Lebanese Positions on Disarming Hezbollah

Overview^[1]

• The ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon in November 2024, which ended the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah, led the Lebanese authorities to declare their willingness to impose a state monopoly on weapons throughout the country. Their commitment was reinforced by the new president, Joseph Aoun, and the new government headed by Nawaf Salam.
• The Lebanese leadership expressed a desire to conduct a dialogue with Hezbollah to ensure the organization’s disarmament in order to reduce the risk of bloodshed. The Lebanese army took control of a significant portion of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure south of the Litani River, while the United States increased its pressure on Lebanon to accelerate the dismantling Hezbollah’s military capabilities, threatening to allow Israel itself to take action against the organization.
• Hezbollah absolutely refused to give up the “resistance”^[2] against Israel, but gradually mitigated its position, claiming it was prepared to engage in dialogue with the Lebanese government to formulate a national defense strategy which would allow Hezbollah to retain its “military capabilities” alongside the country’s security forces. However, even within the Shi’ite community, voices were heard emphasizing the need to relinquish the weapons, given the blows Hezbollah had suffered during the war against Israel.
• As of now, the issue of Hezbollah’s disarmament is prominent in Lebanon’s public discourse, and for the first time since the organization’s founding more than four decades ago, there is an understanding that the matter is critical for the country’s future and its chances of recovery after the war with Israel. Although President Aoun and senior officials are currently proceeding cautiously, international pressure, especially from the United States and the Gulf States, is growing for Lebanon to complete Hezbollah’s disarmament quickly. Furthermore, conditioning the much-needed economic aid for Lebanon’s recovery on enforcing the state’s monopoly on weapons could place Lebanon’s political and military leadership on a direct collision course with Hezbollah and its supporters and increase internal security tensions.

The Government’s Commitment to Achieve a State Monopoly On Weapons

• On November 27, 2024, the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon went into effect, halting the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah which began on October 8, 2023. Under the agreement, the Lebanese government committed to implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and its predecessors^[3] to prevent the reestablishment and rearmament of armed groups in Lebanon and to supervise the sale or supply of any weapons and related materials to the country. The agreement also stated that all weapons and related materials produced inside Lebanon would be regulated and monitored by the Lebanese government.^[4]
• On January 9, 2025, Lebanese army commander General Joseph Aoun was elected president, after the position had been vacant since October 31, 2022. In his inaugural speech in the Lebanese Parliament, he said he would work to achieve a state monopoly on weapons throughout Lebanon, and would eliminate the presence of mafias and “security enclaves.” He added that the state would invest in the army so it could secure the border, stabilize the situation in south Lebanon, prevent smuggling, combat terrorism, preserve territorial unity and implement international resolutions, and uphold the ceasefire agreement and prevent Israeli attacks against Lebanon (Lebanese National News Agency, January 9, 2025).

• On February 26, 2025, the Lebanese Parliament approved the new government headed by Nawaf Salam in a vote of confidence (al-Nashra, February 26, 2025). The government’s said it would implement the president’s directives to realize a state monopoly on weapons and fully implement UN Security Council Resolution 1701. For the first time in 25 years, the “resistance clause,” based on Hezbollah’s “army–people–resistance” formula, was not included in the government’s guidelines. Instead, they said “Lebanon has the right to defend itself in accordance with the UN Charter and has the responsibility to act to safeguard its security and borders” (Lebanese government website, February 8, 2025).

