Hamas Media as Reflected in Documents Brought Back from the Gaza Strip

Overview^[1]

• Hamas’ media system is an extensive network which integrates overt and covert, formal and informal communication channels and targets diverse audiences. It serves as a propaganda and incitement tool in Hamas’ battle for hearts and minds.
• Hamas documents brought back by the IDF during the Gaza Strip War showed that Hamas exercises full control, administratively, financially and strategically over its affiliated media outlets in terms of content and messaging, although such bodies are represented as independent, allowing Hamas to maneuver communicationally, diplomatically and militarily.
• The documents revealed that Hamas’ media activity was based on an orderly, multi-year master program divided into 25 projects, each with quantifiable objectives, content production quotas, timetables and resource allocations.
• An important element of the program was a propaganda campaign to sabotage Israel’s resilience by disseminating fake news, funding targeted advertisements for audiences in Israel, operating satirical pages to mock Israeli leaders and symbols, sowing doubts to demoralize the Israeli public, widen rifts and escalate crises.
• Hamas invests considerable resources in shaping an English-language narrative tailored to the West to mobilize legitimacy for the “resistance” and to defame and demonize the State of Israel. It also conducts an aggressive campaign against Arab states and actors promoting normalization with Israel, including blacklists and public denunciation.
• Internal audits reveal that Hamas’ media outlets suffer from deficits, bad debts and poor asset management. The findings indicate absolute dependence on the transfer of funds from Hamas’ coffers, including via Turkey.
• Ali al-Amoudi, head of the information department, who usually operated behind the scenes and was rarely exposed in the media, made headlines at the end of 2025 following unofficial reports of his appointment as acting head of Hamas’ political bureau in the Gaza Strip and as Yahya al-Sinwar’s apparent successor.
• In ITIC assessment, the documents show that the affiliated media are at the core of Hamas’ battle for hearts and minds, and make the information department particularly important in formulating media policy and managing all the media institutions operating in the service of Hamas, including those the organization does not define as officially affiliated with it.

Background

• Hamas has an extensive, interactive media network of overt and covert, formal and informal communication channels targeting diverse audiences. In terms of ownership and control, it combines direct control with indirect affiliations. Among the media outlets directly owned by Hamas and subordinate to its government media information office are the websites al-Risalah, Felesteen, al-Aqsa TV, al-Aqsa Radio, the Palinfo website, the website of the Izz al-Din Brigades, Hamas’ military-terrorist wing and its Telegram channels. There are also media outlets fully affiliated with Hamas yet presented as independent channels, including the Shehab and Safa news agencies, local radio stations and “independent” journalists and correspondents. The objective of having a hybrid media system is to enable Hamas to appear as advocating media pluralism, while in practice it fully controls the media discourse. Moreover, it grants Hamas diplomatic and operational flexibility, making it possible to circumvent sanctions and deny ties to extremist content by using “independent” or “unofficial” media channels.^[2]
• An analysis of open sources has shown that Hamas’ information department is the central coordinating body of its information strategy. It is responsible for the activity of the entire Hamas media system and supervises the products of Hamas-controlled media outlets. Information department figures periodically visit and meet with Hamas media outlets as part of an oversight processes to ensure that media activity is synchronized with Hamas’ propaganda and incitement effort. According to open sources, the department is subordinate to the Hamas government information office (website of the Hamas government media information office, April 25, 2023).

     
Visit of Hamas’ Hamas government media information office to the information department. Left, Ali al-Amoudi, head of the information department; right, Salama Marouf, next to the head of the Hamas government media information office (website of the Hamas government media information office, April 25, 2023)

• A collection Hamas documents brought back by the IDF during the Gaza Strip War includes a multi-annual Hamas’ information department program and internal audits of some of Hamas’ media outlets. The documents expose Hamas’ media strategy regarding the diverse target audiences to which it directs its messages, alongside the various organizational, operational and financial aspects of its affiliated media outlets. Beyond the data, the reports present a picture of a centralized media network fully subordinate to Hamas’ information department, including the ostensibly “independent” affiliated media outlets.

