Kata’ib Hezbollah: A Dominant Iraqi Pro-Iranian Militia

Overview

• Kata’ib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Brigades) is one of the most dominant pro-Iranian militias operating in Iraq; some even consider it the most dominant^[1]. The militia was established in March 2003 as a result of a union between several pro-Iranian groups following the US invasion of Iraq. They have been operating since 2014 as part of the Popular Mobilization Forces (hereinafter: the PMF), an umbrella organization established with the aim of eradicating ISIS^[2]. Upon the Iraqi government’s recognition of the PMF as an integral part of the country’s security forces, in 2018, the militia began receiving funding from the state and its operatives received salaries. This is how the militia members became an integral part of the Iraqi security establishment while actually being subordinate to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).
• The militia works to promote the regional and international interests of the Iranian regime in Iraq and the region. It takes a central part in carrying out terrorist attacks against American targets in Iraq^[3], is very close to the Lebanese Hezbollah, assists the Syrian regime in suppressing the civil war, and acts as part of the Axis of Resistance^[4] and the Shiite Crescent^[5] while making threats against Israel.
• Kata’ib Hezbollah is headed by Ahmad al-Hamidawi, who serves as its secretary-general. The organization’s leadership includes the Shura Council (Majlis al-Shura), which is an advisory council; an executive arm called the General Secretariat (Al-Amana al-Amma); designated bureaus (such as a military bureau and a political bureau); and fighting forces. The structure is clearly similar to that of the Lebanese Hezbollah, which indicates its influence on Kata’ib Hezbollah that, similarly to the Lebanese Hezbollah, was established by the IRGC’s Qods Force.
• In the recent two years, the militia’s weapons have undergone a significant process of upgrading, from weapons that mainly included rockets made in Iran to the ability to self-produce varied weapons and the extensive use of drones provided by Iran.
• Kata’ib Hezbollah has an extensive civilian infrastructure, which operates according to the model of the Lebanese Hezbollah, and which is designed to train the next generations of militiamen. The infrastructure, which includes educational, research, religious, and youth movement institutions, promotes the pro-Iranian ideology.
• In the ITIC’s assessment, the level of the militia’s threat to internal Iraqi and regional security has increased in the recent two years, both due to the development of an independent capacity to produce weapons and its increasing involvement in Syria and regional issues. The threat potential to Israel and other countries in the region also increased, as evidenced by the threats directed at them by Kata’ib Hezbollah.

Background and development of the militia

• Since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, Iranian involvement in Iraq has greatly increased. Pro-Iranian Shiite militias were formed, which opposed the American presence in Iraq, led by Jaysh al-Mahdi (the Mahdi Army), headed by the Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr (who later began to oppose Iran’s involvement in Iraq).^[6] These militias fought the American forces in Iraq under the direction of the Iranian IRGC’s Qods Force. In 2006, operatives withdrew from Jaysh al-Mahdi, due to Al-Sadr’s decision to stop fighting the American forces,^[7] and established, under the sponsorship of the Qods Force, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq (“League of the Righteous”). A year later, in 2007, Kata’ib Hezbollah was established. These militias broke away from Muqtada al-Sadr’s movement and continued fighting against the American forces in Iraq. Later, other pro-Iranian militias were established (such as Al-Nujaba, Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada and more) in a way that established Iranian involvement in Iraq and at the same time in Syria as well.
• During 2011, before the US withdrawal from Iraq (December 2011), Kata’ib Hezbollah escalated their guerrilla activity against the US Army and its allies in Iraq. They fired rockets and mortar shells at bases and airports and detonated roadside charges along routes where the forces moved. After the pullout of the American forces, the militia announced that it would not lay down its weapons “in view of the threats to Iraq from the United States and several countries in the region” and continued to attack targets where there was still an American presence in Iraq, especially in the Al-Anbar province.
• As Iranian involvement increased in the civil war in Syria (which broke out In 2011), Kata’ib Hezbollah began sending fighters to Syria to take part in the fighting alongside Bashar al-Assad’s regime forces and also began attacking American targets in Syria using rockets and drones.
• In 2018, the militia was officially recognized by the Iraqi government, similar to the other militias in the PMF. It became an integral part of the security forces of the Iraqi state and began to receive funding from the state. This, despite the fact that it continued to serve, first and foremost, the interests of Iran. In 2019, militia operatives participated in the suppression of civil protests in Iraq, for which it received harsh condemnations in Iraq and abroad. Since then, militia operatives have continued to attack US forces in Syria and Iraq, and it forms part of the anti-American discourse in Iraq and the aggressive discourse of the Axis of Resistance. In addition, it penetrates the social and political systems in Iraq through the social institutions it established and through its integration into political frameworks in the country.

