Yunis. The daily infographic of the wing’s activity stated that a SAM-7 missile had been launched at a helicopter (Hamas Telegram channel in Judea and Samaria, January 13, 2024)
  • Ahmed al-Bata, an al-Arabi channel correspondent in Khan Yunis, reported on the fighting in the center of the Gaza Strip and Khan Yunis. He said that during the night the Israeli Air Force had carried out massive attacks in the central Gaza Strip. In Khan Yunis, the exchange of fire between IDF forces and “resistance fighters” located in the southeast of the city resumed. There were also reports of IDF attacks in the north of Khan Yunis (al-Arabi’s YouTube  channel, January 14, 2014).
IDF attacks in northern Khan Yunis (al-Arabi's YouTube channel, January 14, 2014)      An al-Jazeera presenter explains the fighting in the Khan Yunis area (al-Jazeera YouTube channel, January 13, 2024).
Right: An al-Jazeera presenter explains the fighting in the Khan Yunis area (al-Jazeera YouTube channel, January 13, 2024). Left: IDF attacks in northern Khan Yunis
(al-Arabi’s YouTube channel, January 14, 2014)
  • The Philadelphia Axis (the Gaza Strip-Egypt border): “Egyptian sources familiar with Egyptian operations related to the Gaza Strip” said that Egypt had begun to take steps to put an end to Israel’s plans regarding security along the Philadelphia Axis, and to that end was conducting ground and air patrols along the route. According to the “sources,” Israel was pressuring Egypt, through the United States, to reach a new security agreement regarding the Philadelphia Axis. It was also claimed that Egypt did not accept the Israeli proposal because it violated Egyptian sovereignty and gave Israel the right to monitor border violations and respond to them with its Air Force. “The source” revealed that there were “understandings” with the Palestinian “organizations” according to which the Philadelphia Axis should be free of all “resistance” [terrorist] actions to prevent an Israeli presence in the area. According to the “source,” the organizations have shown understanding of the Egyptian demand (al-Araby al-Jadeed, January 12, 2024). Ahmed Abu Ziyad, spokesman for the Egyptian foreign ministry, stated that “Egypt fully controlled its borders” (al-Sharq, January 14, 2024).
  • Sami Abu Zuhri, head of Hamas’ “external” political bureau, said that Israel’s repeated hints regarding the occupation of the Philadelphia Axis showed that Israel had already prepared a plan for it. He said Hamas warned Israel not to occupy the Philadelphia Axis because it would be a practical step towards displacing the Palestinians from the Gaza Strip. He added that the United States had to bear its responsibility and stop its attempts to prettify Israel’s image when it knew Israel was continuing its displacement program. Regarding Egypt, he claimed it was not enough to say it was not coordinating with Israel on the issue, Egypt had to make it clear it opposed Israel and conducted public diplomatic contacts which would strengthen Egypt’s position opposing Israeli intervention along the Philadelphia Axis (al-Jazeera Mubasher YouTube channel, January 13, 2024).
Rocket fire attacking Israel
  • Over the past few days sporadic rocket fire attacks on Israel continued. . On January 12, 2024, at 9 p.m., a rocket barrage was launched at Ashdod.
  • The military information wing of the Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ military wing, published a video claiming a rocket barrage had been launched at Israel from the northern Gaza Strip (al-Jazeera website, January 13, 2024). According to an infographic of the military wing’s activities, a barrage of rockets was launched from the Gaza Strip at Israel (Hamas Telegram channel in Judea and Samaria, January 13, 2024).
  • On January 12, 2024, the PIJ’s military wing announced the launch of rockets at 9 p.m. (the time when the late PIJ commander Bahaa Abu al-Atta customarily launched rockets) at the cities, towns and villages surrounding the Gaza Strip, including Ashdod (Paltoday Telegram channel, January 12, 2024). The following day it also announced the launch of a rocket barrage at the Erez Crossing and the cities, towns and villages surrounding Gaza (Paltoday’s Telegram channel, January 13, 2024).
  • During the fighting, the IDF forces damaged terrorist organization capabilities to launch rockets at Israel. IDF fighters confiscated hundreds of rockets, including long-range rockets, and uncovered and destroyed rocket launchers. Since the beginning of the integrated ground maneuver, over 700 rocket launchers have been destroyed in Air Force and ground force strikes. Rocket launchers have been found in cemeteries, schools and mosques. Many launches were carried out from densely populated civilian areas (IDF spokesperson, January 12, 2024).
The destruction of rocket launchers ready for firing (IDF spokesperson, January 13, 2024)    Launch pits located by IDF forces.
Right: Launch pits located by IDF forces. Left: The destruction of rocket launchers ready for firing (IDF spokesperson, January 13, 2024)
Israeli casualties
  • According to an unofficial estimate, since October 7, 2023, approximately 1,300 Israeli people have been killed. According to the IDF spokesperson, 522 of them are soldiers and officers (188 since the start of the ground maneuver on 27 October, 2023.); 132 civilian and military hostages are still being held by the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip; 121 hostages have been returned.
A ceasefire and the issue of the hostages
  • “An Egyptian source” related to the mediation efforts and claimed that talks were being conducted between Egypt, Hamas and the PIJ as well as with the Israeli government. According to the “source,” the positions presented by the Palestinian “resistance” were not far from implementation and not as exaggerated as Israel presented them. He pointed out that one of the obstacles was the internal conflicts in Israel. He also noted that the vision presented by the Palestinian “organizations,” whether regarding the management of the Strip “the day after” or regarding a ceasefire and the release of the prisoners, was not far from what was agreed upon by the United States government (al-Araby al-Jadeed, January 12, 2024).