Lebanese Leadership Position on Hezbollah’s Disarmament

• “Lebanese sources” reported that President Aoun, in cooperation with Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, is expected to lead a direct dialogue with Hezbollah regarding the state’s monopoly on weapons. “Sources close to Berri” said the Shi’ite parliament speaker, considered Hezbollah’s closest ally in Lebanon’s ruling elite, agreed with President Aoun that the issue of weapons north of the Litani River should be dealt with as part of dialogue and a national strategy (al-Sharq al-Awsat and al-Jadeed, April 8, 2025). “Sources” also reported that the dialogue was in its early stages and the objective was to examine Hezbollah’s willingness to reach an agreement on the issue, after which a national defense strategy would be determined (al-Nashra, April 9, 2025). Reportedly, Berri and Aoun met to discuss reordering disarmament priorities from the perspective of the “Shi’ite duo” (Hezbollah and Amal), with the current priority’s being to “force” Israel to withdraw from Lebanon and stop its attacks, after which serious discussions on disarmament could begin (al-Madan, April 9, 2025).
• A “source in the Lebanese government” said Israel’s withdrawal from south Lebanon would make it possible to resolve the issue of Hezbollah’s disarmament. The “source” stated that the top priorities today were Israel’s withdrawal from the points it still held in south Lebanon, the return of Lebanese prisoners and resolving the 13 disputed land border points. He added that if progress was made on this front, and a withdrawal and the return of “captives” were achieved, a parallel discussion with Hezbollah on disarmament would take place (al-Sharq al-Awsat April 10, 2025).
• According to a different report, “sources” said President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam meant to convey the seriousness of the state in addressing the issue of weapons. However, the “sources” added that the issue had not been seriously discussed with Hezbollah, as the organization was not prepared to hand over its weapons without guarantees protecting the country from the “Zionist project,” and Hezbollah made clear it would not yield to external pressure (al-Akhbar, April 17, 2025).

• Since taking office, Aoun and Salam, along with other senior figures in the Lebanese leadership, have advanced a position of ensuring the state monopoly on weapons in relation to all “armed groups” in Lebanon, especially Hezbollah, and not just south of the Litani River. However, regarding Hezbollah specifically, the Lebanese leadership emphasized their desire to reach agreements through dialogue and expressed hope the matter could be resolved without violence:
  • In his first press interview since taking office, President Aoun stated that he sought to establish a monopoly on weapons and limit them to the state. He added that his goal was for the state to have exclusive responsibility for border security with its own forces, without any military or security partnership. He added that decisions regarding war and peace had to lie solely with the state, and therefore only the state should possess weapons, adding that “resistance” [sic] was primarily the mission of the state (al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 28, 2025).
  • Meeting with a delegation from the American Task Force for Lebanon, Aoun stressed that reforms and disarmament were Lebanese demands just as they were demands of the international community and that he was committed to them. When asked how he planned to disarm Hezbollah, he noted the importance of dialogue, as he had presented in his inaugural speech (al-Jadeed, April 7, 2025).
  • Meeting with Lebanon’s Maronite patriarch, Bechara al-Rahi, Aoun said disputed issues should be addressed through dialogue, communication and honesty. He added that Lebanon’s national interest had to come first to preserve peace among citizens. He said the Lebanese people did not want war and that only the army should be armed. Aoun noted that the decision to restrict weapons throughout the country would be fully implemented (al-Nashra, April 20, 2025).
  • Meeting with a delegation of French senators, Aoun stated that the control of weapons would be in the hands of the Lebanese state, saying, “we cannot return to the language of war” (X account of the Lebanese presidential office, April 28, 2025). Meeting with a delegation from an American research institute, Aoun said the decision regarding the state’s monopoly on weapons was irreversible because it enjoyed broad support from the Lebanon’s people and friendly countries. He also said that transferring weapons to the state would not cause security disturbances and would be done through dialogue (al-Nashra, April 29, 2025).
  • In a press interview, Aoun said the most important thing was to seize medium and heavy weapons, but the current priority was disarmament in south Lebanon. He added that weapons in Palestinian hands also had to be dealt with, not just those held by Hezbollah (Sky News Arabia, April 30, 2025).^[5]
  • Prime Minister Salam said in his first interview after taking office that the Taif Agreement had to be implemented, according to which the state holds a monopoly on weapons. Regarding the area south of the Litani River, which is supposed to be demilitarized under the ceasefire agreement and Resolution 1701, Salam said, “in recent years we argued about the issue, and as a result paid a high price which led to significant destruction in the south” (al-Nahar YouTube channel, February 11, 2025).
  • Salam stated that the chapter on Hezbollah’s weapons had closed after the presentation of the government’s policy guidelines, and emphasized that the slogan “people–army–resistance” was a thing of the past. He specifically emphasized that weapons were restricted to the state and everyone was committed to that. However, he admitted that limiting weapons would not happen overnight (al-Arabiya, March 21, 2025).
  • Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri said that Hezbollah would not give up its weapons before Lebanon’s demands of Israel had been met. He added that “the weapons are our bargaining chip, and we will not give them up without the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and a discussion regarding their fate.” Berri expressed satisfaction with the dialogue President Aoun sought to advance with Hezbollah and said he supported it, but added that “it is important to pressure the ‘enemy’ to meet its commitments under the ceasefire agreement.” He claimed Lebanon had fulfilled its part of the agreement, the Lebanese army was deployed in the south, Hezbollah had withdrawn from the area, but Israel did not fulfill its part, and that was the responsibility of the United States (Asas, April 25, 2025).
  • Foreign minister Youssef Rajji leads the position within the Lebanese government demanding Hezbollah’s disarmament. Meeting with senior figures from the Christian–Maronite community, he said that full implementation of Resolution 1701 had to be a top priority. He said the text of the agreement clearly specified which groups were allowed to bear arms, and emphasized that Hezbollah continued to evade compliance (al-Nashra, March 19, 2025). On another occasion, he said the ceasefire agreement stipulated that weapons be held only by the state and that “regardless of the international community’s opinion, most of the Lebanese people want to live in a normal country like others, where only the state has weapons.” He added that Lebanon had already tried using weapons and war, which brought disaster, and added that “the group,” which does not want to establish a normal state, had to say what solution it thought would “expel Israeli forces, stop the aggression and end the occupation” (France 24, March 19, 2025).

