Operation Iron Swords (Updated to 1 p.m., February 22, 2024)

Overview^[1]

• The southern arena: IDF activity continues, focusing on Khan Yunis in the southern Gaza Strip and the Zeitoun neighborhood in eastern Gaza City. In Khan Yunis the forces uncovered another tunnel used by senor Hamas operatives.
• According to unofficial data, since October 7, 2023, approximately 1,500 Israeli civilians and security personnel have been killed, 576 of them soldiers and officers; 130 civilian and military hostages are still being held by the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip; 123 hostages have been released.
• Negotiations for a hostage deal: Musa Abu Marzouq, a member of the Hamas political bureau, said that for every Israeli hostage released, Hamas demanded the release of 500 Palestinian prisoners. He also noted that there might soon be a breakthrough regarding a ceasefire. “Palestinian sources” outside the Gaza Strip said that a new proposal for a ceasefire was being discussed in Cairo and included the return of hostages. Senior Hamas members continue to reiterate that Hamas has adhered to the conditions it presented in response to what was agreed upon in Paris. However, the claimed they had not closed the door [to negotiations] because they wanted to reach “understandings.”
• The situation in the Gaza Strip: A Jordanian Air Force plane airlifted medical aid to the Jordanian field hospital in the Gaza Strip. The Palestinian Authority government and the European Union signed an agreement to support the supply of water in the Gaza Strip. According to Muhammad Nazzal, a member of the Hamas political bureau, aid for the Gaza Strip was another battle they were waging against Israel.
• The northern arena: During the past day, Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 14 attacks, including firing anti-tank missiles at Metula and Kfar Yuval which damaged homes, and launching a barrage of rockets at the cities, towns and villages in the Western Galilee. The IDF responded with airstrikes and artillery fire.
• Judea and Samaria: Three Palestinian terrorists in two cars carried out a shooting attack near Ma’ale Adumim. One person was killed and eight were injured. Two of terrorists were killed and the third was captured. Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) welcomed the attack and called on the Palestinians to continue attacking. A Fatah Tanzim operative, who was serving ten life sentences for murdering Israelis, died in a prison in Israel. The Palestinians blamed Israel for his death.
• Iran: The Iranian leader claimed the Gaza Strip was currently the main focus of the Islamic world. The Iranian foreign minister condemned the United States’ decision to veto the UN Security Council proposal for an immediate ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.
• The Iranian militias: On the morning of February 22, 2024, IDF aerial defense fighters used the Arrow anti-ballistic missile system to intercept a missile fired at Israel from the Red Sea. United States military forces attacked Houthi targets.
• The international arena: The International Court of Justice (ICJ) debates on the “legitimacy of the Israeli occupation” continued. The 20G summit meeting convened in Brazil. One of the topics related to in speeches was the war in the Gaza Strip.

The Southern Arena

• Palestinian media reported IDF attacks in the Gaza Strip during the past day: in Gaza City, the IDF attacked in the Zeitoun neighborhood, in the southeast of the city, the Sabra neighborhood in the city center and the Rimal neighborhood in the west. In the central Gaza Strip the IDF attacked in Deir al-Balah and the Nuseirat, Bureij and Maghazi refugee camps. In Khan Yunis, the IDF attacked in the center and west; meanwhile, IDF activity continued at Nasser Hospital. In Rafah, the IDF attacked in the Shaboura refugee camp (city  center and near the Rafah-Egypt border) (Wafa, February 22, 2024).

   
An al-Jazeera channel presenter describes the activities of the IDF forces in the Zeitoun neighborhood (right), in western Khan Yunis and in the Mawasi area near the seashore (left) (al-Jazeera YouTube channel, February 21, 2024)

• The southern Gaza Strip: IDF forces uncovered another tunnel route in the Khan Yunis area which was used by senior Hamas terrorist operatives, who clashed with IDF forces. The tunnel was more than a kilometer long and its construction had obviously been very expensive. The tunnel is part of a branching system of strategic tunnels located under Khan Yunis which were used by senior Hamas operatives and the Khan Yunis Brigade as hideouts and for conducting combat. Bedrooms, electricity and water were found in the tunnel. The tunnel was destroyed by IDF forces (IDF spokesperson, February 21, 2024).

