Hamas in Lebanon, Based on Documents Brought Back by the IDF from the Gaza Strip

Dr. Igal Shiri, Dr. Hayim Iserovich, Elad Drori

Overview^[1]

• Hamas has had a presence in Lebanon since the early 1990s, when Israel expelled senior terrorist operatives who visited the Palestinian refugee camps and established initial contacts with Hezbollah and the Qods Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Since 1993, Hamas has had an official representative in Lebanon.
• Hamas documents brought back by IDF forces during the Gaza Strip War^[2] showed that the idea of establishing a military infrastructure in Lebanon was first raised in discussions with Hezbollah around 2012, and two years later a plan of action had already been formulated to develop military capabilities as part of the “resistance to the occupation.”^[3]
• According to the documents the IDF brought back from Gaza during the Gaza Strip War, during the Sword of Jerusalem campaign (the name Hamas gave to Operation Guardian of the Walls) in May 2021, an initial Hamas operational infrastructure was already active in south Lebanon and it fired rockets into Israeli territory with Hezbollah approval. Senior Hamas figures led by Yahya al-Sinwar, encouraged by what they felt had been a “victory,” worked with Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah and with the head of the Palestine Branch of the Qods Force, Muhammad Saeed Izadi, to establish a large military infrastructure for the movement in Lebanon which would be a key component of “the decisive campaign against Israel.”
• The documents showed that efforts to establish the infrastructure encountered difficulties due to Iranian and Hezbollah concerns that Hamas would act without authorization and their refusal to allow the Hamas external leader, Khaled Mashal, rather than the Hamas military wing, the Izz al-Din Brigades to be responsible for the project. However, the issue was resolved, and Hamas in Lebanon continued preparing for a campaign against Israel while also planning terrorist attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets in Europe.
• The Izz al-Din Brigades in Lebanon participated in the war Hezbollah began against Israel on October 8, 2023, in “support” of the Gaza Strip and claimed responsibility for 13 attacks on northern Israel until the ceasefire in November 2024. The IDF eliminated more than 20 terrorist commanders and operatives in Lebanon during the war and after the ceasefire.
• Following two rocket attacks from south Lebanon at Israel in March 2025, Hamas promised the Lebanese authorities it would not violate the country’s sovereignty. However, Hamas, like Hezbollah, still refuses to comply with the Lebanese government’s decision regarding a state monopoly on weapons.
• The documents indicate that the Hamas military infrastructure in Lebanon was not a localized initiative, but rather a strategic project developed gradually as part of the concept of a multi-front “confrontation”^[4] with Israel. Despite the challenges and disagreements, both internal and those with Iran and Hezbollah, the Brigades’ involvement in the fighting alongside Lebanon showed the project had been put into motion, although not on the scale or with the degree of influence which Hamas leaders had intended. Unlike the caution exercised by the Lebanese authorities regarding the disarmament of Hezbollah, it is likely that if the authorities decide to enforce the disarmament of Hamas, the consequences could not only neutralize an important arena of activity for Hamas against Israel but also weaken the movement’s standing in the Palestinian refugee camps vis-à-vis Fatah and the PLO.

Background^[5]

• Hamas began to think of Lebanon as a possible arena of activity as early as 1990, only three years after its establishment. A meeting of its leadership in an Arab country discussed the need to establish contacts with Palestinians living in Lebanon and with Palestinian operatives affiliated with the Islamic movement, while promoting cooperation with al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya (the Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood) and with Lebanese groups and parties. At the time, Hamas focused on humanitarian and social issues, without reference to terrorism.
• Two senior Hamas figures, political bureau member Abd al-Aziz al-Omari and movement leadership member Jamal Issa, were sent on a tour of the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and to meetings with senior Palestinian and Islamic movement figures. They reported back that the Palestinians in Lebanon were interested in cooperating with Hamas as part of a single “Palestinian Islamic project.”
• In January 1991, Israel expelled four Hamas operatives to Lebanon: Mustafa al-Qanu’, Imad al-Alami, Fadl al-Zahar and Mustafa al-Ladawi.^[6] The four settled in the Ein al-Hilweh refugee camp in south Lebanon and became sought-after guests at meetings, events and Palestinian festivals in Lebanon, which were generally held under the banner of support for the [first] intifada. The expulsion of 415 leaders and operatives of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad to Marj al-Zuhur in south Lebanon in December 1992 also strengthened ties between Hamas and the Palestinians in Lebanon.^[7] The tours conducted by many of the leaders of the deportees, including Isma’il Haniyeh,^[8] Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi^[9] and Mahmoud al-Zahar^[10] in the refugee camps in Lebanon enabled them to learn about Palestinian life there and provided them with an opportunity to teach others about Hamas and its objectives.

• In September-October 1992, a Hamas delegation led by political bureau head Musa Abu Marzouq made its first official visit to Iran and met with the leaders of the regime in Tehran, including Ali Khamenei.^[11] At the same time, a Hezbollah delegation led by secretary general Hassan Nasrallah^[12] also visited Iran, and the Iranians arranged a meeting between the two, who agreed on initial coordination, including training Hamas operatives in Hezbollah camps. A few weeks later, Hamas shot and killed an IDF reservist and Hezbollah attacked an IDF with an explosive device in south Lebanon, killing four soldiers. Hamas stated that bilateral cooperation had begun.^[13]
• The expulsion to Marj al-Zuhur began Hamas relations with Hezbollah and Iran. Senior Iranians frequently visited the deportees, the most prominent of whom was Muhammad Saeed Izadi (Hajj Ramadan),^[14] who spent many days in the deportees’ camp and established personal ties which proved critical when he was later appointed head of the Palestine Branch of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force and led coordination with the Palestinian terrorist organizations. Hezbollah representatives also came to the camp and established connections between the Palestinian deportees and the Iranians, while also establishing their own ties with senior Palestinian figures.
• In 1992 a Hamas representative office was established for the first time in Beirut, headed by Mustafa al-Qanu’, one of the Hamas founders who had been deported in January 1991. In September 1993, he was appointed the Hamas official representative in Lebanon and remained in the position until 1998. He was succeeded by Osama Hamdan, who had previously been Hamas representative in Tehran and held the position until 2009, although he remained in Lebanon afterward. The next was Ali Baraka, who represented Hamas for a decade, replaced by Ahmed Abd al-Hadi, who holds the position to this day.
• The role of Hamas representative is primarily symbolic and generally involves presenting the movement’s positions to the media; representing Hamas in the Palestinian arena in Lebanon, particularly in the refugee camps; holding meetings with the leading parties and actors in Lebanon’s political, social and religious arenas and participating in official ceremonies.

