Hezbollah’s Use of Force During the Current Fighting Against Israel

Overview^[1]

• During the night of March 1-2, 2026, Hezbollah fired rockets at northern Israel for the first time since the ceasefire which went into effect on November 27, 2024. A day later, after a series of Israeli attacks on Lebanon, Hezbollah announced it would resume the war on Israel and began attacking military and civilian targets inside Israel and IDF forces in south Lebanon. Since March 3, Hezbollah has claimed responsibility for more than 280 rocket, missile, UAV, and other attacks.
• Hezbollah represented the attacks as “defensive” and in response to the Israeli attacks since the ceasefire, claiming they had no choice because the efforts of the Lebanese government to stop the “aggression” had failed. Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem confirmed that the Israeli-American campaign against Iran and the elimination of Iran’s leader Khamenei had provided “the appropriate timing” to resume fighting.
• Hezbollah’s conditions for stopping the attacks are an end to the Israeli attacks and the withdrawal of IDF forces from Lebanese territory, the release of the Lebanese held by Israel and the return of the displaced to their homes in south Lebanon. The organization also wants to return to its self-declared “deterrent equation” with Israel, in effect until Hezbollah attacked Israel to “support the Gaza Strip” on October 8, 2023.
• Hezbollah’s secretary general said they had learned the lessons of the previous war with Israel and had shifted to decentralized fighting. Reportedly, Hezbollah is also activating elite units such as its Radwan Force and the aerial unit which were rebuilt after heavy losses in the previous war.
• Hezbollah also exploited the renewed hostilities to entrench its positions regarding the Lebanese government’s plan to disarm the organization.
• Iran and Hezbollah admitted that they were carrying out combined and coordinated missile and UAV attacks against Israel.
• Hezbollah is also waging psychological warfare to heighten the Israeli public’s sense of threat, strengthen its image as the “defender of Lebanon” in the Lebanese and regional arena, and claim initiative and control in the campaign.
• In ITIC assessment, Hezbollah’s activity since the beginning of the current attacks indicates command and control capabilities which enable it to carry out combined attacks, both by units deployed in different areas of Lebanon and in coordination with Iran, as well as the ability to control and gradually escalate the fighting. In addition, decentralization and the combination of ground encounters and long-range fire enable Hezbollah to preserve operational continuity even under continued Israeli attacks and to disperse the centers of activity along the border. The friction with IDF forces in south Lebanon indicates the limitations of the Lebanese government after its army claimed it had achieved operational control south of the Litani River as part of implementing the state’s monopoly on weapons. Hezbollah will apparently continue attacking in coordination with Iran and try to end the current round of fighting with a temporary arrangement which will allow it to rebuild its military capabilities and continue its opposition to disarmament.

