Iran and the Continued Aid to the Axis of Resistance amid the Ceasefire in the Gaza Strip

Overview^[1]

• The ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip was achieved at a time when Iran and the “Axis of Resistance” which it leads are facing significant challenges at home and in the region, especially in light of the weakening of the axis and the consequences of the “12-Day War” between it and Israel and the United States in June 2025.
• Senior Iranian officials expressed support in principle for the ceasefire agreement and claimed that Iran had supported every initiative aimed at ending the war over the past two years. However, they expressed doubts about Israel’s commitment to abide by the agreement. In addition, the officials stressed that the decision on the ceasefire was made exclusively by Hamas without any involvement from Tehran. Iran also rejected the invitation to participate in the peace summit in Sharm al-Sheikh, claiming that it could not participate with those who attacked it during the “12-Day War.”
• Iran’s state media portrayed the end of the war as a strategic victory for Hamas and the Palestinians, who succeeded in putting the Palestinian issue back at the top of the global agenda, and as a severe defeat for Israel, which did not achieve its goals and was weakened militarily, economically, socially, and internationally.
• Before and after the ceasefire, senior officials and media outlets in Iran stressed that, despite the challenges and pressures facing the Islamic Republic and the pro-Iranian axis in the region, Tehran has no intention of abandoning its allies. They emphasized the importance of continuing the “resistance” and Iranian support for it. At the same time, Iran continues to deliver aid, including weapons, to its proxies in the region, including the terrorist organizations in Judea and Samaria, Hezbollah, and the Houthis.
• In the ITIC’s assessment, the end of the war in the Gaza Strip is not expected to bring about a significant change in Iran’s policy or put an end to its efforts to expand its influence in the Palestinian arena and to continue providing aid to Hamas and the other Palestinian terrorist organizations. In Tehran’s assessment, Hamas’ continued presence in the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria may also provide it with future opportunities to rebuild the movement’s capabilities and preserve some of Iran’s influence, despite the operational, logistical, and financial constraints that limit Iran’s continued support for the Palestinian terrorist organizations. At the same time, Iran is expected to continue its support for the other components of the “Axis of Resistance” in the region, first and foremost Hezbollah, which is in the midst of a recovery process despite the IDF’s attacks and the demand for the organization to disarm, and the Houthis, who are taking advantage of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip to continue acquiring weapons and improving their offensive capabilities.

Reactions to the Ceasefire in the Gaza Strip

The Iranian Leadership

• The ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip was achieved at a time when Iran is facing significant challenges at home and in the region, especially in light of the weakening of the axis and the consequences of the “12-Day War” between it and Israel and the United States in June 2025. Senior Iranian officials expressed support in principle for the agreement and claimed that Iran has supported every initiative to end the war over the past two years. However, they expressed doubts about Israel’s commitment to abide by the agreement. The senior figures also stressed that the decision regarding the ceasefire was made exclusively by Hamas, without any involvement from Tehran:
  • The Iranian Foreign Ministry’s response to the ceasefire said that the Islamic Republic has always supported every step and initiative that will ensure “the cessation of the war of genocide, the withdrawal of the occupying soldiers, the entry of humanitarian aid, the release of Palestinian prisoners, and the realization of the basic rights of the Palestinian people.” It also said that in the past two years, Iran has used all its diplomatic capabilities, especially at the regional level and within the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the United Nations, to pressure Israel and its supporters to stop the “genocide.” The Iranian Foreign Ministry stressed the responsibility of the international community to prevent Israel’s violation of the agreement and called on it to be vigilant in the face of its “tricks and violations of agreements.” The ministry emphasized that “stopping the crimes and genocide” in the Gaza Strip does not absolve countries and international organizations of their responsibility to fulfill their legal, humanitarian, and moral obligation to prosecute those responsible and perpetrators of “war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity” in the Gaza Strip (Iranian Foreign Ministry website, October 9, 2025).
  • Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said that Iran supports any plan that would lead to an end to the “crimes” in the Gaza Strip, but added that there is no trust in the “Zionist regime.” He stressed that the situation on the ground remains difficult and that half of the Gaza Strip is still under the control of the “occupying regime.” He said the decision on the ceasefire had been made by the “resistance” organizations themselves, and the Islamic Republic will continue to support the process according to those decisions (Iranian TV, October 11, 2025). After the implementation of the first stage of the agreement, Araghchi said that Iran is closely following the plans to end the “killing and genocide” in the Gaza Strip. He said that the cessation of the “crimes” would be welcomed by everyone, but that the only path to resolving the Palestinian issue is ending the “occupation” and realizing the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination (Mehr, October 16, 2025).

