Hamas’ strategy to destroy Israel: from theory into practice, as seen in captured documents

Dr. Uri Rosset

Overview^[1]

• The idea that the very existence of the State of Israel (“the Zionist entity”) is illegal and immoral has been ingrained in Hamas’ worldview since its founding. However, for Hamas, aware of its military and political limitations, the issue of “the destruction of Israel” remained a vision for the future, while the movement focused on the narrative that “not losing is a victory.”
• After the Saif al-Quds campaign (Operation Guardian of the Walls) in May 2021, Hamas’ approach began to shift, as the movement came to believe that the destruction of Israel had become a goal that could actually be achieved. The change was reflected in a series of public statements by Hamas leaders, although they could have been perceived on the Israeli side (and probably were) as boasts.
• Hamas documents taken from Gaza during the Gaza Strip War confirm what Hamas officials had publicly stated and indicate that the plan to eliminate the State of Israel had been regarded in recent years, especially after Operation Guardian of the Walls, by the Hamas leadership, especially Yahya al-Sinwar (as well as by its allies, Iran and Hezbollah), as executable and highly feasible in the near future. Those were not just empty words, they were backed by the development of practical plans and ongoing coordination between the elements of the “resistance axis.”^[2] They felt Israel had become vulnerable while Hamas and other “resistance” forces had grown stronger. Consequently, the plan was discussed in meetings between Hamas and its allies, Iran and Hezbollah, during the preparations for the October 7, 2023, terrorist attack and massacre. The strategic shift by Hamas was not understood at all by Israel.
• In ITIC assessment, the severe blow suffered by Hamas and most elements of the “resistance axis” will probably push back the play to destroy Israel, returning it to the level of a vision for the future. In the long run, if Hamas recovers and receives support from Iran, it is not improbable that the movement could once again regard destroying Israel as a practical plan.

Hamas’ Vision for the Destruction of Israel

• The perception that the very existence of the State of Israel (“the Zionist entity”) is illegal and immoral has been ingrained in Hamas’ worldview since its founding, as has the assumption that Israel’s fate is predetermined and it will one day cease to exist. Accordingly, Hamas rhetoric commonly compares the State of Israel to the Crusader Kingdom, which existed on Islamic land for a limited period but ultimately disappeared following the victory of the Muslim nation over the Christians. The same idea is reflected in the Hamas Charter (1988), the movement’s foundational ideological document:

The Islamic Resistance Movement takes seriously the defeat of the Crusaders by Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi and the liberation of Palestine from their hands, and relates in the same way to the downfall of the Tatars at Ayn Jalut [Ein Harod], where their power was crushed by Qutuz and al-Zahir Baybars, who saved the Arab world from the Tatar invasion which brought devastation to all expressions of human culture. From all these, it learns and draws lessons.

Article 35 of the Hamas Charter (1988)^[3]

• As a movement affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, whose principles include sabr (patience, perseverance), Hamas was also aware of its military and political limitations, and therefore, the issue of “the destruction of Israel” remained a long-term vision. The principle of hudna (truce), which originates from the time of the Prophet Muhammad and permits a temporary cessation of hostilities against Islam’s enemies due to temporary weakness, also provided Hamas with a religious justification for periods when its fight against Israel was suspended.
• Since Hamas’ founding, that has been its dominant approach, shaping its conduct toward Israel, as reflected in limited-scale and goal-restricted rounds of fighting. That was also how it was perceived in Israel, even on the eve of the Gaza Strip War, despite the fact that Hamas had already undergone a significant strategic shift which ultimately led to the October 7, 2023 attack.