Hezbollah’s Motives for Renewing the War

• On the night of March 1, 2026, Hezbollah fired rockets at Israel for the first time since the ceasefire which went into effect on November 27, 2024 (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, March 2, 2026). Hezbollah claimed it had attacked the “missile defense base Mishmar HaCarmel south of the occupied city of Haifa” with a barrage of missiles and a swarm of UAVs in response to the spilling of the “pure blood” of Ali Khamenei “by the criminal Zionist enemy,” in “defense of Lebanon” and the people and in response to continued Israeli “aggression.” Hezbollah added that the leadership of the “resistance”^[2] had long stated that continuation of the “aggression” and killing leaders, youth and residents gave them the right to “defend ourselves and respond at the appropriate time and place.” Hezbollah called the attacks a “legitimate defensive response [sic]” and said the Lebanese leadership and the parties involved had the responsibility to end to the “Israeli-American aggression” against Lebanon (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, March 2, 2026). In response to the attacks from Lebanon, the IDF attacked Hezbollah targets in south Lebanon and in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut, eliminating senior figures and destroying headquarters, weapons depots, facilities of the economic wing al-Qard al-Hasan and additional infrastructure and assets (IDF spokesperson, March 2, 2026).
• A day later, during the night between March 2–3, 2026, Hezbollah officially announced its intention to continue the fighting against Israel (Telegram channel of Hezbollah’s military media arm, March 3, 2026). Following the announcement, Hezbollah began to issue statements of attacks against Israeli targets, with each statement saying it was a “response to the criminal Israeli aggression that struck dozens of Lebanese cities and towns, including the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut.” It was further noted that the “Islamic resistance is engaged in defending its land and people, especially when the Israeli enemy crosses its borders with its criminal actions” and that the actions of the “resistance” were allegedly directed “against military sites, not against civilian sites as the enemy does” (Telegram channel of Hezbollah’s military media arm, March 3–15, 2026).
• Hezbollah, both in declarations by its senior figures and in statements in its various affiliated media, attempted to justify the new hostilities as a “response” and a “defensive” move both to the “aggression” and the possibility of an initiated Israeli action. In an attempt to soften the public anger in Lebanon, given the extensive Israeli attacks and the tens of thousands of displaced persons who had to leave their homes because of the IDF evacuation orders, Hezbollah claimed that the “resistance defended” Lebanon’s sovereignty, accusing the state institutions of inability to act against the “Israeli aggression” while they attempted to dismantle the “resistance.” Hezbollah tried not to represent itself as an Iranian proxy acting on instructions from Tehran, although they did not hide that attacking Israel was related to the Israeli-American war on Iran and the elimination of Ali Khamenei:
  • According to Hezbollah’s combat information media unit, the organization had renewed its attacks because the political and diplomatic efforts to stop the Israeli “aggression” had failed over the 15 months since the ceasefire in November 2024, and it had repeatedly said the situation could not continue without a response. Therefore, Hezbollah claimed it was “necessary to put an end to the aggression with all available means, with determined and effective action,” adding that “confrontation is a legitimate right.” Hezbollah further claimed that initiating rocket fire at Israel was “defensive [sic],” and called on “all those who are worried, interested and responsible” to take action to stop the “aggression” (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, March 3, 2026).
  • Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem said in his first speech since the renewal of attacks against Israel that for 15 months they had refrained from a “military response” to allow the diplomatic efforts of the Lebanese state to halt the attacks. He claimed the attacks were part of a “Lebanese struggle” with no connection to Iran, and barely referred to Iran in his speech, which represented the attacks as a “national defense” to continue consolidating support among the organization’s Shi’ite base in Lebanon. He criticized the Lebanese government and claimed that its recent decisions, in particular the demands to restrict Hezbollah’s weapons, weakened the state’s standing and legitimized American and Israeli pressure (website of Hezbollah’s secretary general, March 4, 2026).
  • In a speech Qassem delivered to mark World Jerusalem Day, he claimed the Hezbollah leadership had held three separate discussions regarding a response to the “aggression,” each time deciding that the timing was unsuitable and that diplomacy should be given another opportunity. Nevertheless, realizing that the Israeli attacks would not stop, in addition to the killing Khamenei, the war against Iran led them to decide on a “defensive confrontation.” He claimed “the Israeli-American aggression is the reason for what is happening and the ‘resistance’ is the response,” again claiming that the attacks were for the “defense of Lebanon, our honor and our land.” He accused the Lebanese government of failing to defend Lebanon’s sovereignty and declared that “there is no solution except ‘resistance,’^[3] otherwise Lebanon will be destroyed.” He added that they would not retreat because it was “an existential battle, neither limited nor simple ” (al-‘Ahed, March 13, 2026).

• • On March 11, 2026, Hezbollah said the name of the operation was “The Eaten Chaff,” a quote from the Quran and thereby providing religious justification for the attacks on Israel.^[4] He said the hostilities had been given a name because they expected the “confrontation” would continue for a long time, and as in the story in the Quran, they expected it would end in the defeat of the “Israeli enemy” (al-‘Ahed, March 13, 2026).