• • Ali Larijani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, praised the “victory of the resistance.” He said that the “grand welcoming ceremony” for the Palestinian prisoners released by the “brave and oppressed people of Palestine” proved which side had won. According to him, the “Zionist regime” can see in these images how, after two years of “cruel killings,” the status of Hamas and the “resistance” has only strengthened in the hearts of the people (Larijani’s X account, October 14, 2025).
  • Majles Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf said that Iran supports any initiative that ends “the crimes of war and genocide in Gaza,” as long as it is supported by the Palestinian people. He said that an end to the “genocide,” an end to the “aggression and occupation” in the Gaza Strip, the lifting of the “siege,” the opening of the crossings, and the entry of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip are urgent demands of the Palestinian people and the “resistance” organizations and are fully supported by Iran. He added that the ceasefire is a defeat for Prime Minister Netanyahu’s plans, and that in the end, Israel and the United States were forced to admit defeat and sign a ceasefire without achieving any of their stated goals. Qalibaf also said that “the Israeli criminals are isolated and hated, and Palestine is proud and free” (IRNA, October 12, 2025).

• • Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei condemned the “ongoing violations of the ceasefire agreement by the Zionist regime” and Israel’s refusal to reopen the Rafah crossing. He noted that the responsibility for these “violations” lies with the guarantors of the agreement and called on the international community to take effective steps to force Israel to stop its “crimes” and withdraw from the Gaza Strip, as well as to provide aid to the Palestinians and prosecute Israel (Iranian Foreign Ministry website, October 18, 2025).
• Meanwhile, Iran declined the invitation to participate in the peace summit led by US President Donald Trump, which was held in Sharm al-Sheikh on October 13, 2025. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Baghaei said that the matter had been examined carefully and that a decision was ultimately taken that served the country’s interests. He argued that Iran’s regional role is not measured by whether it attends a particular event or not. Baghaei added that Iran had been one of the most active states with regard to “monitoring the crimes in Gaza” in the past two years, and that it would continue its activity on the issue (Iranian Foreign Ministry website, October 13, 2025). Earlier, Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi confirmed that Iran would not send a representative to the summit. He said that the president, Masoud Pezeshkian, and he himself cannot communicate with those who attacked Iran and who continue to threaten and impose sanctions on it. However, he thanked Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi for the invitation and stressed that Iran supports any initiative that will bring about an end to the Palestinian “genocide” and ensure the withdrawal of the occupation (Abbas Araghchi’s X account, October 12, 2025).

Iranian Media

• The official media in Iran presented the end of the war in the Gaza Strip as a strategic victory for Hamas and the Palestinians and a severe defeat for Israel, with the articles emphasizing that the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, succeeded in bringing the Palestinian issue back to the center of the international agenda:
  • Even before the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip was announced, the official website of the Iranian Supreme Leader published an editorial marking the second anniversary of Hamas’ attack on Israel. The article argues that two years after the “al-Aqsa Flood,” it is clearer than ever that this action was not a mistake but a strategic decision, intended to preserve the existence and identity of the Palestinian people in the face of a project aimed at the gradual erasure of “Palestine” from the map of the region, as well as initiatives such as the normalization of relations between Israel and the Arab states, which made the “Zionist regime” the focus of the new regional order. It also states that the consequences of the Hamas attack were not only military but also political, social, and emotional: the Palestinian issue, which until October 2023 was pushed to the sidelines due to normalization and economic transactions in the region, has returned to the center of global consciousness; In the past two years, millions of people around the world have taken to the streets to support the Palestinian people, and several European countries once considered Israel’s closest allies have recognized the state of “Palestine.” At the same time, Israel is facing a crisis of legitimacy and accusations of “war crimes.” According to the article, it can be said that the “al-Aqsa Flood” was not only a military operation but also a historical turning point that changed the course of the Palestinian cause in the world (Iranian Supreme Leader’s website, October 5, 2025).
  • The hardline daily Javan reported that the photos of the release of 2,000 Palestinian prisoners attest to the victory of the new order that Iran and its allies have imposed on the region through the “resistance.” It was noted that the new regional order is the result of a change in the balance of power in favor of the “Axis of Resistance” and Iran and to the detriment of traditional actors, such as Israel and Saudi Arabia. The article reads: “Gaza was a miracle that broke not only the sea but the world and its beliefs… It came out of the fire and destroyed the cities of the world on the heads of the defenders of Zionism” (Javan, October 14, 2025).
  • An article published in the Tasnim News Agency, which is affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards, said that the “al-Aqsa Flood” was a strategic blow to the normalization process of some Arab countries with Israel and returned the Palestinian issue to the center of the agenda of the “world conscience.” The article claimed that the operation could not only be seen as a military event, but as a historical and social turning point that changed the balance of power in “Palestine” and in the Islamic world. The operation also symbolized a return to the original concept of “resistance,” which is not only a response to daily aggression but also taking the initiative in determining the time and place of the campaign. The article detailed the main achievements of the war in the Gaza Strip: breaking the “cognitive engineering” of the propaganda systems and media networks in the West, which caused the international public to be indifferent to the situation in “Palestine” or to see the aggressor as a victim; strengthening the moral and political legitimacy of the “resistance” in the region and around the world, and strengthening the understanding that liberation does not depend on foreign forces; creating a link between the Palestinian struggle and global activity and presenting the Palestinian “resistance” as a direct continuation of the global struggle against racism and imperialism; and its impact on the regional balance of power following Israel’s military, security, social, and economic “failure” on October 7, 2023, and during the war itself, and following the slowdown in the normalization process between Israel and the Arab world (Tasnim, October 11, 2025).

