The Latest Round of Escalation in the Gaza Strip: What Next? (Initial Assessment)

How is the most recent round of escalation different from the previous ones?

• The most recent round of escalation is the eighth significant round^[1] since the return marches began on March 30, 2018 (see the Appendix). An analysis of the previous rounds of escalation revealed that the most recent one was different in three main aspects:
  • First, it was the result of an IDF-initiated operation targeting senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) commander Bahaa Abu al-Atta. He was the commander of the PIJ’s north Gaza Strip brigade, and for an extended period of time had initiated various types of terrorist attacks against Israel. Therefore he was also a significant obstacle to the efforts for a lull and understandings which Israel, Egypt and Hamas were trying to promote. In ITIC assessment, the IDF assumed that the PIJ would respond to the targeted attack with extensive rocket fire (which it had done in the past when field operatives, far lower in rank than Bahaa Abu al-Atta, were killed). At approximately the same time as the targeted killing of Bahaa Abu al-Atta, an attack was carried out in Damascus which killed the son of Akram al-Ajouri, a senior PIJ figure. Israel did not claim responsibility for the attack but the PIJ linked the two and threatened revenge for both events.
  • Second, Hamas, which is the strongest terrorist movement in the Gaza Strip, and which played a central role in previous rounds of escalation, for the first time did not participate, as it had in the past (with the exception of having the last word by firing rockets at Beersheba after the ceasefire had gone into effect). Hamas sat on the sidelines throughout the round of escalation despite the belligerent rhetoric and expressions of solidarity from its spokesmen and despite internal criticism (expressed by spontaneous demonstrations in several locations in the Gaza Strip and attacks on Hamas in the social networks). Moreover, Hamas did not respond even after a house in Deir al-Balah was mistakenly attacked by the IDF and a Palestinian family was killed. At the same time, Hamas also did not exert effective pressure on the PIJ to stop the rocket fire and enabled it to let off steam by firing rockets for two days.
  • Third, the IDF responses to the extensive rocket fire attacking Israel (about 560 rockets and mortar shells) were focused pinpointedly on PIJ targets. Israel did not hit Hamas targets, thereby differentiating and preserving a distinction between the two organizations (and contributing to Hamas’ remaining, exceptionally, outside the round of escalation). That contradicted Israel’s stated policy that Hamas is sovereign in the Gaza Strip and therefore responsible for all attacks emanating from it. That changed in an isolated instance when Hamas fired two rockets at Beersheba after the ceasefire went into effect, and the IDF responded by attacking Hamas targets (November 16, 2019).

The balance of the PIJ’s achievements and failures

In the eyes of the PIJ, the main achievement of the recent round of escalation was that it successfully fired hundreds of rockets at populated areas in Israel without the participation of Hamas (whose operational capabilities are greater). For two days it successfully disrupted daily life in the Israeli communities near the Gaza Strip and in Israel’s center, and caused damage to morale and to the economy. PIJ spokesmen repeatedly stress that the organization intends to continue firing rockets at Israel (according to senior PIJ figure Jamil Alian, the ceasefire will not last long because the PIJ wants to continue the military campaign against Israel).

    
Direct rocket hits on Israeli homes. Right: A house in Sderot. Left: A house in Netivot
(Palinfo Twitter account, November 12, 2019).

• The achievement, from the PIJ’s perspective, was related by PIJ leader Ziyad al-Nakhalah to al-Mayadeen TV on the eve of the ceasefire. He claimed that many cities in central Israel had been hit on the first day of the round of escalation. He added that the fact that Israel announced the closing of schools, preventing the activities of various institutions and shut down factories showed that the PIJ’s message, sent by its long-range rockets, had been received by every city in central Israel. He claimed the PIJ had succeeded in paralyzing Israel while Israel was incapable of breaking the “resistance axis” [i.e., Iran and the countries and terrorist organizations it sponsors) (al-Mayadeen TV, November 13, 2019).