    
Right (from right to left): Ahmed Abd al-Hadi (upon assuming the position of representative in Lebanon), Hamas political bureau members Izzat al-Rishq and Ali Baraka (Qudsnet, January 10, 2019). Left: A meeting organized by Hamas in the Ein al-Hilweh refugee camp (Nidaa al-Watan, October 1, 2017)

Establishing a Hamas Military Presence in Lebanon

• Alongside its overt activity, Hamas promoted the establishment of a clandestine military branch which would enable it to turn Lebanon into another arena of “resistance”^[15] against Israel, alongside the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria. Hamas documents brought back from the Gaza Strip detailed discussions held by the movement’s leadership and contacts with Hezbollah and Iranian Qods Force figures to establish the infrastructure.
• According to a document dated September 4, 2012, at a meeting held in Lebanon by senior Hamas figure Abu Khaled (political bureau member Mahmoud al-Zahar) and Hezbollah secretary general Nasrallah, in the presence of Hajj Ramadan (Saeed Izadi), al-Zahar addressed the possibility of coordinating the movement’s military activity in Lebanon.

• Our brothers here [in Lebanon] said they told you we have not abandoned the resistance plan. If there is aggression against Gaza, we must have a role. We can establish a force, we have the capability and we want our sons to be part of the resistance here; and because we respect Hezbollah’s unique role in the resistance plan, just as we respect the Hamas unique role in Gaza in the resistance plan, we want to coordinate with Hezbollah in Lebanon.
• We want to have a presence in Lebanon within the general framework, not like [the Fatah movement] in the past. It is not right for the refugee camps to continue sleeping when their country is meters away from them, because the campaign is undoubtedly coming. Israel is now talking about when it will disappear, and there are reasons for [the talk about] its disappearance, we are taking action and the issue of Lebanon and the resistance can be arranged.

 

• Nasrallah noted the division of authority between the arenas: the Hamas leadership in the Gaza Strip would determine the timing of activity from its territory, while Hezbollah would control military decisions in Lebanon. He said he was willing, in principle, to integrate Hamas, the [other] Palestinian [terrorist] organizations and the refugee camps in Lebanon into the next campaign, but demanded it be done in coordination and under supervision.

• Regarding the issue of activity in Lebanon, we sat with the Hamas military leadership, and brother Hamdan [Osama Hamdan], together with Abu al-Harith,^[16] discussed the general idea with the brothers. We were busy and they were busy. In any future war, Hamas and the organizations will participate, and they must play an important role. In the July War [Second Lebanon War], we did not make use of the Palestinian refugee camps because there was no time. The war resulted in our not making use of anyone, whether the organizations or the camps. There is no problem with the participation of the camps. I recommend that brother Ramadan conduct a review (reassessment), because there has been slowness on this issue.

• In a document from December 2014, entitled “Jihad activity in the Anan [Lebanon] arena for the purpose of resistance activity toward Palestine,” a plan was presented for constructing the Hamas military infrastructure in Lebanon, which would constitute a “main effort in resisting the occupation.” The document explained why Lebanon was a suitable arena.

• There is a supportive organizational environment and a welcoming Palestinian environment (there is a spirit and yearning for resistance activity).
• There is an environment of resistance activity in general and in direct contact with the enemy. It is an arena in which the state’s central government is weak.
• There is an infrastructure of the operations function in the arena and a good number of jihad fighters. The experience in the last war^[17] strengthened the capability to operate and the possibility of participating in jihad from the arena, despite the difficulties and obstacles.
• It is possible to obtain operational equipment through the local market or neighboring countries.
• There is an independent capability for advanced production [of weapons].

 

• As part of the plan, the main objectives were defined:

1. Establishing dedicated combat squads and developing the existing force through high-quality training in accordance with the operational missions that would be approved.

2. Achieving the capability to fire rockets in effective barrages over an extended period, from three geographic launch sectors (there is a detailed operational plan).

3. Studying the terrain and preparing for infiltration operations, and preparing for initiated activity.

4. Procuring rockets and independently producing medium-range rockets, as well as high-quality weapons required in accordance with the operational plan.

5. Developing independent production projects, producing UAVs, completing research on offensive trials and preparing an operational plan for carrying out high-quality [operations].

6. Maintaining the infrastructure required for the operational plans and the necessary logistical requirements.

7. Supporting and directing other squads in the arena for independent activity or to provide facilitation and logistical assistance to our squads in their areas of influence.

• Despite the advantages of establishing a military infrastructure in Lebanon, the document did not conceal the existence of significant challenges:

1. A complicated operating environment from a security perspective, especially in the south, which is under the control of (Hazem) [it is unclear who/what this refers to] and other elements.

2. The absence of the infrastructure required for activity and the necessary logistics. In addition, the limited deployment of operatives from our [operations] department, only inside the refugee camps.

3. Interference in military activity during and after the Eaten Chaff War [Operation Protective Edge] by several elements in the movement, which makes orderly, goal-oriented work difficult.

• The document ends with recommendations to advance the plan:

1. In order to implement the project, a decision is required to assign the work to the operations department and prevent other interference and the dispersal of efforts.

2. Providing the necessary infrastructure and logistics by allocating the required budgets.

3. Obtaining the high-quality means required for the activity through procurement and production.

4. Strengthening the supportive organizational environment capable of bearing the burden of the project and providing it with political backing.

• The desire to advance the development of the infrastructure in Lebanon led the Hamas leadership to understand that the movement’s most senior figures needed to reside there permanently. On June 6, 2017, Izadi sent a letter to the Izz al-Din Brigades’ command in which he reported that in accordance with a request received from “Commander Abu Ibrahim Yahya” (al-Sinwar),^[18] who had shortly before assumed the position of head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, they had arranged visas to Lebanon for Saleh al-Arouri,^[19] who was responsible for the Hamas Judea and Samaria arena, and for Zaher Jabarin.^[20]

My dear brothers,

When we received the message from our dear brother, Commander Abu Ibrahim Yahya, we immediately began arranging the procedures and did not wait for a response to our message. When I suggested that you send a message to his eminence [Nasrallah], I did not mean that sending the message was a condition for beginning the procedures. On this basis, there was cooperation and a response from the very first moment when we received a copy of the passport of our dear brother Saleh [al-Arouri]. We urgently applied for the visa and received it, and this afternoon he arrived safely. Brother Zaher Jabarin will arrive tomorrow, God willing, and his visa has also been arranged.

• Three days later, in a letter to the new head of the Hamas political bureau, Isma’il Haniyeh, Izadi noted that he had conveyed his and al-Sinwar’s requests to Nasrallah, and the Hezbollah secretary general replied they would receive the two senior Hamas figures, protect them and treat them as brothers.

My dear brother,

I received your kind message, as well as the message from our dear brother, Abu Ibrahim Yahya al-Sinwar, and conveyed them to Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah. He sends you his thanks for the message and says to you, “We are ready to receive your brothers and place them in our eyes” [protect them with the utmost care.]

He will reply to your letter in writing soon, Allah willing. We have fulfilled our duty, and the brothers are our guests, under our protection and care.