The Hamas’ Information Department – Work Program

• An undated document entitled “The 2022 Operational Program of the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas – Gaza District,” detailed the information department’s work program for 2022 and provided an insight into the organization’s strategy. The document, part of a multi-year program called “Sword of Jerusalem 2022-2025,”^[3] was a kind of compass for all media outlets operated by Hamas, including strategic objectives, main activities, allocated budgets and behavior of the Hamas media network through 2025, as defined and approved by Ali al-Amoudi,^[4] the director of the information department. The document shows how Hamas manages its propaganda effort vis-à-vis the internal arena, Israel and the international arena.

• The work program begins by defining its two leading projects:
• Strengthening the Palestinian narrative and creating media discourse directed at the foreign target audience.
• Strengthening psychological warfare against “rivals and enemies.”

• The program has 25 sections defining the fields of media activity. They include empowering the Hamas movement and its “values,” outreach to different populations within civilian society and its various sectors, the media and battle for hearts and minds in Israel, the delegitimization of Israel, developing human resources, improving performance and capabilities of oversight, monitoring and financial management.
• The master programs are arranged in tables, each in a specific field, including a breakdown of components divided into sub-tasks, projects and pricing for each activity. Some are indicated for an annual, semi-annual or quarterly basis, and some are noted as are high or low priority:

1. Promoting the movement’s “talents” as social and national symbols.

2. Strengthening the pioneering role of youth, empowering them socially and economically and harnessing their energies in the service of society and the Palestinian issue.

3. Strengthening the positive role of women in building society within a framework of the system of rights and obligations.

4. Establishing community relations and communication with sectors, social groups and professional elites.

5. Adopting public issues, injustices and complaints, defending and addressing them.

6. Societal resilience and unity in the face of “Zionist” attacks.

7. Strengthening civilian and social peace and resolving disputes in accordance with the rule of law.

8. Strengthening Islamic values and reducing occurrences which contradict religious identity.

9. Caring for various social sectors, adopting and guiding them, union members, talented individuals, persons with disabilities and others.

10. Strengthening communication directed at the “enemy and rivals” and waging psychological warfare to undermine them.

11. Confronting normalization moves, activating a comprehensive boycott of the “enemy” and isolating it politically, economically, culturally and communicationally.

12. Strengthening national partnership, institutionalizing national activity and preserving achievements.

13. Developing and building regional and international networks of relations supporting the Palestinian issue.

14. Mobilizing the local community around the national core principles and the movement’s positions.

15. Creating positive and ongoing public opinion toward the movement, its achievements and its leadership.

16. Strengthening the nation’s awareness of the Palestinian issue, preserving the movement’s clean image [sic] and striving to harness its resources for the “liberation project.”^[5]

17. Striving to influence foreign and international public opinion and promoting the movement’s positions and the legitimacy of the “resistance.”^[6]

18. Disseminating culture, literature, drama and art to strengthen identity and society’s religious and national value system.

19. Documenting and promoting the heritage and jihadi experience and milestones in the movement’s activity.

20. Developing the media system and media discourse in a manner serving the movement’s message.

21. Developing human resources among media teams and building their capabilities.

22. Strengthening the programming and monitoring system.

23. Strengthening the quality of the movement’s performance.

24. Strengthening preparedness to deal with disasters and crises.

25. Developing oversight and accounting.

• Hamas’ media system is not directed at a homogeneous audience but operates through the systematic identification of audiences and adaptation of its messages accordingly. Beyond the media effort vis-à-vis enemy audiences, Hamas formulates different messages for internal Palestinian audiences, including differentiation between places and different political conditions, for broader Arab-Islamic audiences and for international and Western audiences. Adapting themes to the selected target audience is part of a strategic concept to maximize the attainment of a cognitive objective. Thus, for example, the same event may be reported in religious-jihadist terminology to one audience and in humanitarian terminology to another.
• The information department’s program divides all media and cognitive activities into organizational activity intended for internal organizational needs, namely strengthening Hamas and its “values” among Palestinian society as a whole, on the one hand among target audiences ideologically identified with Hamas and on the other among those not counted among its supporters. For example, the program dedicates numerous social activities to harnessing and strengthening Palestinian society’s connection to Hamas with emphasis on youth, women and weaker strata. In the infographic below, taken from the program of the 25 programs of the communication department’s master programs, the internal organizational segment includes 12 projects of 46 activities with a total budget of $1,198,795, whereas the segment directed at society and target audiences has 35 projects of 266 activities with a budget of $1,041,865.

