How Hamas perceived Israel’s rounds of deterrence, according to a document found in the Gaza Strip

Dr. Igal Shiri and Dr. Hayim Iserovich

Overview^[1]

• A document prepared by the center for military and strategic studies of Hamas’ military wing, dated September 9, 2023, which was brought back from the Gaza Strip by the IDF during the war, analyzed Israeli policy regarding the rounds of fighting in the Gaza Strip since Hamas seized control in 2006.
• According to the document, for many years Israel relied on a strategy of preemptive strike, but the strengthening of the “resistance” movements led by Hamas and Hezbollah, which could obstruct Israeli capabilities, led Israel to shift to short rounds of fighting of limited intensity.
• In the assessment of the document’s authors, since Israel failed to achieve its objectives in Operation Cast Lead at the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009, foremost of which was overthrowing Hamas rule, it moved to presenting vague objectives alongside a focus on managing the conflict and preserving deterrence, with the objective of weakening Hamas without defeating it.
• Operation Guardian of the Walls [Operation Sword of Jerusalem, according to Hamas] in May 2021 is defined as a formative event in which Hamas deviated from the pattern of the previous rounds by linking the Gaza Strip to events in Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria and by rousing Israeli Arabs to “resistance.”
• The study further noted that Israel failed to implement the policy of the “campaign between the wars,” adding that a multi-front campaign was the greatest challenge to Israel’s capabilities. Therefore, Israel preferred to avoid such a scenario and to operate in each arena separately.
• In the authors’ assessment, Israel did not abandon the idea of a preemptive strike, particularly given the failure of Operation Guardian of the Walls, but was not in a position to build a new equation of deterrence. Therefore, it focused on conflict management, risk management and neutralizing threats. Accordingly, the recommendation to the Hamas leadership was to prepare for a new opening strike which would trigger another round of fighting, but also to initiate an unexpected confrontation that would break the recurring pattern and make Israel’s leadership uncertain.
• In ITIC assessment, the study is part of the effort by Hamas’ intelligence apparatuses to provide the movement’s top decision-makers, Yahya al-Sinwar, head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, and Muhammad Deif, commander of the Hamas military wing, with a full strategic understanding of Israel’s perception and conduct, at a time when they were in the final stages of planning the decisive attack against Israel. The picture emerging from the study, according to which Israel is not interested in overthrowing Hamas rule and is focused on limited rounds with known outcomes, together with the recommendation by the document’s authors to act in an unexpected manner, confirmed al-Sinwar and Deif’s confidence that the attack and massacre would be successful, and which were carried out on October 7, 2023, less than a month after the document was written.

What the Document Says

From a Strategy of Preemptive Strike to Rounds of Deterrence

• In a document prepared by the center for military and strategic studies^[2] of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the Hamas military wing, dated September 9, 2023, which the IDF brought back from the Gaza Strip, there is a section entitled “Recurring rounds of deterrence – pattern, use and current assessment as part of the enemy’s need to carry out a preemptive strike.” It examined the pattern of the rounds of fighting between Israel and the “resistance”^[3] in the Gaza Strip and the possibility that the “enemy” would attempt to carry out a preemptive attack.

• According to the introduction, preemptive action against adversaries can bring strategic advantages if implemented successfully, including preventing possible imminent aggression, removing current threats and achieving the desired deterrence vis-à-vis the adversary. The study states that Israel views the strategy of “preemptive strike” as part of the concept of “if someone comes to kill you, rise up and kill him first,” as implemented in the June 1967 war [the Six-Day War], the attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, the First Lebanon War in 1982, and the attack on the Syrian nuclear reactor in 2007.
• The study marked the 1990s as the point in time when a change occurred in the pattern of Israeli military activity, with the transition to a policy of “rounds of deterrence.” It was a reaction to the rise of the “resistance movements,”^[4] foremost Hamas and Hezbollah, and their ability to damage Israel’s capabilities, and the decline in the threat to Israel from Arab regimes and technological advances. The rounds were based on several days of low-intensity fighting, using precise intelligence and firepower, and became the “enemy army’s” preferred mode of action.

