Iran Assists Hezbollah’s Post-Ceasefire Reconstruction

Overview^[1]

• The United States Treasury Department reported that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) had transferred approximately $1 billion to Hezbollah since the beginning of the year to reconstruct the organization’s military capabilities in the wake of the war against Israel. Since the war ended in late November 2024, Iran has also continued to smuggle weapons to the organization and interfere with the Lebanese government’s efforts to disarm Hezbollah. As a result, a senior American delegation urged the Lebanese leadership to accelerate action against the sources of Hezbollah’s funding.
• The fall of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024 and the flight ban imposed by the Lebanese government on Iran since February 2025 disrupted the land and air routes used by Iran to transfer weapons, technological assistance and funds to Hezbollah. Iran and Hezbollah subsequently found other avenues, including smuggling through Turkey and Iraq, by sea and through currency-exchange agencies. They also continue to rely on smuggling networks along the Syria-Lebanon border, despite Syrian and IDF efforts to block them.
• The Iranian embassy in Beirut denied the information provided by the American government, but throughout the war in the Gaza Strip and after the ceasefire Iranian officials made clear that they continue to support Hezbollah, as they do other members of the “resistance axis.” Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem also publicly thanked Iran for its “massive” assistance.
• The American disclosure of the financial aid transferred by the IRGC to Hezbollah, along with the exposure of smuggling methods, showed that Iran and Hezbollah had found ways to overcome the challenges of geopolitical changes in Lebanon and the Middle East since the ceasefire in late November 2024, and how difficult it was to dent the 40-year cooperation between Tehran and the Lebanese organization. In all probability Iran will continue to support and fund Hezbollah’s military and civil reconstruction in order to preserve its status within the Shi’ite community and in Lebanon, and to prevent Israel and the Lebanese authorities from weakening or neutralizing Iran’s most important strategic arm in the Middle East. The absence of more decisive action by the international community in general and by the Lebanese government in particular, to eliminate Hezbollah’s funding sources and block smuggling routes, will allow Iran and Hezbollah to continue transferring funds and weapons with little disruption.

Background

• On November 6, 2025, the United States Treasury Department reported that since the beginning of 2025, the IRGC’s Qods Force had transferred close to $1 billion to Hezbollah. According to the Department, the funding was channeled through a network of currency-exchange agencies and cash businesses, exploiting legitimate financial mechanisms to conceal the origin and destination of the money. The Department said the funds were used by Hezbollah to rebuild its military capabilities and resist the Lebanese government’s efforts to establish sovereign control throughout the country. It was further noted that Hezbollah’s operational model of mixing illegal funds with legitimate business activity threatened the integrity and stability of Lebanon’s financial system (United States Treasure Department website, November 6, 2025). John Hurley, Department undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, said Iran continued transferring funds to Hezbollah, although the exact amount so far was unknown (AP, November 10, 2025).
• In light of the findings, the Treasury Department imposed sanctions on two Hezbollah operatives and a Syrian businessman involved in the money-transfer network. One was Jaafar Muhammad Qasir, head of Hezbollah’s financial team and its economic investment portfolio. He is the son of Muhammad Jaafar Qasir, former commander of Unit 4400, which was responsible for transferring weapons from Iran and was eliminated by the IDF in October 2024. The inclusion of Qasir’s name in the sanctions list signals the United States view Hezbollah’s financial apparatus is an integral part of its military buildup and not merely a civilian activity (United States Treasury Department, November 6, 2025).