Public Declarations Regarding the Destruction of Israel

• The perception of Israel’s weakness and its imminent downfall was reflected in a series of statements by senior Hamas figures and other “resistance axis” actors in the years leading up to Hamas’ attack and massacre. However, the declarations could be perceived in Israel as mere bravado aimed at self-encouragement and projecting unfounded strength:
  • According to a book published by Hamas’ military wing after Operation Guardian of the Walls (May 2021) entitled Saif al-Quds (Sword of Jerusalem, as Hamas referred to the conflict), “Defeating the enemy has become within range, or even closer, by the will of Allah. The resistance [Hamas] and its political and military leadership have laid out a comprehensive plan for the Promise of the Second Time (wa’ad al-khir). We in Hamas’ leadership maintain unprecedented close contact with all national and Islamic forces and factions to advance the strategic project of return and liberation.” The term Promise of the Second Time refers to an interpretation of Quranic verses stating that the gathering of Jews in the land for a second time and the corruption they cause will ultimately lead to “the fulfillment of Allah’s promise to put an end to them.”^[4]
  • On September 30, 2021, a conference entitled “The Promise of the End of Days – Palestine After Liberation” was held in Gaza under the sponsorship of Yahya al-Sinwar,^[5] then head of Hamas’ political bureau in Gaza, and attended by senior Hamas figures and leaders from other terrorist organizations. Participants discussed preparations for the future governance of “the State of Palestine” in various fields following its “liberation” from Israel. In a speech at the conference, delivered on his behalf by Hamas political bureau member Kamal Abu Aoun, al-Sinwar said, “We are sponsoring this conference because it aligns with our assessment that victory is near” and that “the complete liberation of Palestine from the river to the sea is at the heart of Hamas’ strategic vision.” He further declared, “The conflict cannot end except through the realization of the divine promise of victory and control granted to us by Allah, so that our people may live with dignity in their independent state with Jerusalem as its capital. For this, we are working hard and making great efforts, above the ground and beneath it, in the heart of the sea and the heights of the sky… We already see liberation with our own eyes, and therefore, we are preparing for what comes after it…” At the end of the conference, participants published a list of “methods of action during the liberation of Palestine” following the dissolution of Israel. This list included a call to draft a declaration of independence modeled as “a direct continuation of the Pact of Umar ibn al-Khattab;”^[6] defining the state leadership until elections could be held and recommendations on how to engage with the international community and neighboring states could be made; a call to preemptively draft legislation for the transitional period of governance; a call to establish mechanisms to ensure economic stability after the cessation of the use of the Israeli shekel and to safeguard resources previously belonging to Israel; and a call to prepare a guide on how to facilitate the return of Palestinian refugees to their cities of origin. The conference also recommended formulating guidelines for dealing with Jews who would remain in the land, distinguishing between those who should be killed or legally pursued and those who would be allowed to leave or integrate into the new state. Additionally, it called for preventing brain drain and “retaining Jewish scholars and experts in healthcare, engineering, technology, and civilian and military industries for a period, not allowing them to leave.” The conference further recommended compiling records of “their agents and recruiters in Palestine, the region and the world in order to purge Palestine and the Arab and Islamic homeland of this hypocritical human scum.”^[7]
  • In the television series “The Fist of the Free” produced by Hamas for Ramadan in April 2022, an invasion of Israel was depicted in a manner similar to the October 7, 2023 attack. The character resembling Hamas’ military wing leader, Muhammad al-Deif,^[8] stated at the beginning of the attack that “The balance of power has shifted. Today, we will invade them and not the other way around… We will shake the earth beneath their feet… [It will be] a decisive moment in history, a day the enemy will never forget until they are annihilated” (Episode 29 of the series, Palestinian Drama Telegram channel, April 2022).
  • Saleh al-‘Arouri,^[9] who was deputy head of Hamas’ political bureau, stated in a series of interviews in August 2023, that “A full-scale war has become inevitable. We all recognize its necessity. We want it, the resistance axis, the Palestinians, our nation, we all want it. This is not just something we say in the media. We discuss it behind closed doors… We are convinced we are capable of it. If we reach such a broad confrontation, and I am signing off on this, we will defeat them in a way never seen before in history” (al-Aqsa TV, August 24, 2023; al-Mayadeen, August 25, 2023).
• Senior Hezbollah officials also made similar statements regarding the potential destruction of Israel:
  • Hezbollah’s military commander, Fouad Shukr,^[10] speaking anonymously [sic] in an interview with Hezbollah-affiliated al-Akhbar editor Ibrahim al-Amin in August 2022, said, “The new mission assigned to us after the Second Lebanon War is to build high-quality capabilities that can destroy the Israeli army, not just prevent it from achieving its goals” (al-Akhbar, August 26, 2022).
  • In May 2021, immediately after the conclusion of Operation Guardian of the Walls, the late Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah^[11] delivered a speech marking the anniversary of Israel’s withdrawal from south Lebanon, stating that a new equation had been established in which any harm to al-Aqsa Mosque or Islamic holy sites would no longer be confined to Gaza but would trigger “a regional war for Jerusalem.” He added that any such war would pose a danger to “the entity” and that in his view, it would lead to “the entity’s disappearance ” (al-Manar, May 25, 2021).
  • Exactly two years later, in a speech marking the anniversary of the IDF’s withdrawal from south Lebanon in May 2023, Nasrallah said, “Today, hope is greater than ever for the liberation of Palestine from the sea to the river, for prayer in al-Aqsa Mosque. At the very least, the resistance axis, its leaders, fighters, supporters, believe in this with certainty, and this of course has a major impact on the battle.” Regarding Israel, he claimed, “Its home front is weak, fragile, anxious, always ready to pack up and leave. That is why in recent years we have seen an increase in passport applications and requests for alternative citizenships… Today, within the enemy’s society, there is more existential fear than ever before, fear for the future. Seventy-five years have passed, will we reach 80? Will we reach 100?” (al-Manar, May 26, 2023).