• • The deputy chairman of Hezbollah’s political council, Mahmoud Qamati, claimed they had decided to enter the fighting because of their assessment that Israel was preparing for a preemptive attack on Lebanon, after having concentrated forces on the border and mobilized reserve forces. He claimed Hezbollah’s leadership was of the opinion that continuing restraint in the face of daily Israeli attacks could allow Israel to gain an advantage by attacking the organization’s commanders, facilities and assets, and therefore they had decided to make the first move (Tafasil platform, March 10, 2026).
  • The chairman of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, Muhammad Raad, claimed the organization regarded its activity as a “legitimate right of self-defense” and was determined to “defend Lebanon and its people” against continuing Israeli “aggression” and its [alleged] preparation for a broad attack. He claimed the objective of Hezbollah’s rocket fire was to “warn Israel” not to attack (al-Jumhuriya, March 9, 2026). He wrote an open letter which was published in Hezbollah’s daily al-Akhbar, accusing the Lebanese government of disregarding the Israeli “violations,” and claiming that focusing on the demand to disarm the “resistance” created a situation in which the state had in effect “given up the defense of its sovereignty.” He represented the activity of the “resistance” as continuing the Lebanese right to resist the “occupation” and as an effort to defend the state’s sovereignty and prevent the imposition of political arrangements under conditions of weakness (al-Akhbar, March 11, 2026).
  • Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese daily al-Akhbar also argued that the latest developments were not the result of a Hezbollah initiative, but of continued Israeli policy, according to which hundreds of [terrorist] operatives and civilians in Lebanon had been killed in aerial attacks. It further argued that the firing of “a number of projectiles” from south Lebanon was part of Hezbollah’s attempt to convey a “warning” to Israel and to respond to the Israeli “violations,” while “trying to avoid deterioration into a broad war.” The newspaper alleged that Israel had already prepared for the possibility of escalation in Lebanon, with its timing linked to developments in the regional arena and especially to the war in Iran. The paper also alleged that Hezbollah’s “activity” was a focused response on military targets in Israel, while accusing Israel of attacking civilians in Lebanon (al-Akhbar, March 8, 2026).

Hezbollah’s Objectives

• Hezbollah and its affiliated media outlets stated that their conditions for ending the attacks were the same demands they have reiterated since the ceasefire: the cessation of Israeli attacks and the withdrawal of IDF forces from all Lebanese territory, the release of Lebanese held by Israel and the return of residents to their homes in the border villages in south Lebanon. Hezbollah also seeks to exploit the new war to renew the “deterrent equation” with Israel and to convey the message to the Lebanese government and the organization’s rivals inside Lebanon that Hezbollah is strong and important for the “defense” of the state, in the face of the moves to disarm the “resistance”:
  • Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem said the “obvious” solution for the “resistance” to end the current “confrontation” was “to stop the aggression completely, a full Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, the release of the prisoners and to allow residents to return to their homes and begin reconstruction.” He called on the government to cancel some of the decisions against the “resistance” and “not to stab the resistance in the back,” adding “the solution is to deter the aggression and stop it, not to give the state to the enemy for free” (al-‘Ahed, March 13, 2026).
  • The chairman of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, Mohammed Raad, gave a speech in which he reiterated and elaborated on Qassem’s talking points (al-Jumhuriya, March 9, 2026).
  • The editor of the Hezbollah-affiliated al-Akhbar, Ibrahim al-Amin, quoted sources familiar with the issue who said that Raad’s remarks were intended to block the Lebanese government from moving forward with formal negotiations with Israel. According to the sources, Hezbollah will not stop its attacks before receiving guarantees and without practical steps on the ground, without any transition period, to ensure the fulfillment of the four reiterated conditions: an immediate cessation of the fighting and an immediate withdrawal from every point on the border where the IDF is present, and the deployment of the Lebanese army in those areas, an Israeli declaration and American guarantees for a complete cessation of all “violations and aggression” in every area of Lebanon and allowing the safe and full return of all Lebanese to their villages and homes in the south, especially the villages near the border, the immediate release of all Lebanese prisoners and their safe return to their families, the opening of a reconstruction process in all areas damaged by the confrontation while opening the door to all foreign assistance, with the implementation conducted according to mechanisms determined by the Lebanese government and not as part of an American plan (al-Akhbar, March 10, 2026).
  • In another article, al-Amin that said in Hezbollah’s perspective, any future arrangement had at the very least to restore the status quo ante of October 8, 2023, before the opening of the “support front for the Gaza Strip.” He said the organization regarded the current hostilities as an attempt to “correct a mistake” created by the continuation of Israeli attacks, and not only as an expression of solidarity with Iran. He claimed Hezbollah was managing the war from an “existential perspective” and would therefore seek to impose conditions which ensured a return to the situation which existed before the opening of the “northern front,” alongside guarantees for the cessation of any Israeli action against it, otherwise, he said, the fighting would continue until the objective had been achieved (al-Akhbar, March 7, 2026).

