News of Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (October 21 – 27, 2020)

IDF activity to locate a terrorist tunnel under the border of the southern Gaza Strip (IDF spokesman, October 20, 2020).

IDF activity to locate a terrorist tunnel under the border of the southern Gaza Strip (IDF spokesman, October 20, 2020).

IDF activity to locate a terrorist tunnel under the border of the southern Gaza Strip (IDF spokesman, October 20, 2020).

IDF activity to locate a terrorist tunnel under the border of the southern Gaza Strip (IDF spokesman, October 20, 2020).

Left, Gaza Strip; right, Israel; dotted red line, tunnel path (IDF spokesman, October 20 2020).

Left, Gaza Strip; right, Israel; dotted red line, tunnel path (IDF spokesman, October 20 2020).

Sami al-Amasi pays an official visit to the IHH offices in Gaza (Ma'an, October 26, 2020).

Sami al-Amasi pays an official visit to the IHH offices in Gaza (Ma'an, October 26, 2020).

Earthworks for the construction of fuel reservoirs on the Gaza Strip-Egypt border (Facebook page of the ministry of local government, Gaza, October 6, 2020).

Earthworks for the construction of fuel reservoirs on the Gaza Strip-Egypt border (Facebook page of the ministry of local government, Gaza, October 6, 2020).

Earthworks for the construction of fuel reservoirs on the Gaza Strip-Egypt border (Facebook page of the ministry of local government, Gaza, October 6, 2020).

Earthworks for the construction of fuel reservoirs on the Gaza Strip-Egypt border (Facebook page of the ministry of local government, Gaza, October 6, 2020).

Samah al-Saraj (Abu Fakri), member of Hamas' political bureau, at political policy meetings in Gaza (Right: Dunia al-Watan, December 10, 2015. Left: Amad, December 5, 2019).

Samah al-Saraj (Abu Fakri), member of Hamas' political bureau, at political policy meetings in Gaza (Right: Dunia al-Watan, December 10, 2015. Left: Amad, December 5, 2019).

Samah al-Saraj (Abu Fakri), member of Hamas' political bureau, at political policy meetings in Gaza (Right: Dunia al-Watan, December 10, 2015. Left: Amad, December 5, 2019).
al-Saraj during a visit of students from the business administration faculty at Palestine University to the Paltel offices (Palestine University website, December 20, 2017).

al-Saraj during a visit of students from the business administration faculty at Palestine University to the Paltel offices (Palestine University website, December 20, 2017).

al-Saraj (second from left) at a visit of a Paltel delegation to the Kamal Adwan Medical Center in the central Gaza Strip (palwat.com, October 22, 2020).

al-Saraj (second from left) at a visit of a Paltel delegation to the Kamal Adwan Medical Center in the central Gaza Strip (palwat.com, October 22, 2020).

Muhammad Shtayyeh attends the signing of the agreement with Japan (Muhammad Shtayyeh's Facebook page, October 21, 2020).

Muhammad Shtayyeh attends the signing of the agreement with Japan (Muhammad Shtayyeh's Facebook page, October 21, 2020).

  • In the Gaza Strip, the rise in Covid-19 infections continues. On October 26, 2020, number of active cases in Gaza stood at 2,179. In Judea and Samaria, the number of verified active cases remains relatively stable but high (4,363). The real number of cases seems to be far higher but goes unreported because of the small number of tests administered and the unwillingness of local residents to be tested.
  • IDF forces exposed an attack tunnel in the southern Gaza Strip, apparently constructed by Hamas, penetrating into Israeli territory but not crossing the underground barrier. It was several hundred meters long and built to a depth of tens of meters. A political commentator with ties to Hamas wrote that the exposure of thew tunnel provided them with an incentive to develop new weapons, able to circumvent the barriers constructed by Israel (in the air, at sea or by improving rocket capabilities).
  • Following the exposure of the tunnel two rockets were launched from the Gaza Strip into Israeli territory. One was intercepted by the Iron Dome aerial defense system and the other exploded in an open area. The IDF responded by attacking a number of targets, among them a Hamas site for the manufacture of weapons and underground facilities. A Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) source said that Hamas’ restraint force had detained three of its operatives for launching rockets (pictures of the rockets confiscated by the restraint force were also published). Media in the Gaza Strip claimed that two PIJ operatives had bene shot by fellow operatives for having exceeded the boundaries of the “national consensus” by launching rockets into Israel without permission.
  • In Judea and Samaria the frequent throwing of stones, rocks and Molotov cocktails continues.
  • The office of Mahmoud Abbas and senior Palestinian figures strongly condemned the normalization agreement between Israel and Sudan. The Palestinian media referred to Sudan’s joining the circle of normalization as another stab in the back of the Palestinian people and the betrayal of the Palestinian cause. However, Mahmoud Abbas did not recall the Palestinian ambassador from Sudan (unlike the ambassadors to the UAE and Bahrain).
Overview
Gaza Strip