    
Right: The route of the tunnel. Left: Inside the tunnel (IDF spokesperson, February 21, 2024)

     
Inside the tunnel: a corner shower, beds, a safe and decorative wall tiles
(IDF spokesperson, February 21, 2024)

• Palestinian media reported that Nasser Hospital in Khan Yunis was still surrounded and housed 120 patients and medical staff (Wafa, February 22, 2024). The media also reported an Israeli Air Force attack on al-Farouq Mosque in the al-Shaboura refugee camp in Rafah (Shehab X account, February 22, 2024). The photos of the attack show dense clouds of smoke, strengthening the hypothesis that weapons were stored in the mosque.

    
Right: Attack on al-Farouq Mosque. Left: The mosque on the morning after the attack (Shehab X account, February 22, 2024)

• Gaza City: During the past day, IDF forces intensified their activity in the Zeitoun neighborhood in the southeast. Muhammad Nazzal, a member of the Hamas political bureau, claimed IDF forces tried to break into the Zeitoun neighborhood and suffered “very painful blows,” adding that the IDF even admitted that “dozens of soldiers” had been injured. He claimed the IDF forces, who thought they could easily enter the neighborhood, were “surprised” by the intense fighting they encountered. He claimed that the leadership on the ground in the Gaza Strip, led by Yahya al-Sinwar, faced the possibility of a long, drawn-out campaign and had open options. He said Israel was dealing with an “armed, ideological organization with a mission,” which waged “popular guerilla warfare,” the only strategy capable of “defeating” Israel. Therefore, even though the balance of power in terms of resources and capabilities was in Israel’s favor, the “resistance” [terrorist organizations] could defeat it militarily. Asked if they would be capable of fighting for years, he said he believed the “resistance” could hold out for a long time (al-Jazeera Mubasher YouTube  channel, February 21, 2024).

   
An attack on a Hamas weapons warehouse. Left: An attack on a Hamas terrorist squad
(IDF spokesperson, February 22, 2024)

Rocket fire from the Gaza Strip

• On the evening of February 21, 2024, mortar shells were fired from the Gaza Strip at Israel; they fell in an open area and there were no casualties. A few minutes later, the location from which the shells were fired was identified as the Jabalia area in the northern Gaza Strip. An Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked the terrorist and destroyed the launcher (IDF spokesperson, February 21, 2024).

• Before dawn on February 22, 2024, IDF air defense fighters used the Arrow anti-ballistic missile system to intercept a missile fired at Israel from the Red Sea. The interception was carried out before the missile reached Israeli territory (IDF spokesperson, February 22, 2024).

Israeli casualties

• According to unofficial data, since October 7, 2023, approximately 1,500 Israeli people have been killed. According to the IDF spokesperson, 576 of them are soldiers and officers (238 since the start of the ground maneuver on 27 October, 2023); 130 civilian and military hostages are still being held by the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip; 123 hostages have been released.