  • Ghazi Hamad, a member of the Hamas political bureau, claimed information regarding the Hamas leadership’s leaving the Strip was incorrect and the proposal had not been made to them either by the Qataris or by others. He also stated that their position was clear, they opposed dividing the issues and separating the cessation of Israeli aggression from the issue of the hostages. He claimed the Israeli media promoted many ideas to mislead the Israeli public in attempts to return hostages (al-Mayadeen, January 11, 2024).
  • Mahmoud Mardawi, a senior Hamas figure, said Hamas rejected a proposal for a humanitarian truce at this stage and adhered to a comprehensive ceasefire which would lead to the end of the war and the complete withdrawal of the Israeli forces. He claimed Hamas rejected humanitarian truces because they had been tried in the past under specific circumstances related to the issue of releasing the hostages without negotiations, but Israel’s conduct caused them to be released as part of a deal (TRT Arabic website, January 13, 2024).
  • The position of the PIJ is consistent with that of Hamas. Muhammad al-Hindi, PIJ deputy secretary, reiterated that the position of the “organizations” was clear, it was to reach a comprehensive agreement based on a complete ceasefire and withdrawal of IDF forces. He emphasized that the hostages were the “Palestinian resistance'” trump cards, adding that the “resistance’s” current position was the result of the desire of all the Palestinian people for the war to be stopped completely. He claimed they believed that insisting on a hostage deal after the cessation of the “aggression” and the withdrawal of the IDF forces would be achieved, and Israel would be forced to comply (TRT Arab website, January 13, 2024).
  • The Hamas movement issued a statement on behalf of the “Palestinian organizations” after they allegedly held a meeting at an unspecified location where they said their “united national position” was that there would be no agreement or hostage deals unless there was a complete cessation of the “aggression” against the Palestinian people. The statement added that the management of the Palestinian issue and the Gaza Strip was an internal Palestinian national issue, and they would not allow Israel and its supporters to interfere or impose their will on the Palestinians. They called for “action” against Israel in every possible way, gave thanks for the assistance and support “from the people of the free world,” and from Egypt and South Africa in particular, and noted the need to return the displaced to their homes in the northern Gaza Strip (Hamas Telegram channel, January 11, 2024).
  • Ghazi Hamad, a member of Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, said that they learned their lesson in the first [temporary ceasefire] and would not waste the issue of the hostages again. They had informed Egypt, Qatar and all the mediators that they wanted a complete, inclusive package based on a final ceasefire, a complete withdrawal of IDF forces from the Gaza Strip, and a full prisoner exchange deal, regardless of whether they were civilians or military personnel (al-Masry al-Youm, January 11, 2024). In another interview, he said that what complicated the contacts was the Israeli side and its desire to continue the war, adding that the killing of Saleh al-‘Arouri further complicated matters. He said the issues were still frozen, no serious [progress] was being made and all activity had ended (al-Shorouk website, January 9, 2024).
Bringing medicines to the hostages
  • Osama Hamdan, a senior Hamas figure, said they thanked Qatar for the initiative to send medicine to the Gaza Strip. He claimed “they would treat the captives as best they could, using some of the medicines” (Shehab, January 13, 2024). In another statement, he claimed they were taking care of the hostages, [falsely alleging] that civilians who had been “brought” to the Gaza Strip and released had “testified” to that. He claimed their “ideology” obliged them to provide the necessary care for the hostages, adding that supplying medicines had a “humanitarian aspect” and claiming they provided medicines from what they had. Referring to the Israeli offer to send medicine, he said there were two problems: the first was that they believed that their own people needed and deserved more medicine, the second was the security aspect and the sensitivity of the issue of the hostages. He said they were working to provide them with [medical] treatment, but would use the medicines that arrived for the Palestinians. He thanked Qatar for sending medicines, and said that some of the hostages would receive the medicines when they arrived (al-Jazeera Mubasher YouTube channel, January 13, 2024).

Back To Top

The Gaza Strip
Palestinian casualties
  • The Hamas-controlled ministry of health in the Gaza Strip reported that as of 1 p.m., January 14, 2024, the number of dead since the beginning of the war stood at 23,986 and the number of wounded at 60,582 (ministry of health in Gaza Facebook page, January 14, 2023).
  • The Palestinian media reported 135 dead and 312 wounded in the last day of IDF attacks in the Gaza Strip. The main centers were in the Daraj neighborhood, in Gaza City, the al-Maghazi refugee camp and Deir al-Balah in the central Gaza Strip, the Khan Yunis area, and the northwest of the city Rafah (Ma’an, January 14, 2024).
  • The al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades announced the death of a number of operatives:
    • Mahmoud Arafat Alawi and Tamer Halas, who were killed “while carrying out their combat missions” in the Daraj-Tufah neighborhoods a few weeks ago (al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades’ elaqsa_1965 Telegram channel, January 13, 2024).
    • Commander Muhammad Ali Ashour (elaqsa_1965 Telegram channel, January 11, 2024), who was reportedly killed in an attack on the civilian vehicle in which he was riding in the al-Manara neighborhood in Khan Yunis (X account of @sameh2655014316, January 11, 2024).
    • Wafa Samir Ibrahim Albas, aka Umm Hassan, a released prisoner, an al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades operative al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Battalions and an al-Aqsa Intifada female suicide operative, who was killed in an attack in Gaza City. She served seven years in prison in Israel and was released as part of the Gilad Shalit exchange deal (elaqsa_1965 Telegram channel, January 11, 2024). She was detained at the Erez Crossing on June 20, 2005, wearing explosive undergarments weighing close to ten kilograms. She had been sent by Fatah terrorist operatives to blow herself up in Soroka Hospital in Beersheba, exploiting her permit to receive medical treatment in Israel. When she realized she had been exposed, she tried to blow herself at the Crossing, but the detonator was defective (Haaretz, June 21, 2005). After her release, she was given the rank of colonel in the security apparatus and during the war she worked as a paramedic at Kamal Adwan Hospital. She was killed on January 10 in an attack on her home in the Jabaliya refugee camp (Hani al-Hassan’s X account, January 10, 2024; Leqa’a Sa’adi’s Facebook page,  January 11, 2024).[2]
Albas as a paramedic at Kamal Adwan Hospital (aljazeera.net, December 16, 2023)    Wafa Albas wearing a security force uniform (Leqa'a al Saadi Facebook page, January 11, 2024).