• • Foreign minister Rajji also summoned Iran’s ambassador to Lebanon, Mojtaba Amani, and told him that Lebanon’s sovereignty had be respected and public statements that could be interpreted as meddling in its internal affairs should be avoided (X account of the Lebanese foreign ministry, April 24, 2025). The conversation took place after Amani strongly objected to Hezbollah’s disarmament and claimed the “disarmament project” was “clearly a conspiracy,” and Iran was aware of the danger and warned others not to fall into the trap (X account of Mojtaba Amani, April 18, 2025). Before meeting with Rajji, Amani had already tried to ease tensions and claimed that Hezbollah’s disarmament was an internal Lebanese matter and Iran did not interfere. He called on the Lebanese government to conduct a dialogue and reach agreements with Hezbollah (al-Jadeed, April 23, 2025).
  • Lebanese Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Mitri stated that the government’s policy guidelines made it clear that the state had to have a monopoly on weapons and had a duty to impose its sovereignty over all Lebanese territory. He said there was no dispute regarding the position (al-Ghad, March 31, 2025).
  • Environment Minister Tamara el-Zein, affiliated with the “Shi’ite duo” (Hezbollah and Amal), claimed that while some ministers said Hezbollah had to be disarmed, others prioritized calls for Israel’s withdrawal from the five points in south Lebanon. She added that according to President Aoun, the timing of disarmament depended on the Lebanese army’s capability to deploy in the south and would not be dictated by external parties (al-Hurra, March 17, 2025).

American pressure on Lebanon’s leadership

• The United States plays a central role in ensuring Lebanon’s commitment to Hezbollah’s disarmament. Since the ceasefire went into effect, the Quintet Committee monitoring the agreement, chaired by Major General Jasper Jeffers (now succeeded by Major General Michael J. Leeney), has been overseeing the Lebanese army’s actions to dismantle Hezbollah’s infrastructure south of the Litani River. Meeting with senior Lebanese officials, Jeffers said that in American administration perspective, the timeline for Hezbollah’s disarmament was becoming shorter (Nidaa al-Watan, April 30, 2025).
• Since the Trump administration was inaugurated in January 2025, the United States has increased pressure on the Lebanese leadership to secure a weapons monopoly. Deputy American Special Envoy for the Middle East Morgan Ortagus made several visits to Lebanon, held talks with President Aoun, Prime Minister Salam, Parliament Speaker Berri and other senior political and security officials, and demanded accelerated measures to disarm Hezbollah:
  • During her most recent visit to Lebanon, Ortagus said Lebanon had a “last chance before escalation and must seize it” (al-Jadeed, December 5, 2024; MTV, April 5, 2025). A “diplomatic source” said Ortagus noted that delay in fulfilling commitments was not in Lebanon’s interest and the window which had opened would not remain open indefinitely (Nidaa al-Watan, April 7, 2025).

