Operation Guardian of the Walls as a watershed moment in Hamas’ strategy for the “destruction of Israel,” as reflected in documents found by the IDF in the Gaza Strip

Dr. Uri Rosset

Overview^[1]

• Israel considered Operation Guardian of the Walls (May 2021) a major success which severely damaged Hamas and strengthened Israeli deterrence. Statements by senior Israeli officials, including the prime minister, the defense minister and senior IDF officers, emphasized the blow to Hamas’ military capabilities, primarily the tunnel system (the so-called “tunnel system”) and claimed Hamas was unlikely to act against Israel for years.
• Hamas, however, held an opposing view and considered the operation, which it referred to as Operation Sword of Jerusalem, a significant achievement for the movement and a defeat for Israel. That was reflected in public statements by Hamas leaders in the days following the ceasefire, in which they declared a strategic victory and downplayed the extent of damage to their military capabilities. Leaders of the “resistance axis”^[2] also praised Hamas and its military wing.
• The sense of achievement also appeared in captured Hamas documents found during the Gaza Strip War. They included transcripts of conversations and written correspondence between Hamas leaders and senior figures in Iran and Hezbollah, featuring phrases such as “mythical power” and “heavenly victory,” and denials of Israeli claims about significant damage to the tunnel network.
• Hamas’ perception of success in the operation bolstered the confidence of Yahya al-Sinwar, head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, who moved forward with military plans to implement the vision of “destroying Israel,” in coordination with other members of the “resistance axis,” even if Iran and Hezbollah were not actively involved.
• According to the documents the IDF took from the Gaza Strip, Hamas also discussed the idea of negotiating a long-term hudna (truce), under the assumption that it would lead to Israel’s international isolation or to a civil war which would cause the country’s collapse.
• The documents reinforce the assessment, also evident from public statements, that Hamas regarded Operation Guardian of the Walls as a watershed moment in its future strategic plan for the conflict with Israel. Despite the proposal to promote a political move toward a temporary cessation of hostilities, the Hamas leadership under al-Sinwar focused on practical preparations for a major military operation, culminating in the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre, a step in realizing the movement’s long-term vision of “destroying Israel.”