• The total budget for implementing all the master programs in all their sections amounts to $2,240,660, with funding sources including an approved budget of $1,131,160 and an exceptional budget of $1,109,000. According to the data, no external budget was allocated to the program, the nature of the external budget was not specified.

Information Activity Regarding Israel and the International Arena

• Hamas’ battle for hearts and minds is an important front in the movement’s overall “struggle.” Hamas wages a multi-dimensional campaign aimed at undermining Israel’s legitimacy, influencing global public opinion and blocking normalization processes. As part of the project to strengthen media psychological warfare against “rivals and enemies,” Hamas uses a broad spectrum of measures to demoralize and sabotage the resilience of Israeli society. The main tactics are the use of modern digital tools, especially operating paid advertising directed directly at target audiences in Israel. Reports, statements and articles are prepared and public opinion surveys directed against the enemy have been held, visual materials such as videos, infographics and cartoons are produced, electronic campaigns are managed and there are digital stories focusing on the “enemy’s failures” during confrontations and sponsored advertisements are directed at the geographic areas of rivals through social media platforms.
• The program also had a project to use satire and comedy as weapons of psychological warfare by manufacturing of content and cartoons, and establishing satirical online pages. Meanwhile, to immunize Palestinian society against “Zionist” attacks, a short film focusing on the defeats of the “Zionist” army in battles in the Gaza Strip was produced. The combination of traditional propaganda, reports and articles, modern digital engagement, campaigns, visual content, targeted paid advertising and sponsored advertisements, indicates a sophisticated approach intended to penetrate the Israeli information space on several levels simultaneously.
• An example is the table of the sections of Project No. 1 in Master Program No. 10, strengthening communication directed at “the enemy and rivals” and waging psychological and communication warfare to undermine them. It is an offensive psychological warfare program to undermine and erode resilience within the ranks of the “enemy” and political rivals. The objective was to produce content that would sow doubts, highlight failures and influence public opinion on the other side.

• The document shows that the struggle against the normalization of relations with Israel was central to the’ media strategy and in battle for hearts and minds.^[7] One goal of the Hamas media was to combat it through an aggressive campaign rejecting normalization with Israel, promoting a boycott, collecting information on actors who normalized relations with Israel to defame them in the media and alternatively granting media recognition to actors who boycotted Israel. The master program to confront normalization and activate a comprehensive boycott of the enemy included the following:
  • Recruiting writers around rejecting normalization and combating it.
  • Calling on Arab and Muslim writers and journalists to declare a media and cultural boycott of normalization.
  • Expanding media boycott of normalization to include Arab journalists and writers.
  • Publishing coverage of journalistic statements and positions regarding the struggle against normalization.
  • Holding press conferences on combating normalization and activating a comprehensive boycott of the enemy.
  • Preparing statements attacking normalization and calling for a boycott.
  • Organizing a digital campaign against Arab normalization and exposing the normalizers.
  • Contacting influential media figures to leverage their status to declare rejection of normalization.
  • Producing information videos presenting the movement’s positions regarding normalization.
  • Preparing blacklists of normalizers.
  • Preparing an honor role of Palestinian and Arab figures declaring a boycott of the “occupation.”
  • Spots and information videos emphasizing the dangers of normalization to Arab societies and the importance of boycott.
  • Producing visual news reports.
  • Hosting figures and bodies opposing normalization.
  • Covering anti-normalization activities.

• Another media effort reflected in the document was shaping a narrative tailored to the international arena to mobilize support. The master program for strengthening the Palestinian narrative and creating media discourse directed at a foreign audience included a series of focused activities including developing and maintaining an English-language news website, disseminating campaigns and visual content tailored to a Western audience, publishing a weekly English briefing entitled “Palestine Report,” and actively recruiting foreign writers, journalists and activists supporting the Palestinian narrative. At the same time, the organization constructed internal capabilities, such as training a movement spokesperson in English and establishing a dedicated media incubator for English-speaking students in the Gaza Strip. Thus for Hamas content production was not sufficient, and it established a holistic media apparatus for international influence.