Hamas Activity in Lebanon

• On May 10, 2021, the Hamas military wing began the Sayf al-Quds campaign (Battle of the Sword of Jerusalem) by firing rockets at Jerusalem. Israel countered Operation Guardian of the Walls in the Gaza Strip, which lasted 11 days. There were flare-ups in other arenas, during which at least 13 rockets were launched from south Lebanon, one of which landed in Israeli territory, and infiltrations were prevented.^[21]
• During the campaign, a joint operations room operated in Beirut with representatives of Izadi, Hezbollah military operatives and representatives of Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist organizations. According to Hamas documents from the Gaza Strip, the operations room provided Hamas, at its request, with information on various subjects, including IDF deployment, aerial intelligence activity, Israeli fighter jet activity and detailed information on Israeli intentions to eliminate senior movement figures.
• A report from “Ahmed” (apparently Khaled Ghanem, who was head of Hamas military intelligence abroad) from May 23, 2021, presented the joint activities conducted within the operations room. Representatives of Hezbollah and the Revolutionary Guards authorized the Hamas military wing to fire rocket barrages from Lebanon and the Golan Heights during the campaign.

c. They allowed the brothers in the military wing to fire rocket barrages, and accordingly, the brothers in the military wing abroad carried out all the rocket barrages launched from Lebanon and the Golan Heights.

• In a letter sent by Isma’il Haniyeh to the head of the Hamas military wing, Muhammad Deif (Abu Khaled),^[22] and Deif’s deputy, Marwan Issa (Abu al-Baraa’),^[23] on July 10, 2021, following his meeting with Nasrallah, he noted that the Hezbollah secretary general had presented the measures the organization had taken to assist Hamas during the campaign, including authorization to fire rockets from Lebanese territory.

The party [Hezbollah] cooperated with the brothers in Lebanon, allowed them to fire rockets from south Lebanon and reached understandings with them regarding the possibility of carrying out operations along the border from the direction of the coast and from the east. They [Hezbollah] had no problem with the enemy holding Hezbollah responsible for this, and they were prepared to deal with its responses.

• The documents indicate that during the campaign Hamas already had an operational military infrastructure in Lebanon, with Hezbollah’s knowledge and approval. However, the Hamas leadership in the Gaza Strip, led by Yahya al-Sinwar, which viewed the Sayf al-Quds campaign as an achievement and a major victory and began planning the “decisive” multi-arena campaign against Israel,^[24] regarded Lebanon as an arena in which the military infrastructure should be strengthened and expanded to provide the movement with an additional option for action from the north, whether Hezbollah joined the fighting or confined itself to limited support.
• A letter Izadi sent to al-Sinwar on July 12, 2021 discussed implementing the idea of establishing a Hamas military infrastructure in Lebanon.

Dear brother,

In the past, an agreement was reached with the military brothers abroad on establishing a Hamas force, whether defensive or offensive, particularly in this latest phase and following the repercussions of the Sayf al-Quds campaign, which demonstrated the need for this project more than ever before.

• A week later, al-Sinwar sent a letter in reply to Izadi, in which he noted that establishing a Hamas military force in Lebanon was one of the fundamental pillars in advancing the “decisive campaign of the Axis of the Second Promise.”^[25]

• Although we all understand that we did not achieve everything we wanted, there is no doubt that we have come a long way in the desired direction, and we have a great opportunity in the coming years to complete this journey in a manner that will consolidate the Jerusalem alliance, the axis of the Second Promise and complete the tools needed to achieve it. There is no doubt that the Palestinian military

• Al-Sinwar sent a letter to Haniyeh on July 23, 2021, with a plan combining the establishment of social and political influence in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon with military buildup. He said Hamas should assist the camps to strengthen their ties to the Gaza Strip and the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, recruit them to Hamas and reduce Fatah and Palestinian Authority influence.

The situation in the camps and the requirements for securing our people there, providing services for them in the event of the collapse of the states and examining the most important projects required to protect the camps from collapse, as well as exploring prospects for support and funding for them: they can be informed that the brothers in the al-Qassam Brigades and in Gaza are contributing to them from the sum allocated after Sayf al-Quds, an amount of three million dollars, as an initial sum for a fund to secure the camps in Lebanon. In that way, we achieve several objectives: the first is to make those brothers feel your concern and that of Gaza and al-Qassam, in a way that no one has ever cared for them before, and they will feel the difference. The second is to prepare them to vote in favor of Abu Khaled’s [Muhammad Deif’s] proposal to establish a percentage [allocation] for al-Qassam in the Shura Council [Hamas Shura Council] and the Executive Committee [Hamas Executive Committee]. The third is to weave the first threads of a strong alliance between this important arena and us [the Gaza Strip].

• At the same time, al-Sinwar noted the need to advance the development of the military infrastructure in Lebanon in preparation for the next campaign, in coordination with Hezbollah and the Revolutionary Guards.

2. Lebanon’s role in the resistance and in the liberation and return project, followed by a discussion of establishing a Qassam army in Lebanon, training and arming it in coordination with the Party [Hezbollah] and the Guards so that it will be ready to participate in the coming battle of liberation, Allah willing. We can then expand the discussion of plans to bring our people in Lebanon into Hamas and the Palestinian young people into al-Qassam and block the way for Fatah and the [Palestinian] Authority, so that they will fulfill their important and strategic role in the national project and in the process of liberation and return.

• An anonymous document from April 2022 showed progress in implementing al-Sinwar’s proposals. Regarding Hamas activity among the Palestinian refugee population, it noted that the movement’s representative in Lebanon, Ahmed Abd al-Hadi, had held a political meeting a month earlier in the al-Rashidiya refugee camp, the likes of which had not been held in recent years, which addressed political developments in the Palestinian arena, the economic situation in the camps and the issue of the “resistance.”

On March 7, 2022, the Hamas representative in Lebanon, Ahmed Abd al-Hadi, held a political meeting in the al-Rashidiya camp. It took place after the al-Maghrib prayer, in the Abdullah bin Omar Hall, since such a meeting had not been held for more than three to four years. The meeting was moderated by Abd al-Majid Awad, the Quran was recited by Habib Zamzam and Ahmed Abd al-Hadi delivered a political speech for an hour and a half.

The most important points mentioned:

• The Palestinian political situation in the West Bank and Gaza, followed by Lebanon and abroad.
• The situation in Syria.
• The situation of the people in the camps, especially the economic situation.
• Hamas activity under the slogan “one hand resists and one hand helps the people” made a good impression on the masses and it will continue along this path, especially during the month of Ramadan.

After an hour of speaking, he took questions from those present and answered them for half an hour. The meeting concluded with a prayer led by a man known as Abu Anas and refreshments were served. People left the hall gradually so as not to attract attention, after which Ahmed Abd al-Hadi exited and left the camp. The meeting elicited positive reactions, especially among admirers of Ahmed Abd al-Hadi, and they began promoting the idea that he was the most suitable person to represent Hamas politically in Lebanon.

• Regarding Hamas military buildup, it was noted that military wing operatives were already training in various areas of Lebanon.