“Rounds of Deterrence” in the Gaza Strip

• According to the study, Israel’s perception of the Gaza Strip was based on its desire for the Strip to be like Judea and Samaria in terms of political behavior, in the sense of accepting the Oslo Accords, halting the “resistance,” security coordination and economic development tied to Israeli political conditions. However, the Hamas rise to power in 2006 led the “enemy” towards a siege strategy whose objective was to pressure Hamas and bring about its collapse. After it became clear that it was highly unlikely the movement would collapse, Israel adopted a strategy of “mowing the grass,” that is, doing repeated damage to growing military capabilities to strengthen deterrence vis-à-vis the Strip and to bring about prolonged periods of calm.
• Prime Minister Ehud Olmert declared three central objectives for Operation Cast Lead (December 2008–January 2009), which were to overthrow Hamas rule, free Gilad Shalit and prevent rocket fire. According to the study, those objectives were not achieved and Israel shifted to more ambiguous ones which could not be quantified, such as restoring deterrence and restoring calm.
• The study noted that in the following years as well, under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli policy focused on a strategy of conflict management and the preservation of deterrence through an effort to weaken Hamas, but without directly attempting to overthrow the movement’s rule in the Strip.

6. The enemy’s general policy toward Gaza has not changed and has focused on a sustained effort to weaken Hamas, but without reaching a direct overthrow of its rule. Prime Minister Netanyahu has never used the slogan or proposed the objective of toppling Hamas because he understands the price involved. However, with the intensification of the campaigns and the difficulty in decisively dealing with Hamas’ military capabilities, currently the direction has been to manage the conflict, maintain deterrence, “clip claws,” increase security activity along the borders and achieve a better understanding of Hamas’ intentions and capabilities through intelligence.

• The study listed nine military operations against the Strip, five of which were carried out after Hamas seized power in 2006: Rainbow and Days of Penitence in 2004, Autumn Clouds in 2005, Summer Rains in 2006, Hot Winter in 2008, Cast Lead in 2009, Pillar of Defense in 2012, Protective Edge in 2014, and Guardian of the Walls in 2021.^[5] In addition, three operations were conducted against the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Black Belt in 2019, Breaking Dawn in 2022, and Shield and Arrow in 2023. It was noted that their objective was to preserve deterrence and cause partial damage to the facilities and capabilities of the terrorist organizations, but without fully defeating the “resistance.”
• In addition, beginning in 2015, Israel began to relate to Hamas as a “state organization,” that is, a “resistance” movement possessing military capabilities approaching those of states. According to the study, reinforcement of the perception emerged in the Eizenkot Document,^[6] which included defense alongside the traditional strategic principles of warning, deterrence and decision.
• According to the study, there is a pattern to the rounds of deterrence in the Gaza Strip, especially since the so-called “liberation,” i.e., Israel’s withdrawal and disengagement from the Gaza Strip in 2005. The study also presented the model formulated by the American Brookings Institution, a research facility located in Washington, DC, which analyzed 25 cases of escalation between the “resistance” and Israel in the Gaza Strip and identified seven steps that recurred in every campaign:^[7]
  • Step one: Israel applies economic pressure on the Gaza Strip to pressure Hamas and punish it for its actions.
  • Step two: Israel increases humanitarian and economic pressure and creates a military escalation. The “resistance” forces, with internal political and popular support, fire rockets at Israel and carry out defensive and offensive actions through the tunnels.
  • Step three: Israel intensifies military actions within the Gaza Strip [allegedly] against civilians and against commercial interests, to weaken popular support and place responsibility for the destruction on Hamas.
  • Step four: International and internal Israeli pressure begins to stop the [so-called] “aggression” because of the large number of fatalities.
  • Step five: Egypt acts to mediate a ceasefire and ease the “siege,” as it did in 2009, 2012, 2014, 2021, and 2022.
  • Step six: The international community holds a conference led by donor states which commit to transferring large sums of money for the reconstruction of the Strip. However, most of the commitments are never realized lest the funding be used to build the military power of the “resistance” and to increase its public capital. The document notes, for example, that at the end of the fighting in Operation Protective Edge in 2014, $3.5 billion was promised to the Gaza Strip over three years, but in practice only $1.9 billion was actually transferred.
  • Step seven: With the end of the war the situation returns to the status quo ante. The [so-called] “siege” continues, Israel continues implementing countermeasures to respond to new threats [such as Iron Dome aerial defense system or the construction of a massive ground barrier], intelligence efforts continue, and military maneuvers and exercises are carried out. Meanwhile, the “resistance” works to develop new, more effective techniques for stronger qualitative offensive power.
• Some of the operations began with an Israeli preemptive strike, the most prominent examples of which were Operation Cast Lead, Operation Pillar of Defense and the operations against the PIJ. However, the outcome was always the same, the military confrontation ended through the Qataris or the Egyptians, the media, international pressure and humanitarian aid, without effecting political or economic change.