The issue of the hostages and a ceasefire agreement

• Musa Abu Marzouq, a member of the Hamas political bureau, said Hamas’ price for the release of every Israeli hostage was 500 Palestinian prisoners. He added that there might be breakthroughs in the near future regarding the ceasefire negotiations, but claimed that the main obstacle was Israel’s withdrawal from the Salah al-Din Road [the main road that traverses the Gaza Strip from north to south]. Referring to the possibility of the IDF’s entering Rafah, he said Hamas rejected the idea of releasing the hostages in exchange for the IDF’s keeping out of Rafah. He added that entering Rafah would be worse for Israel because Hamas was better prepared there since its operatives in Rafah had not participated in previous battles (al-Ghad, February 22, 2024).
• “Sources in the Palestinian organizations” outside the Gaza Strip said that a new proposal for an arrangement in the Gaza Strip was being discussed in Cairo, which included a 45-day truce and an extension for each Israeli hostage who was released. According to the sources, the new proposal offers additional stages for discussing a permanent ceasefire after the temporary ceasefire, which also includes the release of elderly male hostages and the remaining Israeli women in exchange for the release of a number of Palestinian prisoners. It also allows the introduction of significant aid to Gaza City and the northern Gaza Strip, but does not include the return of the displaced Gazans to the northern Gaza Strip (al-Sharq TV website, February 21, 2024).
• Muhammad Nazzal, a member of the Hamas political bureau, said that along with the heavy fighting on the ground, there was a political campaign which was no less intense, and so far it was impossible to assess the direction events would take. He said the Hamas delegation was conducting serious deliberations with Egyptian officials regarding understandings. He claimed discussions and negotiations were continuing and they had not closed the door because they wanted to eventually reach understandings. He stated there was no change in Hamas’ position in its talks with the Egyptian and Qatari mediators. He said the two sides were struggling, and they relied on their trump cards: the Palestinian “resistance,” the hostages, and [allegedly] the “world’s support for the Palestinians,” with the exception of the United States. He also said they had ways to pressure Israel, among them “the resistance” and the hostages, which exerted internal pressure in Israeli society. Asked if they expected a deal to be reached before Ramadan, he claimed it was an option and they were serious about reaching a deal (al-Jazeera Mubasher YouTube channel, February 21, 2024).
• On another occasion, Nazzal claimed the obstacles raised by the Israeli government were preventing an agreement from being reached. He claimed Israel did not want to commit to an eventual ceasefire, or withdraw its forces from the Gaza Strip, or lift the blockade, but rather wanted to control the movement of people and goods to and from the Gaza Strip, as well as to receive all the hostages, but without releasing all the Palestinian prisoners. He said the hostages were their trump card, it exerted pressure on Israel and would force it to meet their demands (al-Araby al-Jadeed, February 21, 2024).
• Osama Hamdan, a senior Hamas member, said that the Hamas delegation, led by Isma’il Haniyeh, was visiting Egypt at Egypt’s invitation. He claimed that at meetings Hamas reiterated its adherence to its positions and demands regarding the Paris proposal. Hamas, he claimed, expressed the “national position” of all the “organizations.” He said it was out of the question that accept the version presented by Israel or agree to the continuation of daily “aggression,” or to the continuation of the “siege and starvation,” adding that dealing with those issues was their basic demand (al-Mayadeen TV website, February 21, 2024).

The Gaza Strip

Palestinian casualties

• The Hamas-controlled ministry of health in the Gaza Strip reported at 10:30 a.m., February 22, 2024, that during the past day 97 Gazans had been killed and 132 wounded, bringing the number of dead since the beginning of the war to 29,410 and the number of wounded to 69,465 (ministry of health in Gaza Facebook page, February 22, 2024).

Aid for the Gaza Strip

• A “senior military source” in the Jordanian army reported that a Royal Air Force plane had airlifted urgent medical aid to the Jordanian field hospital in the Gaza Strip. The operation, carried out in cooperation with Britain, was designed to strengthen the hospital’s capabilities and increase the medical teams’ capabilities to provide health services and improve the situation of the residents of the Strip Gaza (Jordanian Army website, February 21, 2024).
• The Palestinian Authority government and the European Union signed an agreement to support water supplies to all areas of the Gaza Strip. According to the agreement, the damages, filling stations and water distribution in Rafah will be repaired. After the repairs, the southern desalination plant will be able produce 20,000 cubic meters (about 5.3 million gallons) of water a day which will reach hospitals and shelters (Wafa, February 21, 2024).
• Muhammad Nazzal, a member of the Hamas political bureau, said that they had raised the issue of aid to the Gaza Strip in talks with the mediators and with all the political groups in contact with them, and were sparing no effort on the issue, which was another campaign they were waging against Israel. Regarding the statement of Israeli Minister Benny Gantz that Israel was coordinating with several Arab countries to introduce aid to the Gaza Strip in a way that would ensure Hamas would not control it, he replied that Hamas had no opposition, Israel could deliver the aid directly to the Palestinian people (al-Jazeera YouTube channel Masher, February 21, 2024).
• Mu’min al-Sharafi, a correspondent for al-Jazeera TV, reporting from the Palestinian side of the Kerem Shalom Crossing, said there had been a significant decrease in the amount of aid entering the Gaza Strip compared to the previous month. He said that before the war, 500-700 trucks entered the Gaza Strip through the Kerem Shalom Crossing every day, compared to only 15 trucks on February 20 (al-Jazeera YouTube channel, February 21, 2024).