Military Training

• Military training is continuing as follows: Hamas [operates] in the Palestinian camps and in the [training] camps of al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya in north Lebanon, and the instructors are from Hamas. As for the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, [they operate] in the al-Qalamoun area in Syria, in Hezbollah camps. Deployment [for activity] is along the border strip, in return for payment, and the shifts are for 15 consecutive days. The Popular Front (General Command) [PFLP-GC] also operates in al-Qalamoun. All these courses rely on young people between the ages of 15 and 25.
• The Islamic Jihad currently has close to 360 operatives in south Lebanon, from all the camps, and Hamas has approximately the same number. The objective is to reach 500 trainees for each organization during the coming month.

Regarding Hamas, training continues in the camps in the south as follows:

• al-Rashidiya camp: al-Baraa’ Center / instructor: Fadi al-Sharari.
• al-Bass camp: Ahmed al-Jashi Center / instructor: Ahmed Mar’i Abu Sahyoun.
• Burj al-Shamali camp: the center north of the old mosque, “in the center of the camp near the water reservoir.”
• Coastal area: Jim Jim Camp Mosque / instructor: Ali Musa.

 

• On May 22, 2022, “Abu al-Walid”^[26] updated the head of Hamas general operations headquarters,^[27] deputy head of the military wing Marwan Issa (Abu al-Baraa’), about a meeting he had held with Izadi in Lebanon, during which the head of the Palestine Branch expressed Iran’s support for establishing the [so-called] Palestinian project in Lebanon.

• 1. Establishing the Palestinian project in Lebanon is not merely a decision, but is part of our philosophy regarding the mobilization of people of all nationalities for the project to liberate Palestine (Lebanese, Iraqi, Yemeni, Afghan), especially because their wives are Palestinian.

 

• The two also discussed the various components of the Palestinian project in Lebanon, including the number of fighters, their missions and training.

5. In response to my question about the number of people you can absorb into the project, he said: As many as you want. We can absorb 2,000 fighters (his deputy told me that our decision is 2,000 fighters).

6. In response to my question about the expected missions, we see two main missions: if a joint campaign breaks out and the Radwan Force is asked to attack, the Hamas force will be the vanguard. If conditions similar to those of the Sayf al-Quds campaign develop, independent infiltration operations will be carried out. That is, al-Qassam squads will carry out the operations and we will only assist them. This means that they are not interested in establishing a missile or UAV force or possessing anti-tank weapons, such as Kornet and the like. I heard this from brother Abu Ruqayya^[28] five months ago. But I did not rush to ask Hajj Ramadan about the above (missiles, UAVs and the like) so that he would not rush to object and it would turn out that we had violated the agreement if we used them later.

7. Regarding training: I asked him about the levels of training and he said: the training has been continuing for some time, has not stopped and will not stop. It will continue as long as there is time. Regarding the levels, we are prepared to train these people to the level required for the missions assigned to them. I will send brother Abu Ruqayya to you and you will hear from him in detail about the training being conducted, the people, the expected training and everything else.

8. Regarding armament: he told me that they would be armed with the weapons held by Hezbollah squads. However, he emphasized that they would work with them as armies work with their soldiers and as Hezbollah operates. That is, they would receive weapons from the positions and return them to the positions after completing the mission.

• In the letter, “Abu al-Walid” also reported on his meetings in Iran with Izadi’s deputy and with one of the aides of Hajj Abd al-Qader, commander of Hezbollah’s Radwan forces, who was supposed to be responsible for Hamas forces in Lebanon. According to him, Hezbollah believed that the force should comprise approximately 10,000 fighters^[29] and they would also receive high-quality weapons if they were deployed in the Sunni villages near the border in south Lebanon.

4. Hezbollah is convinced that recruitment for this campaign will not come from among the Palestinians, but through the Hamas movement. The offensive structure requires that the number of Palestinians be between 2,000 and 10,000.

6. If matters proceed well and satisfactorily, the al-Qassam Brigades in Lebanon will be equipped with high-quality weapons if they succeed in establishing themselves in the Sunni border areas, where Hezbollah has difficulty establishing a presence.

• “Abu al-Walid” concluded that Iran and Hezbollah wanted to establish a Hamas military force in Lebanon of approximately 2,000 operatives who would serve as a vanguard force in coordination with Hezbollah.

To summarize my discussions with the people, I can say the following:

1. It became clear to me that our friends want to establish a Hamas movement project in Lebanon.

2. The ceiling of the project in the foreseeable future is 2,000 fighters, and it will be possible to develop it once the intentions prove genuine and the concerns dissipate (the number of people in the arena does not exceed 1,300, including older people and the security and guard force belonging to the security apparatus and responsible for protecting commanders and headquarters in all arenas of activity in the external region. That means the Lebanon arena cannot currently reach the proposed number).

3. The missions defined by the Party [Hezbollah] and the [Revolutionary] Guards are: vanguard forces in any joint offensive operation, with Hezbollah coordinating with us; high-impact operations if the opportunity arises; possession of high-quality weapons if our brothers can establish themselves in Sunni areas.

• On June 19, 2022, a letter was sent from “our brother” (apparently al-Sinwar) to Haniyeh, asking him, during his meetings in Lebanon with Hezbollah and Revolutionary Guards figures, to present three possible scenarios for a “major strategic campaign that will change the face of the region and the rules of the game.” The third scenario, considered the minimum among the proposals, included the activation of a Hamas force from Lebanese territory with Hezbollah’s approval.

3 – The third scenario:

This is a scenario of necessity, in which we enter with all our strength and ignite the situation in the West Bank and inside the interior, while the Party allows our forces to operate with increasing effectiveness from Lebanon, and support from the forces of the Jerusalem Axis is activated from other arenas (Iraq and Yemen), and guerrilla activity is activated to the maximum possible extent through the Syrian arena and the Jordanian arena. The Party does not participate directly in it, but ensures the activation of everything mentioned above, while at the same time maintaining the highest levels of readiness, capability and preparation to move into an offensive posture at the medium or high level in accordance with its assessment of developments in the campaign. This scenario is the minimum that can be agreed upon and, according to our assessment, agreement on it and the decision regarding it are within the authority of Nasrallah and the Party and do not require approaching the Guide [Iran’s leader]. Accordingly, an agreement on this must be the minimum outcome of this visit, while presenting the first two scenarios and arranging a joint visit to Tehran to meet the Guide and present the first two scenarios, particularly the first, in an attempt to obtain his approval.

• The letter also noted the urgent need to establish a military force in Lebanon of at least approximately Hamas 250 fighters, which by implication would be able to use the operational infrastructure Hezbollah had created for a raid from Lebanon into Israeli territory. Establishment of the force was required in the third scenario was adopted and possibly also if the second scenario were adopted (an intermediate campaign in which Hezbollah would participate partially and forces from the other arenas would also participate). It was noted that the matter “does not tolerate delay, hesitation or procrastination.” To discuss these issues, al-Sinwar asked Haniyeh to coordinate a rapid visit to Tehran because “dealing with this major matter cannot take place in Lebanon alone because of its importance.”