• • On the other hand, an unusual article published in the daily Jomhouri-ye Eslami, which is affiliated with the pragmatic camp in Iran, stated that the “al-Aqsa Flood” was a mistake. The article detailed the serious consequences caused to Iran and the “resistance front” following the Hamas attack on Israel, including the destruction of the Gaza Strip, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria and its withdrawal from the anti-Zionist front, the severe damage to Lebanon and Hezbollah, the losses caused to the Houthis in Yemen, and the damage caused to Iran in the “12-Day War.” It was also written that while Israel did not succeed in achieving its declared goals of destroying Hamas and releasing the hostages, it became hated in the world and suffered losses in the war with Iran. However, no clear winner can be identified from the events of the past two years (Jomhouri-ye Eslami, October 12, 2025).

Iran’s Relations with the “Axis of Resistance” against the Backdrop of the Ceasefire

• The war in the Gaza Strip provided Iran with an opportunity to realize the concept of “convergence of the arenas” and operate several arenas of action against Israel and the United States in a coordinated and simultaneous manner. However, the war also exposed the limitations of Iran’s power in operating all the capabilities available to the pro-Iranian axis in the region. Iran has not been able to achieve its two main goals through its network of proxies: stopping the fighting in the Gaza Strip to reduce the cost of the damage to Hamas, and applying pressure on the United States to cease its support for Israel and pressure it to end the war.
• More seriously, the war in the Gaza Strip posed, for the first time, a significant threat to the very survival of Hamas, which is an important (though not the central) component of the pro-Iranian axis, and severely damaged Hezbollah, which serves as Iran’s main strategic asset in the region. The elimination of most of the organization’s top leadership, including Hassan Nasrallah, and the severe blow to its military power posed a significant threat to the most important regional project which Iran has nurtured for decades, and to a large extent deprived it of the ability to deter Israel and respond to it in the event of an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, as reflected in Hezbollah’s refusal to open another front during the “12-Day War” in June 2025. Moreover, the concept of proxies, which was intended to curb threats to Iran’s national security as far away from its borders as possible by employing proxies, ultimately did not prevent Israel and the United States from attacking it directly.^[2]
• Nevertheless, statements by senior Iranian officials and the discourse in the Iranian media in recent months, even before the war in the Gaza Strip ended, indicate that Iran does not intend to abandon its allies in the region:
  • In a statement by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) marking the anniversary of the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, it was said that the “al-Aqsa Flood” was not a one-time event, but rather a doctrine and an operational strategy for determining the fate of the battlefield, despite the “malicious schemes” to promote a two-state solution (Tasnim, August 2, 2025). In another IRGC statement on the anniversary of the deaths of Hassan Nasrallah and senior Hezbollah officials in the Israeli strike in Beirut, it was said that the “resistance” is not an institution that can be dismantled through political or security processes, but rather an identity, an idea, and a culture rooted among the peoples of the region. According to the IRGC, the “Zionist” and American plans to weaken or destroy the “resistance” have failed many times, and this time as well, they will bring nothing but humiliation and disgrace to the enemy. The statement said that the “resistance” has not only failed to weaken but is in fact growing stronger and becoming a more prominent regional actor. The IRGC declared that it will continue to support the “Axis of Resistance” and regards the ongoing struggle for the elimination of the occupation and the liberation of Jerusalem as a divine, national, and unstoppable mission (Khabar Online, September 27, 2025). In a commentary article in the Tasnim news agency, it was written that the “resistance front” in the region still provides Iran with a trump card against Israel and the United States. According to Tasnim, the front’s main advantage lies in the considerable ground force at its disposal. The news agency cited as an example the establishment of the Islamic Resistance Group in Syria (“Uli al-Baas”), a new militia supported by Iran that appeared in January 2025 and claimed responsibility for launching a rocket at Israel in June 2025 (Tasnim, August 10, 2025).^[3]
  • During his visit to Lebanon in August 2025, Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani declared that the “resistance” is a national asset of Lebanon and all Islamic countries. He noted that the “resistance” was not created at the direction of foreigners and would not disappear at such direction, and that countries outside Lebanon should not instruct Lebanon on what to do (Tasnim, August 13, 2025). During a visit to Nasrallah’s grave, Larijani also stressed Iran’s support for the “resistance.” According to him, Iran does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries but will always support the “resistance” movements (Tasnim, August 13, 2025).