In the Gaza Strip the number of active Covid-19 cases continues to rise. During the 24 hours between October 26 and October 27, 199 new cases were detected, bringing the number to 2,179. So far 31 Gazans have died (al-Ra’i news agency, October 27, 2020).

  • PIJ sources reported that three senior organization figures have become ill with Covid-19: Khaled al-Batash, a member of the PIJ’s political bureau; Da’ud Shehab, organization spokesman; and senior figure Muhammad al-Harazain. According to reports, their condition is good (al-Quds, October 26, 2020).
Judea and Samaria

In Judea and Samaria the number of verified Covid-19 cases remains relatively stable, but high. As of October 26, 2020, 358 new cases were detected, and the number stood at 4,363. During the past 24 hours six more Palestinians died, bringing the number of deaths in Judea and Samaria to 423. The number of active cases in east Jerusalem dropped to 298 (Facebook page of the ministry of health in Ramallah, October 26, 2020). However, the number is probably far higher because few tests are administered and local residents are unwilling to be tested.

Rocket and mortar shell fire into Israel
  • On October 22, 2020 two rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip into Israeli territory. Sirens were sounded in Ashqelon and in the communities near the border. One rocket was intercepted by the Iron Dome aerial defense system and the other exploded in an open area. No casualties or damage were reported. The rocket fire was apparently in response to the exposure of a Hamas tunnel penetrating into Israeli territory from the Khan Yunis area.
  • In response to the rocket fire IDF aircraft attacked a number of Hamas terrorist targets in the Gaza Strip, among them a site for the manufacture of weapons and underground facilities (IDF spokesman, October 23, 2020). A Hamas “security source” reported attacks on two military-wing posts and on fields near the Nuseirat refugee camp and eastern Khan Yunis, damaging property (Agence France-Presse, October 23, 2020). Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem warned that any Israeli “aggression” would be met with an unprecedented response from the “resistance” [i.e., terrorist organizations] (al-Manar, October 21, 2020). However, in reality, no response was forthcoming from Hamas.
Monthly Distribution of Rocket and Mortar Shell Fire