• On the military-political level the PIJ experienced a series of failures and many difficulties were exposed, which Ziyad al-Nakhalah and other senior PIJ figures have tried to minimize in their public statements: Israel carried out the targeted killing of a senior, able commander and thereby, in PIJ perspective, changed the rules of engagement, for the first time since the beginning of the return marches. Israel’s precise information about Bahaa Abu al-Atta demonstrated the PIJ’s vulnerability. The improvement in Israel’s prevention of PIJ rocket fire was demonstrated. PIJ rocket fire at Israel was far less effective than during rounds of escalation where the capabilities of the PIJ were combined with those of Hamas (shown by the relatively few rocket hits in central Israel, the high percentage of rockets successfully intercepted by the Iron Dome aerial defense system, and the fact that there were no Israeli fatalities). On the other hand, reports in the Israeli media about the significant harm done to the PIJ’s military capabilities are exaggerated, in view of the PIJ’s vast military infrastructure and the generous support it receives from Iran (more than the support given to Hamas and other terrorist organizations).

However, in ITIC assessment, the most prominent PIJ failure was in the lack of inter-organization coordination against Israel. For the first time since the return marches began the great gap between the PIJ and Hamas was made public. That proved Hamas was not prepared to allow the PIJ (and its sponsor, Iran) to drag it into an overall confrontation with Israel at a time and under circumstances which it found inconvenient. That Hamas policy is supported by Egypt, which has significant leverage with the PIJ. The PIJ found itself having to pay a price for its attempts to drag both sides into a confrontation which neither side wanted. Despite Hamas’ public rhetoric of solidarity with the PIJ and the rockets fired at Beersheba at the end of the round, in the future the PIJ will have to be more careful and toe the line more with Hamas and Egypt, and that was the main lesson the PIJ learned from the targeted killing of Bahaa Abu al-Atta.

Hamas policy

• In ITIC assessment, the targeted killing of Bahaa Abu al-Atta made it easier for Hamas, the most powerful organization in the Gaza Strip, to continue its current policies (expressed in the most recent speech given by Yahya al-Sinwar before young men and women in the Gaza Strip):^[2]
  • The objective of Hamas’ policy in the coming months will be to end or ease the “siege” of the Gaza Strip while improving the serious humanitarian situation (in Hamas’ eyes the two are interconnected, as Yahya al-Sinwar made clear in his most recent speech). To that end Hamas will continue to be integrated into the efforts for a lull and understandings with Egyptian mediation, Israel’s agreement and money from Qatar. That objective was made clear by the end of Yahya al-Sinwar’ speech, where he said the following:

The challenge of breaking the siege is one of the largest facing them, and we would work at it in the future. We hope to succeed in breaking the siege so that our sons and young people will live a life of respect. [So far] we have been very patient, but we will not continue to be patient, and we will force the enemy to break the siege. I say here, and it is connected to the military matter, to the military challenge before us, that our people have remained silent for a long time regarding the siege, but they can no longer remain silent. Our people have had enough. They can’t take it anymore. Some of the Israeli leadership compete with each other in issuing threats, and we say to them, the solution for the humanitarian problem of the Gaza Strip has to be first and foremost the opinion priority on the agenda. That is because if it is not the top priority, prepare yourselves for something big [to happen]. Prepare yourselves for something big because we will not agree to the continuation of this situation. We are fed up an can no longer be patient.

• The means for implementing Hamas’ policy will be the return marches, despite the waning of their effectiveness in recent months. In the marches, and on other opportune occasions, Hamas will continue to allow and even encourage the use of violence while making sure it remains controlled (i.e., the throwing of IEDs, attempts to break into Israeli territory, launching incendiary balloons, and sabotaging the security fence). Hamas uses controlled violence to exert pressure on Israel and at the same time prevent a broad confrontation which is liable to lead to the IDF’s entering the Gaza Strip. In his most recent speech Yahya al-Sinwar praised Hamas, saying it knows how to deal with Israel without causing a broad military confrontation (mentioning the 12-13 round of escalations of the past two years which did not lead to prolonged fighting).
• In ITIC assessment the recent round of escalation may make it easy for Hamas to pursue that policy. Its exceptional non-involvement in the round sent a clear signal to the PIJ that Hamas expected it to toe the line with its policy. That made it clear to all the actors in the local and regional arenas (Israel, Egypt, Iran, the Palestinian Authority) that Hamas remains in control of the Gaza Strip and does not intend to allow other organizations (especially the PIJ, joined at the hip with Iranian sponsorship) to drag it into a broad confrontation with Israel in contradiction of its policies. At the same time, Hamas has no interest in alienating the PIJ. Therefore Hamas cannot be expected to implement a systematic policy of separating itself from the PIJ, and it can be assumed that both will make an effort to return to their routine, although complex, relations.