Structure, size, and locations

Structure and organization

• The structure of Kata’ib Hezbollah is hierarchical and compartmentalized. The militia is headed by Ahmad al-Hamidawi, who serves as its secretary-general (see details about him below). Next to him is the Shura Council (Majlis al-Shura), an advisory council numbering between five and seven members. The advisory council is the top body in the militia, working alongside the secretary-general and helping him formulate strategy and methods of action. The General Secretariat (Al-Amana al-Amma), which is apparently subordinate to the advisory council, serves as the executive arm of the organization and has at least 33 representatives and several external observers, Qods Force members and representatives from the Lebanese Hezbollah, in addition (or alternatively as substitutes).^[8] Under the advisory council and the general secretariat are the bureaus (Makatib), which apparently serve as operational wings that work under the Shura Council and the General Secretariat. The bureaus include the Political Bureau (Al-Maktab al-Siyasi), the Military Bureau (Al-Maktab al-Amni) and probably other bureaus as well (Al-Estiklal, March 14, 2020; Al-Ahed, October 17, 2021).
• Kata’ib Hezbollah’s total number of fighters is unknown. The numbers range from 5,000 to 30,000 (Khotwa News Agency, December 8, 2021). In the ITIC’s estimation, the number of fighters is around 10,000, including about 2,500 who are fighting alongside the Syrian regime in Syria. In addition, it is known about the existence of a unit for the production of weapons, numbering (as of 2020) about 120 people (Al-Estiklal, March 14, 2020).^[9]
• The militia has at least four operational forces (Khotwa News Agency, December 8, 2021):
  • Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Brigade (Liwa Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas)
  • Karbala Brigades (Kata’ib Karbala), Zaid ben Ali Brigades (Kata’ib Zaid ben Ali)
  • Ali al-Akbar Brigades (Kata’ib Ali al-Akbar)
  • Sajjad Brigades (Kata’ib Sajjad)
• The forces are deployed in the Baghdad province (a central hub is Jurf al-Sakhr, south of Baghdad), in the Shiite areas in southern Iraq, in the Nineveh and Salah al-Din provinces in western Iraq, and also in the Iraq-Syria border area. Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Brigade operates alongside the Syrian regime throughout Syria, especially in the south, inter alia, in the region of Daraa and Quneitra near the border with Israel and Jordan. This force apparently also includes fighters of the pro-Iranian Iraqi militia Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq and possibly from other pro-Iranian Iraqi militias as well.^[10]

Media network

•  Kata’ib Hezbollah’s information network operates a website, social media accounts, and a satellite channel (Aletejah channel). The organization’s website (https://www.kataibhezbollah.me/) serves as a central platform for distributing announcements and messages on behalf of Kata’ib Hezbollah. In addition, websites used by the Axis of Resistance, such as the Lebanese al-Mayadeen channel, which is affiliated with Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Iranian Al-Alam channel, provide a platform for the militia spokesmen.

•  Aletejah TV (https://www.aletejahtv.iq/) is an Internet news channel belonging to Kata’ib Hezbollah operating from Baghdad. The channel used to have YouTube channels, but they were suspended. The articles appearing in it are relatively moderate, and it is designed to attract as many viewers as possible from among the Iraqi population. In practice, the content of the channel represents the Al-Itar al-Tansiqi bloc, a pro-Iranian political bloc close to the pro-Iranian militias.

• The militia has varying accounts on Facebook, Twitter, and Telegram, sometimes under the name Saberin News. The organization’s spokesman, Abu Ali al-Askari, is active on Twitter under various names, and messages on his behalf are distributed almost daily (this is after his original account, @abualialaskary, was suspended)^[11]. Al-Askari also operates an active account on Telegram, whose address is t.me/abualaskary.
•  The Resistance Information Network (Shabakat al-I’lam al-Muqawim, URL: http://r-m-n.me/): The website supports the government of Shia’ al-Sudani, who is affiliated with the Al-Itar al-Tansiqi bloc (a coordination framework which includes Shiite groups in the parliament, such as Dawlat al-Qanun of former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and the Al-Hikma group of the Shiite cleric Ammar al-Hakim). The site reflects the ideology of the pro-Iranian militias, among them Kata’ib Hezbollah. In the site’s logo, armed men appear next to the Al-Aqsa Mosque to show that the ideology of the militia aims to liberate Palestine by violence.

Office holders

• The organization is careful about compartmentalization, and its people are very careful not to reveal their identity. Until early January 2020, the militia was headed by Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who was killed by American forces on January 3, 2020, in Baghdad along with Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani. Al-Muhandis also served as deputy chairman and head of the general staff of the PMF and in practice was the central figure in the PMF. It should be noted that Falih al-Fayyadh serves as the PMF chairman but his role is representative rather than military. In addition, Al-Muhandis also served as Soleimani’s adviser in Iraq and seems to have been the closest and most influential pro-Iranian figure in Iraq after Soleimani.
• After he was killed, Al-Muhandis was replaced by Ahmad al-Hamidawi (Al-Hurra, February 26, 2020; US Department of State website, February 26, 2020), Ahmad Mohsen Faraj al-Hamidawi, AKA Abu Hussein. A few days after his appointment, on February 26, 2020, the US Department of State designated Al-Hamidawi as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) due to his involvement in terrorist attacks against American forces and innocent Iraqi citizens. His picture was published in February 2022. In addition, it was noted that in July 2021, the Shura Council appointed Muhammad Hasab al-Majidi as his successor, but Al-Hamidawi refused to step down and continues to serve as the militia’s secretary-general (euro-times.com, March 4, 2022; washingtoninstitute.org, March 9, 2022). Several members of his family also occupy senior positions in the militia^[12].