Monthly Distribution of Rocket and Mortar Shell Fire

Annual Distribution of Rocket Hits

Annual Distribution of Rocket Hits

Preventing rocket fire
  • A PIJ source reported that an internal Hamas security force (the restraint force) had detained three PIJ military wing operatives in the northern Gaza Strip for having fired rockets into Israeli territory. The Hamas ministry of the interior did not issue a response (Agence France-Presse, October 23, 2020). Social network users posted picture of rockets they claimed had been confiscated by Hamas following the detention of the PIJ operatives.
Rockets confiscated by Hamas' restraint force in the northern Gaza Strip (arrab.gaza Facebook page, October 23, 2020).   Rockets confiscated by Hamas' restraint force in the northern Gaza Strip (arrab.gaza Facebook page, October 23, 2020).
Rockets confiscated by Hamas’ restraint force in the northern Gaza Strip
(arrab.gaza Facebook page, October 23, 2020).
  • A short time later it was reported that operatives of the PIJ’s military wing had been shot by fellow operatives for having exceeded boundaries of the “national consensus.” They were accused of having fired rockets at Israel without permission on October 22, 2020. Other reports mentioned Muhammad Awni Abu Abir (from the Jabalia refugee camp) as having fired or participating in firing the rockets, and has having later been shot in the leg by one of his comrades and thrown into the entrance of the Indonesian Hospital (Abu Ahmed Nabris’ Twitter account, October 23, 2020).
Exposure of Hamas tunnel penetrating into Israeli territory
  • IDF forces exposed an attack tunnel in the Khan Yunis area. The tunnel was hundreds of meters long and built to a depth of tens of meters, extending under the border and approaching Israel’s underground barrier. The tunnel was detected by the technological system on the barrier being built along the Gaza Strip border; its construction will soon be completed. The IDF noted that the tunnel did not cross the underground barrier and was never a threat to the Israeli communities in the region (IDF spokesman, October 20, 2020).
  • The IDF spokesman said the tunnel had apparently been constructed by Hamas, was new and not an old tunnel destroyed in Operation Protective Edge that had been reconstructed. The tunnel was several hundred meters long and built at a depth of tens of meters. Internally its height was that of an average man. The walls were lined with cement and it had branches and other new features whose objective was to fool IDF soldiers (IDF spokesman, October 20, 2020).
IDF activity to locate a terrorist tunnel under the border of the southern Gaza Strip (IDF spokesman, October 20, 2020).     IDF activity to locate a terrorist tunnel under the border of the southern Gaza Strip (IDF spokesman, October 20, 2020).
IDF activity to locate a terrorist tunnel under the border of the southern Gaza Strip
(IDF spokesman, October 20, 2020).
 Left, Gaza Strip; right, Israel; dotted red line, tunnel path (IDF spokesman, October 20 2020).
Left, Gaza Strip; right, Israel; dotted red line, tunnel path
(IDF spokesman, October 20 2020).
Responses to the exposure of the tunnel
  • Senior figures in the Palestinian terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip did not relate to the exposure of the tunnel. However, a number of social network users posted comments: Muhannad Qadih from the Gaza Strip wrote that “despite the sadness involved in the exposure of the tunnel of the resistance in eastern Khan Yunis, it proves that the eyes of the jihad fighters do not rest and their hands never stop working…” (Muhannad Qadih’s Twitter account, October 20, 2020). Adhem Abu Salamia, a Hamas operative from Deir al-Balah who is studying in Turkey and who in the past appeared in the media as the spokesman for the Authority for Breaking the Siege on Gaza, tweeted a video of the underground barrier prepared by a website which monitors the Israeli media. To the video he added, “Did the fence project fall after the occupation’s announcement about the discovery of the resistance’s tunnel that crossed the border for 200 meters into occupied Palestine?!” (Twitter account of Adhem Abu Salamia, October 22, 2020).
  • Mustafa al-Sowaf, a Gazan political commentator with ties to Hamas, wrote that the “resistance” could reach the Israeli heartland (“the occupied Palestinian lands”) despite the fence. He admitted the fence could limit the digging of tunnels, but it would also serve as an incentive to develop different weapons to combat Israel, by rising to the sky or going to sea or improving the rockets (Paltoday, October 21, 2020).
Attempt to infiltrate Israeli territory
  • On October 26, 2020, IDF fighters detained an unarmed Palestinian who had crossed the security fence into Israeli territory from the northern Gaza Strip. After interrogation he was returned to Gaza (IDF spokesman, October 26, 2020).