Iran’s Position

• The Iranian embassy in Beirut denied the United States allegations regarding Iran’s involvement in Lebanon and the transfer of funds to Hezbollah. The embassy replied that the Americans would do better by keeping their promises to the Lebanese people, for example by finding a solution for the electricity crisis, rather than wasting time on empty rhetoric. The statement added that instead of making baseless accusations against Iran, the United States should restrain Israel and its attacks in Lebanon (ISNA, November 11, 2025).
• Nevertheless, Iranian officials said Tehran had continued its assistance and support for the members of the “resistance axis” in general and for Hezbollah in particular during the war in the Gaza Strip and after the “12-day war” [the Israel-Iran War] against Israel in June 2025. Thus Iran continues the policy it has maintained regarding Hezbollah since the organization’ was established in 1982, providing not only ideological support, but military and financial assistance, which is supremely important for Iran, as Hezbollah is its most important proxy and its main strategic arm in the Middle East:^[2]
  • The Iranian foreign minister, Abbas Araqchi, said Iran had always supported Hezbollah and the “resistance” weapons had so far succeeded in blocking Israel’s [alleged] “ambitions” (Iranian television, September 11, 2025).
  • The secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, who visited Lebanon in September 2025, met with Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem and reiterated Iran’s support for Lebanon and the “resistance” in accordance with the directives of Iran’s leader, Ali Khamenei (al-Mayadeen, September 28, 2025). In a press conference following his meeting Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, Larijani said Hezbollah was so strong it did not need weapons from other countries. He also laughed at American claims of millions of dollars of Iranian financial aid to Hezbollah (snn.ir, September 27, 2025).
  • During a visit to Lebanon in August 2025, Larijani reiterated Iran’s support for the “resistance.” He claimed that Iran did not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries but would always support “resistance” movements^[3] (Tasnim, August 13, 2025). In an interview after the visit, Larijani said that Iran had helped Hezbollah and still helped it, but emphasized that it was the Lebanese people who created the organization, which had become an asset for them in the struggle against Israel (Iran’s leader website, August 22, 2025).
  • The IRGC, marking the anniversary of the deaths of Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah and other senior Hezbollah figures in Israeli attacks in Beirut, said that the Guards would continue their support for the “resistance axis” and viewed continuing their course until “the elimination of the occupation and the liberation of Jerusalem as a divine, national, unstoppable mission” (Khabar Online, September 27, 2025).

Hezbollah’s Position

• Hezbollah publicly expressed gratitude for Iran’s military and strategic support and said it did not intend to give up its ties with Tehran despite the blows it suffered in Israeli attacks and the growing calls in Lebanon for its disarmament:
  • In August 2025, Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem met with Ali Larijani, the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. Qassem thanked Iran for its continued support of Lebanon and the “resistance” against “the Zionist regime” and for its solidarity with Lebanon’s unity, sovereignty and independence. Qassem also noted the fraternal relations between the peoples of Iran and Lebanon, calling them “a regional pillar of steadfastness and resistance” (Tasnim, August 14, 2025).
  • Hezbollah’s representative in Iran, Abdallah Safi al-Din, said it they had requested Iran’s help “to expel the occupation from Lebanon and defend its security.” He added that Lebanon had made great achievements with Iran’s assistance and Iran had not asked Hezbollah for anything in return. He claimed that Iran’s only desire was for Lebanon to be able to defend itself and the claim that Iran wanted to interfere in Lebanon’s internal affairs was mistaken (al-Mayadeen, October 6, 2025).
  • In a “two hearts as one” [Iran and Hezbollah] speech given on the second anniversary of the October 7, 2023 terrorist attack and massacre, Hezbollah secretary general Qassem expressed gratitude for Iranian support. He said they felt that “all of Iran, from beginning to end, stands with us” and had enabled them to feel “resolve and strength.” He added that Iran “pays the price because it stands on the right side, alongside the resistance,” and it “serves as a model that asks for nothing in return to remain noble and exalted” (al-Manar, October 7, 2025).

• • In a Hezbollah statement marking two years since the Gaza Strip War began, the organization praised the Islamic Republic of Iran, its leader Ali Khamenei, its government, people and armed forces for their support of Hezbollah and Hamas. According to Hezbollah, regional security and stability depended on “unity of position” and coordination among Arab and Islamic states, and on practical support for the “resistance,” because “the enemy understands only the language of power and confrontation” (al-Manar, October 7, 2025).
  • In a speech marking Shaheed Day, Na’im Qassem thanked Iran, “which has supported and continues to support us,” noting that its assistance “is truly immense.” He specifically praised Khamenei, whom he called “the loving patron, the lover of the mujahideen, the hero of human dignity, the defender of the oppressed and of the rights of Palestine [sic].” He also praised Qassem Soleimani, the late commander of the Qods Force, whom he described as “the leader of the resistance axis who gave everything” (al-‘Ahed, November 11, 2025).