Operation Guardian of the Walls in Israeli Perspective

• The IDF launched Operation Guardian of the Walls against Hamas in the Gaza Strip on May 10, 2021, after the organization’s military wing fired rockets at Jerusalem during Jerusalem Day celebrations, in response to what it described as “crimes and aggression of the enemy in occupied Jerusalem” and “harassment of the residents of Sheikh Jarrah and al-Aqsa Mosque.” The operation lasted 11 days, during which over 4,360 rockets were fired into Israeli territory, including at the Greater Tel Aviv area. The IDF attacked over 1,500 Hamas and other terrorist organization targets, and reported the destruction of more than 100 kilometers of Hamas’ underground tunnel system; the elimination of mortgage than 200 terrorist operatives, including five senior commanders from Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ); the targeting of about 230 rocket launch capabilities; and the destruction of workshops and weapons development centers.^[3]
• Israel’s political and defense leadership presented the operation as a major success which dealt a significant blow to Hamas’s military capabilities, especially its tunnel and rocket capabilities. Until the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre, the prevailing perception in Israel was that the operation had effectively deterred Hamas from acting against Israel for an extended period:
  • At a press conference marking the beginning of the ceasefire on May 21, 2021, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Hamas had received “blows it had never dreamed of.” He noted that a significant portion of the tunnel system had been destroyed, and added that “the equation has changed,” asserting that Israel would respond forcefully to any attack on its communities. Defense Minister Benny Gantz stated, “We achieved all the operational goals we set. Hamas paid a heavy price. We set its capabilities back years. We struck many of its operational capabilities. Hamas was surprised, and they regret, deeply regret, what they chose to do.” IDF Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi called the damage to Hamas and PIJ “severe” (N12, May 21, 2021).
  • In June 2021 Maj. Gen. Aharon Haliva, head of the IDF Operations Directorate during the operation and later appointed chief of Military Intelligence, said that in his assessment the operation could result in five years of calm in the conflict with Hamas (Yedioth Ahronoth, June 25, 2021). He reiterated his opinion in September 2022, saying, “In Gaza, alongside Hamas’ use of force, we’re seeing that economic stabilization processes and the entry [into Israel of Gazan workers] offer potential for long-term quiet” (Ynet, September 14, 2022).
  • Tamir Hayman, head of Military Intelligence during the operation, said it had significantly damaged Hamas’ military buildup, especially its underground capabilities. He said, “Guardian of the Walls created a loss-balance for Hamas that somewhat cooled its enthusiasm to start another campaign against Israel. It won’t last forever, obviously, but it buys us more time” (Israel Hayom, May 26, 2022).
  • Capt. A., head of the targets section in the Palestinian Arena of Military Intelligence’s Research Division, said, “The blow to Hamas’ military buildup was exceptional. We’re coming out of the campaign with a weakened, damaged Hamas, one that will take years to rebuild its rocket arrays” (Kan 11, June 27, 2021).
  • A year after the operation, Brig. Gen. Amit Saar, head of the Military Intelligence Research Division, called the attack on the tunnel system a “significant achievement.” He said, “The main thing we took from Hamas was the understanding that they could function in that dimension however they wished. Hamas thought they had cracked something big, they believed they had found an answer to our air, intelligence and maneuvering superiority. They invested everything in it, and the IDF destroyed it in Guardian of the Walls. Does that mean there won’t be tunnels in Gaza? There will be tunnels. They have no choice, they have no air force, no navy, they can’t face us. But the tunnels are a different matter now. Now they know they can die in them, now they know they can’t move everything underground. Now they realize we have a huge advantage, and they need another systemic idea” (Walla, May 7, 2022).
  • Following an Israeli TV investigative report which revealed failures in the attack on the tunnel system, the IDF spokesperson stated that Operation Guardian of the Walls had achieved its defined goals and created significant deterrence against Hamas. He added: “As a result of the intensity and precision of the strikes, Hamas understood the IDF’s lethal capability to attack underground” (N12, April 12, 2022).
  • After Operation Shield and Arrow against the PIJ in May 2023, Prime Minister Netanyahu said that Operation Guardian of the Walls had created a major change in the balance if deterrence with Hamas, as the organization had not fired rockets at Israel for two years. He said the operation “delivered the harshest blow in Hamas’ history, destroying its air, naval and underground capabilities, which dramatically changed the equation” (Benjamin Netanyahu’s X account, May 15, 2023).
  • In a June 2023 Knesset speech, Netanyahu claimed that Operation Guardian of the Walls had set Hamas back by a decade: “We destroyed their branches; they were left with unreliable weapons, and we dealt with that as well. As a result, it’s been two and a half years, and the number of rockets Hamas fired from Gaza stands at zero! I’m not tempting fate, but it stands at zero because our power changed the equation, and we must commend all security forces for that” (Maariv, June 26, 2023).

Operation Guardian of the Walls in Hamas and Resistance Axis Perspective

• While senior Israeli government and military officials boasted about the results of the operation, the perspective of Hamas and its allies in the “resistance axis” was completely different. In their view, the Battle of the Sword of Jerusalem (as Hamas referred to Operation Guardian of the Walls) did not end in defeat but rather in a major achievement that highlighted both Hamas’s resilience and Israel’s weakness:
  • Yahya al-Sinwar, at the time head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip,^[4] said in his first speech after the ceasefire that although Israel claimed to have destroyed 100 kilometers of tunnels, Hamas had more than 500 kilometers. He added, “What happened was merely a maneuver of what will happen if Israel tries to play with fire at al-Aqsa again” (Al Jazeera, May 26, 2021).
  • Isma’il Haniyeh,^[5] at the time head of Hamas’ political bureau, called that the “resistance’s” victory “strategic” because the days after the battle were entirely different from those before. According to him, the battle opened new doors for the “resistance” and had paved the way for more victories and achievements (Hamas website, May 26, 2021). He also claimed that the Israeli strikes in Gaza were “minor” and that the “city of jihad,” the name he gave the underground tunnel system, remained intact, asserting they had thwarted Israel’s plan to damage the “resistance’s” capabilities (Al Jazeera, May 26, 2021).
  • In May 2021, immediately after the end of Operation Guardian of the Walls, Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah^[6] gave a speech marking the anniversary of Israel’s withdrawal from south Lebanon, in which he declared that a new equation had been established: any attack on al-Aqsa Mosque or other Islamic holy site would no longer be contained in Gaza but would lead to a “regional war for Jerusalem.” He added that such a war would pose a danger to the “entity [Israel],” which in his opinion would lead to “its disappearance” (al-Manar, May 25, 2021).
  • After the operation, Iran’s leader Ali Khamenei issued a message of support to the Palestinians, congratulating them on their victory over “the Zionist regime,” which had been forced to admit its defeat [sic]. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani declared that the Palestinian people had achieved a great victory over “the occupying Zionist entity” and that Palestinians everywhere had united during the confrontation (Fars, May 21, 2021).
• Hamas and its allies’ sense of victory was also reflected in documents seized by the IDF during the Gaza Strip War. The documents included communications between senior Hamas figures who exchanged mutual praise over the results of the battle and referenced the satisfaction expressed by Iran and Hezbollah. In a letter sent by Haniyeh to al-Sinwar on May 23, 2021, two days after the end of the campaign, he stated that the battle had ended in a “clear resolution” and described it as a “divine and glorious victory.”