Palestinian who threw rocks killed by IDF force
  • On October 25, 2020, Palestinians threw stones from a moving vehicle at a civilian Israeli vehicle northeast of Ramallah. An IDF force chased the stone throwers. According to the IDF forces, one of them fell and hit his head; he was later declared dead (Rescue Without Borders in Judea and Samaria, October 26, 2020).
  • The Palestinian media reported the Palestinian who died was ‘Amer Snobar, 18, from the village of Yatma, near Nablus. His death enraged the Palestinians. The PA foreign ministry called on the international community, the human rights organizations and the UN to condemn the “killing” and to appoint an international commission to investigate the event and bring the guilty to trial (Wafa, October 25, 2020).
'Amer Snobar, 18, from the village of Yatma (Palinfo, October 25, 2020).
‘Amer Snobar, 18, from the village of Yatma (Palinfo, October 25, 2020).
  • At the beginning of the weekly government meeting, PA Prime Minister Muhammad Shtayyeh condemned the death [i.e., the “killing”], calling it another Israeli “crime” that the Palestinians would bring to the attention of the International Criminal Court in the Hague (Palestinian TV, October 26, 2020).
Attempt to steal IDF soldier’s weapon
  • Two Palestinians sprayed an IDF soldier with pepper spray northwest of Taybeh[1] and tried to take his weapon. Civilians at the site helped the soldier and called the police. The two suspects, both from Taybeh, were detained and the event is under investigation (Israel Police Force spokesman’s unit, October 26, 2020).
Detentions in Nablus
  • On October 22, 2020, during detentions carried out by the Israeli security forces in the Balata refugee camp in Nablus, a number of wanted Palestinians were detained. Two were suspected of having thrown an IED at an IDF force the previous week, slightly wounding two soldiers (IDF spokesman, October 22, 2020).
House of terrorist operative sealed
  • On October 21, 2020, IDF forces sealed the room where Nazmi Abu Bakr lived in the village of Ya’bed. He was the terrorist operative who killed an IDF soldier in May 2020.[2] The room was sealed after the Israeli Supreme Court overturned the order for the razing of the entire house, converting it to an order for sealing the room he lived in (IDF spokesman, October 21, 2020).
Other events
  • In Judea and Samaria Palestinians continued throwing stones and Molotov cocktails at Israeli vehicles:[3]
    • October 26, 2020: Stones were thrown at a civilian Israeli bus north of Hebron. No casualties or damage were reported.
    • October 26, 2020: Stones were thrown at a civilian Israeli vehicle northeast of Beit El. No casualties or damage were reported.
    • October 26, 2020: Two pipe bombs were thrown at the fence of the committee of Psagot (east of Ramallah). No casualties or damage were reported.
    • October 25, 2020: Stones were thrown at a civilian Israeli vehicle east of Nablus. No casualties were reported; the be was damaged.
    • October 25, 2020: Stones were thrown at a civilian Israeli vehicle southwest of Nablus. No casualties or damage were reported.
    • October 24, 2020: Three pipe bombs were thrown at the Qalandia crossing; they did not explode. A police demolitions expert neutralized them. No casualties or damage were reported (Israel Police Force spokesman’s unit, October 24, 2020).
    • October 24, 2020: Molotov cocktails were thrown at an IDF post southwest of Hebron. No casualties were reported.
    • October 23, 2020: Stones were thrown on the road north of Modi’in Illit. No casualties or damage were reported.
    • October 23, 2020: Molotov cocktails were thrown on the road north of Hebron. No casualties or damage were reported.
    • October 22, 2020: IDF trackers located a suspicious object on a road west of Nablus, apparently a pipe bomb. The road was closed until the object could be dealt with.
    • October 22, 2020: Stones were thrown at a civilian Israeli vehicle south of Nablus. No casualties were reported. The vehicle was damaged.
    • October 22, 2020: Stones were thrown at a civilian Israeli vehicle north of Hebron. A passenger was slightly injured.
    • October 22, 2020: Three Molotov cocktails were thrown at an Israeli police post southwest of Ma’aleh Adumim. The Palestinians who threw them fled. No casualties or damage were reported.
    • October 21, 2020: Stones were thrown at a civilian Israeli vehicle north of Hebron. No casualties were reported.
    • October 21, 2020: A glass bottle was thrown from a passing car at a civilian Israeli vehicle south of Nablus. No casualties were reported. The vehicle was damaged.
Significant terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria since January 2019[4]

