Operation Iron Swords (Updated to 1 p.m., February 4, 2024)

Overview^[1]

• The southern arena: The IDF forces continued their activities, focusing on the Khan Yunis area, where they raided several terrorist targets, including a building used by the commander of Hamas’ Khan Yunis Brigade, and clashed with armed squads. In the central Gaza Strip the operations focused on preventing the movement of Hamas operatives and the transfer of weapons from the northern Gaza Strip to the center. In the northern Gaza Strip, the forces continued to raid terrorist facilities and kill armed terrorist operatives.
• Rockets launched at Israel: A suspicious aerial target which crossed from the Gaza Strip into southern Israeli territory was intercepted. The Arrow missile defense system successfully intercepted a surface-to-surface missile in the Red Sea area which was en route to Israeli territory. A pro-Iranian militia in Iraq released a video documenting the launch of a UAV at Haifa.
• According to unofficial statistics, since October 7, 2023, approximately 1,300 Israeli civilians and security personnel have been killed, 562 of them soldiers and officers; 132 civilian and military hostages are still being held by the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip; 121 hostages have been returned to Israel.
• Negotiations for a hostage deal: For the time being, Hamas has delayed its response to the proposal it received a hostage deal. According to several reports, which were denied, there are differences of opinion between the Hamas leadership in the Strip and “abroad,” and between Hamas and the other terrorist organizations, regarding the terms of the deal. Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, held meetings to discuss the issue.
• The situation in the Gaza Strip: According to reports, residents from the Khan Yunis area continue to migrate to the Rafah area in reaction to IDF activity. Displaced persons in Rafah asked for the war to end immediately and expressed a desire to return to their homes. Signs of Hamas governance can be seen in the northern Gaza Strip, in areas which the IDF left, including the payment of salaries to workers in the local administration. UNRWA stated that the provision of humanitarian needs for over two million people in the Gaza Strip was currently endangered and if funding continued to be delayed, they would probably be forced to stop their activities at the end of the month, not only in the Gaza Strip but throughout the region. The International Campaign to Save Gaza (ICSG) established in Istanbul announced the launches of four campaigns to send ships carrying aid to the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.
• The northern arena: Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 14 attacks. In response, artillery fire and airstrikes were carried out against Hezbollah targets in south Lebanon. The Amal movement reported the deaths of two operatives in the attacks. According to reports, Britain and France are advancing an idea for a gradual ceasefire on the Lebanese-Israeli front.
• Syria: According to reports, targets in southern Damascus were attacked, including a weapons-storage warehouse in the area of the Aqraba military airport east of Set Zaynab, adding that Saeed Alidadi, an Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) advisor, was killed in the attack.
• The pro-Iranian militias: American military forces attacked more than 85 targets of pro-Iranian militias in Syria and Iraq. The attacks were widely condemned by the governments of Iraq, Syria and Iran, as well as by Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and others. The United States announced that the attack would continue where and when it chose. White House officials said the United States would not attack Iran. Meanwhile, the militias in Iraq continue to attack American military bases in Iraq and Syria.
• Yemen: United States and British military forces attacked Houthi targets in Yemen to disrupt their military capabilities. Forces of the United States Army Central Command (CENTCOM) continued disrupting Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea. The Houthis carried out a military exercise that simulated attacking Israeli military posts, cities, towns and villages, kidnapping soldiers and using explosive drones to attack Israeli targets.

The Southern Arena

• Palestinian media reported IDF activity in a number of locations. Attacks were carried out in Gaza City, focusing on the Rimal neighborhood and the area near Shifa Hospital. IDF forces surrounded the hospital and attacked an area adjacent to it. In the central Gaza Strip, the attacks focused on Deir al-Balah. In Khan Yunis, the attacks focused on the southern and eastern parts of the city, primarily near the European Hospital; there was also heavy fire in the city center. In Rafah there was heavy fire in the area between Rafah and Khan Yunis, as well as shooting near the Rafah-Egypt border (Wafa, February 4, 2024).

• The southern Gaza Strip: IDF fighters continued operations in western Khan Yunis. The forces raided a number of terrorist targets and military buildings where grenades, guns, IEDs, ammunition and military equipment were found. In another location in western Khan Yunis, the forces directed an aircraft to attack terrorists in several military buildings. They clashed with and killed armed terrorist operatives, most of them at close range. An armed terrorist squad a fired anti-tank missiles at the fighters; the terrorists were killed in an air strike. The fighters raided a multi-story building used by the commander of Hamas’ Khan Yunis Brigade to direct combat and found large quantities of weapons and military and technological equipment (IDF spokesperson, February 2-4, 2024).

• The central Gaza Strip: IDF operations focused mainly on preventing the movement of Hamas operatives and the transfer of weapons from the northern Gaza Strip to the center. The forces killed armed terrorists and destroyed terrorist facilities, including tunnel routes. Near the Nuseirat refugee camp they located a site for the manufacture of rockets based on a multi-purpose civilian mechanical equipment which was converted by Hamas to manufacture rockets. Safes belonging to Hamas were located and found to contain large sums of money and documents testifying to Hamas’ method of transferring funds to finance terrorist operations (IDF spokesperson, February 2-4, 2024).
• The Palestinian media reported that IDF activity focused on the west Gaza City in the Nasr and Tel al-Hawa neighborhoods. The media claimed IDF forces had compelled the residents of the neighborhoods to evacuate towards Deir al-Balah (Wafa, February 3, 2024).
• The northern Gaza Strip: The forces continued to raid terrorist facilities and kill armed operatives. In the area of the al-Shati refugee camp, the forces killed approximately ten terrorists. The IDF ground forces, in cooperation with the Israeli Air Force, destroyed a tunnel shaft that led to a Hamas hideout which was equipped with an underground elevator. The forces located weapons, night vision and surveillance equipment, intelligence documents and rocket launchers. Raiding many buildings in the area, IDF fighters located weapons, military equipment, ammunition and grenades (IDF spokesperson, February 2-4, 2024).