• • Interviewed by Lebanese media during her third visit to Lebanon, Ortagus said Lebanon’s leadership and people had to decide if they wanted to cooperate with the United States to disarm Hezbollah. She said if that were the case, the United States would be a partner and the Lebanese could expect significant cooperation, but if Lebanon’s government and leaders acted slowly, the United States would not cooperate (LBC, April 6, 2025).
  • “High-level diplomatic sources” reported that in a conversation with an unnamed senior diplomat, Ortagus said Lebanon’s top officials had to disarm the militias in Lebanese territory. She also warned that if they failed to deal with the matter within a reasonable time frame, they risked losing American support and being “left to their fate against Israel.” According to the sources, there is an understanding that the situation on the ground has changed and that American warnings have to be taken seriously. They added that even Hezbollah could no longer deflect American demands, as its weapons had failed to prove effective against Israel or in defending Lebanon (al-Madan, May 7, 2025).
• Meanwhile, United States senators warned the Lebanese army that it had to accelerate implementation of the ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel and expressed frustration with the pace of its execution (al-Arabiya, April 2, 2025). Outgoing ceasefire oversight committee chairman Jeffers reiterated to Lebanese officials that according to the American administration, the window for Hezbollah’s disarmament was shrinking (Nidaa al-Watan, April 30, 2025).

Hezbollah’s opponents

• The strongest support within Lebanon’s political system for disarming Hezbollah comes from the Christian Lebanese Forces (LF) party, which employs its government and Parliament representatives to emphasize that disarmament is central to Lebanon’s security, recovery and growth:
  • In response to Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem’s comments on the need to maintain “resistance,”^[6] the party called on Hezbollah to comply with the ceasefire agreement, which requires the group to disarm and dismantle its “military structure.” The party emphasized that Qassem’s remarks contradicted President Aoun’s inaugural speech on the state’s monopoly on weapons (MTV, January 20, 2025).
  • Party leader Samir Geagea called for the collection of all illegal weapons and dismantling of any illegal military and security infrastructure [primarily referring to Hezbollah] within a clearly limited time frame and without delay (X account of the Lebanese Forces, March 7, 2025).
  • Following American Envoy Ortagus’ visit, Lebanese Minister of Industry representing the LF, Joe Issa al-Khoury, said that the timelines she presented for Hezbollah’s disarmament had to be taken seriously. He stressed that Palestinian and Hezbollah weapons no longer served a purpose and had be in the hands of the Lebanese army, as Israel used Hezbollah’s weapons as a pretext for maintaining its “occupation” in Lebanon. He said LF ministers had urged President Aoun to set a six-month limit for handing over illegal weapons, as the issue harmed efforts to secure aid for recovery (al-Arabiya, April 10, 2025). President Aoun reportedly ignored the request to designate a specific timeline (al-Akhbar, April 18, 2025).
  • LF Member of Parliament Ghassan Hasbani called on the Lebanese army to disarm Hezbollah “willingly or by force.” He stated that the army, as committed under the ceasefire agreement, had to confiscate Hezbollah’s weapons even if conflict arose, noting there was no alternative (X account of Ghassan Hasbani, March 22, 2025).
  • LF Member of Parliament Ghada Ayoub urged the Lebanese government to give Hezbollah a six-month ultimatum to surrender all its weapons from both south and north of the Litani River (X account of the Lebanese Forces, March 25, 2025).