First / urgent and immediate:

We must quickly build a ready and trained force to participate in the next round, especially if we adopt the third scenario, and even if it is the second. We accept that this force will not have weapons or equipment outside the training sites or before implementation begins, and we accept that it will not have the capability to launch missiles that could break the rules that the Party [Hezbollah], as the host, wants to maintain. However, its urgent size must be sufficient and no fewer than 250, trained to the highest standards as elite forces (like the Radwan forces), and it must have sufficient essential equipment at the sites when implementation begins. It must also receive appropriate artillery cover when carrying out its missions, whether it possesses the capability itself or the Party provides it when necessary. The details of the matter do not tolerate delay, hesitation or slowing down, and anything of that kind will make us understand that the group is not serious about building the force or supporting it absolutely, and it is necessary to speak with them frankly about this matter.

Challenges Faced by Hamas in Constructing Its Infrastructure in Lebanon

Problems of Trust with Hezbollah and Iran

• On December 10, 2021, a powerful explosion ripped through the Burj al-Shamali Palestinian refugee camp in south Lebanon, and the source was discovered to be a weapons depot located beneath a mosque under Hamas supervision. Hamas denied it was a weapons depot and claimed that the explosion had been caused by a short circuit in a warehouse containing a large quantity of oxygen cylinders and cleaning and disinfecting materials. However, shortly afterward Hamas announced the death of a military wing operative who had been killed in “jihad activity as part of training and preparation for battle.” Senior Hamas figures attended his funeral, during which several movement operatives were killed and others wounded gunfire from Fatah terrorists.^[30]
• Following the explosion and the shooting, Izadi sent a letter to Haniyeh on January 29, 2022, expressing his anger and dissatisfaction with Hamas conduct in Lebanon and accused the movement of failing to respect Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah. He said Hamas was taking action and making decisions related to Lebanon without sufficient coordination with Nasrallah, or in a manner perceived as bypassing his authority, without considering the consequences. He warned that could erode trust, increase internal tensions within the “resistance axis”^[31] and damage operational and political coordination.

My dear brother Abu al-Abd [Haniyeh], disregarding the opinion of the Sayyid [Nasrallah] (may Allah preserve him) is not a simple or passing matter, for many reasons: the first is his status and importance; the second is his opinion as an ally, friend and supporter; the third is his position, presence and opinion as the one who owns the place and the land; and the fourth is his intervention immediately after the two dangerous incidents, which could have led to major security problems or exploded the situation in the camps. In accordance with his directive, instructions and direct follow-up, Hezbollah intervened with all its weight to contain the incident and deal with its consequences and exerted serious pressure to prevent the opening of security and military cases in the country against the Hamas movement and the (Palestinian) groups that had established a military production facility on Lebanese soil. You know better than anyone what this means in terms of states, in Lebanon’s special situation and under such circumstances.

• Izadi also warned that a campaign conducted by senior Hamas figures against Nasrallah, Iran and the Shi’ites, along with leaks of confidential conversations, had created a crisis of confidence which threatened to delay the establishment of the Hamas terrorist infrastructure in Lebanon.

We were surprised by the launch of a very bad, unprecedented media campaign, more intense than during the [Hamas] departure from Syria, using harsh, impolite and inappropriate terms and words against the Sayyid [Nasrallah] (may Allah preserve him), against the Shi’ites in general and against me personally. We and you know who launched and managed this campaign, and we know the people [some of whom, as you know, are members of the (Hamas) political bureau], and the elements operating the websites that attacked us in the worst manner, including accusations of attempts to split the movement and undermine the sovereignty of its leadership.

 It is worth noting, and very regrettable, that this offensive and bad campaign included the publication of detailed information about our direct conversations with you and with Sheikh Saleh [al-Arouri]. Who allowed this to be published and why? That is another issue requiring another discussion. If the matter is not addressed and those responsible are not held accountable, it means there is no trust whatsoever in meetings between us and you, and this has consequences and risks for us, for you and for the resistance project^[32] itself.

• In a letter sent by “Abu al-Walid” to Marwan Issa on May 22, 2022, regarding his meetings in Iran with Izadi’s deputy and with one of the aides to the commander of the Radwan forces, he noted they had expressed concern that the Hamas infrastructure in Lebanon would not consult them before “carrying out a military operation” against Israel. “Abu al-Walid” added that his Iranian and Hezbollah interlocutors were concerned about the weapons held by the Hamas military wing in Lebanon and how they might be used.

2. One of the concerns that Hajj Ramadan’s deputy spoke to me about and that came up in their internal discussions is the extent of our commitment to the rules of engagement and to coordination with them before carrying out any military operation. They raised with us the problem of al-Saraya [the Jerusalem Brigades, the PIJ military wing] among us in Gaza and how we deal with them even though they are Palestinians, the occupation exists and the fighting continues. They disagree with your assessments and this angers you.

4. The missions that were not discussed: they know that we have capabilities, missiles and UAVs, but they are concerned that later we will use them without coordinating with them. They did not discuss this with us.

5. Their concerns that must be allayed: turning the weapons against them in future events, activity without coordination with them, especially in the missile field.

• Nevertheless, according to the minutes of a meeting of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip on June 11, 2023, Hamas fired rockets from south Lebanon into Israeli territory in April 2023 without Hezbollah’s knowledge, but did not cause a crisis between the sides.^[33]

• The recent rocket-firing operation: although the Party [Hezbollah] had no information about it, it assisted us in the media sphere and prevented the state from carrying out any act of aggression that could harm any of the brothers among the jihad fighters. The Party threatened the enemy that it would respond forcefully to any act of aggression against Lebanon.

Managing the Infrastructure in Lebanon and Disputes Concerning Khaled Mashal

• A major challenge in efforts to establish the Hamas military infrastructure in Lebanon was the dispute over the source of authority and the identity of the person who would command it. The dispute took place within Hamas, between the movement’s leadership and military wing in the Gaza Strip, led by al-Sinwar and Deif, who were close to Iran and Hezbollah, and the Hamas leadership abroad, led by Khaled Mashal. The documents showed the Iranians and Hezbollah completely distrusted Mashal, who tried to transfer control of activity in the Lebanese arena to himself.^[34]
• Izadi sent a letter to al-Sinwar on July 12, 2021, stating that although Iran supported the establishment of a Hamas military force in Lebanon, it was unwilling for it to be Mashal’s responsibility because they did not trust him and wanted the Hamas military wing in the Gaza Strip to assume responsibility for the Lebanese force. He also asked that al-Sinwar, the head of the military wing, Muhammad Deif, and his deputy, Marwan Issa, be involved in dealing with the dispute with Mashal over control of the military force in Lebanon, and not only Isma’il Haniyeh.