Palestinian perspective on the fighting

• Muhammad al-Hindi, deputy PIJ secretary general, claimed that after 120 days, the condition of the “resistance” [terrorist operatives] was “good,” it still [allegedly] controlled the area, carried out “successful operations” against the IDF forces, killing and wounding them. According to al-Hindi, the objective of the meeting in Paris was to find an exit strategy for Israel to remove the hostage card from the hands of the “resistance” so Israel could continue to attack. He claimed that the resistance showed “great flexibility” regarding procedures, but the cessation of aggression, reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and the withdrawal of the IDF were the fundamental principles agreed on by the “resistance” factions (Aljazeera Mubasher YouTube channel, February 3, 2024).

Rocket fire from the Gaza Strip

• On February 2, 2024, aerial defense fighters intercepted a suspicious aerial target that crossed from the territory of the Gaza Strip into southern Israel (IDF spokesperson, February 2, 2024).
• On February 3, 2024, the Arrow missile defense system successfully intercepted a surface-to-surface missile in the Red Sea area which was en route to Israel. Yahya Saria, spokesman for the Houthis’ armed forces, claimed they had attacked specific targets in Eilat with several ballistic missiles (Yahya Saria’s Telegram channel, February 3, 2024).
• The Nobles Movement, a pro-Iranian militia in Iraq, released a video documenting the launch of an unmanned aircraft at Haifa on January 31, 2024 (Nobles Movement Telegram channel, February 1, 2024). In reality, no such attack was detected. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for the launch of an unmanned aerial vehicle at Haifa, but shortly afterwards deleted the notice from its Telegram channel (Iraqi Nujaba militia Telegram channel, January 31, 2024). Akram al-Kaabi, secretary general of the Nobles Movement, stated they would continue their actions until the end of the “aggression” in the Gaza Strip and the withdrawal of the Americans from Iraq (Akram al-Kaabi’s X account, February 2, 2024).

Israeli casualties

• According to an unofficial statistic, since October 7, 2023, approximately 1,300 Israeli people have been killed. According to the IDF spokesperson, 562 of them are soldiers and officers (225 since the start of the ground maneuver on 27 October, 2023); 132 civilian and military hostages are still being held by the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip; 121 hostages have been returned.

The issue of the hostages and a ceasefire agreement

• For the time being, Hamas has delayed its response to the Paris proposal for a hostage deal. According to reports, at Hamas’ request, the visit of its delegation to Cairo was postponed for several days so the movement could hold additional consultations with the [other terrorist] organizations in the Strip regarding the Paris ceasefire proposal. The reports of differences of opinion within Hamas and with the organizations were denied, and according to claims there is complete agreement between all parties (al-Araby al-Jadeed, February 3, 2024). Muhammad Nizal, a member of Hamas’ political bureau, said that the Paris proposal required a discussion held among all the Palestinian organizations. He said they had no choice but to negotiate while fighting on the ground. He added that they had not yet finished discussing the deal (Filastin al-Yawm, February 2, 2024).
• Al-Sharq al-Awsat reported from “sources” that Hamas wanted changes made to the Paris ceasefire proposal, but was inclined to accept it even though it does not require a complete cessation of the war in the Gaza Strip, that is, Hamas waived a condition it had insisted on in the past. The “sources” also claimed that Hamas would be content with the guarantees given by the mediators, but would insist on the other conditions, including the selection of the list of prisoners to be released from Israel, the increase in aid to the Gaza Strip and the return of the residents of the Gaza Strip to their homes. They also stated that the consultations between the “external” leadership of the movement and the leadership in the Gaza Strip were difficult and time-consuming, delaying their final response to the deal (al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 3, 2024).
• The Wall Street Journal reported from “knowledgeable sources” that disagreement between the leaders of Hamas prevented the movement from agreeing on a deal for a ceasefire and the release of hostages. According to the sources, Yahya al-Sinwar, head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, and the military wing are tired after months of fighting and are prepared to agree to a ceasefire of several weeks. However, the movement’s political leaders demand more conditions and want to negotiate a permanent ceasefire (The Wall Street Journal, February 3, 2024).
• Given the circumstances, Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, held several consultations during the past few days:
  • The gist of a conversation with Ziyad al-Nakhalah, PIJ secretary general, was that the examination of the new proposal for a ceasefire would be based on premise that all negotiations would lead to a complete end to the “aggression” in the Gaza Strip, the withdrawal of the IDF outside the Strip, the lifting of the “siege,” reconstruction, bringing in all the necessities of life for the Palestinians, and completing a comprehensive hostage deal [the principle of “everyone in return for everyone”] (Hamas Telegram channel in Judea and Samaria, February 2, 2024).
  • The gist of a conversation with Jamil Mazhar, deputy secretary general of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), was, again, that negotiations would lead to a complete end to “aggression,” the withdrawal of the IDF from the Gaza Strip, the return of the displaced persons to their places of residence, the lifting of the “siege,” the reconstruction of the Strip, bringing in all the necessities of life, and the completion of a “serious exchange deal” (Hamas Telegram channel in Judea and Samaria, February 2, 2024).
  • Ismail Haniyeh and a delegation of the Hamas leadership met with, Ibrahim Kalin, the head of the Turkish National Intelligence Organization and his delegation. The location of the meeting was not disclosed. They discussed developments in Gaza, ways to establish a ceasefire, end the siege and introduce aid and humanitarian needs to the Palestinians in the Strip; the talks on the hostage deal were reviewed. It was claimed that the establishment of the independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem [sic] as its capital was the basis for regional stability (Hamas Telegram channel in Judea and Samaria, February 3, 2024).
• Osama Hamdan, senior Hamas member, held a press conference in Beirut where he said that so far there was no deal. He added that the proposal was a framework agreement which required deliberation, because it lacked all the details, and they would announce their final position once they had formulated it. He said their position would be based on their assessment of the interests of the Palestinian people, their determination to stop the “aggression” against them as soon as possible, provide them with humanitarian assistance, and end their suffering. Asked if there were any Arab efforts to mitigate the “resistance’s” demands, he said what they were asking for was clear. Asked about dates, he said it was not possible to talk about dates before Israel had agreed to the terms of the “resistance” (al-Jazeera TV YouTube channel, February 3, 2024; Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, February 3, 2024).
• According to Hamdan, a number of media outlets had leaked information about opposing positions of the Hamas leadership in Doha and the leadership in the Gaza Strip. He claimed it was an Israeli attempt to distort Hamas’ position and evade the commitment required of Israel to stop the “aggression” against the Gaza Strip. However, he wished to clarify three points: the movement’s decision would be “institutional” and made at the top of the leadership pyramid, and all the movement’s leaders would participate in its formulation; the members of the leadership of the “resistance” in the Gaza Strip and the leadership of the Hamas movement in Gaza were partners in all the decisions that had been made since the beginning of the war, and would be partners in decisions regarding future ideas; Hamas was still examining the issue, and therefore it was not possible to talk about opposing positions or disputes, but rather, a discussion was being held, and Hamas, as usual, would announce its final decision once it had been made by the movement’s leadership institutions (al-Jazeera YouTube channel, February 3, 2024; Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, February 3, 2024).
• Bassem Na’im, a member of the Hamas leadership in the Gaza Strip, said that Hamas had asked for Russia to be included as a guarantor in the exchange deal. He said that when they had presented their proposals, they asked for regional and international guarantees for the implementation of the deal. They requested that Qatar, Egypt and the United Nations become guarantors, and they also asked Russia to act as a guarantor for the implementation of the agreement. He added that the agreement had to include a complete ceasefire, the withdrawal of all Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip, the opening of the crossings and the introduction of necessary food into the Strip (RIA Novosti, February 2, 2024).
• Muhammad al-Hindi, deputy PIJ secretary general, noted that when the Egyptian document was presented, there had been a joint Hamas-PIJ written response which included the “resistance’s” concept regarding the hostage deal and the cessation of “aggression.” He said they adhered to the principles of the cessation of “aggression,” a comprehensive ceasefire to prevent Israel from attacking the Gaza Strip again, and the withdrawal of IDF forces. He claimed there was “great flexibility” regarding the procedures and times of the hostage deal. He said that if Israel genuinely meant to enter into a deal, which it so far did not, it did not matter to them with which category they started the exchange, and he emphasized again that first there had to be a ceasefire, the withdrawal of forces, and a commitment to the reconstruction of the Strip (al-Jazeera Mubasher TV YouTube channel, February 3, 2024).