Significant terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria since January 2019

Shooting attack at Rosh HaAyn prevented (update)
  • After an investigation carried out by the Israeli security forces, on October 26, 2020, an indictment was handed down against Mu’ataz Musa Hussein, from Qalqilya, who planned to carry out a shooting attack at Rosh HaAyn on September 29, 2020. Following the receipt of information, the police searched Rosh HaAyn and saw a suspicious Palestinian. During his detention a loaded gun, magazines and a box of bullets were found hidden under his shirt. He confessed he had been planning a shooting attack (Israel Police Force spokesman’s unit, Judea and Samaria district, October 26, 2020).
High rate of unemployment
  • Sami al-Amasi, chairman of the professional unions in Gaza, paid an official visit to the offices of the Turkish IHH aid fund in Gaza City. He told them that the rate of unemployment in the Gaza Strip had reached 70%, claiming it was the result of the [so-called] “Israeli siege” of the Gaza Strip and the Covid-19 crisis. He estimated that about a quarter of a million people in the Gaza Strip were unemployed (Ma’an, October 26, 2020).
The Hamas administration enlarges fuel reservoirs
  • The ministry of local government in Gaza announced the beginning of another stage in the construction of the “terminal,” i.e., government fuel reservoirs located on the Egypt-Gaza border (Facebook page of the ministry of local government, Gaza, October 6, 2020). The objective is to supply Gaza’s need for diesel fuel and gasoline for 30 to 40 days in case of an emergency preventing the delivery of fuel. During the current stage of construction, which began on October 6, 2020, containers with a capacity of six million liters (about 1.58 million gallons) will be built (website of the ministry of the treasury in Gaza, October 8, 2020).
Hamas delegation to Egypt
  • Khalil al-Haya and Rawhi Mushtaha, both members of Hamas’ political bureau, left the Gaza Strip for meetings with senior officials in Egypt. While there they met with Saleh al-‘Arouri, deputy head of Hamas’ political bureau, who headed the delegation, and Izzat al-Rishq, a member of Hamas’ political bureau. “Egyptian sources” reported that during the meetings the heads of Egyptian General Intelligence would transmit information and updates from Israel to Hamas. The delegation’s arrival in Egypt was referred to as “thawing the ice” between Hamas and Egypt, after tensions caused by Hamas’ holding talks for the internal Palestinian reconciliation in Turkey (Hamas website, October 25, 2020). Egyptian sources reported that the Hamas delegation discussed the issue of the internal Palestinian reconciliation and the Egyptians demanded Turkey not be involved in issues Egypt was responsible for (al-Arabiya ‘Ajel Twitter account, October 26, 2020).
Hamas activity in Turkey
  • On October 22, 2020, The Times in Britain published an article stating that Western intelligence services had discovered “Hamas has set up a secret headquarters in Turkey for carrying out cyberwarfare and counter-intelligence operations. The headquarters in Istanbul, Turkey’s main city, were set up about two years ago and are separate from Hamas’s official offices in the city which deal mainly with co-ordination and funding, according to western intelligence sources. The unit is directed by Hamas’s military leadership in Gaza and was opened without the knowledge of the Turkish government.” Its commander is Samah al-Saraj, who lives in Gaza and reports directly to Yahya al-Sinwar, head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip. The unit’s main missions are acquiring multiple-use equipment that can create weapons, coordinate cyber activities, coordinate the activities of Hamas opponents in the Arab world and monitor and inspect the loyalty of Hamas operatives.
  •  An ITIC examination revealed that Samah al-Saraj (Abu Fakri) is a member of Hamas’ political bureau in Gaza. In the Hamas elections in February 2017, when Yahya al-Sinwar was chosen to head the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, al-Saraj was elected to a second term in the political bureau.
  • According to reports during 2015 and 2017, Samah al-Saraj served as administrative and financial director of Paltel, the Palestinian communications company in the Gaza Strip (website of the ministry of communications in Gaza, November 10, 2015; palwat.com, March 22, 2017; the website of Palestinian University, December 20, 2017).
The internal Palestinian reconciliation
  • Senior Fatah and Hamas figures are still trying to promote the internal Palestinian reconciliation, which has been plagued by difficulties and obstacles. So far no date has been set for a meeting of the organizations’ leaderships, after which Mahmoud Abbas is supposed to issue an edict for holding elections. Sources on both sides are trying to minimize the differences of opinion causing the delay: Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, at a meeting with Nikolay Mladenov, the UN envoy to the Middle East peace process, said that as far as Hamas was concerned the reconciliation was “a strategic choice” to which Hamas adhered. He said the atmosphere surrounding the reconciliation was positive and that the discussion between Hamas and Fatah was “thorough and serious,” and reflected the desires of both movements (Hamas website, October 19, 2020).
Reaction to Israel’s agreement with Sudan

