The launching of IED balloons from the Gaza Strip into Israeli territory

Overview

During the first half of January 2020 a decision was made in the Gaza Strip to renew the launching of balloons, which had stopped in March 2019. Since the decision was put into practice dozens of balloons have been launched into Israeli territory. As opposed to the past, most of the balloon clusters had IEDs attached to them (until March 2019 most of them were incendiary balloons). Most of the IED balloons were observed and located in the western Negev, but some of them flew as far as southern and central Israeli sites, such as Ashdod, Beersheba, Kibbutz Sde Boker and Beit Shemesh. Some of the IEDs exploded, either in the air or on the ground. So far no casualties or damage have been reported. The balloons are launched by squads affiliated with the military wings of Hamas and the other terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip, but sometimes they prefer not to identify themselves.

• The launching of balloons is only one aspect of the pressure Hamas continues to exert on Israel, and to a certain extent on Egypt. The pressure continues, even after the reduction in the frequency of the return marches, as a part of Hamas’ policy of controlled, regulated violent. Its objective is to wrest additional humanitarian and economic concessions as part of the lull arrangement, and to make it easier to exit and enter the Gaza Strip (“easing the siege”).
• Hamas makes sure to implement that policy without being dragged into a vast military confrontation with Israel (such as Operation Protective Edge), which in ITIC assessment Hamas has no interest in. Thus expanding the scope of balloon launches, or their reduction and cessation, is determined by Hamas according to the developments on the ground and in the contacts for a lull arrangement.

   
IED balloons launched into Israel by the designated unit called the Sons of al-Zawari. The balloon launches was represented as a response to the killing of three operatives who infiltrated into Israeli territory (Sons of al-Zawari Facebook page, January 22, 2020). The three operatives threw IEDs at IDF soldiers, and were shot and killed.

• The current wave of balloon launchings has not yet caused significant physical damage but it disrupts daily life and causes psychological harm to the Israeli population living in the south in general and near the Gaza Strip in particular. The balloon launches are accompanied by psychological warfare expressed by threats to increase the number and range of the launches, and to develop more sophisticated methods, such as balloons with toxic substances, drones and quadcopters carrying IEDs, etc.

Why did balloon launchings return?

• The first kites were flown into Israel in small numbers during the third week of the return marches (April 2018). As the marches progressed, the balloon launchers expanded their methods. Burning substances were attached to the kites and they became incendiary kites, setting fire to extensive areas near the Gaza Strip. Later, in addition to the kites terrorists in the Gaza Strip began launching clusters of balloons with IEDs attached. In addition, Hamas and the other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip institutionalized balloon terrorism by establishing designated units for launching balloons. Beyond physical damage, balloon terrorism disrupted the daily life of Israelis living near the Gaza Strip and caused psychological harm.
• Beginning in March 2019 the activities of the balloon-launching units waned until it ceased almost entirely. That happened because of the Egyptian-mediated contacts for an arrangement, one of several measures instituted at the time to calm the situation. In ITIC assessment balloon launchings ceased because Hamas instructed the balloon units to suspend their activities. The launchings stopped but the threat of their renewal was occasionally noted by the media.
• After the return marches were suspended at the end of 2019 balloon terrorism was renewed (in the first half of January 2020), accompanied by a propaganda campaign. In ITIC assessment, the launches were renewed because Hamas decided to continue to exert its controlled pressure on Israel, allegedly because Israel was making difficulties in implementing the lull understandings. According to the Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese newspaper al-Akhbar, Hamas insisted it “will not be silent in the face of Israel’s [alleged] delays in implementing the understandings, and that Israel will not receive the lull for free” (al-Akhbar, January 18, 2020).
• Another Hamas objective, in ITIC assessment, is to send Egypt a message relating to difficulties in their relations (caused by the visit of a Hamas delegation to Iran to participate in the funeral of Qassem Soleimani, which displeased Egypt). The message was in all probability intended to urge Egypt to regularize its relations with Hamas, with an implied threat that otherwise there would be negative consequences for the security situation in the Gaza Strip.
• So far, the renewal of balloon launches has lasted for the past two and half weeks. According to the Israeli media sixty balloon clusters have landed in Israel. Winds have taken them tens of miles from the Gaza Strip. In response the Israeli Air Force recently attacked Hamas targets in Khan Yunis, in the southern Gaza Strip. In that way Israel sent the message (yet again) that it regards Hamas as responsible for launching balloons as well as other violent measures carried out from the Gaza Strip.

Networks in the Gaza Strip specializing in launching balloons

• Although Hamas determines overall balloon-launching policy, the launches themselves are carried out by a number of designated networks specializing in preparing and launching balloons. In ITIC assessment most of the networks have close affiliations to Hamas or other terrorist organizations. It was previously reported that a joint operations room had been set up by the various balloon-launching networks, but it apparently stopped its activities when the launches ceased in March 2019 (it is unknown if the joint operations room has renewed its activities with the current renewal of balloon launches).
• The first network to “specialize” in and institutionalize launching balloons was the Sons of al-Zawari unit.^[1] In ITIC assessment the unit is closely affiliated with Hamas and may possibly be directed by it. However, Hamas prefers to remain vague on the subject (which increases its freedom of action) and does not directly involve itself in the activities of the Sons of al-Zawari or any other balloon-launching network. The spokesmen for the Sons of al-Zawari and Supreme National Authority of the Great Return March prefer to relate the launches to the “legitimate” and “individual measures” of “young revolutionaries” and do not relate them to Hamas or other terrorist organizations (al-Andalou News, Sabq24, January 18, 2020; al-Ain, January 16, 2020).