The Gaza Strip

Palestinian casualties

• The Hamas-controlled ministry of health in the Gaza Strip reported that as of 11:10 a.m., February 4, 2024, the number of dead since the beginning of the war stood at 27,365 and the number of wounded at 66,630 (ministry of health in Gaza Facebook page, February 4, 2024).

The situation in the Gaza Strip

• It was reported that following the IDF activity, residents continue to evacuate from the Khan Yunis area to Rafah. Residents who were interviewed complained that driving from Khan Yunis to Rafah, which should take about 20 minutes, now took between an hour and a half and two hours (Wafa YouTube channel, February 1, 2024).

• Anas al-Sharif, a correspondent for al-Jazeera, reported the return of the residents of the al-Tawan neighborhood in the northwest of Gaza City after the withdrawal of IDF forces from the area. Residents who were interviewed stated that they were amazed to see the extent of the destruction in their neighborhood and that most of them could not find their homes because they had been completely destroyed (QudsN X account, February 3, 2024).

• Displaced persons from the Gaza Strip currently in Rafah who were interviewed asked for the immediate end to the war and said they wanted to return to their homes, even if they had been destroyed and they had to live in tents. Most of them stated that the war brought them only destruction. They also noted that the prices in Rafah were very high and that they felt like strangers there (Wafa YouTube channel, February 3, 2024).

• Osama Hamdan, a senior Hamas member, said that in light of the worsening humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip, due, he claimed to the [alleged] “continued aggression, the war of starvation and water deprivation, and the prevention of the introduction of humanitarian aid throughout the Gaza Strip,” the top priority, for which all international efforts should be united, was to put an end to human suffering and stop the “aggression,” urgently and immediately. He called on all the countries, governments and “people of conscience in the world to intervene quickly and urgently to exert pressure on Israel and the American administration which supports it, to bring in “all the aid, medical aid and services, and save the Palestinians in Gaza from death from hunger, thirst and disease.” He called on the leaders of the Arab and Islamic nation, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the Arab League to establish both official and popular delegations to break the “siege” on the Gaza Strip, bring in aid and “heal the wounds of the Palestinians in Gaza.” He also called on the UNRWA directorate not to surrender, to continue its work, to respond to the Israeli accusations, and not to be complicit in the “crime” (al-Jazeera YouTube channel, February 3, 2024; Hamas Telegram channel in Judea and Samaria, February 3, 2024).

UNRWA

• UNRWA said a statement that providing for the enormous humanitarian needs of over two million people in the Gaza Strip was in jeopardy following the decision of 16 donor countries to stop financial support for the agency. UNRWA claimed that while the war in Gaza continued unabated and while the International Court of Justice called for increased humanitarian aid, it was time to strengthen the agency, not weaken it. UNRWA added that if the funding remained suspended, in all probability they would be forced to stop their activities at the end of the month, not only in the Gaza Strip but all over the region (UNRWA website, February 1, 2024).