  
Right: Al-Hamidawi’s photo as appeared on Twitter (@ahm_ks90 Twitter account, February 20, 2022). Left: Notice of the US Department of State on Al-Hamidawi’s designation as a global terrorist (US Department of State website, February 26, 2022)

• The person responsible for security in the militia, who functions both as a security and military advisor and as the military spokesman, is Abu Ali al-Askari whose real name is Hussein Mu’anes. He is a member of the militia’s Shura Council and was detained by the US forces in Iraq in 2008-2011 (Al-Estiklal, March 14, 2020)^[13]. He used to make threats against political figures and experts who did not align with the organization’s agenda. At the beginning of March 2020, he made a threat against political figures who were in contact with American officials and announced that they would be given an extension until March 15, 2020, to sever their ties, otherwise, they would be eliminated (Al-Arabiya, March 6, 2020). In the same year, he also threatened the life of the Iraqi scholar Hisham al-Hashemi, who criticized the pro-Iranian militias. Two weeks later, Hashemi was murdered, apparently by Al-Askari’s men (Al-Arabiya, July 8, 2022). In December 2020, an arrest warrant was issued in Iraq against Al-Askari, following threats he made against the Iraqi Prime Minister at the time, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, and since then his whereabouts are unknown and he may have moved to Iran (Al-Arabiya, December 28, 2022).

•  Another senior official is Muhammad Muhyi, a member of the militia’s political bureau (Al-Maktab al-Siyasi) (Al-Estiklal, March 14, 2020) who also appears in the media as the militia’s spokesman (Al-Mayadeen, January 12, 2020).

Mutual relations with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Lebanese Hezbollah

• Kata’ib Hezbollah considers Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as its main authority and relies on the ideology of Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic revolution in Iran, which includes, among other things, profound hatred for the United States and Israel. This is reflected in the militia’s website, in the events held by it, and in the similarity between its emblem and those of the IRGC’s Qods Force and the Lebanese Hezbollah.
• According to Kata’ib Hezbollah’s website, the militia is an Islamic jihadi organization advocating “resistance,” whose goal is to establish an Islamic republic in Iraq according to the Iranian model based on the ideology of the rule of the jurisprudent (Wilayat al-Faqih). In addition, the militia works to expose American and pro-American projects in Iraq and fight them; maintain the unity of Iraq while emphasizing its Islamic identity; and strive to reach a political majority in order to implement fundamental changes in the Iraqi constitution in democratic ways (implying the creation of a dictatorial Islamic regime similar to that of the Iranian regime). Also, the militia aims to promote the most suitable people (in the organization’s opinion) to decision-making positions in Iraq^[14].

• There is a similarity in the graphic elements of the militia’s emblem and the emblems of the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Qods Force. Above the hand waiving a rifle, there are Quranic verses intended to attribute to the organization’s activity a religious meaning. The Quranic verse in the emblem of the Lebanese Hezbollah reads, “And whoever is an ally of Allah and His Messenger and those who have believed – indeed, the party of Allah – they will be the predominant” (Surah 5, Verse 56, Sahih International translation); The Quranic verse in the emblem of the Qods Force reads, “And prepare against them whatever you are able of power and steeds of war” (Surah 8, Al-Anfal, Verse 60, Sahih International translation); and the verse in Kata’ib Hezbollah’s emblem reads, “Fight the leaders of disbelief, for indeed, there are no oaths [sacred] to them” (Surat At-Tawbah, 9, Verse 12, Sahih International translation).

         
From right to left: Emblems of Kata’ib Hezbollah, the Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Iranian Qods Force

• According to researcher Michael Knights, an expert on the issue of pro-Iranian militias, there is conclusive evidence that Kata’ib Hezbollah is directly subordinate to the IRGC’s Qods Force and operates under its instructions and guidance. Also, the militia is partially funded by Iran, alongside the funding it receives, starting in 2018, from the Iraqi government.

Weapons

• The organization uses a variety of weapons, including rockets of its own production and standard rockets made in Iran, systems for launching anti-aircraft missiles (shoulder-launched missiles), armed APCs, and drones.
• Artillery: The artillery units are equipped with rockets of the organization’s own production and include short-range rockets (yet with a large warhead), and medium and long-range ones (similar to Grad rockets) (Al-Ayn, December 30, 2019). Some of the rockets (which are similar to Grad) are launched using hives mounted on top of camouflaged trucks. According to a report from January 29, 2021, Kata’ib Hezbollah also received 56 rockets, for short and medium ranges, manufactured in Iran. The rockets were transported from Iraq to Syria on civilian trucks and delivered to the organization in the area of the town of Al-Tibni, about 35 km northwest of Deir ez-Zor (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, January 29, 2021).

• Anti-aircraft weapons: Systems for launching anti-aircraft missiles are carried on a platform apparently made in Iran (Kham News, November 27, 2018). In addition, the organization has in its possession APCs armed with a double-barreled anti-aircraft gun. One of them was identified as a US-made M113 APC that apparently came into the hands of the militia from the Iraqi army (Ahwal, August 29, 2022)^[15].