The issue of “the day after”

• Muhammad Nazzal, a member of the Hamas political bureau, said that their current priority was the cessation of “aggression” against the Palestinian people and the withdrawal of IDF forces from the Gaza Strip, after which it would be possible to talk about settling internal Palestinian affairs, of which the [Hamas] government was a part. Regarding the names circulating behind the scenes, he claimed no one had shown them to Hamas or consulted with the movement about them. Regarding reports that Yahya al-Sinwar regretted the October 7, 2023 attack, and that Hamas wanted to replace him, Nazzal claimed the source of the report was a former prisoner who claimed to have been al-Sinwar’s friend. However, if the IDF forces were unable to find al-Sinwar, how could the source have been his friend and heard he regretted the attack? Therefore, the source spreading the rumor was a liar who allowed himself to be part of the psychological warfare being waged against the “resistance” in general and the Hamas movement in particular. As for rumors that the Hamas leadership was looking for a replacement for al-Sinwar, Nazzal claimed it was “another big lie,” as there was no reason for Hamas to want to replace him, as he had been leading a “heroic ethos” [sic] since October 7 [2023]. He said that in the Hamas movement, positions were filled through the organization’s institutions, and with elections at polling stations (al-Araby al-Jadeed, February 11, 2024).

The Northern Arena

Hezbollah attacks

• During the past day Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 14 attacks using anti-tank missiles, Katyusha and Burkan rockets, whose warheads weigh between 300 and 500 kilograms (between 660 and 1,100 pounds) (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, February 21-22, 2024). Anti-tank missiles were fired at Metula and Kfar Yuval, damaging homes; a rocket was fired at the Western Galilee.

IDF attacks in response

• In response to Hezbollah’s attacks, Israeli Air Force warplanes attacked Hezbollah targets, including three operational headquarters in south Lebanon, an observation post in the al-Khiyam area, a military post in Zibqin from which rockets were launched at the Western Galilee, and a number of terrorist facilities. A combat helicopter attacked terrorist operatives in an observation post in the Ramyeh area, and artillery was fired at the Aitaroun and Alma al-Sha’ab area (IDF spokesperson, February 21, 2024).

     
Right: IDF attack on terrorists in an observation post in the Ramyeh area. Left: Attack on military facility (IDF spokesperson, February 22, 2024)

UNIFIL

• Aroldo Lazzaro, the commander of UNIFIL, expressed concern about an escalation of military operations in south Lebanon should diplomatic efforts fail. During a meeting with local leaders in the Tyre area, attended by Suheil Harb, head of Lebanese army intelligence in south Lebanon, he said that international forces were trying to urge the sides to reach a ceasefire and implement Resolution 1701 to prevent a general escalation. He also condemned the killing of civilians on both sides (al-Akhbar, February 21, 2024).

The Lebanese government

• The members of the delegation of American of Congressmen met in Beirut with Najib Mikati, prime minister of Lebanon’s interim government, and Joseph Aoun, commander of the Lebanese Army. They discussed the situation in south Lebanon and the war in the Gaza Strip. Mikati renewed his call to “continue American support for the Lebanese army to enable it to carry out its duties” (al-Nashra, February 21, 2024).
• Members of the delegation also met with Abdullah Bou Habib, the Lebanese foreign minister, and Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament. Lisa Johnson, the American ambassador to Lebanon, also attended the meeting. A number of topics were discussed, including the situation in Lebanon and the region, given the war in the Gaza Strip and events in south Lebanon. Bou Habib said UNRWA funding was in Lebanon’s interest because it helped the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. After the meeting, he called on Israel “to give peace a chance” instead of continuing with policies that increased hatred and created conflicts (al-Nashra, February 21, 2024).
• The Lebanese mission to the UN stated that in response to Israel’s threats to implement Resolution 1701 by force in the coming weeks, they wanted to make it clear that it was Israel which violated Resolution 1701, and its violations at sea, on land and in the air had been documented in the Security Council since 2006. The mission also complained that threats from senior officials in Israel and its [alleged] “preaching of killing and destruction” continued, indicating Israel’s intentions to expand the scope of the war and its attempt to find an excuse to “initiate aggression” against Lebanon. They called on the relevant UN agencies, especially the Security Council, to obligate Israel to stop its [alleged] “attacks and violations of Lebanese sovereignty” and begin negotiations to fully commit to Resolution 1701 (al-Jadeed, February 21, 2024).
• According to reports, Amos Hochstein, the American envoy, spoke on the phone with Nabih Berri, and said Hezbollah should withdraw several kilometers from the border with Israel. Berri said in response that Hezbollah would withdraw from south Lebanon only on the condition that Israel fully implemented Resolution 1701 (Nidaa al-Watan, February 22, 2024).