Hamas governance in Gaza

• Four residents of Gaza City and a senior Hamas member claimed Hamas had returned to the areas vacated by Israel. In Gaza City, Hamas deployed police officers and paid salaries to some public service employees. After the IDF forces left the area, police officers in uniform and civilian clothes deployed near the police headquarters and other government offices, including near the Shifa Hospital. A “Hamas source,” who spoke anonymously, said that the return of the police marked an attempt to restore order in the Strip after Israel had withdrawn a considerable number of its forces from the northern Gaza Strip last month. According to the “source,” Hamas leaders gave instructions to restore order in the parts of the northern Gaza Strip from which the Israeli forces had withdrawn, and their activities included helping to prevent the looting of shops and houses abandoned by residents. Sayid Abd Albar, a resident of Gaza City, told AP that his cousin had received $200 from an improvised Hamas office set up to distribute payments to government employees, including police and municipal employees (AP, February 3, 2024).
• “Informed sources” said Hamas had asked local officials to manage the work of the government in the northern Gaza Strip after the departure of the Israeli forces, and that the officials attempted to contact other senior officials in the ministry of finance, the ministry of the interior and civil security mechanisms such as the police, and ordered them to take action, each according to its field of expertise and ability, to prove that the movement still existed and was able to rule and prevent a situation of great possible chaos. Instructions were given to the police to operate in the northern areas and an advance of $200 would be paid to each government employee in the Gaza Strip. The police and other security mechanisms have been instructed to return to work in northern Gaza, in accordance with existing capabilities and according to the security situation on the ground, and as a result orders were given to arrest thieves who tried to rob houses and shops, and warrants were issued for merchants accused of hoarding food and exploiting the situation (al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 2, 2024).
• Meanwhile, an attempt was made to reorganize Hamas’ military wing in the northern Gaza Strip. The “sources” claimed Hamas headquarters had issued orders to appoint battalion commanders, lieutenants and field commanders to replace those who were killed. They discovered that about ten days ago a “military” operative who was in command of Tel al-Hawa had been killed by the IDF in an attack on the apartment where he was staying in west Gaza City. He was killed after he had been assigned to replace the previous battalion commander. In addition, a few days ago the IDF killed a field commander of the al-Shati Battalion, who was ordered to renew the battalion’s activities after his commanders had been killed (al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 2, 2024).

A flotilla to the Gaza Strip

• The International Campaign to Save Gaza (ICSG), whose establishment was announced in November 2023 at a conference in Istanbul,^[2] announced the launches of four national campaigns: a Lebanese popular campaign, a Libyan campaign, an Algerian initiative to support the Gaza Strip, and a campaign of aid institutions in Turkey. The campaigns began procedures for launching aid ships to the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. One of the ships will depart from the port of Misrata in Libya and a second will sail from the port of Sidon in Lebanon. A campaign of several Turkish and Palestinian institutions was formed in Istanbul to launch an aid ship from a Turkish port. The Algerian initiative to support Gaza has pledged to provide a significant contribution to launching the ships. A number of businessmen and senior officials in the Arab communities in Turkey will bear the costs of the Turkish campaign. Local committees of charitable institutions were established which began campaigns to collect the aid that will be loaded on the ships, and they are expected to complete their mission in the coming weeks. The ships intend to sail to the port of El Arish, and from there the aid will be transferred to the Gaza Strip through the Rafah Crossing. According to the announcement, docking in El Arish did not mean abandoning the primary goal of breaking the “siege” on the Gaza Strip, and they had begun the necessary preparations to sail to the Gaza Strip and organize an international naval flotilla to pressure Israel to end the “siege” (ICSG website, January 24, 2024). A notice was published on the Freedom Fleet Coalition website stating that starting in February 2024, they were planning a series of direct “non-violent” actions to challenge the “siege” (Freedom Fleet Coalition website, January 24, 2024).

The Northern Arena

Hezbollah’s actions

• During the weekend of February 1-4, 2024, Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 14 attacks using anti-tank missiles and rockets, including Falaq-1 rockets (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, February 1-4, 2024).
• In response to Hezbollah’s attacks, IDF fighter jets attacked Hezbollah targets in south Lebanon, including a military building in Tayr Harfa, a military site in the village of Blida, a truck on which weapons were stored in the Shuba area, a terrorist squad in the Aitaroun area, facilities and military buildings used by Hezbollah operatives in the al-Hayam area, Kafr Qana and Jabal Blat, a military building in the al-Taybeh area, two observation posts in the area of Marwan and Aita al-Shaab, a military headquarters in Yaroun, and a site from which rockets were launched into Israeli territory. In addition, artillery was fired at the al-Jabin area, Aita al-Shaab and Aitaroun (IDF spokesperson, February 2-4, 2024).

Hezbollah casualties

• Hezbollah reported the deaths of two operatives from south Lebanon (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, February 4, 2024):
  • Muhammad Jawdat Yahya, aka Ali al-Hadi, born in al-Taybeh 1995.
  • Abbas Ali Mubarak, aka Abu Hadi, born al-Taybeh in 1990. It was reported that he was one of the two Hezbollah operatives who were killed in the air force attack al-Taybeh, about four kilometers west of Metula (Muhamaddsyrien’s X account, February 3, 2024).

• The Amal movement announced the death of two of its operatives, Ali Khalil Muhammad, aka Shamran, and Mustafa Abbas Dhahar, aka Abu Ali, who were killed “while doing their duty and defending south Lebanon” (al-Nashra, February 3, 2024).

Lebanese citizens in the Gaza Strip

• An article was published in a Lebanese media outlet reporting that dozens of Lebanese families were currently in the Gaza Strip waiting for approval to leave through the Rafah Crossing. A Lebanese citizen in Khan Yunis said there were many Lebanese in the Gaza Strip who do not know whom to contact. According to Ali al-Halabi, the Lebanese ambassador to Egypt, the embassy had submitted a request to the Egyptian Foreign Ministry to evacuate 33 Lebanese citizens and 104 members of their families from the Gaza Strip through the Rafah Crossing. According to the article, their departure also required approval from Israel, which was blocking the move. The ambassador added that a solution can only be found through the mediation of a third country such as Qatar, France or the United States (MTV Lebanon News Instagram account, February 1, 2024).

UNIFIL

• A “senior figure” told the Hezbollah-affiliated daily al-Akhbar that Britain and France were advancing an idea for a gradual ceasefire on the Lebanese-Israeli front. The objective of the proposal is to create a new method of operation for UNIFIL, in cooperation with the Lebanese army, which will enjoy the support of UNIFIL partner countries and the permanent members of the Security Council, especially the United States, Great Britain and France. The proposal includes the establishment of a new UNIFIL battalion which will be in charge of overseeing both sides of the border through towers placed directly on the border line, while strengthening the deployment of the Lebanese army in the area. The proposal also includes the removal of military markers on both sides of the border and the cessation of military operations in an area that will be designated as a “test area.” If successful, the test area will be expanded eastward until it covers the entire border. The proposal will be implemented regardless of the course of events in the Gaza Strip. After contacting Hezbollah in various ways, the official Hezbollah position received by the British and French, and repeated by senior officials of the organization to Western emissaries and senior Lebanese officials, was that it was absolutely out of the question (al-Akhbar, February 3, 2024).