The Lebanese Army Dismantles Hezbollah Infrastructure

• Since the ceasefire went into effect in November 2024, and in accordance with its framework and the directives of the president and government of Lebanon, the Lebanese army has been working to dismantle Hezbollah’s military infrastructure, primarily south of the Litani River but in other areas as well. According to a report of dubious reliability, Hezbollah secretly gave the Lebanese army a map of the organization’s sites where its weapons were hidden (al-Nahar, April 8, 2025).
• According to reports, since the ceasefire went into effect, the Lebanese army has [allegedly] raided more than 500 Hezbollah positions south and north of the Litani River, including in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut (al-Hadath, April 29, 2025). An “official security source” stated that the Lebanese army [allegedly] dismantled more than 90% of Hezbollah’s infrastructure south of the Litani River and claimed there was no Hezbollah military infrastructure remaining in the area (Agence France-Presse, April 30, 2025):
• The Lebanese army reportedly dismantled approximately 80 Hezbollah “military” sites. According to the report, in line with the army’s ceasefire commitments and with UNIFIL support, missile launchers, other weapons and underground passages in villages discovered by the IDF were destroyed (al-Nahar, January 11, 2025).
• Lebanese army and UNIFIL forces entered Hezbollah centers and camps in the Zoter al-Sharqiya area, near the Litani River and about ten kilometers northwest of the northern Israeli city of Metula, and reportedly found rocket launchers. The compound was considered one of Hezbollah’s largest storage and weapons production centers and was in a strategic location because a route led from it to the western Beqa’a Valley. The report said the area had been targeted by approximately 200 Israeli airstrikes since October 2023 and it had been a base for launching rockets at Israel (Janoubia, March 31, 2025).

Hezbollah

• Statements by senior Lebanese officials regarding their desire to ensure a state monopoly on weapons pose a challenge to Hezbollah’s leadership as the organization tries to recover from the blows it suffered during the fighting against Israel from October 2023 to the ceasefire. Nevertheless, early on, “sources in Hezbollah” said the organization had decided to cooperate with the Lebanese army and evacuate all positions in south Lebanon as a sign of its commitment to the agreement (Beirut International, January 7, 2025).
• Initial responses from senior Hezbollah officials opposed any possibility of disarmament. Although they reiterated the role of the “resistance” in statements aimed at gaining support, they gradually began to moderate their rhetoric and expressed a willingness to engage with the government on a “national defense strategy,” which in their view would preserve the “resistance” in coordination with the army and state institutions for the benefit of the Lebanese people.

Hezbollah secretary general

• In a recorded speech, Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem said the “Islamic resistance” would remain in Lebanon, Hezbollah would remain in Lebanon and they would never change their position. He stated that the Lebanese people, together with the “resistance” and the army, would liberate Lebanon (al-Manar, February 2, 2025).
• In his first televised interview since taking office, Qassem warned that if the “occupation” continued [its activities] in south Lebanon, it would have to face the army, the people and the “resistance.” He said Hezbollah would not halt the “resistance,” which continued on the ground. He asked, “If the resistance stops, will Lebanon remain?” (al-Manar, March 9, 2025).
• In a recorded speech, Qassem said the main problem in the country was not the weapons of the “resistance” but the need to “expel the Israeli occupation.” He said they would not allow anyone to disarm them, and anyone calling for such action “only serves the enemy.” He called the weapons the backbone of the “resistance,” and would confront anyone who attacked the “resistance” or tried to disarm it,“just as we confronted Israel.” He said an Israeli withdrawal and a halt to attacks would be a significant step toward launching discussions on a defense strategy and Hezbollah would be willing to take part in President Aoun’s dialogue “at the appropriate time and not under pressure or dictates.” He said Hezbollah’s strategy was about Lebanon’s strength and how to strengthen the army using the “resistance” and its weapons, not about disarmament (al-Manar, April 18, 2025).

• Qassem stated that Israel first had to fulfill its part of the ceasefire agreement before discussions could be held on fully implementing Resolution 1701, including the issue of a monopoly on weapons. He called for patience, adding that Lebanon would not enter a civil war, and urged people to ignore those trying to incite conflict between the “resistance” and the army (al-Manar, April 28, 2025). In a press interview, Qassem said Hezbollah’s weapons were for the “resistance”^[7] against Israel and had nothing to do with Lebanese internal affairs (Iqtadar, May 2, 2025).

Other Hezbollah figures

• Deputy head of Hezbollah’s executive council, Ali Damoush, claimed Israel “violated” the ceasefire and attacked Lebanon with full United States support to pressure the Lebanese state into accepting its demands, disarm the “resistance” and weaken Lebanon’s sources of strength. He claimed anyone calling for the “resistance” to disarm before the end of the “Israeli aggression” was knowingly or unknowingly serving the “enemy’s agenda.” According to Damoush, disarming the “resistance” at the present time was against Lebanon’s interests and weakened its position vis-à-vis Israel. He said disarmament was not currently on the agenda and that discussion of a “defensive strategy” could only be held at the appropriate time, after “enemy” withdrawal, the return of prisoners and cessation of “aggression.” He claimed Hezbollah was prepared to be an active partner with the government and parliament in achieving Lebanon’s priorities, which were ending “aggression,” ending the “occupation,” rebuilding the country and implementing reforms (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, April 18, 2025).