Right: Wafa Albas wearing a security force uniform (Leqa’a al Saadi Facebook page, January 11, 2024). Left: Albas as a paramedic at Kamal Adwan Hospital (aljazeera.net, December 16, 2023)
  • Muhammad Karim al-Adini, a former prisoner who was released in the Gilad Shalit exchange deal, was killed in an attack in Deir al-Balah (Radio Sawt al-Aqsa X account, January 11, 2024). According to his Facebook page, he was a Fatah operative, arrested on June 20, 2003, and sentenced to 15 years in prison.
Muhammad al-Adini (Sidam Haza'a al-Wajia's X account, January 11, 2024)
Muhammad al-Adini (Sidam Haza’a al-Wajia’s X account, January 11, 2024)
The situation in the Gaza Strip
  • The ministry of health in Gaza announced that the health facilities and services in Rafah were fragile and could not provide a response for 1.3 million residents and displaced persons. In addition, the ministry was having difficulty in operating basic services, including intensive care units and children’s services. The ministry warned of the spread of disease in the Gaza Strip, and accused Israel of still deliberately attacking medical teams. It called on international institutions to take action to release detained medical teams, for medical teams, medicines and equipment to enter the Strip and to allow patients to leave because of the lack of resources to treat them (correspondent Abu Jawd’s Telegram channel, January 13, 2024).
  • Adnan Abu Hasna, UNRWA spokesman in the Gaza Strip, reported a severe shortage of medicines and medical equipment. He said they had detected a serious increase in infectious diseases and were concerned about an outbreak of cholera (QudsN account X, January 13, 2024). The Hamas-controlled government information office in Gaza reported that the northern district of the Gaza Strip needed 600 trucks carrying him aid and food every day to meet needs (Shehab X account, January 13, 2024).
  • According to reports the situation at Shuhadaa al-Aqsa Hospital in Deir al-Balah was difficult due to a lack of fuel. The hospital has activated its generators, but it may stop providing services as soon as its fuel reserves run out (al-Arabi Channel, January 13, 2024).
  • According to Sami Abu Zuhri, head of Hamas’ “external” political bureau, almost 60% of the houses and facilities in the Gaza Strip have been completely destroyed, 30,000 Palestinians have been killed, of whom 23,000 reached the hospitals and the rest are under the rubble. Among the dead are 10,000 children and 7,000 women. Most of the residents are now homeless and sheltering in UNRWA tents and schools. Many others who could not find shelter in schools or tents are living unprotected in the open air. [Allegedly] there is almost no food in the northern Gaza Strip and in the south people eat only one meal a day. Only a limited amount of humanitarian aid enters the Gaza Strip and it does not meet minimum needs, since an average of 100 trucks a day enter through the Rafah Crossing. Much of the aid is unsuitable and is not a priority. He called for flour, clothing, field hospitals, tents, clean water, mattresses, blankets, medicine and medical equipment (al-Anadolu News Agency, January 11, 2024; FIMED website, January 12, 2024).
  • The Palestinian communications company Paltel reported that all communications networks in the Gaza Strip had been disabled by IDF activity (Paltel X account, January 12, 2024). The Palestinians reported that for three consecutive days the Gaza Strip had been cut off from Internet, cellular and landline services (Shehab, January 14,2024). Later, the company announced that while the lines were being repaired, two of the company’s employees were killed in an attack on a vehicle in Khan Yunis (Paltoday X account, January 13, 2024). Hamas condemned the attack on the Paltel technical staff while they were working to repair communication lines in Gaza, and despite the fact, Hamas claimed, that the team had coordinated its work with the IDF forces in advance. According to Hamas, it was another “crime” in addition to disrupting communications throughout the Gaza Strip and [allegedly] “denying the Gazans food, water and medicine (Hamas Telegram channel, January 14, 2024).
Reportedly, there is no communication or Internet in the Gaza Strip (QudsN X account, January 14, 2024)
Reportedly, there is no communication or Internet in the Gaza Strip
(QudsN X account, January 14, 2024)
The Rafah Crossing
  • “Knowledgeable Egyptian sources” stated that senior Egyptian officials had met with senior Hamas figures in Egypt to discuss Hamas’ demand to increase the entry of aid to the Gaza Strip through the Rafah Crossing, and increase the number of wounded who could leave the Gaza Strip for medical treatment in Egypt or other countries. According to the “sources,” the talks were held in light of the willingness, expressed to the Hamas leadership by several Arab countries and Turkey, to accept larger numbers of wounded and chronically ill patients in need of urgent medical treatment. They added that the Egyptian officials had discussed the demand with an Israeli delegation that recently visited Cairo (al-Araby al-Jadeed, January 12, 2024).
  • Sami Abu Zuhri said that the Rafah Crossing was managed by the Palestinians from the Palestinian side, was an Egyptian-Palestinian crossing and had to be kept as such. He said that since the beginning of the war, Israel had been interfering in the Crossing’s activity and controlled everything that entered and left. He also noted that one of Israel’s lawyers at the International Court of Justice had said Egypt was responsible for the Rafah Crossing’s being closed, Abu Zuhri said that the Egyptian response should be resistance to Israeli control over the delivery of aid and personnel into the Strip, open the Rafah Crossing completely and the delivery of aid (al-Jazeera Mubasher YouTube channel, January 13, 2024).