On October 23, 2020, the White House issued a joint statement with Israel and Sudan, as follows: “The leaders agreed to the normalization of relations between Sudan and Israel and to end the state of belligerence between their nations. In addition, the leaders agreed to begin economic and trade relations, with an initial focus on agriculture. The leaders also agreed that delegations will meet in the coming weeks to negotiate agreements of cooperation in those areas as well as in agriculture technology, aviation, migration issues and other areas for the benefit of the two peoples” (White House website, October 23, 2020). The Palestinians were severely critical of Sudan which, they claimed, had violated inter-Arab agreements regarding the Palestinian cause. Wasel Abu Yusuf, a member of the PLO’s Executive Committee, said that by joining the circle of normalization with Israel Sudan had plunged another knife into the back of the Palestinian people and betrayed the Palestinian cause (Amad, October 23, 2020). However, Mahmoud Abbas did not recall the Palestinian ambassador to Sudan, as opposed to the recall of the ambassadors from the UAE and Bahrain.

  • The main reactions were the following:
    • Mahmoud Abbas’ office rushed to issue a condemnation. Nabil Abu Rudeineh, spokesman for Mahmoud Abbas, said the Palestinian leadership would take appropriate steps at the appropriate time. He said normalization was unacceptable not only because it contradicted the Arab peace initiative and international law, but because it sidelined the Palestinian people, and no one had the right to speak for them (Voice of Palestine, October 24, 2020).
    • Abbas Zaki, a member of Fatah’s Central Committee, said normalization between Israel and Sudan would not benefit Sudan and would serve only Israel. Usama Qawasmeh, Fatah spokesman, said the Palestinian people and leadership opposed the plot whose objective was to circumvent the Palestinian cause and the rights of the Palestinian people (Wafa, October 23, 2020)
    • Hamas called on the Sudanese people to oppose the agreement, which would harm Sudan more than benefit it (Hamas website, October 23, 2020). Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, said the agreement did not express the position of the Sudanese and its historical position on the Palestinian cause. He also praised the voices in Sudan opposing normalization (alresala.net, October 25, 2020).
    • The PIJ issued a response defining the agreement between Israel and Sudan as a threat to the identity and future of Sudan and as betrayal of the Arab nation and the principles of Arab consensus. The PIJ also said it was certain the Sudanese and their national patriotic political parties would not accept “such treachery” (Ma’an, October 23, 2020).
The Palestinian economy
  • The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics reported that during the past year losses to the Palestinian economy amounted to more than $2.5 billion, mainly because of the outbreak of Covid-19. Compared to 2019, the Industrial Production Index dropped significantly. Revenue from tourism dropped by 68% and more than one quarter of the people working in the tourism industry were unemployed. The rate of unemployment in the Gaza Strip is currently 49% (about 203,200 unemployed) and in Judea and Samaria 15% (118,200). Because of the emergency situation, 77% of family breadwinners did not work (al-Iqtisad, October 20, 2020)
  • At a meeting of the UN Security Council, Nikolay Mladenov, the UN envoy to the Middle East, said the financial aid from other countries was not a substitute for the tax revenues the Palestinians had refused for months to accept from Israel. He urged the Palestinian leadership to renew security coordination with Israel and accept the money (Wafa, October 26, 2020).
Aid from Japan for the PA
  • PA Prime Minister Muhammad Shtayyeh attended the signing of an agreement for $33 million in aid from Japan. The funds are earmarked for the construction of new schools in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, and the development of the infrastructure in the Palestinian refugee camps. The agreement was signed by the representative of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in Ramallah and Shukri Bishara, the Palestinian minister of the treasury. Muhammad Shtayyeh praised and thanked Japan for its support of the PA at this time. The Japanese ambassador to the PA said that since 1993 Japan had given the PA more than $2 billion and intended to continue its support (Muhammad Shtayyeh’s Facebook page, October 21, 2020).

Muhammad Shtayyeh attends the signing of the agreement with Japan (Muhammad Shtayyeh's Facebook page, October 21, 2020).
Muhammad Shtayyeh attends the signing of the agreement with Japan
(Muhammad Shtayyeh’s Facebook page, October 21, 2020).