11. The enemy employed the method of “preemptive deterrence” in a continuous series of operations, the most prominent of which were 2008, 2012, and the opening strikes against the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. These operations were characterized by the same exit strategy and led to similar results, whereby once the military confrontation had reached its peak it was calmed, each time in the same manner, through the Qataris (financial and humanitarian), the Egyptians (political and negotiations), and the UN (mediation and projects), without political or economic change. It is a recurring cycle enclosed by fragile rules of engagement and economic tools. The constant within it is that deterrence is a complementary and dual process in which military force and economic tools are used simultaneously. The conflict requires high-level control mechanisms and monitoring capabilities, to which the international community and regional powers contribute.

• According to the study, military deterrence has a defined role within the integrated program of restriction and control, which includes economic easing or collective punishment used to control the situation, curb escalation and achieve influence over Hamas’ decision makers. However, it was noted that after every round of fighting Hamas grew stronger, gained recognition as a “national political” movement, and enjoyed popular support, a process that the “enemy” could not stop except through a renewed military campaign. Therefore, Israel’s need for a round of deterrence was a matter of time, waiting in the wings for the appropriate timing.
• According to the document the “enemy” did not employ force to achieve impossible political objectives, but wanted to weaken the ability of the “resistance” to harm it. That was done by “mowing the grass,” a military strategy to erode the capabilities of the “resistance” through constant attrition and cumulative deterrence, and thus to achieve longer periods of quiet.^[8]

The enemy’s behavior indicates the use of “preemptive action” within the equation of deterrence, restraint and control, whose objectives are imprinting perception, eroding capabilities, delaying and disrupting, and buying time. Accordingly, the use of force is not intended to achieve impossible political objectives, but rather to weaken the resistance’s ability to harm the enemy. The enemy adopted a military strategy to erode capabilities through constant attrition and cumulative deterrence to achieve periods of calm which would allow it to gain advantages in changing the international and regional environment, foreign relations and normalization, and intelligence work. The strategy was later termed “mowing the grass,” whose purpose is to repeatedly damage growing military capabilities, which the enemy applies in the West Bank. It seeks to change the rules of confrontation with the movement in Gaza to raise the cost of loss for Hamas should it consider using its military power, while reducing its gains from doing so.

• It was further noted that the rounds of fighting granted the Israeli army a period of calm, left the Gaza Strip dealing with issue of mass reconstruction and building, and made the “resistance” leadership more cautious. Meanwhile, Israel began preparing for the next round by collecting intelligence, improving target accuracy, cementing the equation of deterrence, rebuilding force, improving planning, and deepening political relations within Israel and in the international arena.

Operation Guardian of the Walls and Altering the Pattern

• The Sword of Jerusalem campaign, the name Hamas gave to Operation Guardian of the Walls in May 2021, was a watershed event in Hamas perception of the conflict with Israel. The movement began to consider the possibility that the vision of the destruction of Israel could be realized in the near future, as reflected in public statements by Hamas leaders. Hamas documents brought back from the Gaza Strip by the IDF during the Gaza Strip War illustrated how the movement’s leaders, and especially Yahya al-Sinwar, viewed the campaign’s results as a major achievement, leading them to advance military plans for the decisive battle against Israel.^[9]
• The study noted that the Sword of Jerusalem campaign was unique in that it deviated from the pattern which had repeated itself in previous rounds. Whereas previously the understandings that ended the fighting related only to the Gaza Strip, this time Hamas’ use of force was intended to express support for Jerusalem and opposition to the “eviction” of residents of the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood, and it also fomented popular and armed “resistance” “throughout occupied Palestine and the dispersal.”

16. The Sword of Jerusalem campaign deviated from the recurring pattern and was a “resistance” initiative to achieve a national and Islamic objective. It employed military force for the sake of Jerusalem, to prevent the expulsion of the residents of the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood, and was aligned with the movement’s vision for the liberation of “Palestine”. The use of military force from Gaza caused a chain reaction of popular armed “resistance” throughout all of occupied “Palestine” and in the dispersal. The movement gained broad official and popular support in the Arab and Islamic world, and the Palestinian narrative prevailed for the first time over the enemy’s narrative in Western and foreign forums.

• According to the study, Israel viewed the link Hamas created between the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem as crossing red lines and a severe blow to the equation of deterrence, damaging the strategy of reinforcing Palestinian division and maintaining geographic and cognitive separation between the various Palestinian areas. Accordingly, when the PIJ attempted to link the Gaza Strip to Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria, Israel did not hesitate to deliver a painful opening strike to the organization in Operations Breaking Dawn and Shield and Arrow, thereby also attempting to restore deterrence vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip.
• The study further noted that Israel did not achieve its objectives in Operation Guardian of the Walls and that the scope of its military and intelligence preparations did not match the combat or the desired outcomes. Israel failed to upset or damage Hamas’ command and control array or its military weapons’ manufacturing facilities. It also failed to undermine civilian trust in the “resistance” by inflicting as extensive damage as possible on Hamas fighters who were in the tunnels (the so-called “metro”).