A cartoon by Alaa' al-Laqta accusing Egypt of collecting huge sums in exchange for leaving the Gaza Strip through the Rafah Crossing. In the attached post, he claimed that Egypt charged each person $10,000 (Alaa' al-Laqta's Facebook page, January 12, 2024)
A cartoon by Alaa’ al-Laqta accusing Egypt of collecting huge sums in exchange for leaving the Gaza Strip through the Rafah Crossing. In the attached post, he claimed that Egypt charged each person $10,000 (Alaa’ al-Laqta’s Facebook page, January 12, 2024)

Back To Top

The Northern Arena
Hezbollah attacks
  • Hezbollah continued attacking IDF posts and troop concentrations on the Israeli border. Between January 11 and14, 2024, Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 28 anti-tank missile and rocket attacks (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, January 11-14, 2024).
  • At noon on January 14, Hezbollah fired an anti-tank missile at a house in Kfar Yuval, killing two Israeli civilians and wounding one (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, January 14, 2024).
  • In response to Hezbollah’s attacks, IDF forces continued heavy attacks on Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon from the air and with artillery fire. Among the targets attacked were military buildings, military positions and Hezbollah terrorist facilities (IDF spokesperson, January 11-14, 2024).
 Attacking Hezbollah facilities in the al-Hiyam area (IDF spokesperson, January 11, 2024)
Attacking Hezbollah facilities in the al-Hiyam area (IDF spokesperson, January 11, 2024)
  • Ali Shoeib, a correspondent for the al-Manar network, reported on recent Israeli Air Force attacks and IDF artillery fire (Ali Shoeib’s X account, January 13 12, 2024). A video was also published showing the Israeli Air Force attack on Meiss al-Jabal (Fouad Khreiss’ X account, January 13, 2024).
IDF artillery attacks targets in Kafr Kila (Ali Shoeib's X account, January 12, 13, 2024)    Attack on Jabal al-Blat between Ramyeh and Morukhin.
Right: Attack on Jabal al-Blat between Ramyeh and Morukhin. Left: IDF artillery attacks targets in Kafr Kila (Ali Shoeib’s X account, January 12, 13, 2024)
Attacking targets in Meiss al-Jabal (Fouad Khreiss' X account, January 13, 2024)
Attacking targets in Meiss al-Jabal (Fouad Khreiss’ X account, January 13, 2024)
The Islamic al-Izz Brigades
  • Before dawn on January 14, 2024, an IDF force patrolling the Mount Dov area clashed with a terrorist squad whose operatives had come from Lebanese territory; three terrorists were killed in the exchange of fire. Meanwhile, IDF forces fired artillery and mortars into the area of the clashes. Kalashnikov rifles, ammunition magazines, grenades and anti-tank missiles were found in the terrorists’ possession. Five IDF soldiers were injured (IDF spokesperson, January 14, 2024). An unknown organization called the Islamic al-Izz Brigades claimed responsibility, stating they had come in response to the killing of Saleh al-‘Arouri. According to the announcement, three operatives were killed and two managed to return to Lebanon. It was also stated that three of the organization’s operatives had been killed on December 8, 2023, in an IDF UAV attack in the Mount Dov area, after they had been there for 35 hours on a surveillance mission (al-Nashra, January 14, 2024).
The weapons found in the terrorists' possession (IDF spokesperson, January 14, 2024)
The weapons found in the terrorists’ possession (IDF spokesperson, January 14, 2024)
Killed in attacks
  • The Hezbollah-affiliated Islamic Health Organization – Civil Defense reported the death of two medics (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, January 11, 2024):
    • Ali Muhammad al-Sheikh Ali, aka Rawad, from the village of Rchaf in south Lebanon.
    • Sajed Ramzi Qassem, aka Abdullah, from Aita al-Shaab in south Lebanon.
The Islamic Health Organization fatalities (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, January 11, 2024)     The Islamic Health Organization fatalities (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, January 11, 2024)
The Islamic Health Organization fatalities
(Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, January 11, 2024)
  • The Islamic Health Organization, which is subordinate to Hezbollah’s Executive Council, has an extensive network of hospitals, medical centers and clinics spread throughout the Shi’ite population throughout Lebanon, with an emphasis on south Lebanon. It provides free or subsidized medical services to close to two million people.[3]
  • Sources in Lebanon reported that Abdelkarim Salim al-Barnawi, 18 years old, from Sidon, was killed in a clash with an IDF force on the Lebanon-Israel border. His body was found on January 10, 2024, in the al-Hamames area, about one and a half kilometers northeast of Metula. It was reported that he purchased a rifle with his own money in order to fight Israel (Abu al-Basal’s X account, January 13, 2024), and that two months earlier he left home without informing anyone where he was going. It is not known whether he belonged to any organization or party (Ecco Watan, January 12, 2024).
Right: Abdelkarim Salim al-Barnawi. Center: The announcement of his death (Abu al-Basal's X account, January 13, 2024). Left: The funeral ceremony held for him (AToufayli's X account, January 12, 2024)
Right: Abdelkarim Salim al-Barnawi. Center: The announcement of his death (Abu al-Basal’s X account, January 13, 2024). Left: The funeral ceremony held for him (AToufayli’s X account, January 12, 2024)
The residents of south Lebanon
  • The disaster management unit of the association of municipalities in the Tyre district reported that the number of displaced persons registered in the unit’s operations room was more than 23,000. According to the unit, it works with official authorities and international organizations to meet the needs of the displaced according to its available capabilities and funding. It stated that the increase in the number of displaced persons was caused by the expansion of IDF attacks on the villages in south Lebanon, and that required everyone to take responsibility for the civilians, alleviate their suffering and preserve their dignity (disaster management unit in Tyre Facebook page, January 13, 2024).