Destroying Israel, from Theory into Practice

• Hamas documents taken from Gaza during the Gaza Strip War show that the public statements, which could have been interpreted as mere boasts before October 7, 2023, were gradually accompanied by the development of a practical perception regarding the feasibility of the plan to destroy Israel, marking a fundamental shift in Hamas’ strategy. A document dealing with Israel entitled “The Movement’s Strategy 2013-2017” (undated), was mainly framed in a defensive manner against Israeli attacks from the sea and air, with “resistance” being conducted according to a “realistic plan,” such as an intifada in Judea and Samaria, an uprising of Israeli Arabs (Arabs of ’48), or the pursuit of “Jews” in international forums.

Third: The confrontation with the enemy (managing the confrontation with the enemy)

17) Strengthening and developing the structure of the resistance in Gaza so that it can endure and participate in the liberation plan. Preserving and achieving victory, Allah willing, in the face of an impending war (whether ground or aerial), while working to prevent it. Participating in the resistance and liberation plan according to a calculated and realistic strategy.

18) The release of prisoners (a new prisoner exchange deal).

19) Implementing popular resistance in Palestine against Judaization, settlement, arrests and suppression of prisoners.

20) Reaching a state of armed resistance in the West Bank (launching West Bank resistance).

21) Carrying out resistance operations from the outside in (resistance from the outside in).

22) Creating a suitable form of struggle for our people in 1948 territories (creative struggle for 1948). Mobilizing Arab and Islamic forces of good to carry out jihad against the occupation’s interests [handwritten].

23) Turning the issues of Jerusalem, the right of return, and the separation wall into practical international programs on an international and humanitarian level (practical programs for Jerusalem, prisoners, and return).

24) Pursuing Jews and military personnel in international forums.

• However, in a document from January 2019, written by the office of the head of Hamas’ political bureau in Gaza [Yahya al-Sinwar], the relations between Hamas and Iran were examined, identifying the interests of each side and their shared goals, as well as ways to cooperate. The only highlighted section in the document, under the heading “What do we want from them?”, stated:

Reaching a joint defense agreement that will include the Qods Force, Hezbollah, and Hamas in preparation for the war to liberate al-Quds [Jerusalem], activating all fronts against the common enemy, Israel, and preparing a practical plan to be executed in an attack on the enemy from all fronts.

• Itai Baron, former head of the IDF Intelligence Research Division, claimed, based on open sources, that the turning point was Operation Guardian of the Walls (May 2021), after which the perception began to develop that Israel could be destroyed.^[14] Confirmation of this assessment was found in documents taken from Gaza. In a letter dated June 5, 2021, sent by al-Sinwar, Mohammed Deif, and his deputy Marwan Issa to Esmail Qaani, commander of the Qods Force, they said the goal was “the great victory and the removal of the cancer” and “the elimination of the entity and its removal from our land and holy places.” They added, “we will never close our eyes, rest or remain silent until we achieve this sacred goal.” Additionally, they requested $500 million from Qaani for a period of two years.