Reports of Hamas’ Finance Department Regarding Media Outlets

• Among the documents were internal audits of the Hamas finance department for 2021 for its media outlets al-Risalah, Shehab, Safa and the newspaper Felesteen. The Hamas-affiliated media outlets defining themselves as “independent” are funded by Hamas, dictated to by Hamas and are an integral part of the organization’s overall media network. The audits were written in an almost identical format, bore the logo of Hamas’ finance department and were addressed to the person who oversaw all the movement’s media activity, Ali al-Amoudi, aka Abu Ahmed, head of Hamas’ information department and a close aide of Yahya al-Sinwar (head of the Hamas political bureau who was killed in October 2024). The audits submitted to al-Amoudi had information regarding managerial structure, financial challenges and operational failures, and examined the performance and conduct of the media outlets during 2021, focusing on the areas of programming versus execution, examining the gap between strategic and operational programming and actual execution, administrative matters, human resources management, organizational structure, asset management and internal processes, financial matters, analysis of revenues, expenditures, budget management, debt collection and account management.

Al-Risalah

• Al-Risalah is Hamas’ journalistic platform and its content reflects Hamas’ ideology, promotes its messages and both its organization and budget are controlled by the movement. For many years its editor was senior Hamas figure Ghazi Hamad, who was later appointed Hamas spokesperson, was Hamas deputy foreign minister and is currently a member of the political bureau.
• The financial and administrative audit of al-Risalah for 2021, submitted by the Hamas department of finance to al-Amoudi in November 2022, began with a brief historical review of the paper since its establishment in 1997 by the al-Khalas (“salvation”) party, which was Hamas’ political wing. It stated that the newspaper al-Risalah gave birth to numerous media departments, such as alresala.net, launched in 2004, and the al-Risalah radio station, which began broadcasting in October 2011, adding that what distinguished the radio department was that it addressed all internet users and therefore had a wide distribution. Its broadcasts were heard not only by residents of the Gaza Strip but also the Palestinian public and the Palestinian public “inside,” i.e., Israeli Arabs.
• The first part of the audit related to the administrative aspects of al-Risalah and second part to financial aspects. The report pointed to a series of deficiencies in administrative and financial conduct. The overall evaluation score, given according to the model prepared by the financial and administrative audit department, was a weak 69%. Regarding administration, the main deficiencies noted were lack of alignment between the administrative system and employee regulations approved by the Hamas movement, deficiencies in authority and definition of board tasks mainly after subordinating al-Risalah to the information department, absence of board members from most board meetings and the absence of a programming versus execution report.
• The audit referred to deficiencies raised in the previous audit which were not corrected, including the preparation of a strategic program for al-Risalah consistent with Hamas’ information department.
• The audit noted that al-Risalah had an operational program for 2021 and presented its ten objectives:
  • Mobilizing the local community around the movement’s positions and its core principles.
  • Strengthening Palestinian identity and building national and Islamic consciousness.
  • Strengthening the nation’s awareness regarding the Palestinian issue and preserving the image of the movement and its project.
  • Supporting the movement’s vision of “resistance activity”^[8] and documenting its accumulated jihadist experience.
  • Combating normalization projects with the “occupation” and exposing their initiators.
  • Providing media support for governmental, legislative and judicial activity.
  • Strengthening communication directed against the “enemy,” waging psychological warfare and undermining “rivals.”
  • Strengthening partnership with “factions”^[9] and national components in a manner serving the national interest and the movement’s worldview.
  • Strengthening media directed at the world, supporting the issue and exposing [alleged] Israeli “crimes and violations.”
  • Strengthening the activity of the al-Risalah media training center.