  
Right: A system for launching two anti-aircraft missiles (shoulder-launched missiles) (Kham News, November 27, 2018). On the left: an M113 APC made in the USA, one armed with a medium machine gun and the other with a turret including a dual-barrel anti-aircraft gun. The APC bears the inscription “Kata’ib Hezbollah” on its side (Ahwal, August 29, 2022)

• Drones: According to research conducted by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the militia is highly capable of operating drones. It uses them to attack US Air Force bases in Iraq using command and control systems and operating methods employed by the Houthis in Yemen. The research indicates that the Qods Force trains and guides pro-Iranian elements in Iraq and Yemen (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 14, 2021). One of the drone types is the Iranian-made “Sumud,” which includes a warhead and is known by the Iraqi militias as “Sahab” (clouds) (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 27, 2022).
• Sniper unit: The unit uses sniper rifles apparently made in Iran (Al-Khanadiq, March 29, 2021).

Activity

The internal arena

•   The militiamen are accused of abducting and murdering thousands of Iraqi citizens during the protests against the Iraqi government held in 2019. The protests, which took place due to criticism of the government’s performance, also included criticism of Iranian involvement in Iraq. During the demonstrations, the militiamen attacked the demonstrators with live ammunition, and in response, the demonstrators beat and even killed several fighters of Kata’ib Hezbollah and other pro-Iranian militias. Demonstrators also set fire to the militia headquarters in Najaf in protest of the murder of demonstrators (Kitabat, January 19, 2020).

   
Right: Militia fighter (in red shirt) carried by demonstrators (YouTube, December 7, 2019). Left: The militia headquarters in Najaf going up in flames (Kitabat, January 19, 2020)

• At the same time, the militia also had conflicts with the Iraqi government led by Mostafa al-Kadhimi (who was in office between May 7, 2020, and October 28, 2022). During his tenure, Al-Kadhimi sought to weaken Iranian involvement in Iraq in order to maintain the independence of the government and exercise Iraqi sovereignty. The main conflict between Al-Kadhimi and Kata’ib Hezbollah began in June 2020 following several incidents of rocket fire at American targets attributed to the militia (Reuters, June 26, 2020). Al-Kadhimi ordered the arrest of those responsible for firing the rockets. On June 25, 2020, forces of the Iraqi Counterterrorism Unit, which reports directly to the prime minister, raided a militia compound in southern Iraq and arrested 14 operatives (according to other versions, 19 or 23 operatives). In addition, launchers and rockets were seized. They were apparently intended to carry out additional attacks against American targets. According to an Iraqi official, three militia commanders were among the detainees, one of them an Iranian citizen. Al-Kadhimi’s move created a conflict with the pro-Iranian militias, which included a personal attack and threats against him; he was even accused of collaborating with the United States. A few days later, the operatives were released, except for one, apparently due to the heavy pressure exerted on Al-Kadhimi by Kata’ib Hezbollah (Al-Hadath, June 29, 2020).

The political arena

• At the beginning of 2017, fourteen Kata’ib Hezbollah representatives were integrated into the Iraqi parliament (out of 329 seats) but their influence on government decisions was low. The penetration of the pro-Iranian militias into Iraqi politics began to be established in the Iraqi parliamentary elections in 2018 when the prominent pro-Iranian militias (Kata’ib Hezbollah, Badr Organization, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq, and Imam Ali Brigades) formed the Al-Fatah coalition^[16] and won 48 seats in the parliament^[17].
• In the parliamentary elections on October 10, 2021, the power of the Al-Fatah coalition decreased and it won 17 seats (the winner of the elections was Muqtada al-Sadr with 73 seats; he called for unity around Iraqi nationalism while suppressing Iranian and American involvement in the country). However, after the withdrawal of the Sadrist representatives from the parliament on June 12, 2022, the weight of the Al-Fatah coalition and the Shiite bloc in the parliament (known as Al-Itar al-Tansiqi) rose again. This may later lead to pro-Iranian elements taking over the political system in Iraq and may put the continued sovereignty of the Iraqi regime at risk.
• The current Iraqi government, formed on October 27, 2022, is considered pro-Iranian because it is headed by Muhammad Shia’ al-Sudani, who was the preferred candidate of Iran and the militias supporting it. He is also close to former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki (who served as prime minister between May 2006 and September 2014). For now, it is not clear what the extent of the influence of Kata’ib Hezbollah is on the new government. It seems that the government will have to concentrate, at least in the near term, on dealing with Iraq’s internal problems, primarily corruption and the poor functioning of the state’s institutions.

Activity against the US forces

• Immediately upon its establishment, the militia assumed a central part in the attacks against the American forces in Iraq, mainly the activation of roadside charges and the launching of rockets at the bases of the American forces. In 2009, Kata’ib Hezbollah was designated as a terrorist organization by the US State Department (Al-Hurra, February 26, 2020; US State Department website, February 26, 2020). The following are noteworthy events in recent years.
•  On December 27, 2019, about 30 rockets were launched at a joint base of the Iraqi army and the US army in Kirkuk, killing an American citizen who was working as a contractor. Following this, on December 29, 2019, US planes attacked three targets in the Iraqi city of Al-Qaim and two targets in Syria, in the Albukamal border crossing area. According to reports by the Lebanese Al-Mayadeen channel, which is affiliated with Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah, over 30 people were killed and over 50 wounded in the attack. Most of the victims, if not all, were Kata’ib Hezbollah operatives (Reuters, December 29, 2019; Al-Mayadeen, December 29, 2019). In response, Kata’ib Hezbollah made threats against the United States and Israel and organized a demonstration in front of the United States Embassy in Baghdad in which thousands participated. The demonstrators attacked the embassy building, causing material damage. They were unable to break through the main doors, but were able to temporarily take control of the outside space of the embassy and even hoist the militia flags on the compound wall. Alongside the militia supporters, operatives and commanders of other pro-Iranian militias such as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq and Al-Nujaba could also be seen taking part in the demonstration (Reuters, Al-Sumaria, Al-Jazeera, Russia al-Youm, and Baghdad al-Youm, December 31, 2019).