Hezbollah’s Attacks

• Since the ceasefire at the end of November 2024, Hezbollah has taken steps to enable it to recover from the blows of the previous war, which severely damaged the leadership and command structures, and to prepare for a new confrontation with Israel. The organization’s military wing reorganized and decentralized, its structure now similar to its early years in the 1980s, relying on small cells, camouflage, secrecy and the exploitation of the conditions on the ground.^[5]
• Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem said they had learned the lessons of the previous war and were now targeting IDF soldiers using “mobile tactics without a fixed location,” that is, guerrilla warfare. He added that Hezbollah was prepared to confront IDF forces in the event of a ground invasion and claimed that “the resistance fighters,^[6] through their movement on the ground, will be able to have achievements and results through confrontation with the enemy at close range.” Qassem said the organization was prepared for a prolonged campaign and its young fighters were ready and seeking shahada (martyrdom) because they did not fear death and wanted confrontation at close range, which could also indicate a willingness to attack Israeli forces with suicide bombing attacks. He added they had prepared the equipment required for the confrontation and that with faith in Allah and determination they would be able to stand against Israel even when the military power of the sides was unequal (al-‘Ahed, March 13, 2026).
• Lebanese sources said Hezbollah was using lessons learned in the previous war with Israel and was preparing for the possibility of a broad Israeli invasion and prolonged fighting while returning to guerrilla warfare in south Lebanon. According to the sources, the organization’s fighters operate in small cells and have reduced the use of communications equipment which Israel could intercept, along with a “measured use of certain weapons”, including anti-tank missiles. The sources noted that some of the activity was concentrated in the area of the town of al-Khiam near the meeting point of the borders of Lebanon, Israel and Syria, which the organization views as one of the areas from which an Israeli ground invasion might begin. They added that Hezbollah was working to ensure command continuity by appointing several deputies for each commander to preserve the continuity of operations in the event that the command echelon was attacked during the fighting (Reuters and Nidaa’ al-Watan, March 10, 2026).
• Sources involved in the fighting claimed Israel was “surprised” by Hezbollah’s ability to maintain command and control structures and combat capability after months of attacks which were intended to prevent its recovery. Hezbollah reportedly believes that Israel finds it difficult to employ its full force in the Lebanese arena simultaneously with the war against Iran, and therefore the organization is using more precise weapons in the early stages of the fighting and is declaring its readiness for a possible ground invasion (al-Diyar, March 11, 2026).
• According to Hezbollah’s daily al-Akhbar, the organization’s main activity is concentrated along the south Lebanon border, where it attacked IDF posts and concentrations of forces in the areas of Markaba, Aitaroun, Kafr Kila, Maroun al-Ras and al-‘Adisa. The attacks included rocket and missile fire, the use of suicide UAVs and artillery attacks, and their objective has been to disrupt the movement of Israeli forces and block a possible ground advance. Direct confrontations were reported at several border points in which small arms and RPGs were used to attack IDF forces. It was also reported that an Israeli Hermes 450 UAV was shot down in the Wadi al-Saluqi area, represented as an attempt to damage Israel’s aerial intelligence and collection capabilities over the combat zone (al-Akhbar, March 9, 2026).
• Al-Akhbar represented the battles near al-Khiam as an example of Hezbollah’s ability to initiate and conduct a three-dimensional campaign against Israel: tactically they claimed the outskirts of al-Khiam served as a “trap for armor” with ambushes to attack Merkava tanks; operationally, the attacks were carried out simultaneously in several arenas in northern Israel, “reflecting cohesion and coordination capability in the organization’s command and control network;” and strategically, attacks on bases deep inside Israel, along with the use of suicide UAVs, were meant to expand the circle of fighting and increase the attrition of the Israeli military system (al-Akhbar, March 11, 2026).
• Hezbollah combines attacks on military and civilian targets in Israel with rockets and UAVs with anti-tank missile fire, artillery shells and close-range fire at IDF forces:^[7]
  • At the beginning of January 2026, the commander of the Lebanese army, Rodolph Haykal, told the ministers of the Lebanese government that “effective and real” operational security control had been achieved south of the Litani River in the south of the country as part of implementing the plan to ensure the state’s monopoly over weapons. Hezbollah also claimed it had fulfilled its part the ceasefire agreement and ended its presence south of the Litani.^[8] However, the incidents between IDF forces and Hezbollah gunmen near the border in south Lebanon, as reflected in the statements of the IDF spokesperson and Hezbollah statements, indicate that Hezbollah still has an operational presence in south Lebanon (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel and the IDF spokesperson, March 3-15, 2026).
  • Nevertheless, from the statements of the IDF spokesperson it appears that a significant portion of the rockets are fired at Israel from areas north of the Litani River. For example, on March 9, 2026, the IDF attacked Hezbollah headquarters in the town of al-Ansariya, north of Tyre, after rockets had been fired at Israeli territory from that area (IDF spokesperson, March 10, 2026). In contrast to the previous hostilities, in which Hezbollah had greater capabilities south of the Litani, the dismantling of Hezbollah infrastructure by the Lebanese army and UNIFIL forces since the ceasefire, along with enforcement attacks by the Israeli air force, have made it difficult for the organization to maintain its capabilities near the border.
  • Hezbollah is also using in the fighting units that were claimed to have been severely damaged in the previous hostilities. Sources familiar with the matter said that in preparation for the fighting Hezbollah deployed fighters from its elite Radwan Unit in south Lebanon to confront IDF forces operating in the area and block a possible advance of armored forces (Reuters, March 5, 2026). According to reports in Israel from the IDF, Hezbollah deployed Radwan fighters in south Lebanon who operate in small cells and shoot at IDF forces and at northern Israeli communities (Haaretz, March 11, 2026). Reportedly, Hezbollah’s aerial unit (Unit 127), responsible for launching UAVs, was restored and is operating from south Lebanon and from the Beqa’a Valley even though it lost most of its commanders in the previous hostilities (Walla, March 10, 2026).