We congratulate you, our brothers, our people, and our nation on the great salvation and the victory that Allah has granted us. The banner of our movement, our al-Qassam, was raised across the world, and millions cheered and called out the name of the dear resistance chief of staff, the jihad fighter commander Abu Khaled [Mohammad Deif], who achieved a divine and glorious victory in the hearts of the believers and the devoted.

• In his reply letter, al-Sinwar wrote that the “legendary force” shattered the Israeli image.

Praise be to Allah, who honored us and granted us victory, supported us with his armies, defeated our enemy, broke its strength, lowered its flag, humiliated its leadership, and with Allah’s help we are close to the destruction of its state.

Exalted be Allah, who exposed the disgraceful truth of this entity and its supporters, the boastful, arrogant and conceited entity, through the legendary power that shattered its image in the course of this blessed confrontation.

Today it has become clear to everyone that there is a predatory, lethal tiger named Hamas and the al-Qassam Brigades, and that if it becomes angry and decides to kill it has the courage to make that decision, is ready to go further than people imagine and is willing to make sacrifices.

• In a letter sent by Haniyeh to Hamas’ military leadership, he described his meetings in Lebanon with Qods Force commander Esmail Qaani, Saeed Izadi (Haj Ramadan),^[11] head of the Palestine department in the Qods Force, and with Nasrallah, and said that they were “excited by the victory.”

The performance of the [Izz al-Din] al-Qassam Brigades during the campaign left a profound and deep impression on them, and they are excited about the victory, the military leadership and the coordination between the field and the political leadership. They stated that the campaign and its outcomes had a strategic dimension which opened the door wide for a great victory and creating a multi-front operational concept in the future to resolve the confrontation with the enemy, with the help of Allah may he be exalted.

• Israeli statements about significant damage to the underground tunnel system were dismissed by senior Hamas officials. In a meeting held in Lebanon by members of the Hamas leadership and senior officials from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, one senior Hamas figure stated that despite the Israeli strikes, Hamas’ capabilities remained in good condition and that the damage could be repaired within a short period of time. According to him, the underground tunnel system was not damaged at all, and only the offensive tunnel network was lightly damaged and would soon be repaired. He added that Hamas’s command, control, and communications capabilities were maintained throughout the entire conflict.

Despite all the bombings, the capabilities of the resistance are in good condition, and the damage caused can be repaired within a very short period of time with Allah’s help.

What the occupation calls Hamas’s “metro” was not damaged.

The offensive tunnel network was only slightly damaged and will be restored quickly.

The occupation failed to strike a true nerve and did not achieve a victory image.

Command and communication capabilities remained intact the entire time.

Political and Economic Leverage of the Achievements of the Operations

• In Hamas’ view, the achievements of the Sword of Jerusalem campaign elevated the movement’s status on the international stage and opened new opportunities in the political arena. In a letter sent by al-Sinwar to Haniyeh on June 20, 2021, he noted that Hamas had become internationally recognized as the most important player in the arena, and that even the Americans understood that Hamas could not be bypassed when it came to regional issues.

The political track:

It is now clear to everyone, especially to important and influential international actors, that Hamas is the most important player in the arena, especially since we have become, justifiably, those who make the decisions on war and peace… Everyone has also come to realize that the [Palestinian] Authority is unreliable, failing and corrupt. You may have already noticed this during your meetings with presidents, kings, emirs and ministers around the world. It is evident that the Americans have already internalized it as they have begun saying that Hamas cannot be bypassed.