Maher al-Akhras’ hunger strike (update)
  • Maher al-Akhras’ hunger strike continues being newsworthy. So far it has lasted more than 90 days and he has been hospitalized in Israel. The Israeli media reported that following an appeal he lodged against his transfer to the Israel Prison Service and against the renewal of his administrative detention, on October 22, 2020, the Israeli Supreme Court issued an interim decree preventing him from being transferred from the hospital to the Prison Service medical center. After the Supreme Court criticized the State Attorney’s Office, the Office informed the Court that as long as there was no change in his condition it did not oppose leaving him in administrative detention and he would remain in the hospital without the supervision of the Prison Service (Israeli media, October 25, 2020).
  • Maher al-Akhras was interviewed from his hospital bed by the Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese media. In an interview with al-Mayadeen he announced he would either be released or die as a martyr. He called on all the prisoners to stand with him in opposition to the “weak enemy,” and not to surrender. He also appealed to Mahmoud Abbas to stop negotiations which led to differences of opinion within the Palestinian people (al-Mayadeen, October 25, 2020). In an interview with al-Manar, he called on all Palestinians to oppose Israel (“the occupation”) in every way, by blocking roads, etc. (al-Manar, October 25, 2020)
  • Activities undertaken for Maher al-Akhras have been the following:
  • At the beginning of the weekly government meeting, PA Prime Minister Muhammad Shtayyeh demanded that international government organizations intervene immediately to save the life of the hunger-striking prisoner (Palestinian TV, October 26, 2020).
  • The PIJ’s military wing announced a general mobilization and preparations in light of what it called the deterioration of al-Akhras’ condition (Jerusalem Brigades website, October 24, 2020).
  • The PIJ’s Barak balloon-launching unit announced a mobilization of its operatives throughout the Gaza Strip and its intention to “exert popular pressure” in the wake of the deterioration of al-Akhras’ condition. It also announced that the explosions heard on the eastern side of the border fence were the result of IED balloons launched by the unit, and that the coming hours would be “hell for Israel.” On October 26, 2020, the units reported that they had launched incendiary balloons at the Israeli communities near the border in support of Maher al-Akhras and to mark the 25th anniversary of the death of Fathi Shqaqi, the PIJ’s founder (Filastin al-Yawm, October 26, 2020). The ITIC has no information about balloons identified in Israeli territory.
  • The Vadia Hadad Squads (a network of balloon-launches belonging to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – PFLP) announced they had launched incendiary balloons into the Israeli communities near the Gaza border as a sign of their support for the prisoners in Israeli jails, among them Maher al-Akhras, senior PFLP prisoners Wa’el al-Jaghoub, and especially Khalda Jarar, who has been imprisoned for more than a year (Palsawa, oct 26, yea).
Balloons launched by the Vadia Hadad Squads (Palsawa, October 26, 2020).   Operatives of the Barak Unit launch balloons at the Israeli communities near the Gaza Strip (Twitter account of journalist Hassan Aslih, October 26, 2020).
Right: Operatives of the Barak Unit launch balloons at the Israeli communities near the Gaza Strip (Twitter account of journalist Hassan Aslih, October 26, 2020). Left: Balloons launched by the Vadia Hadad Squads (Palsawa, October 26, 2020).
  • In Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip rallies and demonstrations were held in solidarity with the prisoners. At a rally held on the Gaza border balloons were launched with pictures of al-Akhras, while demonstrators chanted “Death to Israel” (al-Jazeera, October 24, 2020).

[1] A village northeast of Jerusalem.
[2] On the night of May 11, 2020, while Israeli security forces detained suspects in the village of Ya'bed (in northwestern Samaria) a large rock was thrown from the roof of the house where the forces were operating. It hit the head of an IDF soldier, critically wounding him, and causing his death the following day (IDF spokesman and the Israeli media, May 12, 2020).

[3] All information and reports are from Rescue Without Borders in Judea and Samaria unless otherwise noted.

[4] A significant attack is defined by the ITIC as involving shooting, a vehicular attack, the use of IEDs, or a combination of the above. Stones and Molotov cocktails thrown by Palestinians are not included.