Lebanese Army/UNIFIL
  • Amos Hochstein, the American mediator, met with Joseph Aoun, commander of the Lebanese army, to discuss the developments in south Lebanon and the general situation in Lebanon (Lebanon Army X account, January 11, 2024).
The Lebanese government
  • Najib Mikati, prime minister of Lebanon’s interim government, met with the American mediator, Amos Hochstein. Hochstein emphasized the need to calm the situation in south Lebanon even if it was not currently possible to reach a complete agreement. He called for a temporary compromise so that the situation did not deteriorate. Mikati emphasized that priority had to be given to a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, the cessation of Israeli attacks in Lebanon and the cessation of the repeated violations of Lebanese sovereignty. By doing so, Mikati in essence aligned himself with Hezbollah. He said they wanted peace and stability through compliance with international resolutions (Lebanese government X account, January 11, 2024).
  • In response to Amos Hochstein’s visit to Lebanon, Hezbollah informed the senior officials in Lebanon, the central political forces and the parties in contact with the United States, that there was no place for any kind of discussion before the cessation of Israeli attacks on the Gaza Strip, noting that Hezbollah would continue to “support the Gaza Strip” (al-Akhbar, January 12, 2024).
  • During a government meeting, Najib Mikati said that they had informed all the representatives who spoke about a ceasefire in Lebanon only, that it was an unreasonable request, since based on their guarantees and principles they demanded a ceasefire as soon as possible in the Gaza Strip, concurrent with a ceasefire in Lebanon. Mikati also welcomed South Africa’s initiative to file a lawsuit against Israel with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (al-Nashra, January 12, 2024).

Back To Top

Judea and Samaria
Terrorist attack near the community of Metzad
  • On the afternoon of January 14, 2024, a Palestinian vehicle with two passengers tried to break through an IDF checkpoint near the community of Metzad (northeast of Hebron) while shooting at an IDF force stationed there. The force responded by shooting at the vehicle, killing one of its passengers and wounding the other (Israeli media, January 14, 2024).
Infiltration of terrorists into Adora
  • On the evening of January 12, 2024, an alert was received at the fence of the community of Adora (west of Hebron). An IDF soldier who went to the perimeter fence of the industrial zone adjacent to the community to check the warning was shot and moderately wounded. Large forces arrived and searched the area. During the searches, three Palestinians aged 16-19 were found who had infiltrated the community. The forces shot and killed them. They were found in possession of an M-16 rifle, an axe, knives and other weapons (IDF spokesperson, January 13, 2024). The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades claimed responsibility for the attempted attack in the village of Adora (al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades Telegram channel, January 12, 2024).
The weapons found in the possession of the squad (Israeli media, uncredited, January 11, 2024)
The weapons found in the possession of the squad
(Israeli media, uncredited, January 11, 2024)
Counterterrorism activities
  • The Israeli security forces continued their counterterrorism activities throughout Judea and Samaria. Since the beginning of the war in the Gaza Strip, more than 2,650 wanted Palestinians have been detained, including about 1,300 Hamas operatives (IDF Spokesperson’s Telegram channel, January 14, 2024).
  • On January 13, 2024, Israeli security forces operated in the al-Far’a refugee camp, south of Tubas (in northern Samaria). The forces detained two wanted Palestinians, located a surveillance room, and seized funds intended to finance terrorist activity (IDF spokesperson’s Telegram channel, January 14, 2024). Palestinians reported extensive damage to shops and infrastructure. One of the residents said in an interview that if Israel thought that the refugee camp residents would not resist and confront its forces, it was an illusion (Wafa YouTube channel, January 14, 2024).
Israeli security force activity in the al-Far'a refugee camp (Wafa YouTube channel, January 14, 2024)     Israeli security force activity in the al-Far'a refugee camp (Wafa YouTube channel, January 14, 2024)
Israeli security force activity in the al-Far’a refugee camp
(Wafa YouTube channel, January 14, 2024)
  • On the afternoon of January 11, 2024, Israeli security forces were operating in Jaba’ (south of Jenin). The forces killed a senior wanted PIJ operative who was armed and detained another wanted Palestinian. A search of the wanted man’s home and village revealed weapons, magazines, and money intended to finance terrorist activity (IDF spokesperson’s Telegram channel, January 11, 2024). The Palestinian media reported extensive activity by Israeli security forces in the area and the arrival of reinforcements. They said Majdi Fashafsha, 37, a former prisoner and commander of the PIJ’s Jaba’ Battalion, was killed in the operation (al-Jazeera TV, January 11, 2024).
The funeral of Majdi Fashafsha. His body is draped in the PIJ flag (al-Jazeera TV, January 11, 2024)   Majdi Fashafsha (Khaberni website, January 11, 2024).
Right: Majdi Fashafsha (Khaberni website, January 11, 2024). Left: The funeral of Majdi Fashafsha. His body is draped in the PIJ flag (al-Jazeera TV, January 11, 2024)
  • The Israeli security forces detained the two sisters of former Hamas senior figure Saleh al-‘Arouri in al-Bireh and al-‘Aroura (Wafa YouTube channel, January 14, 2024). Hussam Badran, a member of Hamas’ political bureau, commented on the detention of Saleh al-‘Arouri’s sisters, saying that Israel sought revenge on al-‘Arouri by detaining his sisters. He stressed that Israel’s terrorism against the families of resistance leaders and shaheeds and the detention of women and children would not dishearten the Palestinians or weaken the resolve of the resistance (Hamas Telegram channel in the West Bank, January 14, 2024). The PIJ said the detention proved that everything Israel was doing was part of acts of revenge and its open war against the Palestinian people (PIJ’s information office Telegram channel, January 14, 2024).