The Lebanese Forces Party

• The Lebanese Forces Party, headed by Samir Geagea, which opposes Hezbollah, said in a statement that since the war against Israel, Lebanon was in the most difficult situation in its history and had no significant allies because of the “resistance,” and Hezbollah’s situation was worse now than it was after the Second Lebanon War in 2006. It also stated that Hezbollah’s real goal in the fighting was not to destroy Israel, but to fully control Lebanon (Lebanese Forces Party Facebook page, February 22, 2024).

Israel, Judea and Samaria

Terrorist attacks

• On the morning of February 22, 2024, three Palestinians arrived in two vehicles on a road near Ma’ale Adumim close to the az-Za’eem checkpoint (east of Jerusalem). The three took advantage of the morning traffic jam due to the security check, got out of their vehicle armed with M-16 rifles, a Carlo submachine gun, grenades and magazines and began shooting at civilians sitting in their cars. Civilians and policemen on duty at the scene shot and killed two terrorists. The third tried to flee but was caught by the police. During his capture, he was critically wounded. An Israeli civilian was killed and eight others were wounded, including a pregnant woman, who was critically wounded (Israel Police Force spokesman’s unit, Israeli media, February 22, 2024).
• According to Israeli media reports, the terrorists were two brothers, Mohammad Zawahreh, 26, and Kazem Zawahreh, 31, who was imprisoned in Israel for illegal presence in the country. The two were residents of the village of Beit Ta’amar (east of Bethlehem). The third was Ahmed al-Wahsh, 31, from the village of Za’tara (east of Bethlehem) (Israeli media, February 22, 2024). Following the attack, IDF forces raided their homes and detained the Zawahreh brothers’ father (QudsN X account, February 22, 2024).

     
The weapons used by the terrorists (Israel Police Force spokesman’s unit, February 22, 2024)

• Hamas praised the “heroic attack” and stressed that it was carried out in response to “the crimes of the occupation in the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria.” It also noted that the Palestinians would continue to “resist” the “occupation” until it was defeated, and that Israel’s intention to prevent Palestinians from reaching al-Aqsa Mosque during the month of Ramadan would not provide them with security. Hamas called on the Palestinian public to escalate the confrontation with Israel everywhere (Hamas Telegram channel, February 22, 2024). The PIJ praised the attack and called on the Palestinians to continue resisting the “occupation” everywhere (PIJ Telegram channel, February 22, 2024).

Counterterrorism activities

• The Israeli security forces continued their counterterrorism activities in Judea and Samaria, detaining 17 wanted Palestinians. Since the beginning of the war, about 3,200 wanted Palestinians have been detained, including more than 1,350 Hamas operatives (IDF spokesperson’s X account, February 22, 2024).
• On the night of February 21, 2024, Israeli forces operated in Ramallah and Qalandia (north of Jerusalem), seizing funds intended to finance terrorist activity. In Beit Rima (northwest of Ramallah), they detained six wanted Palestinians. In the Balata refugee camp in Nablus, they destroyed IEDs located by the side of the road (IDF spokesperson’s X account, February 22, 2024).

Death of Palestinian prisoner

• The Israel Prison Service reported that Khaled Jamal al-Shawish, a 53-year-old security prisoner who was serving ten life sentences in Nafha Prison, died after being evacuated to a hospital. The Israel Prison Service said the circumstances of his death were being investigated (Ynet, February 21, 2024). Khaled Jamal al-Shawish, who headed Fatah-Tanzim in Ramallah, was detained on May 28, 2007, after having been wanted for several years for his involvement in terrorist attacks in which eight Israeli civilians were killed, and later, after he was wounded, he was mainly engaged in directing terrorist attacks and involved in dispatching suicide bombers (2002).^[2]
• The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades issued a mourning notice for the prisoner, commander Khaled Jamal al-Shawish, one of the commanders of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in the city of Tubas, who was sentenced to 11 life sentences and died as a result of “deliberate medical negligence” in Israeli jails (al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades Telegram channel, elaqsa_1965, February 15, 2024). Fatah’s media information and cultural commission also issued a mourning notice. It stated that al-Shawish had joined the ranks of Fatah in his youth and was detained for his activities against Israel. After the establishment of the PA, he joined Force 17 but that did not prevent him from fulfilling his national role in “resisting” Israel during the Western Wall Tunnel events, and then during the second intifada, until his arrest in 2007. The announcement also noted that his death had proved beyond any doubt that the Israel Prison Service followed a policy of “medical assassination” (Fatah’s media information and cultural commission Facebook page, February 21, 2024).
• Zaher Jabarin, a member of Hamas’ political bureau in charge of the prisoners’ portfolio, issued a mourning notice blaming Israel for his death, stressing that only the “resistance” could force Israel to release the prisoners as soon as possible. He called on the Palestinians and the families of prisoners in prisons to rise up in Judea, Samaria and Israeli territory and confront IDF soldiers and settlers (Palinfo, February 21, 2024).