   
Kata’ib Hezbollah’s flag at the entrance of the US Embassy in Baghdad
(Baghdad al-Youm, December 31, 2019)

• On January 3, 2020, the militia announced that Iraq’s security forces must stay at least a kilometer away from US military facilities, in what was interpreted as a warning of an intention to attack them. Another threatening message was sent by militia spokesman Jaafar al-Husseini, according to which “the militia members are ready at any moment for the decision of the organization’s commanders to attack bases where American soldiers are stationed all over Iraq” (Al-Mayadeen channel, January 2, 2020).
•  In mid-January 2020, a few days after the appointment of Qaani as Qassem Soleimani’s replacement as commander of the Qods Force, the heads of the Iranian-backed Iraqi Shiite militias and Muqtada al-Sadr, the head of the Sadrist movement, gathered in the city of Qom in Iran. The Iranian Fars News Agency, which is affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards, reported that the purpose of the meeting was to formulate a strategy for coordination following the assassination of Soleimani and Al-Muhandis. The Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar, which is close to Hezbollah, reported that at the meeting, a strategy was formulated to remove the Americans from Iraq by carrying out a series of attacks. On February 29, 2020, in a precedent-setting step, Kata’ib Hezbollah issued an ultimatum to the US forces to leave Iraq by March 15, 2020. Abu Ali al-Askari, a senior commander in the militia, threatened Iraqi contractors working with the American military in Iraq to stop doing so by that date. In addition, he called on Iraqi diplomats and members of the security establishment to sever relations with the US military, and in particular visits to the bases where the Americans are stationed, otherwise they will be held responsible^[18].

• On March 3, 2021, militia operatives fired self-manufactured rockets (apparently similar to Grad rockets) at the Ain al-Asad airbase, located about 85 km northwest of Ramadi, where American military forces and civilians were stationed. The truck from which the rockets were launched was camouflaged as a garbage truck and was destroyed in its front part, apparently in a counterattack, while the box of the truck, including 10 launch pads that were on it, remained intact (imgur, March 3, 2021). An American contractor was killed^[19].

     
Kata’ib Hezbollah’s truck from which rockets were fired at the Ain al-Asad airbase
(imgur, March 3, 2021)

• Later in March 2020, Grad rocket barrages were launched several times at the Taji base, north of Baghdad, where Global Coalition soldiers, especially Americans, were stationed. In one of the attacks, which took place on March 11, 2020, two American soldiers and a British soldier were killed. On March 14, 2020, another attack was carried out, with no casualties. In view of the assessment that the militia operatives were behind the attacks although they did not claim official responsibility, the United States responded with airstrikes against groups belonging to Kata’ib Hezbollah (US Department of Defense, March 14, 2020; Al-Jazeera, March 14, 2020)^[20].

• As of January 4, 2022, the militia began launching drones at American targets in Iraq and Syria^[21]. Two drones were launched on January 4, 2022, at the Ain al-Asad airbase, northwest of Ramadi, which hosts US Army forces and American civilians supporting them. Both drones were shot down by the air defense systems at the base. The launch was attributed to Kata’ib Hezbollah (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 6, 2022).
• On June 9, 2022, it was reported that during the night, an explosive drone landed on a road near the American Consulate in the city of Erbil. The Kurdish security forces accused Kata’ib Hezbollah of launching the drone. They said the drone had been launched from the Kirkuk area. Pro-Iranian media sources reported that it was an assassination operation against Israeli Mossad operatives in the area (RUDAW, June 9, 2022; i24News, June 9, 2022)^[22].

Activity against ISIS in Iraq

• The militia fighters were integrated in 2014 as part of the PMF in the fight against ISIS and operated especially in the provinces of Baghdad, Salah al-Din, Al-Anbar, and Diyala. As part of this activity, the militia fighters were involved in blatant violations of human rights among Sunni Iraqi citizens, which included evicting Sunni residents from their homes and taking over their property (Al-Arabiya, December 30, 2019). With the decline of the threat of ISIS, calls arose in the Iraqi public and on the part of some politicians in Iraq for the disarmament of the pro-Iranian militias, including Kata’ib Hezbollah. The militias objected. They continue to take part in the fight against the remaining ISIS squads in Iraq, to a significant extent in order to justify their existence in the Iraqi public.