• • Foreign Minister Araghchi stated that peace in the region will be less stable without the weapons of the “resistance,” and that if the “resistance” does not possess weapons, no other power will be able to curb Israel’s “hegemonic ambitions” in the region. According to him, recent years have proven that the “resistance” is the only force capable of standing up to the “Zionist regime” and creating deterrence against it (Iranian TV, August 14, 2025). In another interview, Araghchi said that Iran has always supported Hezbollah, and that the weapons of the “resistance” have thus far succeeded in curbing Israel’s ambitions; if weakness is perceived, Israel’s boldness will only increase (Iranian TV, September 11, 2025).
  • Ali-Akbar Velayati, senior advisor to the Supreme Leader of Iran, said at a meeting of the World Forum for Islamic Awakening in Tehran that the “resistance of the Palestinian people” should be fully supported. He called for the continuation of the “resistance” until “the complete liberation of Palestine: from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea” (Tasnim, September 9, 2025).
  • In an interview, Esmail Qaani, commander of the IRGC’s Qods Force, referred to the developments in Hezbollah since the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023. Regarding the issue of disarming Hezbollah, Qaani said that the “Zionist regime’s” plan to disarm the organization stems from its inability to achieve its goals through military operations. He stressed that the “Zionist regime” cannot eliminate the “resistance” because it is like a sword, the more it is sharpened, the sharper it becomes (Iranian TV, October 3, 2025).

• • In a statement issued by IRGC Commander Mohammad Pakpour following the death of Houthi Chief of Staff Mohammad Abd al-Karim al-Ghamari in an Israeli attack, he expressed his willingness to “strengthen the strategic ties with the Houthi forces in dealing with “Zionism and international arrogance” (Tasnim News Agency, October 19, 2025).
• At the same time, Iran continues its efforts to deliver aid, including weapons, to its proxies in the region, despite the pressures and constraints facing the Islamic Republic and the “Axis of Resistance.”

Aid to the Palestinians

• Since 2014, Iran has been Hamas’ main strategic support. Iran’s support included military aid (weapons and training) and hundreds of millions of dollars in financial aid to the movement’s leadership and military wing, including in preparation for the October 7, 2023, attack.^[4] Iran is also expected to play a role in helping to rebuild Hamas’ military wing after the end of the war in the Gaza Strip, despite the demand to disarm the movement as part of the second phase of the ceasefire agreement.^[5]
• In addition to supporting Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Iran continues its efforts to smuggle weapons into Judea and Samaria in an attempt to ignite another front against Israel.^[6] In October 2025, it was reported that the Israel Security Agency (ISA) and the IDF had thwarted a large smuggling of advanced weapons originating in Iran and intended for terrorist operatives in Judea and Samaria. It was noted that the shipment contained “balance-breaking” weapons, including 15 anti-tank rockets, 29 Claymore charges (IEDs), drones capable of dropping IEDs, hand grenades, machine guns, and pistols. According to the announcement, the shipment was carried out by the IRGC’s Special Operations Directorate and the Qods Force Special Operations Unit (ISA media and IDF Spokesperson, October 8, 2025).