     
Khaled al-Shawish (Right: Fatah operative Munir al-Jaghoub’s X account, February 21, 2020; left: Quds Press, February 21, 2024)

rosecution for incitement

• Israel’s State Prosecutor’s Office informed the court that Sheikh ‘Akrameh Sabri, chairman of the Supreme Islamic Committee in Jerusalem and former Mufti of “Palestine,” would be tried on two counts of incitement to terrorism. The statement was issued in response to a petition by the Lavi organization, which filed a petition in September 2023 against the attorney general, the ministry of justice and the Israel Police for a conditional order for his prosecution (Channel 7 website, February 21, 2024).
• Sabri said in an interview that the intention to prosecute him was an attempt to silence him before the month of Ramadan. He linked the “incitement” against him to the Israeli government’s decision to restrict the entry of worshippers to al-Aqsa Mosque. He claimed the accusations against him were not new, were backed by extreme right-wing elements, and unfortunately, the police had yielded to their demand to prosecute him. Sabri added that the defense team representing him was examining the new charges and intended to respond to them, and the Palestinian council of Muslim endowments [waqf] would convene soon to discuss the issue and the council’s preparations for the month of Ramadan (al-Araby al-Jadeed, February 21, 2024).
• The PIJ issued a condemnation claiming it was new “proof” of the existence of an Israeli plot against al-Aqsa Mosque through harming one of Jerusalem’s most prominent figures. The statement called on the Palestinians to confront the “Zionist-Nazi” measures and prepare to defend al-Aqsa Mosque (PIJ Telegram channel, February 21, 2024).

Palestinian Authority (PA)

• PA Prime Minister Muhammad Shtayyeh held a meeting in his office to coordinate with Tor Wennesland, the UN envoy to the Middle East, Alexandre Stutzmann, the EU representative to the PA, and other international figures. He called on them to formulate a plan of economic reconstruction and recovery for the moment the war ended, similar to the Marshall Plan for Europe after World War II. He added that the United States vetoed Security Council resolutions requiring Israel to stop its attacks and stressed that the efforts of all international partners had to be combined to raise funds and implement the process of reconstructing the Gaza Strip (Wafa, February 21, 2024).

Iran

• Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei told a conference in Tehran that the issue of the Gaza Strip was the main issue of the Islamic world today. He criticized the leaders of Muslim countries for not acting in accordance with Islamic principles regarding the Gaza Strip and not announcing the severing of their ties with Israel. He added that the Muslim world would witness the elimination of the “cancerous Zionist tumor” (Fars, February 22, 2024).
• Hossein-Amir Abdollahian, Iranian foreign minister, condemned the American decision to veto the proposal for an immediate ceasefire in the Gaza Strip in the UN Security Council. He noted that the repeated veto by the United States on the draft resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire in the Gaza Strip should be called “the diplomatic disaster of the century” and clearly indicated American responsibility for the continuation of the “genocide in Gaza and war crimes in the West Bank” (Iranian foreign minister’s X account, February 21, 2024)
• Kamal Kharrazi, chairman of Iran’s Strategic Council for Foreign Relations, met in Tehran with Osama Hamdan, a member of Hamas’ political bureau, and Ali Abu Shahin, a member of the PIJ’s political bureau, to discuss developments in the Gaza Strip. Kharrazi said Iran’s strategy was to support members of the “resistance axis”^[3] and help them obtain the necessary capabilities to defend their rights, but independent of the Islamic Republic. That was, according to him, to preserve the independence of the “resistance forces” in their political and military decisions (ISNA, February 21, 2024)