Motives behind a Preemptive Attack for a New Campaign

• The study claimed Israel was returning to the use of force because it felt force was the only means enabling it to fight the military buildup of the “resistance.” The study presented reasons which could lead Israel to carry out another preemptive strike:
  • Completion of the operational objectives of Operation Guardian of the Walls, especially damaging popular support (the “popular hothouse”), combat capabilities and individuals who influenced military buildup.
  • Strengthening cumulative deterrence.
  • Neutralizing the Gaza Strip’s military capabilities and preventing its possible participation in a future regional struggle.
  • Eliminating influential commanders in Judea and Samaria who supported cooperation within the “resistance axis,”^[10] thereby making it difficult to build a regional alliance.
  • Occupying the Gaza Strip with its internal affairs, including civilian reconstruction and military buildup, to prevent it from intervening should there be significant developments regarding the West Bank, [the so-called] “Judaization,” settlements, Jerusalem and the prisoners.
  • Attacking Iran-backed actors as part of an international plan directed against Tehran.
• The study included an in-depth analysis of the factors which might deter the “enemy” from a preemptive strike, calling such a move dangerous and without a guaranteed victory:
  • The “resistance axis”: The “enemy” is concerned about not taking sufficient steps to prevent the “resistance” in the Gaza Strip from increasing coordination with Iran and with other “resistance” organizations, and activating other arenas, taking into consideration the aspiration of the “resistance” to lead Islamic causes in general and the Palestinian issue in particular, to ignite Judea and Samaria and to incite the “Palestinians” within the Green Line (Arab Israelis). Therefore, when the PIJ attempted to lead “unity of the arenas” between the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria, Israel hastened to deliver a preemptive blow against the organization.
  • Regional deterrence: Israel views Iran as the central regional threat, manipulating Hezbollah and “resistance” organizations to exert pressure. While Israel does not need a preemptive strike to restore deterrence vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip, it may carry one out to reinforce its regional-level deterrence.

• The campaign between the wars: According to the study, the campaigns between the wars are intended to allow Israel to continually rid itself of threats across all arenas, but over time failed to provide the desired deterrence. It was noted that Iran continued to supply weapons to Hezbollah despite Israeli attacks in Syria.
• “Resistance” capabilities: According to the study the “resistance” has military capabilities which could partially put a brake on a preemptive “enemy” attack, since the response would be violent, disrupt daily life in Israel and cause casualties and property damage. In such a case, the “enemy” would repeat the same mistakes and harm civilians, which would lead to increased popular pressure at friction points, as occurred in the Sword of Jerusalem campaign. At the same time, the study acknowledged that the “siege” and Egyptian assistance in curbing the “resistance’s” capabilities made it difficult to introduce game-changing weapons into the Strip.
• The right-wing government in Israel: According to the study, Israel’s government is taking a harsher ideological line toward Palestinians in Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria, and within Israel, and is pushing for a decisive resolution of the conflict rather than managing it, without taking its international image into account. It was further stated that the government preferred to advance economic improvement in exchange for quiet at the expense of a political process.

• • A multi-front campaign: Israel has plans for a multi-front campaign, but prefers to avoid it as much as possible and to neutralize the capabilities of each arena separately. The study emphasized that such a campaign was the greatest challenge to the entity’s capabilities.
  • Geostrategic uncertainty: The Israeli decision to carry out a preemptive strike is also influenced by uncertainty at the regional and international levels, including the implications of the Russia–Ukraine war, the decline of Russian involvement in Syria, Iran’s strengthening, and the American difficulty in curbing the nuclear project and the impact on efforts to advance full normalization with Saudi Arabia.
  • If Israel wishes to carry out a preemptive strike, it is expected to conduct an operation to deceive and disrupt the “resistance’s” early warning systems.^[11]
  • Media activity: Israeli media have placed increasing emphasis on escalation in Judea and Samaria and linked it to Iranian assistance to terrorist infrastructures and to direct involvement in Hamas leadership in the Gaza Strip and abroad. The assessment is that Israel is working to present Hamas as an Iranian asset, like Hezbollah and the Houthis, in preparation for a possible decision to strike, even though the international community, the United States, and Israeli society do not agree with the view that Hamas is an Iranian proxy.