Involvement in Syria

• Kata’ib Hezbollah was the first Iraqi militia called (apparently by the Iranian IRGC’s Qods Force) to assist the Assad regime in the early stages of the Syrian civil war in 2011, although it only admitted this in 2013. Troops of the Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Brigade operated in the Damascus area, especially in the Al-Sayyida Zainab tomb complex, south of Damascus, a holy site for Shiites^[23]. In 2014, the militia expanded its activities in Syria while focusing on fighting ISIS, especially in the city of Aleppo and its surroundings, which ISIS took over, under direct instructions from the Qods Force commander at the time, Qassem Soleimani, who claimed that “the road to the liberation of Mosul [in Iraq; it was also occupied by ISIS in the same year] passes through Aleppo.” In addition, the militia apparently also operated against other Salafi-Jihadist elements in Syria that were not affiliated with ISIS.
• Kata’ib Hezbollah established local Shiite militias to assist the Syrian regime in collaboration with the Lebanese Hezbollah and the pro-Iranian Badr Organization Iraqi militia. By the end of 2015, there were a total of about a thousand Kata’ib Hezbollah fighters in the Aleppo region. In 2018, militia fighters participated in the Syrian regime’s retake of the Damascus area. As of the end of 2019, the militia held some bases and weapons depots in Syria, but the ITIC has no information regarding the continued existence of these bases and depots today.

• The Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Brigade, Kata’ib Hezbollah’s main arm in Syria, has been localized and established local militias in Syria. As of April 2022, Adnan Abu al-Saud, AKA Abu al-Abbas, is the head of it. Abu al-Abbas, 45, who comes from Al-Mayadeen, is a graduate of an informatics engineering college. In 2011, due to a tribal blood feud, he fled Al-Mayadeen to Damascus, where he owned a cart selling vegetables in the Al-Sayyida Zainab area. In 2014, he joined the IRGC in Syria and was tasked with establishing a local militia that would belong to the IRGC and operate under the Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Brigade. It was reported that he was responsible for recruiting hundreds of people from Deir ez-Zor into its ranks. After the occupation of Al-Mayadeen in October 2017, the brigade grew by recruiting many more to its ranks (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, April 20, 2022)^[24].
• Today, the militia fighters are deployed on the Syria-Jordan border, in the As-Suwayda region, in southwestern Syria, working in close collaboration with the Lebanese Hezbollah. On June 2, 2022, it was reported that hundreds of fighters from Iranian-backed militias, including the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Brigade, left their headquarters in the area of Damascus International Airport towards the area of the Al-Sayyida Zainab tomb, in the Damascus area, to receive missions and take part in gatherings (for preaching purposes) of Shiite clerics. After that, they continued towards southern Syria and held new positions in the Syria-Jordan border area. The fighters were deployed in the towns of Era, about 30 km north of the Syria-Jordan border (and about 6 km southwest of As-Suwayda), and Al-Qrayya, about 20 km north of the Syria-Jordan border (and 14 km south of As-Suwayda). In addition, it was reported that a hundred of the fighters of the Iranian-backed militias were deployed with their full equipment, including anti-aircraft guns, at Tall Al-Zaqaq, about 4 km northwest of Al-Qrayya, near the town of Basra al-Sham. The transfer of forces was carried out in several rounds, with the fighters equipped with light and medium weapons, and their deployment was accompanied by tanks and heavy machine guns. The deployment, which included many troops, was apparently in preparation for entering several cities and towns in Daraa province, led by the Syrian army (Baladi, June 3, 2022).
• It was recently reported that the militia fighters were deployed in the Al-Raqqah area. On August 16, 2022, a convoy of the Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Brigade, which included seven military vehicles, a truck of logistical equipment, and 28 fighters armed with light and medium weapons, arrived at a farm in the town of Mughlah Kabir, overlooking the Euphrates River, about 45 km southeast of Al-Raqqah. This concentration of the brigade’s forces is the first of its kind in the Al-Raqqah province since the brigade began operating in Syria. In addition, there are reports that the militia fighters are present in the Deir ez-Zor–Al-Mayadeen region (Syria TV, August 17, 2022).

Assistance to Iran in suppressing the riots in the country

• The website Iran International, which operates from London (and is funded by Saudi Arabia), stated on November 1, 2022, that it had received reports according to which militia fighters from the PMF, including militia fighters from Kata’ib Hezbollah, are taking part in suppressing the civil unrest in Iran. According to the website, eyewitnesses reported about 150 fighters aged 25-30 arrived from Iraq at the Mashhad airport on October 31, 2022. In addition, reports were received of Arabic speakers participating in the suppression of the riots. It is estimated that the regime is afraid that Iranian policemen will refuse to attack demonstrators who are their own people (and possibly also their families) and therefore prefers to use mercenaries. Fars Agency, which is close to the government, issued a denial (Iran International, January 11, 2022). This is further evidence of the complete subordination of the militia to the Iranian regime.

Civilian institutions

• Similar to the model implemented by Iran with Hezbollah in Lebanon, Kata’ib Hezbollah operates a network of civilian foundations among the Shiite population in Iraq, although they seem to operate on a smaller scale and at lower costs than those in Lebanon. Their purpose is mainly to deepen Kata’ib Hezbollah’s influence among the Shiites and to inculcate Iranian ideology. The militia’s civilian foundations in Iraq include educational, research, religious, and youth institutions:
  • The Mosques and Hussainiyas^[25] Authority: Apparently in charge of mosques and Hussainiyas controlled by the organization. It was designed to serve the purposes of the militia, to promote its position in the Iraqi civilian sphere, to consolidate a pro-Iranian consciousness in the Iraqi public, and apparently also to find volunteers and operatives for Kata’ib Hezbollah. It operates, inter alia, among children and youth, apparently also educating them for militant activity (Mosques and Hussainiyas Authority’s Facebook page, September 6, 2021).