Aid to Hezbollah

• The overthrow of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024 and the Lebanese government’s decision to suspend flights from Iran to Lebanon since February 2025 severely damaged the land and air routes used by Iran to transfer weapons, technology, and financial aid to Hezbollah.^[7] However, Iran and Hezbollah continued their efforts to continue smuggling despite the difficulties in the effort to rebuild Hezbollah’s military capabilities:^[8]
  • Iran has reportedly begun using small vehicles to smuggle weapons to Hezbollah through Syrian territory, after relying on large trucks in the past. According to the report, this way Hezbollah managed to smuggle Kornet anti-tank missiles and advanced weapons into Lebanese territory (Wall Street Journal, July 17, 2025).
  • It was reported that in August 2025, Iran asked a senior Iraqi official to grant it extraordinary concessions at the al-Qaim border crossing between Iraq and Syria to transfer money shipments to Hezbollah through Syrian territory. It was also reported that security sources in Syria and Lebanon had been following increasing Iranian attempts to transfer aid to Hezbollah in light of the pressure exerted on the organization to disarm. Senior figures in the Shiite “coordination framework” in Iraq reported that Iran had informed the leaders of the factions to look for new ways to rebuild Hezbollah’s capabilities (Asharq Al-Awsat, September 5, 2025).
  • In October 2025, the Syrian Directorate of Internal Security thwarted an attempt to smuggle Kornet anti-tank missiles in the al-Qusayr area on the border with Lebanon, and an attempt to smuggle “medium and heavy” weapons in the city of Homs was also thwarted (Telegram channel of the Syrian Ministry of the Interior, October 11, 2025; Al-Arabiya, October 12, 2025). IDF forces also thwarted an attempt to smuggle weapons from Syria to Lebanon via the Mount Hermon region (IDF Spokesperson, October 18, 2025).

Aid to the Houthis

• On June 27, 2025, the Yemeni National Resistance Forces (NRF), operating in southern Yemen and supported by the West, intercepted a vessel carrying more than 750 tons of weapons and military equipment disguised as civilian equipment. It was reported that, among other things, hundreds of cruise missiles, anti-aircraft missiles, anti-ship missiles, advanced warheads, hundreds of drone engines, air defense system components, radar systems, and communications equipment were discovered. It was further revealed that the training manuals accompanying the equipment were in Persian, and many of the systems seized were manufactured by a company affiliated with the Iranian Defense Ministry, which is subject to US sanctions.
• Subsequently, the ship’s crew revealed the existence of an extensive smuggling network run by the IRGC in cooperation with the Houthis since 2013, which operates in many countries in the Middle East and Africa, such as Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Oman, Somalia, and Djibouti (Account X of the military media arm of the “legitimate” Yemeni government; Yemeni media, August 9-10, 2025).^[9]
• In this context, on August 2, 2025, the authorities in South Yemen seized a shipment of weapons inside 58 containers weighing more than 2,500 tons that were aboard a commercial cargo ship that was on its way from the port of Djibouti to the port of Hodeidah, but was forced to divert to the port of Aden due to a ban on entry to Al-Hodeidah port following Israeli strikes. It was reported that the shipment included large quantities of weapons and military equipment such as drones and equipment for their production and launch, jet engines, communications, surveillance and espionage equipment, and equipment for manufacturing weapons and spare parts (official website of the Southern Armed Forces and Defense Line website, October 2, 2025).^[10]
• On October 22, 2025, forces loyal to Yemen’s recognized government seized an Iranian ship carrying Iranian-made weapons and products, including Kornet missiles and drone spare parts. The ship reportedly left the port of Bandar Abbas and was on its way to Houthi-controlled areas near Bab al-Mandeb, and the eight crew members on board were detained (official website of the Southern Armed Forces, October 22, 2025).

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] For further information, see the ITIC’s study from July 6, 2025, “The ‘Resistance Axis’ and the Israel-Iran War”
^[3] For further information, see the ITIC’s study from September 1, 2025, “Is South Syria a Terrorist Threat to Israel? The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria, a Test Case”
^[4] For further information, see the ITIC’s study from November 18, 2024, “Captured Documents Show Iranian Support for Hamas in the Gaza Strip”
^[5] For further information, see the ITIC’s study from October 23, 2025, “The future of Hamas’ weapons and its efforts to rebuild the military wing”
^[6] For further information, see the ITIC’s study from December 19, 2024, “Captured documents reveal how Iran smuggles weapons via Syria and Jordan”
^[7] For further information, see the ITIC’s study from May 22, 2025, “Hezbollah’s Challenges After the Ceasefire and the Campaign Against Israel” (Hebrew)
^[8] For further information, see the ITIC’s study from October 23, 2025, “Hezbollah’s Reconstruction Efforts Amid the IDF’s Enforcement of the Ceasefire in Lebanon”
^[9] For further information, see the ITIC’s study from August 18, 2025, “Iranian Backing for the Houthis During the Gaza Strip War: the Seizure of the Al-Sharwa as a Test Case”
^[10] For further information, see the ITIC’s study from October 26, 2025, “The Houthis-Israel Confrontation Following the Ceasefire in the Gaza Strip”

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