The brother, the mujahid commander:

To achieve these great goals with which we will change the face of the universe, with the help of Allah, we are in great need of financial assistance in the amount of twenty million dollars per month for two years, which is equivalent to 500 million dollars over two years. We are confident that by the end of these two years or during them, if Allah wills, we will uproot this distorted entity, and together we will change the face of the region and ultimately, if Allah wills, this dark era in the history of our nation…

• In another letter sent on the same date to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei:

This imagined entity is weaker than people think. With the help of Allah, with your assistance, and with the support of our nation, we are capable of uprooting it and removing it, in the near future, with Allah’s help. We trust in Allah that we are close to fulfilling this divine promise from which there is no escape…

• In a letter al-Sinwar sent to Saeed Izadi, head of the Palestine branch in the Qods Force,^[17] on July 19, 2021, he wrote that the “resistance forces” were on the verge of “a tremendous strategic victory that will have strategic consequences and impact on the future of the region, the Islamic nation, and the entire world.” He added that they were standing “right on the threshold of victory and the fulfillment of Allah’s promise, ‘the second promise.’”

As for the second issue in your letter, I have noticed, as has everyone, the strategic shift in the policies and directions of the movement under the leadership of Abu al-Abd [Ismail Haniyeh], may Allah protect him, who has corrected much of the imbalance that existed in previous periods. Although we all understand that we have not achieved everything we wanted, there is no doubt that we have made great progress in the desired direction, and we have a significant opportunity in the coming years to complete this journey in a way that solidifies the Jerusalem Alliance, the axis of the Promise of the Second Time, and completes the necessary tools to achieve it. There is no doubt that the Palestinian military apparatus in Lebanon is one of the fundamental pillars of this project, and it is your right to ensure the path and direction of this apparatus so that it never deviates from its goal toward Jerusalem. Perhaps after we complete our internal elections in the coming weeks, we will begin to take practical action to organize the political, military and security paths to ensure the achievement of the objectives, the unwavering direction of the compass and the mobilization of all sincere energies toward the liberation of Jerusalem, the removal of this criminal occupation and the advancement of the sovereignty of the Muslim nation in the universe.

• A year later, in a letter sent by al-Sinwar to Isma’il Haniyeh on June 19, 2022, al-Sinwar outlined a practical strategic scenario for a multi-front confrontation with Israel that would lead to its destruction. He opened the letter by stating, “Since the ceasefire in Sword of Jerusalem, our jihad fighters have been preparing at maximum speed and without hindrance. They are confident that their level of preparedness for a great strategic battle that will change the face of the region and its rules of engagement is almost complete, and that what they have prepared is sufficient to begin immediately if required by Allah’s command.”
• He then presented three scenarios for “unifying the fronts and deciding on seizing the opportunity.”
  • The first scenario (the great strategic campaign): All elements of the “resistance axis,” except Iran, would attack Israel with the aim of “bringing down the occupying state and bringing an end to its existence, as well as ending the dismal situation in the region.” Al-Sinwar further stated, “Such a campaign would change the face of the region, its world order and its political reality entirely, while also bringing about the realization of the great Islamic revolution.” He estimated that the goal could be achieved “assuming Hezbollah possesses one-third of the capabilities they are claimed to have and participates in the battle with full force,” alongside “reasonable participation from Yemen, Iraq, and Syria, not the states themselves, but the axis forces, participation by fedayeen from the Jordanian border, significant participation from our side, and igniting the West Bank and the interior” [Israeli Arabs]. He also it was Hamas’ preferred scenario and that “the campaign’s symbol should be al-Aqsa and Jerusalem, as they can cause a nuclear explosion in the entire region.” According to the document, the timing should be linked to one of the Jewish holidays, preferably Passover, “as during the holidays, the Jews increase their incursions into al-Aqsa and their acts of aggression and prayers there.”

A scenario of a large-scale strategic campaign (ma’rakat wa’ad al-akhira):

We, along with the party [Hezbollah], the resistance forces, and the al-Quds Axis in the region (excluding Iran), will enter into a sudden confrontation from all fronts with all available force, aiming to overthrow the occupying state, eliminate it and put an end to the current state of collapse in the region. This will reshape the region, its systems and its overall political reality, leading to the rise of the great regional Islamic revolution. The brothers in the military are convinced that if the party [Hezbollah] possesses even a third of the military capabilities that have been discussed and participates in full force, along with reasonable participation from Yemen, Iraq, and Syria (from axis forces, not the states themselves), guerrilla operations beyond the Jordanian borders, our solid participation, and an explosion of the West Bank and the interior [Arab citizens of Israel], then, with the will and assistance of Allah, we will be able to achieve the desired objective. This is the preferred scenario, and we must reach an agreement on it. The campaign’s banner must be al-Aqsa and al-Quds because it serves as a nuclear trigger across the entire region. The timing must certainly be linked to one of the Jewish holidays when their storming of al-Aqsa, their assaults and their Talmudic prayers intensify. Undoubtedly, Passover, which coincides in one way or another with Ramadan, is the most suitable occasion, but there are other Jewish holidays that could also serve as the spark for the explosion.