Conclusions of the Study

• The main conclusion drawn by the study, based on the analysis of previous rounds of deterrence, especially Operation Guardian of the Walls, was that Israel might still carry out a preemptive strike against the “resistance”:
  • Israel is still contending with the “achievements” of the “resistance” during Operation Guardian of the Walls, as reflected in the link between fronts and the “unity of the arenas.” Accordingly, it is conducting ongoing security and military actions in Judea and Samaria alongside its economic pressure on the Gaza Strip.
  • The likelihood of a preemptive strike by Israel increases if the “resistance” in Gaza has an impact on developments in Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem to repeat the activity of the Sword of Jerusalem. A Hamas attempt to operate in other arenas or to participate in a regional alliance against Israel would also raise the likelihood of a preemptive strike.

2. The likelihood of a preemptive strike by the enemy increases as Gaza’s influence over events in the West Bank and Jerusalem grows (if the resistance attempts to repeat what it did in the Sword of Jerusalem.) It increases further as the movement seeks to activate new arenas such as Lebanon and Syria, or when the enemy is convinced that these are part of a regional alliance against “Israel.”

• • The current role of the “resistance” in the Gaza Strip is to provide political and media support to the other arenas of confrontation, namely Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem, and to employ military force if the need arises.
  • Israel’s control and conflict-management plan combines operations of deterrence with tools of economic improvement.
  • Israel has not abandoned the idea of a preemptive strike, and will not abandon it so long as Hamas responds according to the pattern that recurs in every round.
  • According to the study, as of September 2023, Israel is not in an internal or external position that allows it to build a new equation of deterrence. Therefore, it is focusing more on the routine handling of threats and risks, and less on creating new rules of engagement.

7. The current circumstances (internal and external) of the entity state do not allow it to build a completely new equation of deterrence, and the current military effort is focused on neutralizing escalating risks and threats.

Recommendations of the Authors of the Study

• The recommendations of the authors to Hamas decision-makers:
  • The authorized bodies within the movement’s apparatuses are called upon to make early preparations to contend with an expected Israeli action of deterrence, based on the recurring patterns and preparation of the required capabilities at the various stages, identification of the opening strike, military preparedness, establishment of the response, and the recovery phase. It was noted that the steps should also include media, political, governmental and military responses.
  • The authorized bodies in Hamas are called upon to submit their ideas for ways to prevent Israel from carrying out a preemptive strike, by analyzing the factors and opportunities which accelerate the occurrence of a preemptive strike and turning them into steps and decisions leading to deviating from the pattern in rounds against Israel.
  • Hamas’ leadership is called upon to manage the conflict in an unpredictable manner to deviate from the pattern and confuse the “enemy” (emphasis not in the original). It is possible that this recommendation is what encouraged al-Sinwar and Deif to proceed with Hamas’ terrorist attack and massacre in Israel on October 7, 2023, both to surprise Israel and to obviate a possible Israeli preemptive strike in the Gaza Strip.

3. The movement’s leadership must manage the conflict with the enemy in an unpredictable manner to deviate from the pattern and put the enemy’s leadership in a state of uncertainty.

 Appendix: The Full Document in Arabic^[12]

1. Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.

2. Apparently a Hamas research body.

3. Terrorist organizations.

4. Terrorist organizations.

5. In the original document only the years are listed, the names were added by the ITIC.

6. An official document of IDF strategy, which was formulated and distributed under Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot in the summer of 2015. It defined the strategic threats facing the State of Israel and the principles governing the use of force by the IDF. (https://www.idf.il/media/3cdhcgro/strategy.pdf) ↑

7. December 2018, "Ending Gaza’s Perpetual Crisis: A New U.S. Approach" https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/CNAS-Brookings-Report-Gaza-final-v2-web.pdf

8. For further information, see the 2013 report by Efraim Inbar and Eitan Shamir published by the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, “Mowing the Grass: Israel’s Strategy for Protracted Intractable Conflict,” Hebrew only. https://besacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/MSPS105_Hebrew.pdf

9. For further information, see the March 2025 ITIC report, Hamas’ strategy to destroy Israel: from theory into practice, as seen in captured documents, and the April 2025 report, Operation Guardian of the Walls as a watershed moment in Hamas’ strategy for the “destruction of Israel,” as reflected in documents found by the IDF in the Gaza Strip.

10. Iran, Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Houthis in Yemen and the Shi'ite militias in Iraq.

11. This paragraph is incomplete in the original document.

12. It should be noted that page 10 of the document did not appear in the original, and therefore it is also missing here.

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