The Shehab New Agency

• The Shehab news agency is one of the strongest, most widespread and most influential media outlets in the Palestinian arena, especially the digital arena. Operating primarily from the Gaza Strip, is it affiliated with Hamas although it represents itself as an “independent news agency.” Its connection to Hamas is apparently structural and ideological, and it serves de facto as one of its main propaganda arms, combining ongoing news reporting with an extremist ideological narrative, incitement to violence and terrorism and communicational leveraging of Hamas’ political and military objectives. Since the October 7, 2023 terrorist attack and massacre, and the war in the Gaza Strip, the Shehab agency has increased its activity and it was one of the leading channels of Hamas’ military-terrorist wing for distributing documentation videos of attacks on IDF forces produced by the combat information unit of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ military-terrorist wing .
• The audit of the Shehab agency for 2021 was submitted by Hamas’ finance department to the director of the information department, Ali al-Amoudi, after a team from Hamas’ information department visited the agency’s offices. That is further evidence of the agency’s affiliation and subordination to Hamas, both administratively and operationally. According to the audit, until 2021 it operated in affiliation with the al-Aqsa network, a media network affiliated with Hamas.

Introduction:

The Shehab media institution is a company for media services and artistic production founded in 2007. The company began its activity in the field of journalism and news by launching a website called the Shehab News Agency and through the use of social networks which convey the situation and news in Palestine responsibly and professionally. The company also provides integrated media services and production services to satellite channels, media companies, governmental institutions, private sector companies, civil organizations and international bodies.

During a visit by the financial and administrative audit team to the Shehab agency, cooperation by the agency’s personnel, simplification of processes and transparency in conduct were evident, however we were unable to evaluate the agency using the assessment questionnaire model due to its affiliation with the al-Aqsa network until the end of 2021.

• The audit report gave data and findings about Shehab’s organizational structure:
  • Manpower: As of the end of 2021, the agency employed 37 workers, 24 permanent employees, 11 employees under an operational contract and two employees under an office contract.
  • Hierarchical structure: The agency has a hierarchical structure which includes a director, an administrative unit and four core departments, news (12 employees), production (12 employees), operations (seven employees) and administrative and financial services (six employees).
  • Physical location: The agency is headquartered in two apartments (fourth floor and roof) in the Palestine Tower in Gaza City. The property itself is owned by Hamas’ media department.
  • Management and programing: The agency’s activity was based on long-term programming including a multi-year strategic program (2017-2021) and a detailed operational program for 2021 indicating systematic and structured management.
• Alongside the general information on the agency’s functioning, the audit exposed significant gaps and failures in its financial and organizational conduct:
  • Financial balance: The agency’s total revenue in the reporting year was $349,562 and total expenditures reached $361,417 so the agency concluded the 2021 budget year with a deficit of $11,855. The main expense of the Shehab agency in 2021 was payment of employee salaries in a total amount of $275,576.
  • Financial affiliation with the al-Aqsa network: The agency’s advertising revenues were approximately 60% percent of the total revenues of Hamas’ al-Aqsa network, indicating the agency’s economic importance as source of revenue for Hamas’ media network.
  • Sources of income: The agency’s revenues were divided into three main sources, revenues from budgets, $269,407, revenues from media and advertising, $70,640 and miscellaneous revenues, $9,515.
  • Affiliation with Turkey: As of the end of 2021, the agency’s liquid asset balance was $46,937 in local banks, mainly the Bank of Palestine and the Production Bank, and a separate cash balance of $16,606 held in Turkey. The existence of a cash balance in Turkey, even if modest, indicates the agency’s affiliation with Hamas’ financial network abroad, for which Turkey serves as an important financial center.
  • Affiliation with the al-Aqsa network: The agency relies entirely on the financial system of Hamas’ al-Aqsa network and does not prepare independent financial reports. Thus it can be postulated that Hamas maintains close financial and operational oversight of Shehab and regards it as one of its media arms.
  • Absence of managerial reporting: According to the audit, managerial reports of the agency’s achievements in accordance with managerial principles were not prepared.
  • Poor asset management: Although an asset inventory was conducted by an external body, the al-Aqsa network, the Shehab agency itself does not maintain a register of assets and property.
  • Severe collection problem: The audit revealed that 87% of the agency’s total client debts were old debts which had not been collected, in a total amount of $108,261.