• • When “Operation Eaten Chaff” began on the evening of March 11, 2026, within an hour Hezbollah launched a series of heavy rocket barrages at Israeli territory, from northern communities to the center of the country. According to the IDF, Hezbollah planned to launch about 600 rockets, however Israeli aerial attacks prevented about two thirds of the planned launches and eventually about 200 rockets were launched (Israeli media, March 12, 2026). It showed that Hezbollah’s command and control capabilities allow it to simultaneously launch a large number of rockets within a short time and from many sites. Hezbollah also sought to show it could still to attack on a larger scale and expand the range of the fighting.
  • Some of Hezbollah’s rocket fire and UAV launches at northern Israel were carried out simultaneously with launches of Iranian ballistic missiles toward Israel, especially toward northern Israel. However, only in the evening hours of March 11, 2026 did the Iranian Revolutionary Guards note that the 40^th wave of attacks of Operation True Promise 4^[9] was “a joint, coordinated operation between the Revolutionary Guards and the Lebanese resistance,” which included “intensive attacks” of UAVs and rockets by Hezbollah along with the launching of Iranian missiles, thereby “imposing a new situation on the enemy” (al-Manar, March 11, 2026). According to reports in Lebanese and Arab media, the combined launches were an attempt to create multi-arena operational pressure on Israel’s defense systems as part of a broader regional campaign. It was noted that Hezbollah’s attacks integrated into a broader strategic Iranian concept seeking to create a system of parallel arenas which limits Israel’s freedom of action and makes it difficult to concentrate military efforts in only one arena (al-Mayadeen, March 11, 2026, al-Akhbar, March 8, 2026, al-Jazeera, March 4 and 11, 2026).

Hezbollah’s Psychological Warfare

• Hezbollah is also waging psychological warfare against Israel with several objectives: to amplify its capabilities and “achievements” both for the internal Lebanese arena and against Israel, to instill fear and exert psychological pressure on the Israeli population, especially residents of the north and IDF soldiers who are in Lebanese territory or are expected to enter it, and to raise the morale of the organization’s terrorist operatives
  • Hezbollah publishes pictures of its attacks, including preparations and the launches as well as footage from Israel after the alleged attacks. At the end of each day Hezbollah issues a list of its claims of responsibility for attacks and a map of the targets attacked and data on the targets and the weapons used. For a considerable portion of the attacks there has been no Israeli corroboration, such as claims of responsibility for launches at the center of the country or for attacks on IDF forces in south Lebanon.

     
Right: A missile launcher before firing at the Home Front Command headquarters in Ramla (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, March 11, 2026). Left: A map of alleged Hezbollah attacks during March 11, 2026 (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, March 12, 2026)

• • In response to the evacuation notices issued by the IDF spokesperson in Arabic for extensive areas in Lebanon, Hezbollah also published its own notices in which it “ordered” residents of Nahariya and Kiryat Shmona to “evacuate immediately” and move south. Hezbollah claimed responsibility for rocket and UAV launches at both cities and stated that the attacks had been carried out after the warnings.