Our position is that we cannot agree to this force being under the command of Abu al-Walid in his capacity as the official responsible for the external region, for the reasons we mentioned and for many other reasons that we overlooked and did not mention in this letter. We do not agree to hand command of this force to someone with whom we have had experience and whose bad positions and decisions we have recently experienced, which placed us in difficulty, and we cannot place our trust in him. I informed brother Abu al-Abd [Haniyeh] of this matter and proposed to him that the force be under the command of [the] al-Qassam [Brigades] in Gaza, managed by them, and that they appoint someone responsible on their behalf. We did not speak with the brothers in the arena and left resolution of the problem to the leadership.

Although I spoke about this with brother Abu al-Abd, I wanted to present this matter and these details to you, and especially to the al-Qassam leadership, dear brother, commander, the living martyr, Abu Khaled [Deif], may Allah preserve him, and dear brother, commander Abu al-Baraa’ [Issa], may Allah preserve him, so that you will be informed of these details and assist your brother Abu al-Abd on this matter. It is clear that your assistance and support for him are necessary, as I have seen, since brother Abu al-Abd cannot deal with this problem alone and cannot make this decision by himself.

• Haniyeh sent Nasrallah a letter on April 2, 2022 in which he noted that the Hamas leadership understood that activity without coordination with Hezbollah could destroy the project and therefore the source of authority for the movement’s military activity in Lebanon had to be formally regulated. According to the document, the decision was to transfer direct responsibility for the military department in the Lebanon arena to the Hamas central military office (operational headquarters), headed by Marwan Issa, by virtue of its role as the body overseeing the movement’s “resistance activity”^[35] in all arenas. At the same time, the chairman of the political bureau would remain the political authority. It was also noted that Abd al-Aziz Abu Amer (Samir Fandi)^[36] would be entrusted with establishing a team to supervise activity on the ground, in coordination and consultation with Marwan Issa. According to Haniyeh, there was an understanding within Hamas that activity in Lebanon was part of the “resistance and liberation project”^[37] and it should be carried out in coordination with external actors, including the Revolutionary Guards:

Brother, the Sayyid [Nasrallah]:

I would like to speak with you regarding jihad activity in Lebanon and its direct source of authority. In light of your position on this issue, and after calm discussions within the movement’s leadership and with brother Abu al-Walid [Mashal] and the brothers in the [external] region, and out of our shared determination to establish the foundations of this project and enable the movement’s operatives and even our people to take part in resisting the occupier and keep pace with current developments, and taking into account your position and adhering to the bonds of jihad brotherhood that unite us, and on the basis of the strategic alliance that brings us together for the liberation of Jerusalem and the land of Palestine, I would like to officially inform you of the following:

1. It has been agreed that the movement’s central military office will be responsible for the work of the military department in the Lebanon arena and for the coordination and cooperation required for this purpose with you and with the brothers in the Revolutionary Guards for the benefit of the resistance and liberation project, given that the movement’s central office, headed by the jihad fighter brother Abu al-Baraa’ ‘Marwan’ [Issa], is the movement’s central authority supervising all areas of resistance activity in the various regions. Accordingly, the central [military] office will be the source of authority for activity in the Lebanon arena in all aspects related to this blessed activity, while the movement’s chairman will be its political authority.

In light of this, brother Abd al-Aziz Abu Amer will be tasked with establishing the team that will supervise activity on the ground, in coordination and consultation with brother Abu al-Baraa’ ‘Marwan.’

2. I contacted Abu al-Baraa’ Marwan tonight and informed him of the decision. He will contact you to formulate the necessary arrangements and will also contact brother Abu Amer Abd al-Aziz to discuss the framework and mechanisms related to the issue.
In light of the above, we expect the activity to begin with secure steps, a clear vision and a coherent plan, while relying on Allah and then on you regarding assistance, support and providing protection for the brothers in Lebanon, who long to take part in resisting the occupier and fighting him until the project of liberation and return to their homeland in blessed Palestine is realized. This will take place within a strategy to be agreed upon with Your Eminence and with the brothers in the Guard [Revolutionary Guards], and in light of the decisions taken by the movement’s leadership as the supreme source of authority for the victorious al-Qassam Brigades wherever they may be.

• “Abu al-Walid” sent a letter to Marwan Issa on May 22, 2022, stating that Izadi had expressed complete opposition to the appointment of a coordinator between himself and the Hamas leadership in everything related to the Lebanon project, particularly not someone from the “external” region, and that he wanted responsibility to come from the Hamas military wing. Izadi also made clear that, in his view, Samir Fandi (Abd al-Aziz) was unsuitable because he would help Khaled Mashal build a new power base and lacked professional military understanding. According to “Abu al-Walid,” Izadi threatened that if the issue were not resolved, he would not allow the development of the Hamas military infrastructure in Lebanon to proceed.

9. Regarding the appointment, he said: I heard from you that you were appointed coordinator of the project, meaning the liaison between me and the committee. My position is clear, we strongly oppose this formula. I would rather sit with them directly than have an intermediary pressuring me and pressuring them. I know them well and know how to work with them. I do not want a coordinator. I want a commander who will command the project in the arena and be responsible to us. You will agree among yourselves on the form of your internal relations.

I told him that the idea of a commander from outside the arena is extremely sensitive and is unacceptable to the people and to their personalities. He said: This is the project and you must balance the importance of the project against the personalities of the people. We discussed the issue at length. He told me: Do not pressure me, it appears you are well prepared. I will not agree to a formula that does not establish that [the person appointed is commander of the entire project], of course within the authority of al-Qassam.

10. He explained his refusal to work with brother Abd al-Aziz [Fandi] as commander or source of authority for the project by saying: There are two reasons. The first is that Abd al-Aziz wants to build a force for Abu al-Walid [Mashal], and that is unacceptable to me. The second reason is that Abu Abd al-Aziz fundamentally has a professional problem. His military understanding is superficial and this project needs someone with military understanding.

11. Regarding the point that you do not want a commander from among them and not even a committee, while the army is from among them and the cadres are from among them, he said: I know that, therefore at least the commander should not be from among them.

12. The meeting ended with him stressing that he insisted on what had been said and would not change his positions before the politicians among the movement’s commanders. Either we accept this formula or the project will remain suspended.

• “Abu al-Walid” reported that Izadi’s deputy and an aide to the commander of Hezbollah’s Radwan forces also told him that they wanted the Hamas military wing in the Gaza Strip to be responsible for the infrastructure in Lebanon to ensure that there would be no “surprises,” such as operations carried out without coordination.

6. To allay the concerns, they want the force to be directly subordinate to [the] al-Qassam [Brigades], and it should be clear that the person responsible for the project will be from al-Qassam in Gaza.

• Subsequently, “Abu al-Walid” met with Fandi, who did not conceal his displeasure over the disputes surrounding responsibility for the infrastructure’s activity and his own role.