• According to al-Sinwar, an international opportunity had emerged to advance a political initiative aimed at achieving a long term truce (tahadiya). He explained that the objective was to reach an agreement on a long hudna of five, seven or at most ten years. In return, Israel would be required to withdraw from Judea and Samaria and from east Jerusalem, dismantle the settlements, release Palestinian prisoners and lift the blockade on the Gaza Strip. He claimed that the “victory” made internal Palestinian reconciliation possible, on the condition that the Palestinian Authority showed it was sincerely willing with the Authority taking the lead on the political track, while Hamas would form an indirect part of the solution. Additionally, al-Sinwar said that although Egypt played an important role because of its geographic proximity, greater investment should now be made to involve Qatar, since “the Qataris are more loyal to us, dedicated, affectionate and give generously.”

Likewise, there is no doubt that global public opinion and the positions of world leaders and countries are ready for a political initiative aimed at achieving a solution, and I believe that if the Palestinian house is organized, it is possible that we will be part of this solution, not directly and without any commitment on our part to recognition or to any condition set by the Quartet or any other commitment. We agree to a truce of many years in exchange for the occupation’s withdrawal from the West Bank and east Jerusalem, the dismantling of the settlements, the release of the prisoners and the lifting of the blockade on Gaza. That is a very strong card that Qatari diplomacy can maneuver with and use powerfully as part of a series of contacts with the American administration, European countries, Russia, China and others.

• Although in al-Sinwar’s view, a long-term hudna would be acceptable to most countries in the world, he was of the opinion that Israel would never agree to it, and that would lead to its isolation in the international arena and solidify the strategic shift against it that began with the Sword of Jerusalem campaign. On the other hand, he opined if the “occupation” decided to move toward negotiations, it would lead to internal disintegration and even civil war.

This move, which would be difficult but generally acceptable to most countries in the world, is unlikely to be accepted by the occupation, especially by its current government, which includes far-right elements which would never agree to such a plan. If we cause them to reject it, it will put them in opposition to global public opinion, deepen their isolation and sever ties. Thus, it is possible to build on the strategic shift that has occurred in global public opinion, particularly in the American and European arenas, whose early signs began to appear during the Sword of Jerusalem campaign. Even if the occupation decides to go in this direction and cooperate with the outlook, its internal situation will tear it apart from within and lead to internal strife, conflict, civil war, and complete political collapse, as has already been signaled by the enemy’s political map.

• In addition to the possibility of advancing political initiatives, Hamas identified an opportunity to leverage the “success” of the campaign against Israel to secure financial aid. Al-Sinwar informed Haniyeh that he, Muhammad Deif, and his deputy Marwan Issa decided to take advantage of Iran’s immense surprise at the military wing’s performance to request a monthly allocation of $20 million, a sum total of $500 million, from Qods Force commander Esmail Qaani.

As you know, the Iranians were stunned by the performance of al-Qassam in this campaign, which they expressed in a letter they sent to you and to us in Gaza. We thought of sending letters in our names, Abu Khaled [Muhammad Deif], Abu al-Baraa [Marwan Issa], and Abu Ibrahim [Yahya al-Sinwar]. We prepared a letter for the Leader of Iran, Qaani and Haj Ramadan [Saeed Izadi], in which we requested to receive an amount of $20 million per month for two years.

• However, al-Sinwar noted that only about 20% of the $75 million promised to Hamas for reconstruction and renovation efforts had actually been received, and he warned that this could damage the “image of victory.” He also emphasized that only half of the total sum was intended for supporting the residents and reconstruction, while the other half was to go directly to the military wing.

The amount allocated to Gaza (75) for reconstruction and rehabilitation:

Only 17 has arrived from the total amount. A sum was received for the brothers from the prisoners’ portfolio, and a sum also reached the ministry of finance in Gaza. It appears that the amount which arrived for the prisoners and the ministry of finance came from the same account. According to what we understood, brother Abu ‘Ikrama says he transferred everything he had, and we agreed with the brothers that half of the 75 is for al-Qassam and the other half is for assisting the people and repairing lightly damaged homes, as well as for the renovation and reconstruction of our buildings and offices or for rebuilding what was destroyed.

Military Leverage from the Achievements of the Operation

• Immediately after Operation Guardian of the Walls, Hamas began to think that the goal of destroying the State of Israel would be a realistic objective if a decisive military campaign were launched from multiple fronts simultaneously. Correspondence between senior Hamas figures reveals that just weeks after the end of the campaign, Hamas had already defined the goal as achieving “the great victory and removal of the cancer” and “eliminating the entity and erasing it from our land and our holy places.”^[20]
• According to a document labeled “Personal and Very Secret” from the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, which appears to have been written after Operation Guardian of the Walls and sent to various members of the military wing’s general council, coordination should be strengthened with “friendly” parties interested in the “destruction of the entity.” In Hamas assessment, the “enemy” would not be able to withstand multiple fronts and its reliance on the air force at the expense of other units would lead to the collapse of its forces and its home front. It was further stated that Hamas and its allies had to formulate joint military plans and define the “zero hour” for a coordinated military confrontation against the “Zionist enemy” with the aim of destroying it.