• In light of the above, Hamas’ finance department recommended that the agency undertake a series of corrective measures, including adopting a new organizational structure, preparing measurable strategic programs, preparing reliable managerial reports and taking immediate action by the collection system.
• Attached to the document was one page from a response and clarification document of the agency regarding the audit findings, which stated that at the end of 2021 a new director was appointed to the agency, Shadi Abu Sabha,^[10] who in October 2021 led a split of the agency into two separate bodies, the Shehab news agency and the “Event” production company. The audit also noted that the agency’s work and authorities were separated from the al-Aqsa network in January 2022 and registration of the agency as “independent” was completed in May 2022, while the agency’s operational budget became independent and separated from the al-Aqsa network in December 2021. As of the date of the report, only an administrative connection existed between the Shehab agency and Event until final approval of the new organizational structure in order to complete the full separation. As for employees employed under personal contracts with the Shehab agency, they still received their salaries from the al-Aqsa network.

The Safa News Agency

• The Safa news agency is a Palestinian news agency operating from the Gaza Strip which also represents itself as an “independent and professional” media body but is clearly affiliated with Hamas and is a conduit for the organization’s propaganda. Safa serves as a more institutionalized arm within the organization’s media network compared to Shehab, which operates more as a social network. Unlike Shehab, which focuses on publishing short videos and emotional posts, Safa has a classic news agency format and publishes long articles, investigations, interviews and reports, however its content aligns completely with Hamas’ propaganda and incitement, as does its terminology.
• The Hamas’ finance department audit of the Safa agency for 2021, which was sent to Ali al-Amoudi, showed the agency’s direct affiliation with Hamas and with the movement’s central management and oversight systems. The audit noted that the agency had no independent media strategy and its activity relied on the strategic program of Hamas’ media department, indicating the agency’s strategic subordination to Hamas’ media and information apparatus.

2. There is reliance on the strategic plan of the information department and the operational plan was prepared in accordance with these objectives, however no relative weights were assigned to the objectives and activities included in the agency’s operational plan

• The audit report exposed data, gaps and failures in the financial and organizational conduct of the Safa news agency:
  • Financial balance: The agency’s total revenues for the reporting year were $91,633 and total expenditures were $95,430 so the agency ended the 2021 budget year with an annual deficit of $3,797.
  • Absence of a strategic program: According to the audit, the agency had no independent strategic program and relied on that of Hamas’ media department.
  • Deficient operational programing: The operational program did not include measurable objectives which made oversight of its performance impossible.
  • Gap in achieving objectives: According to the audit, many objectives and activities were not carried out, among other things because of the Covid-19 epidemic and budget limitations.
  • Irregular payments: The auditors found that the agency had paid administrative allowances and salary supplements to several employees directly from the operational budget in contravention of procedures requiring central approval.
  • Dependence on external entities: The agency had to rely on an external company to issue invoices to clients and had to pay it commissions.
• In light of the deficiencies, Hamas’ finance department recommended that the Safa agency formulate an independent strategic program tailored to the agency’s objectives, define measurable quantitative objectives in its operational program, cease paying irregular salary supplements from the operational budget and act in accordance with central procedures.

Felesteen

• Felesteen is Hamas’ main daily newspaper in the Gaza Strip. Its 2021 audit was the harshest and indicated a huge financial deficit, serious programming gaps and managerial paralysis. In addition, the audit addressed the newspaper’s handling of the damages it incurred “during the campaign against Israel in May 2021,” i.e., Operation Guardian of the Walls.
• According to the audit, the newspaper’s total revenues in the reporting year reached 4,891,842 shekels ($1,514,502 in terms of the value of the shekel in 2021) and total expenditures stood at 5,269,067 shekels ($1,631,290) so the ended the year with a deficit of 377,225 shekels ($116,787).
• The audit also presented a picture of organizational chaos:
  • Activity without oversight: No managerial reports exist on the newspaper’s performance during the year, and the organization operated for an entire year without an approved budget.
  • False registration: The auditors found that salaries received from Hamas’ finance department were recorded in the newspaper’s books as partners’ loans instead of as income. It may have been an attempt to obscure the extent of the newspaper’s absolute dependence on direct funding from Hamas’ leadership and to present a false picture of internal financial stability.
  • Systemic collection failure: The audit found a significant increase in debts of distributors and governmental institutions, indicating a severe problem in the collection system.
  • Damage to assets: The auditors’ review of assets noted the damage caused to the newspaper’s headquarters in al-Jawhara Tower by bombing during the campaign against Israel. That explained the operational and financial damages suffered by the newspaper and served as an argument to justify some of the cash flow and operational difficulties arising from the audit.