    
Launching IED balloons on January 18, 2020 by the Sons of al-Zawari unit in the eastern part of the al-Maghazi refugee camp (central Gaza Strip) (Facebook page of Imad Ibn Palestine, January 18, 2018).

    
Right: Preparing explosives for IED balloons launched into Israeli territory. Left: A night launch of IED balloons from Rafah (southern Gaza Strip) (Sons of al-Zawari Facebook page, January 21, 2020).

    
Right: Preparing explosives for IED balloons which [allegedly] contain toxic and incendiary substances. Left: Launching IED balloons into Israeli territory (Sons of al-Zawari Facebook page, January 22, 2020).

• The following are other networks of balloon-launchers:
• Ahfad al-Nasser: A network affiliated with the Popular Resistance Committees. The head of the network is aka “Abu Malek”. One of its operatives, aka “Abu Atayia”, recently said the network had used new methods to launch balloons. He also claimed that many clusters of toxic incendiary and IED balloons had been launched at the Israeli communities near the Gaza Strip, and that in the coming days “many surprises” could be expected (Qawm, January 19, 2020).

    
Ahfad al-Nasser network operatives prepare balloons for launching (knspal website, January 19, 2020).

•  The Sons of al-Qoqa units of the Popular Resistance Movement: On January 19, 2020, the network claimed responsibility for launching “hundreds of incendiary and IED balloons” between the evening of January 17 and January 19, 2020. They stressed they would not stop the campaign until their objectives had been achieved. The statement added that Israel should know that the Sons of al-Qoqa units were preparing quadcopters, balloons and explosives (Twitter account of the Popular Resistance Movement, January 19, 2020; Ghaza al-A’an, January 19, 2020).

• The Wadia Hadad squads, which belong to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP): On January 17, 2020, Gazan journalist Hassan Aslih reported that the Wadia Hadad squads, affiliated with the PFLP, announced the launching of large clusters of balloons from the eastern Gaza Strip (Twitter account of Gazan journalist Hassan Aslih, January 17, 2020).

     
An operative of the PFLP’s Wadia Hadad unit prepares a balloon for launching (Twitter account of Gazan journalist Hassan Aslih, January 17, 2020).

Appendix

Examples of balloons that landed in Israeli territory

• The following are examples of IED balloons that landed in Israeli territory:
• January 25, 2020: A balloon cluster with an RPG warhead attached to it landed in an open area near Kibbutz Sde Boker (about 44 miles from the Gaza Strip). A police demolitions expert was called to the site and dealt with the warhead. Another cluster was located near Kibbutz Tse’elim (in the western Negev near the Gaza Strip) (Ma’ariv, January 25, 2018).

• January 23, 2020: An IDF force identified a balloon cluster to which a soccer ball full of explosives was attached. It landed in the western Negev near the Gaza Strip. An engineering force was called to the site and dealt with the explosives (western Negev regional council, January 23, 2020).

• January 21, 2020: The Israel Police Force located a balloon cluster with a suspicious object that looked like a radio-controlled aircraft attached to it, about 7.5 miles from the large southern Israeli city of Beersheba area (about 25 miles from the Gaza Strip). Another balloon cluster with what were apparently explosives attached was found in the western Negev (Israel Police Force spokesman’s unit, January 21, 2020).

• January 20, 2020: A balloon cluster with a suspicious object attached to it landed in the city of Sderot. A police demolitions expert was called to the site and examined the suspicious object. Another balloon cluster was found in an open area near the city of Beit Shemesh (about 31 miles from the Gaza Strip), (Israel Police Force spokesman’s unit, January 20, 2018).

• January 19, 2020: Several balloon clusters exploded in the western Negev and in the region of the southern coastal city of Ashqelon.
• January 18, 2020: An IED balloon cluster was found in a public playground in Sderot. A demolitions expert detonated the small IED attached to the balloons. During the day more balloon clusters were observed as they were launched from the Gaza Strip into Israeli territory. Some of them exploded in the air and some landed in open areas (Ynet, January 18, 2020).
• January 17, 2020: A balloon cluster with a small IED attached to it was found on the Ashdod beach. It was neutralized by police demolitions experts (Ynet, January 17, 2020).

•  January 16, 2020: Balloons with IEDs attached were found in an open area in the western Negev. Demolitions experts were called to the site. With their arrival the IED exploded. No casualties or damage were reported. In response IDF aircraft attacked an underground Hamas target in the northern Gaza Strip.

    
Right: An IED attached to balloons which detonated near Israeli security forces near the Gaza Strip. Left: A IED balloon cluster that exploded in an open area in the western Negev (Israel Police Force spokesman’s unit, January 16, 2018).

• January 15, 2020: A balloon was found in the city of Sderot with a pipe attached to it that was suspected of being an IED. Police demolitions experts were called to the site (Laqish police spokesman’s unit, January 15, 2020).

^[1] The unit was named after Tunisian aeronautical engineer Mohammed al-Zawari, who worked for Hamas. He was killed in the city of Sfax in eastern Tunisia (December 15, 2016). Al-Zawari was born to a religious family in Tunis. On completion of his studies and military service, he passed a civilian pilot course and was hired by Tunisair. As a result of his activity in the Ennahda Islamic political party, he was dismissed and fled to Sudan. In 1991, he moved to Syria and joined Hamas’s military wing. As a member of Hamas, he worked on the development of UAVs and model airplanes. ↑

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