• Head of Hezbollah’s political council, Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid, stated that the organization was prepared for dialogue on a national security strategy, but certain issues had to be resolved first, particularly “continued Israeli occupation of certain areas and instability in the Palestinian situation.” He said dialogue “under [Israeli] occupation and aggression” had some value but became meaningful only after they ended. Hezbollah, he said, was not willing to participate in dialogue under the current circumstances. He added that Israel did not fear the “resistance’s” weapons but rather the persons carrying them (al-Manar, May 3, 2025).
• Deputy head of Hezbollah’s political council, Mahmoud Qamati, claimed that “the whole world has united against the organization’s weapons.” He said they refused to conduct a dialogue with President Aoun through the media on a defense strategy while “the enemy still occupies our land.” He noted that no timeline for talks on the weapons issue had been agreed with Aoun, and discussions would begin when conditions were suitable (al-Jadeed, April 16, 2025).
• Head of Hezbollah’s liaison and coordination unit, Wafiq Safa, stated that President Aoun was aware of Hezbollah’s position that Israel first had to implement Resolution 1701, after which discussion of a “defensive strategy” could begin. He said the focus should be on arming the Lebanese army, not disarming Hezbollah (Radio al-Nour, April 18, 2025).
• Hassan Fadlallah, member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament,
  claimed the organization believed the state should make decisions on war, lead the liberation of territory, halt attacks, return prisoners and uphold national sovereignty, whether through diplomacy, media or “other means” (al-’Ahed, March 5, 2025). In response to Prime Minister Salam’s statement that Hezbollah’s weapons chapter had been closed following the new government’s policy guidelines and that the “people–army–resistance” slogan belonged to the past, Fadlallah said Salam had to tell the Lebanese what equation protected them from “ongoing Israeli aggression.” He added that “resistance” was never just a written word, but rather “the past, the present and the future.” He said the government had to confront Israeli “violations” and avoid making statements which “do not contribute to the national position” (SIMIA, Hezbollah’s social media monitoring unit, March 23, 2025).
• A “senior source” in the “Shi’ite duo” (Hezbollah and Amal) said certain parties were trying to drag the organization into internal conflict in order to disarm it. He stated that Hezbollah had refused to surrender its weapons but was willing to discuss its future within the framework of a defense strategy. The “source” also said that the organization supported the state’s efforts to “liberate the land” through politics and diplomacy, while maintaining the right to defend Lebanon if necessary (al-Liwaa, March 5, 2025).

The Hezbollah-affiliated media

• Ibrahim al-Amin, editor of Hezbollah’s daily newspaper al-Akhbar, wrote a long editorial claiming that any attempt to dismantle the “resistance” by force would lead to civil war, and there was no power in Lebanon capable of carrying out such a mission. He pointed to the weakness of President Aoun, Prime Minister Salam and the Lebanese army commanders, accusing them of allowing the United States to remotely control their decision-making. He claimed the United States acted freely through the monitoring committee, and in his view, would not do so if it thought there was anyone in Lebanon who would not follow its dictates. He held President Aoun and the prime minister directly responsible for the situation (al-Akhbar, March 12, 2025).
• In another editorial, al-Amin warned Lebanese actors against adopting an aggressive approach to Hezbollah’s disarmament, arguing it could lead to a conflagration greater than civil war. He wrote that the forces seeking to get rid of the “resistance” believed its heavy losses in the war and the expanded American and Israeli influence in the region would result in Hezbollah willingly giving up its weapons. However, he claimed, that required a Lebanese consensus or a clear majority, and a regional and international reality different from the present one (al-Akhbar, April 14, 2025).