Statements by senior Hezbollah officials

• Na’im Qassem, Hezbollah deputy secretary general, claimed the Lebanese front in the current war had been opened to “help the Gaza Strip,” and when the “aggression” in the Strip stopped completely there would be no need for military support and it would stop “automatically.” He also claimed that the talks for a ceasefire were a Palestinian matter only, and therefore no one could obligate them to discuss Israeli demands regarding south Lebanon after the end of the fighting. He emphasized that as long as the “aggression” continued, they would not deal with anything related to the issue (al-Akhbar, February 2, 2024).

The Lebanese government

• During a visit to the Lebanese army forces, David Cameron, the British foreign minister, said that if they wanted to progress towards a ceasefire, they needed to make sure that the border between Israel and Lebanon was calm. He said that for that to happen, they needed to demarcate the border properly, ensure that Hezbollah moved north and armed Lebanese forces would have to man the border (British Foreign Office X account, February 3, 2024).
• Samir Geagea, head of the Lebanese Forces party, noted on the occasion of the anniversary of Lugman Salim’s^[3] death that the Lebanese had begun to say that Hezbollah’s weapons were the essence of the ruling junta’s corruption (Samir Geagea’s X account, February 4, 2024).

Syria

• A “military source” stated that on February 2, 2024, at around 4:20 a.m., Israel attacked several targets in south Damascus from the direction of the Golan Heights. According to “the source,” the Syrian air defense forces intercepted some of the missiles and the attack caused only material damage (Syrian News Agency, February 2, 2024).
• It was later reported that the target of the attack was a temporary warehouse for storing weapons in the area of the Aqraba military airport, about a kilometer east of Set Zaynab. Militias operating under the auspices of Iran are stationed at the airport and the area has dozens of headquarters and warehouses which are used to store weapons and precision ammunition (Sawt al-Asama, February 2, 2024). Furthermore, Saeed Alidadi, an IRGC advisor, was killed in the attack (Iranian State Broadcasting Authority Telegram channel, February 2, 2024). Reportedly, he was a technical expert in the field of developing UAVs and precision missiles, and his main work was at the Scientific Research Center in Masyaf, in the rural area of Hama. He recently arrived in Damascus at the invitation of the command of the IRGC in Set Zaynab (Sawt al-Asama, February 2, 2024). Iranian media reported that Saeed Alidadi, a member of the IRGC, was killed in an attack attributed to Israel in the Damascus area on the night of February 2, 2024 (SNN, February 2, 2024).

Judea and Samaria

Counterterrorism activities

• The Israeli security forces continued their counterterrorism activities in Judea and Samaria. Since the beginning of the war, approximately 3,000 wanted Palestinians have been arrested, more than 1,350 of them Hamas operatives (IDF spokesperson’s Telegram channel, February 4, 2024).
• On the morning of February 4, 2024, Israeli security forces operating in the Balata refugee camp in Nablus detained a wanted Palestinian suspected of shooting at the forces, and confiscated his weapons (IDF spokesperson’s Telegram channel, February 4, 2024). The Palestinians claimed Israeli forces had entered the camp, stationed snipers on the roofs of buildings and begun to strip roads (Ma’an, February 4, 2024). On February 3, 2024, Israeli security forces operating in Nablus detained a wanted Palestinian who was carrying a gun, and later located and detonated an IED (IDF Spokesperson’s Telegram channel, February 3, 2024).
• The Palestinian media reported that Palestinian police forces had dismantled an IED planted under the road in Azzun (east of Qalqilya) which was meant to attack Israeli forces (QudsN X account, February 3, 2024).

The Palestinian Authority (PA)

• Mahmoud Abbas, PA chairman, spoke with Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, the emir of Qatar, to discuss the efforts to stop Israeli “aggression” against the Palestinian
• people and the need to introduce humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip. Mahmoud Abbas claimed the only solution to the situation was to “end Israel’s presence on Palestinian lands” (Wafa, February 1, 2024).
• PA Prime Minister Muhammad Shtayyeh said in an interview that they were in contact with Hamas indirectly, through Egypt and Qatar. He said they did not want to return to a political process and negotiations, but rather wanted international recognition of a Palestinian state. He also claimed the United States could not discuss a two-state solution with the PLO while defining it as a terrorist organization. Shtayyeh also stated that Hamas had to complete the dialogue with the PA leadership and accept what was involved in the PLO program. As for the PA’s financial situation, he said they were undergoing a genuinely serious financial crisis which had led to their inability to pay salaries. He noted that the idea of the transfer of the tax funds collected by Israel to Norway did not mean that they reached the PA, it meant they were frozen (Sky News channel in Arabic, February 3, 2024).

Iran

• Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian spoke with Ismail Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, and with PIJ secretary general Ziad Nakhalah. They discussed developments in the Gaza Strip and proposals for a ceasefire and prisoner exchange. Abdollahian praised the “Palestinian resistance” and said only the Palestinian people could decide its fate and future (IRNA, February 1, 2024).
• Abdollahian also spoke with his Egyptian counterpart, Sameh Shoukry, and discussed regional developments, especially in the Gaza Strip. He noted that all countries had to focus on ending the war and finding a political solution for the crisis in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. He thanked Egypt for its efforts to deliver humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip and expressed Iran’s willingness to deliver aid in coordination with Egypt and the UN. They also discussed the tension in the Red Sea (IRNA, February 1, 2024).
• Abdollahian also spoke by phone with Josep Borrell, EU foreign minister, to discuss relations between Tehran and the EU and regional developments. Abdollahian said that the only way to restore stability was to “stop the crimes of the Zionist regime in the Gaza Strip” and focus on the roots of the Palestinian crisis. He also warned against continued attacks by the United States and Britain against the Houthis in Yemen (ISNA, February 1, 2024).
• On February 3, 2024, the Iranian foreign minister met with Hans Grundberg, the UN special envoy for Yemen, and said that the attacks by the United States and Britain in Yemen complicated the situation and posed a problem for a political solution in Yemen (Tasnim, February 3, 2024).
• The Politico news website, citing “American intelligence sources,” claimed Iran did not have full control and authority over the operational decision-making and attacks of its proxies in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, including the attack on the American base in Jordan which resulted in the deaths of three American soldiers (Politico, February 2, 2024).