Appendix A: Ali al-Amoudi

• The documents indicated that the key figure in Hamas’ extensive media apparatus was Ali al-Amoudi, who was appointed head of the information department in 2021. Despite his significant role, he was one of the movement’s shadow figures and hardly appeared in the media.
• According to open source information, he was born in the Gaza Strip and lived in Khan Yunis. In 2004, he was detained by Israel for terrorist activity against IDF forces and sentenced to life imprisonment. He was released in the Gilad Shalit exchange deal in 2011 (al-Arabiya, December 29, 2025).
• Al-Amoudi was one of Yahya al-Sinwar’s confidants. Their connection was formed while they were imprisoned in Israel. Al-Amoudi was director of al-Sinwar’s office during his first term as head of the political bureau in the Strip, 2017-2021. In 2021, al-Amoudi was elected to Hamas’ political bureau in the internal elections which symbolized the takeover of power centers in the Gaza Strip by the generation of terrorist operatives released in the Gilad Shalit exchange deal.
• As head of the information department, he formulated the movement’s entire media strategy. He was party to discussions in the most limited forums in al-Sinwar’s office and was involved in coordinating between the political echelon and Hamas’ operational forces.
• According to unofficial reports published at the end of 2025, after al-Sinwar was killed in October 2024 and most of the senior political bureau leadership in the Gaza Strip had been killed during the war, al-Amoudi was appointed acting director of the political bureau. He promotes a hard line whose objective is to ensure the continuity of governance by al-Sinwar’s loyalists while ousting local leaders considered weak or having abandoned their roles during the war. Sources noted that his independent activity in the Strip created friction with senior figures in Hamas’ leadership abroad who claimed that al-Amoudi was breaking the movement’s bylaws (al-Sharq al-Awsat, December 31, 2025).
• Sources claimed that al-Amoudi’s appointment to a role so significant in Hamas was central to the movement’s ability to preserve minimal governance on the ground and reflected the continuation of the trend led by al-Sinwar before the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre, of tight linkage between Hamas and the “resistance axis”^[11] led by Iran. Moreover, al-Amoudi’s appointment took place at a time of fateful internal elections for the leadership of Hamas’ political bureau. They will determine the organization’s course after the damage to Hamas’ governance capability in the Gaza Strip and after the “resistance axis” suffered blows which significantly weakened it (Aram News, January 1, 2026).

Appendix B

“Hamas’ Operative Program for 2022, Gaza Strip” Brought back from the Gaza Strip by the IDF

1. Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.

2. See " 'The Word Must Precede the Bullet:' Words as Ammunition – Hamas’s Media Artillery" by Ido Zelkovitz and Yehiel Limor, 2025, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21520844.2025.2563433

3. "The Sword of Jerusalem" was the name Hamas gave to Operation Guardian of the Walls, May 2021.

4. For information about Ali al-Amoudi, see Appendix A.

5. The destruction of the State of Israel.

6. The activities of the terrorist organizations operating to destroy the State of Israel.

7. Hamas opposes every form of normalization with Israel, so it can be assumed that the activities in the table refer to the Abraham Accord and the possibility that Saudi Arabia and other Arab-Muslim states will also normalize relations.

8. Terrorist attacks.

9. Terrorist organizations.

10. Shadi Abu Sabha is a Palestinian journalist, columnist and media activist known primarily for his political writing and his activity in journalists’ organizations in Gaza. He focuses on covering the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, analysis of internal Palestinian policy and journalists’ rights. In the past he was spokesperson for the Palestinian Journalists Forum, and a prominent voice in protesting harm to Palestinian journalists, detentions and the closure of media institutions. He is frequently interviewed on issues related to freedom of the press and protection of journalists in conflict zones. His writing is critical and he provides an in-depth analyses of Israeli society and its internal politics, and deals with the situation in the Gaza Strip and the issue of prisoners.

11. Iran, Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Houthis in Yemen and the Shi'ite militias in Iraq.

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