The Shi’ite community

• Within the Shi’ite community, Hezbollah’s main support base, there was backing for the leadership’s stance and opposition to surrendering its weapons. At the same time, given the war against Israel’s outcome, some also called for Hezbollah to reassess its path, including the option of disarmament:
  • Shi’ite Mufti Sheikh Ahmad Qabalan, considered the highest religious authority among Shi’ites in Lebanon, warned against disarming Hezbollah. He said “the weapon that restored Lebanon is the holiest of all weapons” and warned that surrendering it would be “most dangerous and harm Lebanon, its political system and its existence.” According to Qabalan, the Shi’ite community paid the highest price in Lebanon’s history and was now “amid ruins.” He warned that attempts to disarm Hezbollah were “playing with fire” and said “the mistake regarding the resistance’s weapons is bigger than Lebanon and the region” and “we have nothing left to lose” (al-Akhbar, March 31, 2025).
  • Shiite cleric and former Mufti of Tyre, Ali al-Amin, said Hezbollah had to return to the state’s fold and let it make the decisions. He said he had asked Iraq’s religious leadership to issue a fatwa to its supporters in Lebanon declaring the state the sole sovereign over weapons (al-Hadath, April 22, 2025).
  • Ali al-Amin, journalist and editor of Janoubia, said Hezbollah’s disarmament and the state’s monopoly on weapons was a Lebanese, regional and international demand. He added that the role of Hezbollah’s weapons ended after the balance of power in the region changed. He said Hezbollah knew any retaliation against Israel would provoke its supporters, as people could no longer bear Israeli attacks, and if Hezbollah were to initiate disarmament, it would reduce its losses (al-Janoubia, April 29, 2025).
  • According to a Facebook post by a Shi’ite Hezbollah supporter, the decision regarding disarmament was not solely Hezbollah’s but concerned the entire sect, and the Shi’ite community would not surrender its weapons (Facebook page of Abu Zahraa al-Chayah, April 7, 2025).

The Lebanese Public

• Immediately after President Aoun’s inaugural speech in January 2025, in which he spoke of establishing a state monopoly on weapons, posters were put up across Lebanon with his picture and the slogan “Army, People, State,” emphasizing the state’s sole authority over weapons. It contrasted with Hezbollah’s slogan, “Army, People, Resistance,” which promotes the collaboration of the “resistance” with the army and the people and the in defending the country (X account of Samia Khadaj, January 11, 2025).

• A street survey was conducted of passersby who were asked if they supported or opposed Hezbollah’s weapons, and everyone supported disarming Hezbollah and backing the Lebanese army and state. People said, “Weapons should be in the hands of the army, not an organization”; “There is no sovereignty but the state’s, and no weapons but the army’s”; “We have the Lebanese army, why should Hezbollah have weapons?”; “Hezbollah’s weapons once served Lebanon, now they no longer serve the national interest”; “They should join the army or other roles, their weapons visit problems on the country”; “Weapons must be in the hands of the state, no one else” (Radio Beirut International, April 10, 2025).

     
Right: Lebanon tries to break free of Hezbollah’s control by cutting the rifle strap in an attempt to dismantle the “army–people–resistance” triangle (X account of Voice of Lebanon Radio, April 14, 2025). Left: Iranian weapons [represented by barbed wire] encircling the Lebanese state, which wants to rid itself of Iranian arms (Janoubia, May 5, 2025)

• Dr. Makram Rabah, editor of NOW Lebanon and a researcher at the American University of Beirut, wrote that the debate over Hezbollah’s weapons was no longer political but existential. He wrote, “This is not politics. It is pathology. And like the pre-Islamic tribes who buried their daughters and insisted it was noble, Hezbollah’s base — and its shrinking leadership — insists on the legitimacy of a weapon that has long since become an act of collective suicide” (Nidaa al-Watan, April 30, 2025).

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] Violence and terrorism aimed to destroy the State of Israel.
^[3] UN Security Council Resolution 1559 from 2004 calls for the disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias in the country and the withdrawal of all foreign forces stationed in Lebanon, alongside the extension of state control over all parts of Lebanese territory. Resolution 1701, adopted at the end of the Second Lebanon War in 2006, also calls for the implementation of Resolution 1559.
^[4] For further information, see the December 2024 ITIC report" The Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire Agreement: The Lebanese Point of View"
^[5] For further information, see the May 2025 ITIC report, "Disarming the Palestinian factions in Lebanon."
^[6] Capabilities to attack Israel.
^[7] Attacks.

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