American attacks

• American President Joe Biden said he had instructed United States military forces to attack targets in Iraq and Syria inside bases of the IRGC and pro-Iranian militias used to attack American forces in the region. President Biden said the response had begun and would be continued where and when they chose. He noted that they were not looking for conflict in the Middle East or the world (Reuters, February 3, 2024).
• Shortly after Biden’s announcement, CENTCOM said the forces had attacked targets in Iraq and Syria belonging to the IRGC and pro-Iranian militias from the air. According to the statement, more than 85 targets had been attacked by fighter jets and long-range rockets. The airstrike hit control and intelligence centers as well as weapons depots of militias that assisted in the attacks against American forces (CENTCOM X account, February 2, 2024). Around 40 people were reportedly killed (Reuters, February 3, 2024).
• White House spokesperson John Kirby said the American response had not ended, adding that they had notified the Iraqi government before the strikes. He also noted there had been no communication with Iran since the attack in Jordan, in which three United States Army soldiers were killed (Reuters, February 3, 2024). Gen. Michael Kurilla, CENTCOM commander, said the IRGC’s Qods forces and pro-Iranian militias continued to pose a direct threat to the security of Iraq, the region and the United States, noting that they would continue to do whatever was necessary to protect their personnel and hold those who threatened their security accountable (CENTCOM X account, February 3, 2024).
• Citing “Iranian sources,” al-Jazeera claimed that the IRGC and Qods Force had no bases in the areas attacked by the United States in Syria and Iraq. Iranian officials condemned the American attack, stressing that the United States’ claims about attacking the Qods Force in Syria and Iraq were “unrealistic” (al-Jazeera, February 3, 2024).

Iraq

• The Iraqi government reported that the airstrikes had resulted in the deaths of 16 people, including civilians, and the wounding of 25 others, and claimed it was a “new aggression against Iraqi sovereignty,” as it was carried out against sites of the Iraqi security forces and “civilian sites” in the Akashat and al-Qaim areas. It also noted that the American claim of coordination before the attack was false and intended to mislead international public opinion and evade legal responsibility. The Iraqi government stressed that the presence of the international coalition forces, which deviated from the missions assigned to them, had become a threat to Iraq’s security and stability, justifying Iraq’s involvement in regional and international conflicts (Iraqi News Agency, February 3, 2024).

• Yahya Rasool, spokesman for the Iraqi armed forces, called the attacks “a violation of Iraqi sovereignty” and claimed the airstrikes had been carried out at the same time as Iraq’s attempts to ensure stability in the region. He also stressed that the airstrikes would drag the region to unexpected consequences and would have an adverse impact on Iraqi and regional security (Shafaq News, February 3, 2024).
• Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia’ al-Sudani met with representatives of the Popular Mobilization, the umbrella organization of the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, and said the Iraqi government was prepared to provide the forces with support and enable them to continue dealing with terrorist elements. He said it was their responsibility to remain prepared and confront terrorism and the remnants of ISIS by force (Iraqi prime minister’s office Telegram channel, February 3, 2024). The Iraqi foreign ministry summoned the chargé d’affaires of the American embassy in Baghdad and gave him an official memorandum of protest regarding the attack (Iraqi News Agency, February 3, 2024).
• In a speech given by Falih al-Fayyad, chairman of the Popular Mobilization, during the funeral ceremony of those killed in the attack, he said that attacking the Popular Mobilization forces was “playing with fire,” adding that they did not believe in negotiations and that the foreign forces had to be removed from Iraq immediately (Popular Mobilization Telegram channel, February 4, 2024).

Syria

• According to a statement issued by the Syrian defense ministry, the American forces carried out an airstrike against several sites and cities in eastern Syria near the Syrian-Iraqi border, leading to the deaths of several civilians and military personnel, wounding civilians and causing extensive damage to property. It was also reported that the area attacked was the same area where the Syrian army was fighting against ISIS remnants (Syrian TV, February 3, 2024). In Syria, 28 targets were reportedly attacked in areas controlled by the Syrian army and Iranian-backed militias in Deir ez-Zor and its rural area, al-Mayadeen, Albukamal and other sites. According to the reports, at least 29 militia operatives were killed, including nine Syrians, six Iraqis, six Hezbollah Lebanon operatives and eight unknown persons (Deir ez-Zor 24 X account, February 3, 2024).
• The Syrian foreign ministry condemned the attack, claiming that it was another in a series of violations by the United States against Syrian sovereignty and that it inflamed the regional conflict “in a very dangerous way” (SANA, February 3, 2024).