The Sword of Jerusalem campaign constituted a turning point in the conflict between us and the thieving Jews, as this campaign marked a stage of striking the faces of the sons of Zion and their humiliation at the hands of the holy fighters, so that we can move on to the next phase, eliminating their entity and removing its existence. That requires capitalizing on the achievements and gains made during the Sword of Jerusalem campaign and coordinating efforts with friendly parties whose appetite and desire for the destruction of the entity have grown, in order to take practical steps that will accelerate its disappearance and make it possible to manage the battle of liberation [sic] and jointly coordinate the leadership of the liberation legions from the surrounding countries.

• The plan began moving to practical stages as early as July 2021, when Haniyeh informed Hamas’ military leadership about his meetings in Lebanon with senior officials of the Revolutionary Guards and with Nasrallah, during which the parties discussed the idea of establishing a defense alliance among the various “resistance” fronts with the goal of presenting a united front against Israel. According to Haniyeh, Nasrallah informed him that the militias in Yemen (the Houthis) and in Iraq stood alongside Hezbollah with thousands of fighters in Syria and were prepared to enter any future regional war.

In our discussions, we addressed strategic and future channels, including what was outlined in the letter regarding the establishment of a defense coalition among the resistance fronts. We presented the matter to Hassan Nasrallah based on what we had formulated during our previous visit and noted that the Yemenis and Iraqis were standing alongside Hezbollah with thousands of fighters in Syria who are ready to participate in any future regional war.

This requires the concerned brothers, both on our side and theirs, to define the concept, the rules of engagement, the roles, the levels and the political decision. Two principles are involved:

First: adopting the strategic direction at the leadership and political levels.

Second: the nature and level of participation will be determined for each front at the appropriate time and in accordance with what has been agreed upon in the event of a request from the active front.

• As part of the preparations, al-Sinwar proposed establishing an army in Lebanon of thousands of Hamas fighters to be trained and armed by Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards to take part in the “upcoming war of liberation.”

2. The role of Lebanon in the resistance and in the project of liberation and return, followed by a discussion on the establishment of a Qassam army in Lebanon, its training and armament in coordination with the Party [Hezbollah] and the Revolutionary Guards, so that it will be ready to participate in the upcoming liberation battle, Allah willing. We can then expand the discussion on the plans to absorb our people in Lebanon into Hamas and Palestinian youth into al-Qassam, and to block the path of Fatah and the [Palestinian] Authority, so that they fulfill their important and strategic role in the national project and in the process of liberation and return.

• About a year later, in a letter sent by al-Sinwar to Haniyeh on June 19, 2022, he presented three scenarios for “uniting the fronts” within the framework of a multi-front confrontation that would lead to the destruction of Israel:^[24]
  • The first scenario (the grand strategic campaign) included all components of the “resistance axis,” excluding Iran, launching an attack on Israel with the aim of “bringing down the occupation state and ending it, as well as ending the tragic regional situation.” Al-Sinwar also noted, “Such a campaign would change the face of the region, the world order, and the political reality entirely, and alongside that would realize the great Islamic revolution.”
  • In the second scenario (the intermediate campaign), Hamas would play the central role in the confrontation against Israel, while Hezbollah would participate partially, and forces from other fronts Judea and Samaria and inside Israel, would also participate. According to al-Sinwar, that would cause significant damage to Israel, many of its citizens would want to emigrate, and Judea and Samaria would be liberated along with the release of prisoners. He added that it would also lay the foundation for Israel’s ultimate future elimination.
  • In the third scenario, Hezbollah would not be a direct partner, at least not in the initial stage. The main burden would fall on Hamas, which would be joined by forces from the “resistance axis” and fedayeen from Jordan and Syria. According to the document, that is the minimum scenario Hamas would find acceptable, and al-Sinwar stated that it would not require approval from Iran’s leader, but only from Nasrallah and Hezbollah.
• Although he proposed the far-reaching first scenario, al-Sinwar appeared aware that its chances of being realized were slim. In a letter to Haniyeh dated June 7, 2022, about two weeks before sending the document outlining the three scenarios, al-Sinwar wrote that Iran and Hezbollah were proceeding with great caution. Despite losing senior figures such as Qassem Soleimani^[25] and Imad Mughniyeh,^[26] they did not “break the rules or show their hand in the struggle with the occupation.” He added that Iran and Hezbollah’s considerations differed from those of Hamas and were primarily aimed at “creating a shield for Iran and its nuclear program.” Thus it can be understood that al-Sinwar chose the scenario of Hamas independently launching a campaign to destroy Israel, concluding that such a move was possible and worthwhile, based on growing faith and confidence in the movement’s power since Operation Guardian of the Walls.