• • Al-Zainabiyat^[26] Foundation: Kata’ib Hezbollah’s women’s organization, which is designed to encourage women to support the militia and enlist the support of their families for the organization’s ideology. According to the militia’s website, this foundation is intended “to expose the lie of the Umayyad Caliphate,” i.e., the Sunnis, and make sure that women have a significant role in shaping society according to the Islamic-Shia style.

• • The Al-Hadaf Research Center: An educational center designed to promote the ideology of the Iranian Islamic Revolution in Iraq. The address of the center’s website: http://hadafcenter.com/. The content on the website is pro-Iranian and anti-American. The center holds conferences and courses to promote the Khomeinist-Shiite Islamic ideology.

• • The Al-Nukhab (i.e., the chosen, elite) Foundation in Academia: Established in November 2013, it operates as a sort of research institute and engages in pro-Iranian activity among university students in Iraq. The address of the foundation’s website: http://alnukhab.com. The website documents the foundation’s activity, including financial aid to the needy, commemoration of Kata’ib Hezbollah’s martyrs, and propaganda activities for the militia. The foundation has a YouTube channel: www.youtube.com/watch?v=P_sWi8LT44E. On the channel one can watch, for example, a conference held by the foundation on the deterrent power of the Axis of Resistance against Israel, which stressed the importance of the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq in the Axis of Resistance as part
    of the “Deterrence Equation” against Israel while expressing hostility towards the United States and Israel (YouTube channel of the Al-Nukhab Foundation in Academia, July 4, 2021).

• • Al-Subul al-Wadiha Foundation (“Clear Paths Foundation”): Intended to promote religious issues in the spirit of the Iranian regime’s ideology. It includes Quran memorization centers for children and organizes conferences for adults. It has an active YouTube channel, the address of which is https://www.youtube.com/@user-ky4id6rs8r. Khamenei’s photo appears on the homepage.

• • Al-Imam al-Hussein Scout Movement (youth movement named after Imam al-Hussein, son of Ali, who was killed in the battle of Karbala in 680 AD and is a symbol of sacrifice and heroism in Shia): Its purpose is to mobilize the youth so that they will form the basis for the militia fighters in the future.

    
Right: The emblem of the youth movement, based on the emblem of the Boy Scout movement. In the center is the flag of Iraq. The name of the youth movement and the word “obey” appear against the background of the colors of the militia flag (website of the youth movement, June 25, 2020). Left: Young members of the youth movement during paramilitary training (nashatat.org, August 3, 2015)

Threats against Israel and other countries

Threats against Israel

• Kata’ib Hezbollah often expresses hostility towards Israel and calls for its destruction. It has even expressed a willingness to take part in a wide-scale fight against Israel. Here are some examples:
  • In June 2021, Kata’ib Hezbollah announced that it was ready to fight against Israel. In an interview given by the militia’s spokesman, Muhammad Muhyi, to the Al-Mayadeen channel, which is close to Hezbollah, he stated that the militia was prepared to participate in fighting against Israel in a broad framework (i.e., as part of the Axis of Resistance or the Shiite Axis led by Iran) and that it would not necessarily be the only Iraqi militia that would participate in a possible extensive conflict with Israel. He added that the militia can use precision missiles and drones to overcome the geographical distance from Israel (Al-Mayadeen, June 17, 2022).

• • In January 2020, against the background of the “Deal of the Century” (the American plan presented by the American administration to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict), the militia published a statement according to which in this deal, the United States exposed its hostility towards Muslims, its bias in favor of Israel (the “Zionist entity”) and contempt for the rights of the Palestinian people. The announcement emphasized that the Axis of Resistance would be at the forefront of aid to the “Palestinian Resistance.” According to the announcement, “the hopes of US President Donald Trump to grant fake legitimacy to the Zionist entity will not be realized […] and the announcement of this deal will serve as a loud call to remove the Zionist cancer and liberate Palestine and its holy places” (Kata’ib Hezbollah’s website, January 29, 2020).

Threats against other countries

• Threats against Saudi Arabia and the Emirates: Another façade organization of the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq (apparently, of Kata’ib Hezbollah) is the True Promise Brigades (Alwiyat al-Waad al-Haqq), which on October 2, 2022, made threats that it would attack companies operating in Saudi Arabia. This, in light of Saudi Arabia’s support for the Yemeni government fighting the pro-Iranian organization Ansar Allah (also known as the Houthi movement). Additional threats were made by the organization against the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia’s strategic partner in the war in Yemen. On February 2, 2022, the organization also claimed responsibility for a drone attack against vital facilities in Abu Dhabi, apparently an Iranian warning not to act against the Houthi movement in Yemen^[27].
• Turkey: In the past year, the militia presented itself as defending Iraq’s interests in the Kurdistan region against attacks attributed to Turkey. Thus, for example, the militia threatened on June 25, 2022, that it would act against elements operated by Turkey whom it accused of launching six rockets at gas and oil fields in the Kurdish region (Shafaq News, June 25, 2022). A month later, the militia organized a demonstration, along with other pro-Iranian militias (Al-Nujaba and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada), in front of the Turkish Consulate in Baghdad in protest of the Turkish artillery attack in Zakho, on the Iraq-Turkey border (Al-Jazeera, July 22, 2022). This is intended to present the pro-Iranian militias as patriotic, although in practice this is part of the struggle that Iran is waging against Turkey.