• The airstrikes in Syria and Iraq were widely condemned:
  • Nasser Kanani, spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, strongly condemned the airstrikes, saying they had violated the countries’ sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as international law. He added that the airstrikes had been an “adventurous move” and another strategic mistake on the part of the United States, which would only lead to an exacerbation of regional tension and instability. He claimed the American military airstrikes served the goals of the “Zionist regime” and increased American involvement in the area. He warned that the continuation of American actions threatened regional and global peace and security and might spread the war in the region. He said the roots of the regional tension and crisis went back to Israel, which continued its military operations in the Gaza Strip and the [alleged] “genocide” of the Palestinians with American support (ISNA, February 3, 2024). 
  • Maria Zakharova, spokeswoman for the Russian foreign ministry, claimed the United States had disregarded the standards of international law, and called for an ad hoc Security Council meeting to discuss the situation. She said the United States was not looking for solutions to problems in the region and had always been pleased with the escalation of tensions in the Middle East (RT in Arabic, February 3, 2024).
  • Hamas claimed it was a dangerous escalation, an attack on the sovereignty of the countries and a threat to regional stability. According to Hamas, the actions served Israel’s agenda of expansion and were intended to hide its crimes against the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip (Hamas Telegram channel, February 3, 2024).
  • The PIJ claimed the attacks would lead to an escalation of regional tension and increase regional instability (PIJ Telegram channel, February 3, 2024).
  • Hezbollah claimed it was a blatant violation of the sovereignty of both countries and international law, and that the new aggression contributed to destabilizing the region and creating excuses for the continued American occupation of areas in Iraq and Syria (Hezbollah’s combat information Telegram channel, February 3, 20204).
  • The Nujaba movement, a pro-Iranian militia in Iraq, said the American occupation had to know that the “Islamic resistance” would respond where and when it saw fit and that they had surprises that would “infuriate” the United States (Nujaba movement Telegram channel, February 3, 2024). Hossein al-Mousawi, spokesman for the Nujaba movement, said that they would withdraw only after the withdrawal of the American forces from Iraq and that the “aggression” was part of an attempt to cover up the United States’ failure (al-Mayadeen, February 3, 2024).
  • Kazem al-Fartousi, spokesman for the Iraqi militia Sayyid al-Shuhada Brigades, said the attacks only increased their desire to continue carrying out “resistance” activities and defend Iraqi soil (Shafaq News, February 4, 2024).
  • Ali al-Qahum, a member of the Houthis’ political bureau, said they condemned and rejected the American “aggression” against Syria and Iraq. He said they would continue to support and show their solidarity with the resistance movements in Syria, Iraq and the Palestinian territories (al-Mayadeen, February 3, 2024).

Pro-Iranian militias

Iraq

• Recently, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for several attacks in Syria and Iraq, among them the Kharab al-Jir base in Syria and the Harir base in Iraq (Islamic Resistance Telegram channel, February 2-4, 2024). It also claimed responsibility for attacking a base in Erbil, but three security sources reported that no attack against the base had been identified (Reuters, February 3, 2024).
• Akram al-Kaabi, secretary general of the Iraqi Nujaba movement, said they would continue their activities until the “aggression” in the Gaza Strip ceased and the United States withdrew from Iraq. His statement was published after reports that Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia’ al-Sudani had reached an agreement with some of the militias to stop the attacks in the country while the Nujaba movement was making it difficult. Regarding the statement of Kataib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Brigades) on the suspension of their activity, al-Kaabi said they were waiting for its cancellation, stressing that the other militias in the “resistance” would continue their activities (Akram al-Kaabi’s X account, February 2, 2024).

Yemen

• Lloyd Austin, the American defense secretary, said they and the British military had attacked 36 Houthi targets in Yemen, including underground facilities, weapons stockpiles, missile launchers and other military targets. He noted that the airstrikes had been intended to disrupt the Houthis’ capabilities and send them a clear message that if they continued their attacks, they would continue to bear the consequences (United States Department of Defense website, February 4, 2024). Grant Shapps, British defence secretary, said the British Air Force, in cooperation with the United States, had carried out a series of targeted airstrikes against Houthi military targets in Yemen, with the aim of destabilizing them. He noted that they acted in self-defense and in accordance with international law (Reuters, February 4, 2024).
• Yahya Saria, spokesman for the Houthi armed forces, reported that American and British planes had carried out 48 airstrikes in various areas of Yemen. Thirteen of the airstrikes were carried out in the capital Sana’a, nine in the al-Hudaydah governorate, 11 in the Taizz governorate, seven in the al-Bayda governorate, and seven in the Hajjah governorate. He also said that the attacks would not go unanswered, and they would not succeed in changing the Houthis’ position and support for the Gaza Strip (Yahya Saria’s Telegram channel, February 4, 2024).
• Muhammad Ali al-Houthi, a member of the Houthi political bureau, said in response to the attacks that it was an escalation versus an escalation and that as long as the “aggression” against the Gaza Strip existed, their military operations against Israel would continue regardless of the price (al-Arabi, February 4, 2024).
• At the same time, CENTCOM forces continued to disrupt Houthi anti-ship activity in the Red Sea (CENTCOM X account, February 2-4, 2024).
  • On February 1, 2024, at around 5 a.m. (Sana’a time), American military forces intercepted a UAV over the Gulf of Aden. At 10:30 a.m., the forces identified a Houthi unmanned vessel and a UAV heading toward the international shipping lane and determined that it posed an immediate threat. They attacked and destroyed the vessel. At 12:45 p.m., two anti-ship ballistic missiles were launched from Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen, apparently targeting the Liberia-flagged M/V Koi of Bermuda.
  • On February 2, 2024, at around 10:30 a.m. (Sana’a time), the destroyer USS Carney intercepted a UAV over the Gulf of Aden. At 4:40 p.m. (Sana’a time), the forces attacked and destroyed four UAVs ready for launch. At 9:20 p.m. (Sana’a time), the aircraft carrier USS Laboon and the aircraft carrier Eisenhower intercepted seven UAVs over the Red Sea (CENTCOM X account, February 3, 2024). On February 4, 2024, at around 4 a.m. (Sana’a time), the forces attacked an anti-ship Houthi cruise missile ready for launch in Houthi-controlled areas at ships in the Red Sea.
  • On February 3, 2024, at 7:20 p.m. (Sana’a time), they attacked six Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles ready for launch at ships in the Red Sea.
  • On February 4, 2024, at around 4 a.m. (Sana’a time), the forces attacked an anti-ship Houthi cruise missile ready for launch in Houthi-controlled areas at ships in the Red Sea.
• Abd al-Malik al-Houthi, leader of the Houthis in Yemen, ridiculed the United States and Britain, claiming that they had failed in their attempts to protect ships and that they could not even protect their ships from attacks. He stressed that they were ready to attack any ship inclined in favor of Israel and that they would continue their military position in operations at sea as long as the “aggression” and siege of the Gaza Strip continued (Houthi Telegram channel, February 1, 2024).
• Houthi spokesman Abd al-Ghani al-Zubeidi said that in the coming days and hours, there would be “unprecedented developments in the Red Sea,” and that the United States and Israel would lose the war in the long run. He stressed that if the United States continued to attack Yemen, it would lose the military campaign in the Red Sea because the Houthis had a huge force of missiles and UAVs capable of reaching any point in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea, as indicated by their attack on Eilat, which is about 2,300 kilometers away from Yemen (al-Arabi Network, February 4, 2024).
• On February 3, 2024, the Houthis carried out a military exercise called “Yemen for Palestine,” which simulated, among other things, attacking Israeli posts and towns, kidnapping soldiers, and using explosive drones against Israeli targets (Houthi movement’s information center, February 3, 2024).