• The second scenario (the intermediate campaign): Hamas would play the central role in the battle against Israel, while Hezbollah would participate partially, and forces from other fronts, the West Bank, and the interior would also join. In al-Sinwar’s assessment, Israel would suffer significant damage, many of its citizens would seek to emigrate, and the liberation of Judea and Samaria and the release of prisoners would be achieved. He stated that this would also lay the groundwork for Israel’s final destruction in the future.

2 – Intermediate campaign scenario:

This scenario is intended to tarnish the enemy’s image, destroy its capabilities, prestige and motivation to fight, crush its morale and cause many casualties on the opposing side. It aims to shatter the occupation’s image as a force capable of leading the [Sunni-Zionist] alliance, [it aims to] change the popular and political atmosphere in the region, dismantle the Palestinian Authority, alter the internal Palestinian political landscape, secure the release of prisoners, liberate the West Bank, defend Jerusalem and al-Aqsa, and establish the Battle of the Second Promise. We enter this battle with full force, the party [Hezbollah] participates with a quarter or a third of its power, keeping the remaining forces for deterrence and the strategic campaign, while the al-Quds axis forces engage from the other fronts. Meanwhile, we will ignite an uprising in the West Bank and the occupied interior.

• The third scenario: Hezbollah would not be a direct participant, at least not initially. The main burden would fall on Hamas, with additional forces from the “resistance axis” and fedayeen from Jordan and Syria. It was the minimum scenario Hamas would settle for, and according to al-Sinwar, it did not require the approval of Iran’s Supreme Leader, only that of Nasrallah and Hezbollah.

Third Scenario:

This is a scenario of necessity, in which we fully engage, ignite the situation in the West Bank and the occupied interior, and the party [Hezbollah] allows the activation of our forces with increasing efficiency from Lebanon. Meanwhile, the forces of the al-Quds axis are mobilized from other fronts (Iraq and Yemen), and guerrilla operations are conducted with maximum possible capability through the Syrian and Jordanian fronts. The party does not participate directly in this scenario but ensures the activation of all the aforementioned elements while maintaining the highest levels of readiness, capability, and preparation to escalate into a medium- or high-level offensive depending on battlefield developments. This scenario is the minimum agreement that can be reached, and according to our assessment, the decision regarding it falls within the authority of Nasrallah and the party, without requiring the approval of the Guide [Iran’s supreme leader]. Accordingly, securing an agreement on this scenario must be the minimum outcome of this visit, while presenting the first two scenarios and arranging a joint visit to Tehran to meet with the Guide and present the first two scenarios, especially the first one, in an effort to secure his approval.

• Additionally, the document emphasized the urgent need to establish a Hamas military force in Lebanon of at least 250 fighters, which could utilize Hezbollah’s operational infrastructure (implicitly) for raids from Lebanon into Israeli territory. Establishing this force was deemed necessary if the third scenario were decided upon, and possibly even if the second scenario were chosen. It was stated that this issue “does not tolerate delay, hesitation or procrastination.” To discuss these matters, al-Sinwar requested that Haniyeh quickly arrange a visit to Tehran, as “dealing with this great issue cannot happen in Lebanon alone due to its importance.”

Immediate / Rapid Action:

It is necessary to swiftly establish a prepared and well-trained force to participate in the next round, especially if we adopt the third scenario, or even the second. We will accept that this force will not possess weapons or equipment outside of training sites or when implementation begins. We will also accept that it will not have the capability to launch missiles that might violate the restrictions the party (Hezbollah) wishes to impose as the host. However, the urgent numerical requirement must be sufficient, no less than 250 trained to the highest level as elite forces (like Radwan forces) and equipped with the necessary adequate gear at the designated sites. When the implementation begins, this force must receive appropriate artillery cover while carrying out its missions, whether it is capable itself or if the party provides for its needs. The details of this matter cannot tolerate any delay, hesitation or slowdown. Any such issues will lead us to conclude that the group is not serious about building this force or supporting it fully. It is essential to discuss this issue candidly.