Transferring Iranian Aid to Hezbollah

Ministry of the Interior and National Security, Security and Police Forces

• Hezbollah was established as Iran’s most favored strategic arm of its proxy organizations in the Middle East to promote its ideology and regional influence, conduct direct confrontation with Israel, and support other organizations and militias belonging to the “resistance axis.” To that end, through Unit 4400, which is responsible for the organization’s buildup and weapons transfers, and Unit 190 of the IRGC Qods Force, Hezbollah established an integrated network for smuggling weapons, money and technology which strengthened Hezbollah’s military capabilities, particularly in stockpiling an arsenal consisting of more than 100,000 missiles, rockets and UAVs. Iran also helped establish Hezbollah’s social institutions within Lebanon’s Shi’ite community.^[4] During the war against Israel (October 8, 2023 – November 27, 2024), Hezbollah made extensive use of the weapons smuggled from Iran or developed with its assistance.^[5] However, the organization’s operational capabilities were severely damaged, it lost thousands of operatives, and much of its attack capabilities and military infrastructure, especially in south Lebanon, were damaged.
• Political changes in Lebanon and regional changes in the Middle East challenged Tehran’s ability to assist in rebuilding and rearming the organization after the war against Israel, as had been done after the Second Lebanon War in 2006:^[6]
  • Blocking the air route between Iran and Lebanon: Beirut International Airport served as a main route for smuggling weapons and money from Iran to Hezbollah. However, as part of implementing the ceasefire agreement and under American pressure and Israeli threats, the Lebanese authorities tightened control at the airport. On January 2, 2025, large sums of money were found in the luggage of an Iranian embassy employee who had landed in Beirut, and on February 12, 2025, the takeoff of an Iranian passenger plane to Beirut was prevented after Israel warned that it would be attacked. As a result, the new government headed by Nawaf Salam halted civilian flights between Iran and Lebanon in mid-February 2025, and they have not been renewed.
  • Action against smuggling along the Syria-Lebanon border: In December 2024, rebel organizations toppled the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who had been an ally of Iran and Hezbollah and had allowed them to use his country as a land route for smuggling weapons into Lebanon. The new regime, headed by President Ahmed al-Sharaa, stated that it would not allow weapons to be transferred through Syria. The security forces of the new Syrian regime took action to prevent weapons from being smuggled into Lebanon, while the IDF attacked illegal border crossings used for smuggling Iranian weapons into Lebanon.
  • Elimination of Iranian officials responsible for supporting Hezbollah: During the Israel-Iran War, the IDF eliminated Muhammad Saeed Izadi (Haj Ramadan), the head of the “Palestine” Department in the IRGC Qods Force, who for nearly two decades had been responsible for Qods Force ties with Hezbollah, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad for operations against Israel, as well as liaising between them and the Iranian leadership.^[7] Behnam Shahriyari, the commander of Unit 190 in the Qods Force, who had been responsible for transferring funds and weapons from Iran to Hezbollah and other proxy organizations, was also eliminated (IDF spokesperson, June 21, 2025).
• As a result, Hezbollah and Iran had to find alternative ways to continue the flow of weapons and funds to the organization in Lebanon. The new system relied on smuggling through third countries, using dismantled components reassembled in Lebanon, and smuggling through civilian maritime routes. The shift from weapons transport to independent production capability in Lebanon enabled Hezbollah to move from dependence on supply lines to reliance on local capabilities based on knowledge, technology and available materials.
  • Smuggling through Turkey: Israel complained to the committee supervising the implementation of the ceasefire that Iranian diplomats and Turkish citizens were transferring cash to Hezbollah on flights from Istanbul to Beirut (Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2025). In a complaint submitted by Danny Danon, Israel’s ambassador to the UN, to the Security Council on February 21, 2025, he accused Turkey of acting as a conduit for transferring funds between Iran and Lebanon for Hezbollah (Nordic Monitor, May 5, 2025). In late February 2025, Lebanese security authorities arrested a Lebanese citizen who arrived on a flight from Turkey carrying $2.5 million destined for Hezbollah. He admitted receiving the suitcase from an Iranian (al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 28, 2025).
  • Smuggling through Iraq: According to Lebanese political analyst Ali Hamadeh, Iran transfers large sums of cash to Lebanon through Iraq, estimated at $20-$30 million a month. He said pro-Iranian Iraqi Shi’ite militias, which possess extensive financial networks, transfer tens of millions of dollars each month from Iraq or overland through Syria using smuggling gangs which have assisted Hezbollah and Iran for years. Hamadeh added that money is also transferred by Lebanese tourists visiting Shi’ite holy sites in Iraq or Iraqi Shi’ite tourists visiting Beirut to visit the grave of former Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah (Aram News, October 28, 2025).
  • Currency exchange offices: As stated by the United States Treasury Department, exchange offices have become an important factor in transferring Iranian funds to Hezbollah. On June 24, 2025, Haitham Abdallah Bakhri, the owner of the Al-Sadiq exchange office in Beirut, was killed in an Israeli airstrike in south Lebanon. The IDF reported that Al-Sadiq stored and transferred funds from the IRGC Qods Force to finance Hezbollah’s terrorist activity, and Bakhri knowingly worked with Hezbollah to transfer the funds from Iran. The IDF spokesperson said the Qods Force transferred money to exchange offices in the Middle East, which later balanced accounts with Lebanese exchange offices which passed the funds to Hezbollah. In addition to Al-Sadiq, the IDF reported the involvement of the Hassan Ayash, Al-Insaf, Malikha, Ramez Mecttaf, and Yara exchange offices (IDF spokesperson, June 25, 2025).