     
Right: Launching a ballistic missile. Left: Firing a missile from an armored vehicle (Houthi movement’s information center, February 3, 2024)

   
Right: Use of UAVs. Left: Occupation of a post and kidnapping of soldiers (Houthi movement’s information center, February 3, 2024)

The Arab Arena

Saudi Arabia

• “Three Saudi individuals” noted that Saudi Arabia would not insist that Israel take concrete steps to establish a Palestinian state as part of the normalization negotiations, and that it would be willing to make do with accepting a commitment from Israel to a two-state solution. It was noted that Saudi Arabia was doing that to obtain a security agreement with the United States in exchange for normalization with Israel, thereby strengthening its security. Another source said that if Israel stopped fighting in the Gaza Strip, or at least declared a ceasefire, it would make it easier for Saudi Arabia to continue normalization negotiations (Reuters, February 2, 2024).
• Saudi Defense Minister Khaled bin Salman said at a meeting of the defense ministers of the countries that are members of the counterterrorism coalition held in Riyadh that the Israeli “aggression” against the Gaza Strip had to be stopped immediately, and that the situation required a united position of the coalition member states and a unified condemnation of Israeli violations in the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria. He added that terrorism and extremism posed a threat to international security and stability, and that fighting them was a shared responsibility (Arab News, February 4, 2024).
• Faisal bin Farhan, Saudi foreign minister, spoke with American Secretary of State Antony Blinken. The two discussed the latest developments in the Gaza Strip and the region and efforts to deal with their security and humanitarian implications (Saudi foreign ministry X account, February 2, 2024). Faisal bin Farhan also spoke with Hakan Fidan, Turkey’s foreign minister. They mainly discussed the latest developments in the Gaza Strip and the region and the efforts being made on the issue (Saudi foreign ministry X account, February 4, 2024).

Qatar

• Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman met in New York with UN Secretary General António Guterres to discuss Qatar-UN cooperation and recent developments in the Middle East, especially in the Gaza Strip. The Qatari prime minister emphasized the important role played by UNRWA and warned of the devastating consequences if funding to the agency was cut off (Qatari foreign ministry X account, February 3, 2024).

The International Arena

United States

• American President Joe Biden issued an executive order imposing sanctions on four Israeli men involved in settler violence in Judea and Samaria. According to American National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, the executive order includes financial sanctions and visa blocks of people who attack Palestinians or damage their property (Reuters, February 1, 2024). The publication of an executive order on the subject is a precedent-setting event that sets a legal basis for American punishment of Israeli citizens involved in nationalist crimes in Judea and Samaria and is a kind of step up in the position of the American administration in the face of settler violence in Judea and Samaria. The revocation of the executive order entails an additional executive order that renounces the content of the current order or legislation in Congress, which requires the approval of the President of the United States.
• The United States Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on six officials at the IRGC’s Cyber Electronics Command, which is responsible for a series of cyber attacks on critical infrastructure in the United States and other countries. The sanctions were imposed on these elements in response to the cyber actions of elements affiliated with the IRGC on infrastructure in the United States, including by damaging products of the Israeli company Unitronix. Another statement said sanctions had been imposed on an Iranian company and several Hong Kong companies that supplied components and sensitive technology for Iran’s ballistic missile and UAV programs, including Shahed-series UAVs (United States Department of the Treasury website, February 2, 2024).

United Kingdom

• British Foreign Secretary David Cameron said Britain might officially recognize a Palestinian state as soon as a ceasefire was declared in the Gaza Strip without waiting for the formal end of the war. However, he said they would not be able to do so as long as Hamas was in the Gaza Strip (AP, February 1, 2024). The PA foreign ministry issued a statement praising David Cameron’s remarks, saying it was a step in the right direction towards achieving an immediate ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, protect Palestinian civilians and ensure their humanitarian needs, and that they wanted these statements to be translated into practical steps and support for full membership of the State of Palestine in the UN (PA foreign ministry X account, February 2, 2024).

Turkey

• An armed man broke into an American factory in Kocaeli, northwestern Anatolia, and held seven people hostage to protest the war in the Gaza Strip (al-Quds al-Ekhbariya, February 1, 2024). It was later reported that the Turkish police managed to release the seven hostages (AP, February 2, 2024).

Global Jihad

• The ISIS-affiliated al-Azaim Foundation apparently operating in Afghanistan published a poster in English criticizing Hamas for failing to implement religious principles (according to ISIS’s perception) in several aspects: adopting democratic values, implementing infidel laws instead of applying sharia, collaborating with infidel regimes such as the Iranian regime, collaborating with regimes operating against ISIS operatives, as occurred in the Sinai Peninsula and elsewhere, and recognizing Shi’ites as Muslims and adhering to rapprochement with them (Telegram, February 2, 2024).

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications. ↑
^[2] For further information see the November 2023 report, "Attempts to organize an aid flotilla to the Gaza Strip." ↑
^[3] Luqman Mohsen Salim was a Lebanese publisher, political activist and commentator who was known as a harsh and prominent critic of Hezbollah, he was found dead in his car in south Lebanon after being shot. His family members claimed that Hezbollah assassinated him but Hezbollah denied it (Wikipedia). ↑

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