In ITIC assessment, in view of that particular Hamas policy, and the belligerent behavior of the PIJ, no fundamental change can be expected in the security and humanitarian situations in the Gaza Strip. That is first and foremost because of the internal contradiction inherent in Hamas policy: on the one hand, Hamas considers itself as responsible for managing the every-day lives of the population, and to that end works to ease the “siege” and improve the economy by means of maintaining controlled pressure on Israel. On the other, since Operation Protective Edge Hamas has been constructing an improved military infrastructure, giving priority in its resources to the military buildup, and publicly declaring it.^[3] Between economic recovery and the military buildup and an ongoing, belligerent approach to Israel, there is an inherent contradiction which cannot be expected to disappear in the foreseeable future.

Appendix

What is the PIJ’s weight in the rounds of escalation accompanying the return marches?

Overview

PIJ leader Ziyad al-Nakhalah was interviewed on the eve of the ceasefire of the most recent round of escalation, and said that this past year there had been more than 13 confrontations with Israel. He claimed the Jerusalem Brigades (the PIJ’s military wing) was the backbone of the confrontations with Israel. The involvement of the PIJ in the confrontations came, he claimed, as the result of a decision of the organization’s leadership, and was not the fruit of local initiatives (al-Mayadeen TV, November 13, 2019). An ITIC examination showed that Hamas initiated most of the rounds of escalation, while the PIJ also played an important role in initiating the rounds. Moreover, the PIJ also initiated events of rocket fire which did not evolve into significant escalations (some of them without issuing claims of responsibility and in contradiction of Hamas policy).

• To examine the validity of al-Nakhalah’s claim the ITIC examined the role of the PIJ in eight significant rounds of escalation since the beginning of the return marches (March 30, 2018). A significant round of escalation is defined by the ITIC as a clash between terrorist organizations and the IDF during which more than 40 rockets and mortar shells are fired at Israel and which lasts two days or more. In addition to significant rounds of escalation, since the beginning of the return marches there were also short rocket fire events which did not lead to significant Israeli reprisals. Some of the rockets were fired without claims of responsibility and without evident reason.

Monthly distribution of rocket and mortar fire at Israel since the beginning of the return marches

• An ITIC examination had the following findings:
  • First round of escalation (May 29-30, 2018): Initiated by the PIJ in revenge for the deaths of three of its operatives. Hamas and other terrorist organizations joined the rocket fire. About 150 rockets and mortar shells were fired at Israel.
  • Second round of escalation (June 19-20, 2018): Initiated by Hamas following the deterioration of the situation on the ground (the Israeli Air Force attacked Hamas targets after incendiary balloons and kites were launched, causing a series of blazes in and near the Israeli communities near the Gaza Strip). No organization joined Hamas. During the escalation about 45 rockets and mortar shells were fired at Israel.
  • Third round of escalation (July 13-14, 2018): Initiated by Hamas and the PIJ following the deterioration of the situation on the ground (an IDF officer was wounded by a hand grenade thrown at him during the return march, and the Israeli Air Force attacked Hamas targets). About 200 rockets and mortar shells were fired at Israel.
  • Fourth round of escalation (August 8-9, 2018): Initiated by Hamas following a deterioration of the situation on the ground (gunfire from a Hamas post in the northern Gaza Strip mistakenly interpreted by the IDF as sniper fire, given previous sniper attacks. In response an IDF tank fired a number of shells at the Hamas post from which the gunshots were fired, killing two Hamas military operatives). The PIJ joined the rocket fire, and about 180 rockets an mortar shells were fired at Israel.
  • Fifth round of escalation (November 12-13, 2018): Initiated by Hamas in response to an operational activity carried out by an IDF special force in the southern Gaza Strip (during which six Hamas military operatives were killed). The PIJ joined the rocket fire, and about 560 rockets and mortar shells were fired at Israel.
  • Sixth round of escalation (March 25-25, 2019): Initiated by Hamas after Hamas rocket fire (which they claimed was fired in error) hit a house in central Israel north of Tel Aviv. The IDF responded by attacking dozens of targets. Other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip joined Hamas. About 70 rockets and mortar shells were fired at Israel.
  • Seventh round of escalation (May 4-6, 2019): Initiated by PIJ sniper fire at IDF soldiers. The IDF responded by attacking Hamas targets, killing two Hamas military operatives. The following day massive rocket fire began, unprecedented in scope, and about 690 rockets and mortar shells were fired at Israel. The rockets were fired by Hamas, the PIJ and other terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip.
  • Eighth round of escalation (November 12-14, 2019): Initiated by Israel’s targeted killing of Bahaa Abu al-Atta, the commander of the Jerusalem Brigades’ northern Gaza Strip brigade. Also killed was the son of Akram al-Ajouri, a senior member of the PIJ leadership outside the Gaza Strip, in an attack in Damascus (for which Israel did not claim responsibility). The PIJ blamed Israel for the attack and joined it to the killing of Bahaa Abu al-Atta. During the round of escalation about 560 rockets and mortar shells were fired at Israel.