Second: I believe, and the conversation confirms it, that the group will not easily agree to such a move. Both Hezbollah and Iran have lost very senior figures such as Soleimani, Fakhrizadeh, Mughniyeh and others who were killed recently, in addition to the hundreds of attacks they have “absorbed” in Syria, and they have continued to maintain a measured and calm approach without breaking the rules in their confrontation with the occupation. This was evident in the brothers’ meeting with Nasrallah and with Haj Ramadan [Saeed Izadi], and it is the meaning behind Haj Ramadan’s involvement. Likewise, all of Nasrallah’s explanations, clarifications, and conversations attest to this. Even if we had agreed on all the details, it would still be necessary to present the matter to the “Sayyid” [Nasrallah] in order to obtain his approval, and I believe he would only give his approval in rare cases and only based on considerations that concern him and Iran. The considerations of Iran and its arms, particularly Hezbollah, are entirely different from ours, as Hezbollah’s force buildup, and Iran’s effort to build power in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, are primarily aimed at building a defensive wall for Iran and its nuclear program.

• That was further reinforced in another letter from al-Sinwar to Haniyeh in March 2023, in which he discussed how Hamas interprets its role in the eyes of the Iranians. According to al-Sinwar, Iran wanted Hamas to be part of the overall response in the event that “the Zionist enemy launches an attack on Iran.” However, he added that “our considerations, which at any given moment may be entirely different from theirs, and at another moment may partially or fully overlap, remain our own.”

After witnessing our courage and strength, they are pinning their hopes on one of two outcomes, either that we will crush the occupation, destroy its ability to strike them, and spare them a destructive war on their path to joining the nuclear club and becoming a power, or that we will continue to occupy and exhaust the enemy.

1. Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.

2. Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, the Palestinian organizations, the Shi'ite Houthis in Yemen and the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq.

3. For further information, see the May 2021 ITIC report, “Escalation from the Gaza Strip – Operation Guardian of the Walls – Summary.”

4. Appointed head of the Hamas political bureau in August 2024, eliminated by the IDF on October 16, 2024. ↑

5. Eliminated by Israel in a targeted attack on July 30, 2024.

6. Eliminated in an Israeli attack on September 27, 2024.

7. For the original document, click [Document 1]. The translated section is marked in red.

8. For the original document, click [Document 2]. The translated section is marked in red.

9. For the original document, click [Document 2] The translated section is marked in red.

10. For the original document, click [Document 2]. The translated section is marked in red.

11. For further information about the role of Saeed Izadi as the liaison between the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and the Palestinian terrorist organizations, especially Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, see the January 2025 ITIC report, “Activities of Saeed Izadi, Head of the Qods Forces’ “Palestine Branch,” Reflected in Captured Documents.”

12. Eliminated in an Israeli attack in March 2024.

13. For the original document, click [Document 3]. The translated section is marked in red.

14. For the original document, click [Document 4]. The translated section is marked in red.

15. For the original document, click [Document 5]. The translated section is marked in red.

16. For the original document, click [Document 2]. The translated section is marked in red.

17. For the original document, click [Document 5]. The translated section is marked in red.

18. For the original document, click [Document 5]. The translated section is marked in red.

19. For the original document, click [Document 5]. The translated section is marked in red.

20. For further information, see the ITIC report by Dr. Uri Rosset, March 2025, “Hamas' strategy to destroy Israel: from theory into practice, as seen in captured documents.”

21. For the original document, click [Document 6]. The translated section is marked in red.

22. For the original document, click [Document 3]. The translated section is marked in red.

23. For the original document, click [Document 7]. The translated section is marked in red.

24. See Footnote 20.

25. Commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps Qods Force, eliminated by the Americans in January 2020.

26. Hezbollah’s military commander, killed in explosion in February 2008.

27. For the original document, click [Document 8]. The translated section is marked in red.

28. For the original document, click [Document 9]. The translated section is marked in red.

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