Solidarity with the Gaza Strip
  • The Department of Endowments in Jerusalem reported that 12,000 Muslims participated in the Friday prayer on the Temple Mount on January 12, 2024, and that the measures taken by the Israeli security forces prevented thousands more worshippers from reaching the Temple Mount (al-Quds, January 12, 2024).
  • On January 12, 2024, dozens of Palestinians held a march in the center of Ramallah, initiated by Hamas, to support the Gaza Strip and condemn the American-British attacks in Yemen. They waved Palestinian, Hamas, and South African flags and a picture of Houthi leader Abd al-Malik al-Houthi (al-Araby al-Jadeed, January 12, 2024).
  • On January 13, 2024, the families of the Palestinian prisoners and the Save the Prisoners movement held a protest rally in support of the jailed prisoners, the resistance, and Gaza, in al-Manara Square in the center of Ramallah, followed by a march that passed through the streets of Ramallah (Hurriya News, January 13, 2024).
The marches in Ramallah (right: al-Araby al-Jadeed, January 12, 2024; left: @quds_feed X account, January 13, 2024)    The marches in Ramallah (right: al-Araby al-Jadeed, January 12, 2024; left: @quds_feed X account, January 13, 2024)
The marches in Ramallah (right: al-Araby al-Jadeed, January 12, 2024; left: @quds_feed X account, January 13, 2024)
Palestinian Authority (PA)
  • PA Prime Minister Muhammad Shtayyeh met in Ramallah with German Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck to discuss ending Israel’s “aggression” in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. Shtayyeh said what was happening in the Gaza Strip was “crime and genocide” and that the day after the war they wanted a political horizon and practical steps to implement the two-state solution (Wafa, January 12, 2024).
  • Jibril al-Rajoub, secretary of Fatah’s Central Committee, said they wanted Hamas to be part of the Palestinian national system and that the PLO was the framework under which everyone had to gather. He said Hamas was part of the Palestinian national liberation movement and part of the popular fabric, and that a reformulation of the status of the PA or PLO had to be determined by a Palestinian decision or will. He said their lines of communication with Hamas were open. He noted that the strategy for the current stage was to build a map of national courses of action with Hamas and the other organizations. He said they called on Hamas to adopt a new approach based on building a state within the 1967 borders. He called on the entire Palestinian street to confront the settlers, saying that “it is inappropriate for the attackers among them to come out alive” (al-Araby, January 11, 2024).

Back To Top

Iran
  • Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, speaking in Tehran at an international conference in support of the Palestinians, said that the Palestinian issue had become the most important issue of the Islamic world and freedom seekers in the world. He said that the path of negotiations, normalization and agreements with Israel, such as the Camp David, Sharm el-Sheikh and Oslo Accords, had failed, and that the only way that had proven itself was the path of “resistance.” He praised the activity of the “resistance front” from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen against Israel, stressing that the Islamic nation had to unite and defend Palestine with all its capabilities. He said victory was assured for the Palestinians and Israel’s elimination was imminent (Tasnim, January 14, 2024).
  • Hossein Amir Abdollahian, Iranian foreign minister, spoke with his Saudi counterpart, Faisal bin Farhan, to discuss the situation in the Gaza Strip (Farda News, January 11, 2024).
Pro-Iranian militias
Iraq
  • The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for two attacks against Israeli territory (Islamic Resistance Telegram channel, January 12, 2024):
  • Attack on a “Zionist target in the Jordan River Park.” The Saberin News Telegram channel, affiliated with the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, reported that the target was a security control unit belonging to the Golani Brigade (Saberin News, January 12, 2024).
  • Attack on a vital target in Eilat in the early morning hours of January 12, 2024.
  • The Islamic Resistance also claimed responsibility for rocket and drone attacks against US Army bases in Syria and Iraq, including the al-Shadadi base in Syria (Islamic Resistance Telegram channel, January 11, 2024); the Koniko oil field in Syria (Islamic Resistance Telegram channel, January 12 and 13, 2024); the Kharab al-Jir base (Islamic Resistance Telegram channel, January 13, 2024); a base in the Green Village and the al-Omar oil field in Syria (Islamic Resistance Telegram channel, January 14, 2024).
US and British attacks against the Houthis
  • On the night of January 11-12, 2024, US and British forces attacked Houthi targets in Yemen. A senior US official noted that more than 30 targets in Yemen had been attacked (Reuters, January 12, 2024). Nasr al-Din Omar, chairman of the board of directors of the Yemeni News Agency, reported on American, British and “Zionist” strikes in the capital Sana’a and the cities of al-Hudaydah, Saada and Dhamar (Nasr al-Din Omar’s X account, January 12, 2024).
The attack against Houthi targets (al-Qahera Network, January 12, 2024)
The attack against Houthi targets (al-Qahera Network, January 12, 2024)
  • American President Joe Biden announced that US military forces together with Britain and with the support of Australia, Bahrain, Canada and the Netherlands had successfully carried out strikes against a number of targets in Yemen used by the Houthis. He noted that the strikes were a direct response to Houthi attacks on international vessels in the Red Sea, and that the targeted attacks were a clear message that the United States and its partners would not tolerate attacks on their people or allow hostile actors to endanger freedom of navigation. He also said he would not hesitate to instruct further steps (White House website, January 12, 2024). A joint statement issued by the United States, Britain, South Korea, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Canada, Bahrain and Australia said their goal was to reduce tensions and restore stability in the Red Sea (Agence France-Presse, January 12, 2024).
  • Yahya Saria, spokesman for the Houthi armed forces, reported that on the night of January 12, 2024, the “American-British enemy” had carried out 73 strikes against Yemen. He said five members of the armed forces had been killed and six others wounded in the strikes. He stressed that the United States and Britain bore full responsibility for the “aggression” and that it would not go unanswered (Yahya Saria’s Telegram channel, January 12, 2024). The Houthi Supreme Political Council issued a statement saying that in response to the “aggression,” all American and British interests in the region had become legitimate targets for the Yemeni armed forces (al-Masirah, January 12, 2024).