Conclusion

• Kata’ib Hezbollah is one of the most important, if not the most important, arms of Iran in Iraq. It works to advance the regional and international interests of the Iranian regime, and not only at the local Iraqi level. It has an Iranian budget alongside a budget that it receives from the Iraqi government. It has many resources, a trained military force with extensive combat experience, is involved in the political mechanisms in Iraq, and has an extensive civil infrastructure, which operates according to the model of Hezbollah in Lebanon and is intended to train the next generations of militiamen. The militia has undergone significant development in the last two years, especially by being equipped with rockets and drones. Therefore, the level of threat that it poses to the Iraqi regime and the entire region has only intensified.
• As part of its subordination to Iran, the militia takes a major part in attacks against American targets in Iraq and Syria and acts as part of the Axis of Resistance and the Shiite Crescent while making repeated threats against Israel and other countries in the region. Under these circumstances, it seems that the militia will continue to challenge the regimes in the region, the West, and Israel.

^[1] The current study is an update of the previous study published by the ITIC on July 14, 2020, “Kataeb Hezbollah: Profile of a Shiite-Iraqi militia handled by the Qods Force to promote Iranian interests in Iraq” ↑
^[2] The Popular Mobilization Forces (hereinafter: the PMF) includes about 40 militias, the vast majority of which are Shiite and the dominant ones are pro-Iranian and supported by Iran. ↑
^[3] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis ↑
^[4] The Axis of Resistance is an anti-American and anti-Israeli political-military alliance between Iran, the Assad regime in Syria, Iran’s proxies (Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthi movement in Yemen, and pro-Iranian militias in Iraq and Syria), Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC). It advocates a violent struggle against Israel. ↑
^[5] The Shiite Crescent is the name used to denote the spread of Iran’s regional influence through Iraq (about 60% of its inhabitants are Shiites), Syria (where members of the Alawite tribe, who rule the country, make up about 10% of the population and are recognized by this axis as Shiites), and Lebanon (which is actually controlled by Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy in Lebanon). The expansion of Iranian influence (from Iran to Lebanon) is in the shape of a crescent. ↑
^[6] For further details on the Shiite militias in Iraq, see the ITIC’s study from November 15, 2022, “The Pro-Iranian militias in Iraq – the current situation” ↑
^[7] Al-Sadr stopped his activity against the US forces in 2006, and in 2007 declared a ceasefire in the fighting against the US forces. ↑
^[8] https://iranprimer.usip.org, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org ↑
^[9] https://iranprimer.usip.org, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org ↑
^[10] See the ITIC’s Information Bulletin from July 11, 2018, “Hezbollah and Iran-handled Shi’ite militias are integrated into the Syrian army in its campaign to take control of south Syria” ↑
^[11] https://twitter.com ↑
^[12] https://euro-times.com, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org ↑
^[13] http://new.alestiklal.net ↑
^[14] https://www.kataibhezbollah.me/about ↑
^[15] For details on the APC, see https://www.artstation.com/artwork/bKk5Yg ↑
^[16] The Al-Fatah coalition (I’tilaf / Tahaluf al-Fatah, also called Kutlat al-Fatah, i.e., the Fatah Bloc; the term Fatah means victory or occupation), the political wing of the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, is headed by Hadi al-Amiri, one of the main pro-Iranian figures in Iraq and the secretary-general of the pro-Iranian Badr militia (Badr Organization). ↑
^[17] https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2021/nov/10/profiles-pro-iran-militias-iraq ↑
^[18] https://jiss.org.il ↑
^[19] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org ↑
^[20] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3-RQKz8fTzM ↑
^[21] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org ↑
^[22] https://www.rudaw.net ↑
^[23] The Al-Sayyida Zainab (commonly known as Sitt Zainab) Shrine, which is situated south of Damascus, is considered the Shiite holiest site in Syria. The Shiites believe that Zainab, the daughter of Ali bin Abu Taleb, the most prominent figure in Shiite Islam, is buried there. Zainab is considered a role model especially for Shiite women. During the civil war in Syria, defending the tomb and the compound surrounding it became the main justification for the involvement of Shiite pro-Iranian elements in the fighting in Syria alongside the Syrian regime, claiming that the Sunni jihadist elements, which are hostile to the Shia, will put the site in danger and will even destroy it. ↑
^[24] From a study on Kata’ib Hezbollah by CISAC Institute, Stanford University: https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu ↑
^[25] Hussainiya: a Shiite religious community center of sorts, where educational, cultural and social activities take place. ↑
^[26] Zainab women are named after Zainab, Ali’s daughter, who is a role model in Shiite Islam. ↑
^[27] https://wwww.washingtoninstitute.org, https://www.aljazeera.com ↑

Related Articles