• Two weeks later, on July 1, 2022, Haniyeh updated al-Sinwar on the content of a secret meeting arranged by Haj Ramadan (Saeed Izadi, head of the Palestine branch of the Qods Force) with Nasrallah, in which Hamas representatives presented the scenarios for the battle against Israel. According to Haniyeh, Nasrallah expressed support for the first scenario, the great strategic campaign, calling it “realistic,” and it was agreed that the issue would be presented to Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei.

First: The strategic course of the conflict

We presented our vision regarding the course of action and explained to them that we had examined the issue within our internal circles in Gaza and the West Bank. As for our brothers abroad, they are conducting a general study of the conflict with the enemy at this stage but are not yet fully informed about the detailed scenarios and vision. We presented them with the first and second scenarios mentioned in your letter, but we did not touch on the third scenario. After an in-depth and lengthy dialogue, the stance of Sayyid [Nasrallah] was clear and firm, stating that he supports the first scenario and believes that the data and circumstances demonstrate that it is a realistic scenario that can be achieved, namely, the end of Israel’s existence. Haj Ramadan generally supported this but emphasized the necessity of examining the means and identifying obstacles and challenges before advancing the matter. Regarding the scenario, the following was agreed upon:

1. The matter will be presented to the Leader of the Revolution in Iran, and he will be updated on what has been agreed upon. Sayyid Hassan will ensure this, and I will speak with the Leader during our next visit to Iran.

2. In light of this, the relevant authorities are requested to formulate a comprehensive plan that takes into account the strengths and weaknesses, the means, the roles, and the parties that will participate in this.

• Haniyeh concluded his update to al-Sinwar by stating that the first scenario, in which all elements of the “resistance axis” (except Iran) would attack Israel, was the one agreed upon by the main players, Iran and Hezbollah.

If so, this scenario [the first scenario] was approved in the discussion we held with our allies; we are awaiting its final review in additional meetings, particularly with the Iranians, and we will follow up on the necessary preparations for it as outlined above.

We pray to Almighty Allah to bring about the destruction of the entity at the hands of our brothers and the members of the nation who are diligently working on their project and standing alongside the resistance project against the American-Zionist project.

• On January 14, 2023, Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, addressed members of Hamas’ executive committee (majlis al-shura) gathered in Doha, some of whom had arrived from Turkey and Gaza. Haniyeh described Israel’s escalation after the establishment of the right-wing government, calling it “dangerous,” as he claimed its policies threatened the Palestinian cause, particularly regarding “al-Quds and al-Aqsa, the settlements, the land of ’48, and the siege and strangulation of Gaza.” As a result, he assessed that the conflict with “the enemy” was approaching an explosion point (infijar). Haniyeh also mentioned the protests inside Israel as a factor destabilizing “the enemy” and expressed hope that Israel’s right-wing government would cause an internal explosion.

First: The course of the conflict with the enemy is moving toward a broad confrontation because the issues the enemy is dealing with are at the core and axis of the conflict, especially al-Quds. We are advancing toward a widespread explosion point, which this time may be different from previous stages.

Second: This government, as much as it poses threats to the Palestinian people, carries within it the seeds of an internal explosion inside the entity. The contradictory and opposing statements we see and hear, along with the protests, indicate that the internal state of the entity is unprecedented.

• On April 4, 2023, a conversation took place between Yahya al-Sinwar and Muhammad Nasser (Abu Amr), a member of the Hamas political bureau. Al-Sinwar reassured Nasser, stating that “our brothers in Gaza have the capability to change the face of the Middle East,” and noted that the Sayf al-Quds campaign [Operation Guardian of the Walls] had been “a picnic” for the enemy compared to what was expected in any future campaign.

– A message to everyone, pass it along on your way: Any new campaign will make Saif al-Quds [Operation Guardian of the Walls] seem like a walk in the park for the enemy, so powerful that it will shatter the enemy into fragments. Our readiness is high and our development is significant.

– The developments in the West Bank are extremely important, a popular incubator, a field of resistance work.

– The enemy has 51 battalions operating in rotation without rest, and the enemy is noticeably exhausted.

– In exporting national issues, our media is working effectively, and the whole world rushed to take control of the situation and calm the arena. Al-Aqsa is an opportunity and a winning card, and we have a great responsibility.

– The meaning of the Ramadan campaign is a comprehensive explosion, the fall of regimes and a blow to the occupation.