  • Ali al-Qahum, a member of the Houthi political bureau, noted that the Yemeni response was not long in coming and that they had attacked American and British warships in the Red Sea and their military bases (Ali al-Qahum’s X account, January 12, 2024). Houthi spokesman Muhammad Abdeslam said they had carried out an initial response to the incident and that they would expand it very soon (Mohammed Abdeslam’s Telegram channel, January 12, 2024).
  • A few hours after the attack, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) announced that it had received a report that a missile had been fired at a vessel sailing southeast of the port of Aden and that the missile had landed in the water and no casualties or damage had been reported (UKMTO X account, January 12, 2024). A senior US military official later noted that the Houthis had fired an anti-ship ballistic missile, but it did not hit any ships (Reuters, January 12, 2024).
  • On January 13, 2024, the US Army Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that at 03:45 (Sana’a time), US forces had carried out another attack against a Houthi radar site in Yemen. It was reported that the attack was a continuation of the attacks the previous day (January 12) intended to hit the Houthis’ ability to attack vessels (CENTCOM X account, January 13, 2024).
Comments on the events
  • Muammar al-Ariani, information minister in Yemen’s legitimate government, said that the “crime of piracy committed by the Iranian regime” against the American oil tanker St Nikolas, after the Houthis had attacked an American ship, revealed the real motives of these operations against world trade routes and their management from a joint operations room in Tehran. He said the incident provided further evidence that the Houthis’ justification for their attacks on the grounds of support for Gaza was a “big lie.” It was only a pretext for implementing Iranian dictates to settle its scores with international forces and undermine regional and global security. He called on the international community to act decisively and begin classifying the Houthi militia as a terrorist organization and dry up its financial, political, and media sources (Muammar al-Ariani’s X account, January 13, 2024).
  • Nasser Kanani, spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, strongly condemned the attacks, saying they were a clear violation of Yemen’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and international law, and that the United States and Britain were trying to divert world attention from Israel’s crimes against the Palestinian people by expanding their support for the “Zionist regime.” Kanani called on the international community to act responsibly to prevent the escalation of war and regional instability (IRNA, January 12, 2024). Hossein Amir Abdollahian, Iranian foreign minister, also condemned the attack on the Houthis. He praised Yemen’s “support for women and children in the Gaza Strip” and said that instead of attacking Yemen militarily, the United States had to immediately cease its military and security cooperation with Israel against the residents of the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria to restore security (Iranian foreign minister’s X account, January 12, 2024).
  • The Egyptian foreign ministry issued a statement expressing deep concern about the escalation of military operations in the Red Sea region and the airstrikes against Yemen. It called for international and regional efforts to reduce regional tension and instability (Egyptian foreign ministry Facebook page, January 12, 2024). The UAE expressed its deep concern about the implications of the attack on navigation in the Red Sea and stressed the importance of preserving the security of the region and the interests of the countries living there within the framework of international law (UAE News Agency, January 12, 2024). Iraq, Syria and Oman also condemned the attack.
  • Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan noted that the attack was not “proportionate.” He said the United States and Britain were trying to turn the Red Sea into a “sea of blood” (Reuters, January 12, 2024).
  • Hamas claimed it was a terrorist act carried out under Israeli influence. It blamed the United States and Britain for the consequences of the attack on regional security. Hamas also expressed appreciation for Yemen’s support for the Palestinians in Operation al-Aqsa Flood (Hamas Telegram channel, January 12, 2024). The PIJ also strongly condemned the “American-British aggression” against Yemen (PIJ Telegram channel, January 12, 2024).
Houthi forces’ military exercise
  • The Houthis released videos of an exercise carried out by their forces simulating attacks on Israeli targets from the air and ground, taking over an Israeli community and headquarters as well as taking hostages. The exercise included the use of drones, missiles and a tank. It took place in the northern province of Saada, a Houthi stronghold. The commander of the exercise noted that the campaign was at sea, on land and in the air. During the exercise, the operatives stepped on the American flag and on a picture of the Israeli prime minister (Houthi movement Ansar Allah Telegram channel, January 13, 2024).
Abduction of civilians (Houthi Ansar Allah Telegram channel, January 13, 2024)    Attacking an Israeli town and headquarters.
Right: Attacking an Israeli town and headquarters. Left: Abduction of civilians (Houthi Ansar Allah Telegram channel, January 13, 2024)
Firing a tank and launching a missile during the exercise (Houthi combat information X account, January 13, 2024)    Firing a tank and launching a missile during the exercise (Houthi combat information X account, January 13, 2024)
Firing a tank and launching a missile during the exercise (Houthi combat information X account, January 13, 2024)
The Arab Arena
Egypt
  • Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi spoke with British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and discussed regional developments considering the current situation in the Gaza Strip and the Red Sea. They reviewed the ongoing efforts to bring about a ceasefire, protect civilians and carry out the hostage deal, and stressed the importance of intensive activity to avoid the expansion of the conflict in the region. El-Sisi stressed the responsibility of the international community to ensure access to aid for the residents of the Gaza Strip (Egyptian presidential website, January 12, 2024).
  • Abdel Fattah el-Sisi met in Cairo with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken. During the meeting, Blinken expressed his appreciation for Egypt’s efforts to calm the situation and forge peace and stability. El-Sisi stressed the responsibility of the international community to ensure the entry of sufficient aid into the Gaza Strip and the need to invest efforts in a ceasefire. The two also agreed that uprooting Palestinians from their land was out of the question. At a press conference held by Blinken at the Cairo airport, he said that the establishment of a Palestinian state was the best way to isolate Iran and its proxies, and that the United States had invested great efforts to ensure that the territories of Judea and Samaria did not catch fire (Egyptian presidency spokesman’s Facebook page, January 11, 2024).