• During the conversation with brother Abd al-Aziz, his face reddened and he became angry when the idea of the coordinator and commander was discussed. He tried to behave with artificial calm and then tried to discuss with us the proposed formula, his role and his status. We tried to calm him by telling him that he would be responsible for the department’s other activities taking place in the arena.
• He tried to establish the idea that he was the person responsible and that the commander who would command the project had to be under his authority, since he was responsible for operational activity in the arena, or under the authority of the committee he had established. He discussed with us the idea that the proposed commander would be commander of the infantry forces and would have no connection to UAVs or missiles. We did not discuss the issue with him because it was not within our authority, but we informed him of the allies’ true position. The discussion ended with him saying that he would consult his people, both in the department and with brother Abu al-Walid [Mashal].

• “Abu al-Walid” ended the letter with a recommendation to defuse the situation within Hamas to ease the internal tensions and the tensions with Izadi.

In conclusion: I believe the picture we received from the allies is extremely clear, and there is no need for further clarification, especially regarding the macro issues. We now need an internal discussion to resolve the situation internally, reduce communication between brother Abu al-Baraa’ and Hajj Ramadan [Izadi] on the one hand and between brother Abu al-Baraa’ and brother Abd al-Aziz on the other, and put an end to the confusion created by the intervention of several well-intentioned brothers.

• Al-Sinwar sent a letter to Haniyeh on June 7, 2022, discussing at length the possibility of Iranian and Hezbollah involvement in a multi-arena campaign against Israel and said they would proceed cautiously because the Israeli response could be severe and they had already lost senior figures in their ranks. He said their considerations related more to the possibility of an Israeli attack on the nuclear facilities and did not correspond with those of Hamas. Nevertheless, al-Sinwar said they should be pressured regarding the Hamas force buildup in Lebanon, although he acknowledged that the disputes surrounding Khaled Mashal were delaying progress.

• Fourth: I believe that one of the most urgent issues at present is their seriousness regarding force buildup in Lebanon. However, I also believe that their seriousness on this matter is limited unless they are assured that it [the military infrastructure] will be under their control and decision-making authority and will operate according to their vision and timetables. We are still facing a genuine internal problem, since the proposed formula accepted by Abu al-Walid is still unacceptable to them and it will be difficult for us to resolve the matter internally. There is a high probability that we will remain in place without making much progress.

• After another round of meetings, on September 26, 2022 “Abu al-Walid” sent a letter to Issa saying he had confronted Izadi over allegations by Iran and Hezbollah that he was obstructing progress on the project in Lebanon. He said Izadi noted that the appointment of a commander from the military wing in the Gaza Strip could serve as an interim solution to stabilize the project.

4. At my last meeting with Hajj Ramadan, I told him: I see that there is false information among your friends in the [Revolutionary] Guards and the Party [Hezbollah] that I am the one obstructing the jihad project. He smiled at me and said: I did not update them on the latest developments, nor on the details of the refusal by your brothers abroad. I am not concerned about presenting the details to them, and therefore they are still stuck with the original story that you are unwilling to manage the project. So I asked him: How far have you progressed with the project? He said: While we continue the training to save time, try to convince your brother of the importance and feasibility of the project. It is not necessary for the person who comes from Gaza to remain forever. Rather, it could be a trial period of two years, for example, until everyone is confident about everyone else.

• “Abu al-Walid” met with Fandi and briefed him on the understandings regarding management of the project and tried to reassure him regarding his status.

The first point he discussed with me concerned his authority. I told him that the brother assigned the position would be accountable to you and to Abu al-Baraa’, and would be responsible for the project vis-à-vis the Guard [Revolutionary Guards] and the Party [Hezbollah]. Regarding your authority, you will reach an agreement with Abu al-Baraa’ on the rules and definitions, and the two of you will formulate whatever terms of reference you deem appropriate. The Guard and the Party have nothing to do with that. I reassure you that it is not in Abu al-Baraa’s nature to interfere and he does not descend into details, particularly if you deal with him with the necessary trust. He only wants to be reassured regarding the matters that concern the allies.

The second point he discussed with me concerned the authority of the brother, head of the external region [Mashal]. I told him briefly that he has the right to be informed of all the details, but he is not authorized to make a decision to open fire, since that is a matter for the movement’s leadership, and the order will reach you through brother Abu al-Baraa’, not through him.

Abu Amer [Fandi] responded to the two previous conclusions with great satisfaction and noted that he was convinced. He said: I trust your reading of the Party and the Guard and trust your assessment, and therefore we should discuss again what was said previously because I want to write it down. After he wrote it down, he said: I am convinced of the matter, and I will travel to meet brother Abu al-Walid after his son’s wedding in order to apply pressure.

• On December 18, 2022, Abu Ibrahim (Yahya al-Sinwar) and Abu Osama (Khalil al-Hayya)^[38] met with the limited military council of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades. According to the summary of the meeting, signed by Abu al-Baraa’ (Marwan Issa), the need to resolve the dispute surrounding management of the military infrastructure in Lebanon was emphasized to enable coordinated activity with the Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah.

Regarding force buildup in Lebanon:

• The situation regarding this matter, which has been the subject of extensive internal discussion, was reviewed, and so far there has been no breakthrough or progress, neither with the brothers abroad nor with the Party [Hezbollah] and the Guard [Revolutionary Guards].
• The following mechanism was agreed upon and adopted:
• We must continue along two tracks. The first is to bring the dispute to an end and inform the brothers abroad, through brother Abu al-Abd [Haniyeh], that it would be preferable to give the region authority to deal with the Guard through the mechanism that existed in the past, at the minimum level presented to us, while the central [Operations] Headquarters will issue clear instructions to the [Operations] Department abroad to complete the missions and activities assigned to them, such as the military production of missiles and UAVs, the existing training with the Party and the possibility of exploiting an arena (Syria, Daraa + the Golan, the areas not controlled by the regime) in preparation for future phases. We emphasize that an effort will be made to keep the atmosphere stable between them and the brothers in the Party and the Guard.
• The second track: we will rely on brother Ammar [Fandi] through the infrastructure currently in his hands, while developing this infrastructure vis-à-vis the Party and the Guard and expanding activity with other elements in Lebanon (such as the Islamic movement), so that these infrastructures will be ready to operate in the future with the agreement of the Party and the Guard, without Hamas (Lebanon), so that we do not enter into internal disputes with the external region if it discovers this, although it is our right. Of course, the utmost secrecy must be maintained on this matter with the Party and brother Ammar, so that these infrastructures will constitute our strike force.
• Following the adoption of these two tracks for force buildup, we will close the matter currently under discussion with the movement in the external region. Brother Abu al-Abd will quietly inform them that, on this issue, after the exploratory phase with the axis [“resistance axis”], we did not achieve a breakthrough, and therefore it is necessary to work according to the mechanism familiar from the past, with them having the authority to operate and procure equipment. The connection with the central headquarters will be within a framework of technical monitoring. Likewise, Abu al-Baraa’ will correspond with Abd al-Aziz with the same substance of the matter that Abu al-Abd is handling with Abu al-Walid.