• From June 19 to June 23, 2023, a Hamas delegation led by Isma’il Haniyeh and Saleh al-‘Arouri visited Iran and met with senior regime officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. According to a document from Hamas’ Arab and Islamic Relations Department dated July 6, 2023, summarizing the visit, Haniyeh emphasized that Gaza was “the base of resistance,” and that Hamas was prepared for a new campaign against Israel, positioning itself at the forefront of the battle. According to the minutes of the meeting, the Iranians expressed support for the capabilities of “the resistance” in light of Israel’s “weakness.” Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi stated that “the resistance is stronger than ever, while Israel is weaker than ever.” Hossein Salami, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), said the Iranians saw “signs and a possibility of removing Israel from the map” and claimed that Hamas’ situation was “better than that of the occupation, and the resistance’s capabilities are increasing in a way that will gradually push Israel into a corner.”

– Gaza today is the base of the resistance, and we rely on the following strategy:

– Gaza must be ready to intervene in case an event occurs or if there is aggression against al-Aqsa, our prisoners, our Jerusalem and our people. This is what you saw in Saif al-Quds [Operation Guardian of the Walls], the unity of the arenas and the revenge of the free peoples that the resistance ignited, with the brothers in Islamic Jihad [the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, PIJ] leading the charge. There was precise coordination between us and our brothers in the PIJ, who performed well, along with other factions.

– Gaza must be prepared in case of a major campaign for Jerusalem and al-Aqsa, and we believe this is a strategic matter on the path to defeating the Zionist entity. We are constantly discussing with all relevant parties how such a campaign should be conducted. We in Palestine confirm that we are ready and will be at the forefront of this expected confrontation, and we will not hesitate in defending our people, Jerusalem, and al-Aqsa.

1. Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications

2. Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Shi'ite Houthis in Yemen and the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq.

3. For further information, see the March 2006 ITIC study, " The Hamas Charter (1988) – Overtly anti-Semitic and anti-West, radical Islamic in outlook, it stresses Hamas’ ideological commitment to destroy the State of Israel through a long-term holy war (jihad)."

4. Sagi Polka, "This Land Grows Resistance Fighters as It Grows Olives" - Victory and Defeat in the Eyes of the Resistance Organizations, Ma'arachot, 504, December 2024, pp. 13-14. (Hebrew)

5. Killed by the IDF on October 16, 2024.

6. The Treaty of Surrender of Byzantine Jerusalem to the Muslim conquerors around the year 638.

7. A conference in Gaza under Hamas' sponsorship discussed the stage after the liberation of Palestine and the "disappearance" of Israel: a distinction must be made between Jews who should be killed and those who should not; preventing the brain-drain of Jews, MEMRI website, October 5, 2021.

8. killed in an Israeli attack on July 13, 2024.

9. killed in an Israeli attack on Beirut on January 2, 2024.

10. killed in an Israeli attack on Beirut on July 30, 2024.

11. killed in an Israeli attack on Beirut on September 27, 2024.

12. For the original document, click [Document 1]. The translated section is marked in red.

13. For the original document, click [Document 2]. The translated section is marked in red.

14. Lecture by Brig. Gen. (Res.) Itai Baron, "From 'Inferiority' to 'Balance' and Perhaps to 'Superiority' – Stages in the Development of the 'Victory Theory' of the 'Resistance Camp,' Intelligence Heritage Magazine Resistance Camp, METG website, October 27, 2024. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1biJpWLcWgM)

15. For the original document, click [Document 3]. The translated section is marked in red

16. For the original document, click [Document 4]. The translated section is marked in red

17. For further information about Saeed Izadi and the links between the IRGC's Qods Force and the Palestinian terrorist organizations, see the January 2025 ITIC report, "Activities of Saeed Izadi, Head of the Qods Forces’ “Palestine Branch,” Reflected in Captured Document."

18. For the original document, click [Document 5]. The translated section is marked in red

19. For the original document, click [Document 6]. The translated section is marked in red

20. For the original document, click [Document 6]. The translated section is marked in red

21. For the original document, click [Document 6]. The translated section is marked in red

22. For the original document, click [Document 6]. The translated section is marked in red

23. For the original document, click [Document 7]. The translated section is marked in red

24. For the original document, click [Document 7]. The translated section is marked in red

25. For the original document, click [Document 8]. The translated section is marked in red

26. For the original document, click [Document 9]. The translated section is marked in red

27. For the original document, click [Document 10]. The translated section is marked in red

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