Jordan
  • King Abdullah II of Jordan spoke with UN Secretary-General António Guterres about developments in the Gaza Strip and the need to reach an immediate ceasefire. He stressed Jordan’s refusal to uproot Palestinians from the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria and warned of the disastrous consequences of expanding the conflict (Petra, January 11, 2024).
The International Arena
International Court of Justice in The Hague
  • Following South Africa’s request to hold a hearing of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the grounds that Israel was violating the UN Convention for the Prevention of Genocide against the Palestinian People in the Gaza Strip, the first hearing on the issue was held on January 11, 2024. South Africa asked the court to issue urgent temporary injunctions against Israel to prevent further violations of the Convention.
  • On the first day of discussions, South Africa presented its main arguments, noting that the war was part of a decades-long systematic campaign to oppress the Palestinians, and warned that there was solid evidence of a pattern and clear intentions pointing to actual “genocide.” The next day, Israel presented its arguments. After that, the ICJ is expected to decide within a short period of time whether to issue urgent injunctions against Israel.
  • In response to the appeal to the ICJ, White House spokesman John Kirby said that there was no evidence that Israel had committed genocide in the Gaza Strip and that South Africa’s prosecution against it was ineffective. He said it was the right time to discuss the future of the Gaza Strip the day after the war, and that they believed that reforming the Palestinian Authority would lead to a solution. He stressed that they continued to support Israel but opposed the occupation of the Gaza Strip and that, according to him, Yahya al-Sinwar had violated the ceasefire and started the war on October 7, 2024, and that the Palestinians had to hold him accountable (al-Arabiya, January 11, 2024).
  • Referring to the discussions, Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan said Turkey was providing the ICJ with documents according to which Israel had committed “genocide.” He said he believed Israel would be convicted (Reuters, January 12, 2024).
  • FIMED[4] held a meeting with Sami Abu Zuhri, head of the political department of Hamas abroad, attended by 20 Turkish media outlets. Abu Zuhri said that the prosecution was very important and that the Palestinians were placing their trust in the court, hoping that it would convict Israel and issue a decision to stop the war. He added that Israel and the American administration were concerned about the lawsuit and that the American administration was in contact with several countries to prevent them from filing similar lawsuits or providing support for the current lawsuit (Anadolu News, January 11, 2024; FIMED website, January 12, 2024). In another interview, Sami Abu Zuhri said the results to be announced by the ICJ could lead to a reassessment of the position of some European countries towards Hamas and the other organizations (al-Jazeera Mubasher YouTube channel, January 11, 2024). Musa Abu Marzuq, a member of Hamas’ political bureau, said the ICJ’s decision to end the “aggression” and the withdrawal of the attacking forces would be respected and appreciated by Hamas and the oppressed Palestinian people. He added that the movement would cease fire and cooperate with the court and the committees it would establish in the future (Musa Abu Marzuq’s X account, January 13, 2024).
  • PIJ spokesman Mus’ab al-Breem called on the Arab and Islamic countries to act immediately and take political, legal and humanitarian measures to pressure Israel to stop its “aggression” against the Gaza Strip and break the siege. Referring to the lawsuit against Israel at the International Court of Justice, he said it was a step that would lay the foundations for more progressive positions to do justice to the Palestinian cause and the rights of the Palestinian people. He noted that the Arabs and Muslims had to lead this legal and humanitarian process. He also stressed the need to instruct aid institutions and humanitarian organizations to fulfill their duty towards the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip because the  humanitarian situation there was beyond description (Hespress website, January 12, 2024).
Palestinian cartoons referring to South Africa's appeal to the ICJ in The Hague against Israel (al-Quds, al-Quds al-Araby, January 13, 2024)    Palestinian cartoons referring to South Africa's appeal to the ICJ in The Hague against Israel (al-Quds, al-Quds al-Araby, January 13, 2024)
Palestinian cartoons referring to South Africa’s appeal to the ICJ in The Hague against Israel (al-Quds, al-Quds al-Araby, January 13, 2024)
United Nations Security Council
  • The UN Security Council held a discussion on the situation in the Middle East following Russia’s call for a meeting of the council on “US and British attacks on Yemen.” The American ambassador to the United Nations said the airstrikes carried out in Yemen were intended to disable the Houthis’ ability to launch further strikes on commercial vessels. According to the ambassador, since last November, Houthi attacks have forced more than 2,000 ships to deviate from the Red Sea. Russia’s representative to the UN claimed that following the strikes in Yemen, the United States and its allies had expanded the conflict to include the entire region, and that the American-British response to Yemen had nothing to do with self-defense (Reuters, January 13, 2024).

[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
[2] For further information see the November 2011 ITIC report, "A number of prominent terrorist operatives released in the Gilad Shalit prisoner swap expressed readiness to return to terrorism, calling for abduction of more Israelis." In their public statements, they called for the kidnapping of additional Israelis as "bargaining chips" to be used for the release of Palestinian prisoners. The statements of the released terrorists, who enjoy great prestige in Palestinian society, were integrated into the Hamas propaganda campaign claiming the path of "resistance" (terrorism) had proved itself superior to the path of negotiation as a means to achieve the Palestinian "goals"
[3] For further information see the July 2019 ITIC report, "The Islamic Health Organization: Hezbollah institution providing health services to Hezbollah operatives and the Shiite population in general as a means for gaining influence and creating a Shiite mini-state within Lebanon."
[4] The Palestinian Information Association, known as FIMED (the acronym of its name in Turkish), aims to convey the Palestinian narrative to Turkish society. Its executive director is Hamas publicist Ibrahim al-Madhoun. It is headquartered in Istanbul and was headed by senior Hamas official Sami Abu Zuhri.