     
Transfer of funds through money-exchange offices (IDF spokesperson, June 25, 2025)

• • Gold smuggling: In May 2025, a Lebanese “senior security official” revealed that Lebanese security authorities had prevented more than 22 kilograms of gold from being smuggled through Beirut International Airport (Wall Street Journal, May 10, 2025). According to analyst Ali Hamadeh, there is extensive gold-smuggling through Turkey by organized gangs or ordinary citizens from Hezbollah’s support circle who transfer quantities of industrial gold into Lebanon, where it is converted into gold bars. Hamadeh noted that for every successful attempt to prevent smuggling, four attempts fail (Aram News, October 28, 2025).
  • Smuggling by sea: A “Western security source” reported that weapons are smuggled into Lebanon by sea. According to the source, Hezbollah effectively controls the port of Beirut through a network of collaborators in customs and inspection authorities operated by Wafiq Safa, Hezbollah’s liaison and coordination unit chief, to smuggle equipment, weapons and money without oversight. The source also noted that the IRGC Qods Force promotes maritime smuggling to Lebanon, directly or through other countries, via Units 190 and 700 (al-Hadath, April 8, 2025). However, Lebanese transportation minister Fayez Rasamny stated that there was no evidence of Hezbollah smuggling through the port of Beirut and claimed that security at the port was under strict supervision (Lebanon 24, April 9, 2025).
  • Other methods enable Hezbollah to finance its activities, even if Iran’s involvement is unclear. Among them are the import of electronics and construction materials to Lebanon for sale to generate revenue for Hezbollah, and money laundering by paying low prices in Europe, mainly in Belgium and Germany, for vehicles which had been in road accidents, transferring them for repair in Lebanon, and reselling them at inflated prices (Aram News, October 28, 2025).

Smuggling along the Syrian Border

• The Syrian regime’s security forces continue to report preventing the smuggling of weapons into Lebanon, including the seizure of two shipments of Kornet anti-tank missiles in the al-Qusayr area in Homs Province and preventing “medium and heavy” weapons from being smuggled through the city of Homs (Telegram channel of the Syrian ministry of the interior, September 27 and October 11, 2025; al-Arabiya, October 12, 2025). The IDF also foiled two attempts to smuggle weapons into Syria in the Mount Hermon area in October 2025 (IDF spokesperson, October 18 and 23, 2025). However, “individuals with access to Israeli and Arab intelligence” said that Hezbollah was stockpiling rockets, anti-tank missiles and artillery, some of which were smuggled by sea and through the Syrian border despite the efforts of the current regime in Damascus to prevent it (Wall Street Journal, October 30, 2025). Below some of the main reports regarding the situation along the border:
  • According to reports, Iran has begun using small civilian vehicles to discreetly transport weapons across Syria and into Lebanon instead of heavy truck convoys easily identifiable by satellites and UAVs. Hezbollah reportedly made significant improvements to its local weapons-manufacturing capability inside Lebanon, including UAVs and medium-range missiles. Meanwhile, according to claims, shipments of Kornet anti-tank missiles and other sophisticated equipment were smuggled from Iran (Wall Street Journal, July 18, 2025).