The examination of the eight rounds of escalation indicated that Hamas has initiated most of them and played the central role. Hamas initiated four rounds of escalation and a seventh in collaboration with the PIJ. Three rounds (the first, seventh and eighth) were initiated by the PIJ. Hamas joined first and eighth rounds (the most extensive) and remained on the sidelines for the eighth. In addition, the PIJ was involved in firing rockets and mortar shells from the Gaza Strip, on occasion without claiming responsibility, which did not lead to escalation.

• The following are several instances of rocket fire unilaterally initiated by the PIJ in contradiction of Hamas policy and interests:
  • October 26-27, 2018: About 40 rockets were fired at the southern Israeli cities of Ashqelon and Sderot, and at the Israeli communities in the western Negev. The rockets were fired following a deterioration in the situation on the ground in which the PIJ was involved. The PIJ claimed responsibility for the rocket fire, calling it “October revenge.”^[4]
  • September 10, 2019: Two rockets were fired at Ashqelon and Ashdod during an election rally in Ashdod where Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was a speaker. Two rockets were intercepted by the Iron Dome aerial defense system. In response to the rocket fire Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked about 15 Hamas targets. During an al-Mayadeen interview with Ziyad al-Nakhalah, the interviewer mentioned rocket fire for which Bahaa Abu al-Atta was responsible, which caused the Israeli prime minister to leave the stage. Ziyad al-Nakhalah admitted it had been a Jerusalem Brigades attacks (al-Mayadeen TV, November 13, 2019).
  • The IDF spokesman reported that Bahaa Abu al-Atta had been responsible for two rocket fire attacks on Sderot in August 2019 (IDF spokesman, November 12, 2019):
  • On August 17, 2019, three rocket launches at Israel were identified in the northern Gaza Strip. A number of fragments were found in a house in Sderot. No organization claimed responsibility for the rocket fire. In response to the rocket fire the Israeli Air Force attacked Hamas targets in the central and northern Gaza Strip (IDF spokesman, August 17, 2019)
  • On August 25, 2019, thee rocket launches at Sderot and the Israeli communities near the Gaza Strip were identified. A house under construction was hit. No organization claimed responsibility for the rocket fire. In response the IAF attacked Hamas targets in the northern Gaza Strip (IDF spokesman, August 24, year).

^[1] A significant round of escalation is defined by the ITIC as a clash between terrorist organizations and the IDF during which more than 40 rockets and mortar shells are fired at Israel and which lasts two days or more. In addition to rounds of escalation there were unilateral rocket fire events to which the IDF did not respond, or to which the response was minor (See the Appendix). ↑
^[2] For further information, see the November 10, 2019 bulletin, "Yahya al-Sinwar gave a belligerent speech warning Israel that Hamas and the Palestinian people would not accept the continuation of the "siege" of the Gaza Strip, saying, "We can no longer bear it and our patience is at an end." ↑
^[3] Yahya al-Sinwar, speaking before young Palestinian men and women on November 10, 2019, said the Palestinian military force in the Gaza Strip had at its disposal about 70,000 armed young men, thousands of rockets, hundreds of anti-tank missiles, hundreds of tunnels, hundreds of above- and below-ground control and command rooms and hundreds and even thousands of ambushes waiting for IDF forces if they decide to enter the Gaza Strip. The construction of the broad military infrastructure demands substantial resources and stands in complete contradiction to the economic recovery of the Gaza Strip. ↑
^[4] According to al-Sharq al-Awsat the PIJ tried to claim responsibility for the rocket fire in the name of the joint operations room of all the terrorist organizations. However, Hamas opposed the idea, claiming the rocket fire had been a unilateral action. A member of Hamas' political bureau criticized Hamas, saying it was not a unilateral action when there are contacts [for a lull] with the enemy (al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 29, 2018). ↑

Related Articles