     
Right: An “evacuation notice” for residents of Kiryat Shmona. Left: A video calling on residents of the north to disregard the statements of Israeli Defense Minister Katz calling on them to remain in their homes (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, March 7, 2026)

• Hezbollah amplified statements appearing in the Israeli media about Hezbollah’s capabilities against targets inside Israel to strengthen the narrative of a powerful organization capable of posing a real threat and surprising Israeli intelligence bodies.

     
Right: Hezbollah boasts of launching 100 rockets and UAVs at Israeli territory in a single day (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, March 7, 2026). Left: Hezbollah criticizes the IDF after firing more than 150 rockets (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, March 12, 2026)

Appendix: Hezbollah Activity on the Ground

• Between Hezbollah’s official announcement of the beginning of the “campaign” on March 3, 2026 and March 14, 2026 at midnight, it issued 291 claims of responsibility for attacking military and civilian targets in Israel and IDF forces operating in Lebanese territory:^[10]
• Attacks on targets in Israeli territory:

• Israeli communities, 58 attacks. Kiryat Shmona (15 attacks) and Nahariya and Metula (14 attacks each) are the leading targets according to Hezbollah’s statements.

• Military bases and posts, 61 attacks.

• Security facilities and infrastructure, 24 attacks.

• Concentrations of soldiers and military vehicles, 32 attacks, mainly near the border.

• • Attacks on IDF forces in Lebanon:

• Concentrations of soldiers and military vehicles, 91 attacks.

• Combat sites and posts, 17 attacks.

• Shooting down UAVs, three cases.

• In some instances Hezbollah claimed it had attacked specific military targets, whereas according to IDF reports some of the rocket fire also hit civilian areas. Several incidents of rocket fire at areas deep inside Israel were reported. In some instances Hezbollah claimed the attack while according to IDF reports some of the launches were intercepted or fell in open areas.
• According to Hezbollah, there were 16 attacks on Israeli targets deep inside Israel south of Caesarea, including on the Tel HaShomer base (five times), the Glilot base (twice), the Home Front Command base in Ramla (twice), the Palmachim base and a satellite communications station in the Elah Valley. However, the IDF spokesperson confirmed only three cases of rocket barrages from Lebanon targeting the center of the country, and there is no verification for most of the attacks claimed by Hezbollah.
• Hezbollah used a variety of weapons, mainly rockets (usually in attacks on communities in the Galilee, contact line posts and concentrations of forces), suicide UAVs and “quality precision missiles” (usually against strategic bases and headquarters in Haifa and southward). However, unlike the previous hostilities it has not yet specified the exact types.^[11]

• After a rocket barrage targeting central Israel on March 9, 2026, in Israeli assessment short-range Fateh-110 ballistic missile had been used. The missile is based on a family of Iranian missiles and can carry a warhead weighing hundreds of kilograms to a range of up to 350 km (about 218 miles). The possible use of such a weapon may indicate the organization’s willingness to expand the range of the fighting and demonstrate its capability to attack targets deep inside Israel, along with continued attacks on border areas and the north (Reuters, al-Jazeera, March 9, 2026).

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] Hezbollah and the other terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon.
^[3] Attacks on major Israeli cities.
^[4] "The Eaten Chaff" is a term from the Quran (Surah 105 al-Fil, verse 5). Chaff is what remains after the wheat has been threshed and the wheat kernels removed, and is used as food for sheep and cattle. It is crushed in the animal's mouth. In the context of the Quran, it refers to Allah, who harshly struck the enemies who fought the residents of Mecca in the year of the birth of the prophet Muhammad and figuratively crushed them. The message is that this war will crush Israel. Hamas also used this term to describe Operation Protective Edge in 2014.
^[5] See the May 2025 ITIC report, Challenges Faced by Hezbolla after the November 27, 2024 ceasfire and the December 2025 report, Hezbollah: One Year After the Ceasefire.
^[6] Terrorist organizations.
^[7] See the Appendix.
^[8] See the January 2026 ITIC report, The Completion of the First Phase of Hezbollah’s Disarmament
^[9] What Iran calls its response to the American-Israeli attacks.
^[10] In some instances, a number of reports described ongoing events, for the most part fighting against IDF forces in south Lebanon.
^[11] See the January 2025 ITIC report, Weapons Used by Hezbollah Against Israel, October 8, 2023 to November 27, 2024

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