• • A “Syrian intelligence source” said that the state was struggling to control the border because of organized smuggling networks of arms dealers, smugglers and individuals with a military background, some formerly linked to the Free Syrian Army or the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who operate for profit. The source confirmed that Hezbollah maintained secret weapons depots in areas it had controlled, especially in al-Qusayr, which had become the smuggling hub. It was noted that the organization was trying to reclaim part of its stockpiles through intermediaries and local actors, while Syrian authorities attempted to prevent the smuggling through surveillance and the deployment of forces in the field. According to the report, the smuggling routes are almost identical to those used for drug trafficking, from the Homs areas and Damascus suburbs (Mdaya, Serghaya, and al-Qusayr) into Lebanon (al-Medan, October 15, 2025).
  • The Beqa’a Valley region, from al-Qusayr and al-Qalamoun in western Syria to Baalbek-al-Hermel in eastern Lebanon, is reportedly the overland supply route between Iran and Lebanon. According to a report, the sketchy borders make the area a center for the transport of equipment and manpower, while changes in governance within Syria continue to undermine Damascus’s ability to control the periphery, keeping the smuggling routes active and adaptable. A “prominent tribal leader” residing in the Baalbek area said, “There are mountains the organization still controls, hiding its weapons in tunnels inside them” (Independent Arabic, October 23, 2025).
  • It was reported that Hezbollah had rebuilt a significant part of its military supply network since the November 2024 ceasefire, dispersing its weapons stockpile into smaller warehouses and even beginning domestic production of components for precision systems. According to “two security and political sources,” Iran plays a central role in the reconstruction: Iranian military delegations arrive in Lebanon and channel foreign currency, supply communications equipment and UAVs to compensate for losses, and replenish missile stockpiles. According to Lebanese analyst Ali Hamadeh, independent smuggling networks operating between Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon continue to move weapons and components from stockpiles remaining in areas formerly controlled by Iranian militias. Missile components, communications systems and drones are transferred in dozens of small shipments instead of large convoys and are assembled in workshops in Lebanon (Aram News, October 30, 2025).
  • An investigation revealed that in recent weeks Hezbollah had renewed arms transfers through maritime and overland smuggling networks extending from several regional countries into Lebanon. A “source close to the organization” confirmed that the transfers had not stopped entirely after the war but only changed routes and methods. He said some shipments were transported overland through the eastern border [Syria], in mountainous areas difficult for the Lebanese army to fully monitor, while others arrived by sea from allied states, particularly from small ports not under official supervision (Voice of Beirut International, October 31, 2025).

American Pressure for Action Against the Sources Funding Hezbollah

• The United States Treasury Department’s announcement of the $1 billion transfer from Iran to Hezbollah was released during a visit to Lebanon by a senior United States Treasury Department delegation led by Sebastian Gorka, director of counterterrorism at the White House National Security Council, and attended by undersecretary John Hurley, responsible for sanctions. The delegation met with President Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, and other senior Lebanese officials and discussed the need to cut off Hezbollah’s sources of funding along with efforts to disarm the organization. President Aoun claimed that his country was rigorously implementing procedures adopted to prevent money laundering, smuggling or terrorist financing, and that it severely punished all forms of financial crime (Lebanese presidency X account, November 9, 2025).
• However, Hurley said that while Lebanese authorities had made “great progress” in curbing illegal financial inflows into the country, the United States expected more, and Lebanon now had a window of opportunity to act before the general elections scheduled for May 2026. According to Hurley, Hezbollah smuggles cash and gold in suitcases, mostly through Turkey and the UAE, which the United States delegation also visited, as well as via cryptocurrencies. The Americans also urged the Lebanese to take stronger action against al-Qard al-Hasan Association, Hezbollah’s financial arm (AP, November 10, 2025). In July 2025, Lebanon’s central bank issued a directive prohibiting any relations with al-Qard al-Hasan Association because of United States sanctions and suspicion of terrorist financing.
• “Lebanese parliamentary sources” said that members of the delegation had made clear to their hosts that they had until the end of the current year to complete the required reforms and take specific steps, foremost among them tightening oversight of money-laundering companies. According to the report, when one Lebanese parliamentarian remarked that the time frame was insufficient, he was told, “The United States has been waiting for you for 40 years!” Delegation head Gorka warned that Lebanese failure to cut off Hezbollah Iranian funding would compel the United States administration to abandon Beirut to its fate (OTV, November 10, 2025; al-Sharq al-Awsat, November 11, 2025).

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] For further information, see the October 2025 ITIC report, Iran and the Continued Aid to the Axis of Resistance amid the Ceasefire in the Gaza Strip ^[3] Terrorist organizations.
^[4] For further information, see the October 2023 ITIC report, Operation Iron Swords The development of Iranian-Hamas-Hezbollah cooperation and the December 2024 report, Captured documents reveal how Iran smuggles weapons via Syria and Jordan
^[5] For further information, see the January 2025 ITIC report, Weapons Used by Hezbollah Against Israel, October 8, 2023 to November 27, 2024
^[6] For further information, see the May 2025 ITIC report, Challenges Faced by Hezbolla after the November 27, 2024 ceasfire
^[7] For further information, see the January 2025 ITIC report, Activities of Saeed Izadi, Head of the Qods Forces’ “Palestine Branch,” Reflected in Captured Documents

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