Pro-Iranian militias

Yemen

• The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) reported that on February 21, 2024, between 12 and 6:45 p.m. (San’aa time), their forces carried out four strikes against seven Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles and an anti-ship ballistic missile launcher. The forces also intercepted UAVs originating in Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen (CENTCOM X account, February 22, 2024).
• The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) said that on February 22, 2024, at around 7:20 a.m. San’aa time, it received a report of an incident that occurred about 70 miles south of Aden. It was later reported that two missiles were
• fired at a vessel and that it was hit, resulting in a fire on board. It was also reported that the coalition forces were responding to the incident (UKMTO X account, February 22, 2024). The British naval security firm Ambrey reported that the damaged vessel had been a British-owned cargo ship flying the Palau flag (Reuters, February 22, 2024).
• Matthew Miller, spokesman for the American State Department, said the United States and its partners would continue to take appropriate action to protect freedom of navigation and shipping in the Red Sea from Houthi attacks. He noted that the United States condemned the indiscriminate attacks on civilian cargo ships and that the Houthis were behaving like a terrorist organization (American Department of State website, February 22, 2024).

The International Arena

G20^[4] summit in Brazil

• The annual G20 summit meeting was held in Brazil. Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan said the G20 countries had the responsibility to take decisive action to end the “disaster in the Gaza Strip.” He stressed the importance of “condemning the [alleged] atrocities committed in the Gaza Strip” and urged the participating countries to exert pressure to take significant actions to end the war and support the two-state solution (Saudi Arabia News Agency, February 22, 2024).
• On the sidelines of the summit, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry met with Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan to discuss developments in the war in the Gaza Strip and the growing tension in the region due to the situation in the Gaza Strip, including threats to the security of navigation in the Red Sea. The ministers stressed that contacts with the various parties were continuing to support efforts to bring calm and prevent the expansion of the conflict in the region. Shoukry also met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Among other things, they dealt with the Palestinian issue, the fighting in the Gaza Strip, and events in Yemen (Egyptian foreign ministry spokesman’s Facebook page, February 22, 2024). Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan also met with Shoukry and discussed efforts to bring humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip and prevent the war from spreading (Anadolu News, February 21, 2024).

UNRWA

• The Wall Street Journal reported that a new American intelligence assessment found that some UNRWA employees in Gaza had likely participated in the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack. However, the United States could not verify Israel’s accusations that a large number of UNRWA employees had ties to organizations in Gaza. It was also noted that the new intelligence assessment did not dispute Israel’s accusations of ties between some UNRWA employees and the organizations, but it did provide a relatively milder assessment of Israel’s claims and public statements by American and Israeli officials (The Wall Street Journal, February 21, 2024).

International Court of Justice

• The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague continued deliberations on the “legitimacy of the Israeli occupation.” The Russian representative noted that the two-state solution was the best way to stop the Israeli attacks. He added that the court had to create conditions for new negotiations and emphasize that Israel and the Palestinians had to be committed to it. He also noted that the Security Council had already determined that the settlements violated international law and were an obstacle to lasting peace (al-Jazeera, February 21, 2024).
• The United States representative noted that it was impossible to order an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories without taking into account Israel’s security needs, nor could the ICJ conclude that Israel was obligated to withdraw from the occupied territories under international law in the immediate future (Reuters, February 21, 2024).
• Egypt’s representative to the ICJ said that Israel should refrain from expanding its activities, noting that Israel had a clear intention to isolate the Palestinians. She said there was evidence confirming that Israel had caused demographic changes in the Palestinian territories. She also noted that “Israeli aggression against the Gaza Strip is a brutal war.” She said Egypt had submitted a request to recognize the Palestinians’ right to self-determination and to put an end to Israeli military operations in the Palestinian territories (al-Qahera Telegram channel, February 21, 2024).

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications. ↑
^[2] For further information, see the ITIC's Information Bulletin from June 3, 2007, "Fatah-Tanzim and Hamas operatives detained in counterterrorist activity in Ramallah and Hebron" ↑
^[3] Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist organizations and the Houthis in Yemen. ↑
^[4] A forum comprised of finance ministers and central bank governors of 20 economies, 19 of the world's largest economies and the European Union. The forum works to cooperate and advise on issues related to the international financial system. ↑

Related Articles