Final Plans for the October 7, 2023 Invasion and Massacre

• Despite the challenges, as preparations for the major attack on Israel advanced, the Hamas military infrastructure in Lebanon became more established. According to a document containing the minutes of the sixth meeting of the Hamas Shura council in the Gaza region, held on August 12, 2023, senior movement figures gave speeches noting the status of the military wing on the northern front, although they acknowledged that despite the progress, the situation had still not reached the level they desired.
• Isma’il Haniyeh, head of the Hamas political bureau, represented force buildup outside the Gaza Strip, particularly in Lebanon, as a central part of the “resistance project” led by Hamas. According to him, the rocket fire from Lebanon during Ramadan (April 2023) showed the beginning of the project’s activation and the possibility of turning Palestinians outside the Palestinian territories, the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria, into an active force in the campaign against Israel. Haniyeh viewed the connection between the three arenas as the principal hope of the Palestinian people for liberation “from the occupation.”

It is now clear that the resistance project, which the movement is leading, with heroic Gaza at its heart and embracing it, alongside the West Bank, and the building of the resistance project “abroad,” whose first signs appeared during Ramadan when a rocket barrage was fired at northern occupied Palestine, this resistance project is the only hope for the masses of our people who yearn for freedom and to rid themselves of the occupation and its hordes of settlers.

• Yahya al-Sinwar, head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, described significant progress in consolidating the “resistance axis” and preparing several arenas for joint action in the event of a broad war. He said the process was advancing under the auspices of the Hamas leadership in the Gaza Strip and in coordination with Hezbollah and the Revolutionary Guards, and rockets had been fired from Lebanon with Hezbollah’s assistance and protection. He said approximately 1,000 Izz al-Din al-Qassam operatives were already training in Lebanon, but acknowledged that internal disagreements, particularly the tension with Khaled Mashal, had delayed expansion of the force, which in his view should be 10,000 fighters.

Very extensive training is taking place in Lebanon for Palestinians. We have approximately one thousand fighters^[39] from among our brothers in the Shaheed Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades who are training in Hezbollah and Revolutionary Guards camps, and the Islamic Jihad [PIJ] also has more than one thousand fighters, and the aspiration is for the number to increase greatly. Even organizations such as the Popular Front [PFLP] today have several hundred who are training and preparing, and the Revolutionary Guards are training them. On this issue, we have a small problem which, if we succeed in solving it, will allow the number [of fighters] to become much larger. The problem is the existing complexity between our brothers in the “external” region, specifically brother Abu al-Walid [Mashal], in relations with Hezbollah, and if this is resolved, within a short time the number of operatives from the Shaheed Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades will increase very significantly. They say they are prepared to bring the number into the thousands, to 10,000 fighters, who will be trained and prepared and become an army, but because of the complexity of the issue within our movement, which we have not succeeded in resolving, matters began weakly and not as they should have on this issue.

• The commander of the Gaza Brigade in the military wing, Izz al-Din al-Haddad (Abu Suhaib),^[40] focused on the gap between the Hamas force buildup in Lebanon and the progress made by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). He expressed concern that the PIJ had succeeded in training a larger number of operatives and had received broad support from Hezbollah, while the Hamas training was limited and irregular. He said expanding the infrastructure in Lebanon was essential for maintaining the Hamas status as the leading Palestinian force in all arenas of confrontation.

Abu Suhaib al-Haddad/

In the name of Allah, the compassionate, the merciful. Regarding the issue discussed by the brothers, concerning the existence of training for Hamas operatives in Lebanon and the problem on this matter between the movement [Hamas] and the Party [Hezbollah] regarding the low number of trainees: the number of trainees from the Islamic apparatus [PIJ] exceeds 1,500 and they receive support and sponsorship from the Party, whereas in the case of Hamas, the training is for one thousand recruits, but the training is scattered. This issue must be addressed and followed up before it is too late, because of our great need for this arena and this front, so that Hamas remains at the forefront of resistance to the occupation on all fronts.

Therefore, we want to be prepared in the Lebanon arena, because this is our project and this is our strategic path, and our effort in it must be strategic. We must put aside all marginal matters so that we can concentrate on this aspect.

• In a report sent by an operative named Ammar^[41] to Marwan Issa on August 30, 2023, he briefed him on progress in Project 87, a joint Hamas-Hezbollah initiative to establish a “special force.”

My dear brother / regarding the project between us and the brothers in the Party [Hezbollah] related to the “special force,” they appointed a coordinator for us, an excellent brother, enthusiastic, serious and practical, praise be to Allah.

He informed me that his orders are to cooperate with us to the maximum extent on this project. He also informed me that he has a team of skilled operatives ready to assist this project, and that they said they are prepared for three types of activity:

The first type: they are known as the “mobilization forces.” These are operatives who undergo training and continue with their work until they receive a call for a mission involving “rocket fire and the like” or for training.

The second type: “guard forces” (routine security). They are divided among guard posts along the border after undergoing military training. They have designated guard positions and observation missions.

The third type: training of “special squads” whose role is to carry out operations beyond the lines, meaning inside Palestine.

Bottom line: they are prepared to continue with us on the project in full. The new development is that they are prepared to absorb the largest possible number, of course within the framework of their policy, meaning after the individuals undergo the familiar security clearance procedure.

For our part, we are prepared to increase the numbers and proposed that this be done gradually.

Involvement of the Lebanon Branch in Preparations for Attacks Abroad

• Alongside preparations for the campaign against Israel, the military wing in Lebanon played a central role in establishing infrastructure in preparation for the possibility Hamas would carry out attacks abroad for the first time. The arrests of four Hamas operatives in Germany and the Netherlands in December 2023 and three Hamas operatives in Germany in October 2025 revealed that the wing’s branch in Lebanon had established hidden weapons caches in Europe for attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets. According to details disclosed by the Israeli Mossad and in the indictment filed against Hamas operatives in Germany, the person who operated the infrastructure in Europe was Khalil Hamed al-Kharaz, aka Abu Khaled, who was deputy commander of the military wing in Lebanon and described by the defendants in the case as the Hamas “head of the foreign attacks unit.”^[42]

The Hamas Branch in Lebanon During the Gaza Strip War^[43]

• On October 7, 2023, when the Hamas military wing in the Gaza Strip launched the al-Aqsa Flood campaign against Israel, invaded Israeli territory, massacred more than 1,000 Israelis and took more than 250 hostages to the tunnels in the Gaza Strip, the branch in Lebanon reportedly numbered approximately 1,500 trained fighters who had also undergone training in Iran. Most of the operatives came from the Burj al-Shamali and al-Bass Palestinian refugee camps in the Tyre area of south Lebanon, as well as the Ein al-Hilweh refugee camp near Sidon and the Burj al-Barajneh refugee camp in Beirut (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 15, 2023). In the following months, it was reported that hundreds of new operatives recruited from the 12 Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon had joined the ranks of the Hamas military wing, although only some of them reached the border area with Israel, generally for rocket launches (Al Jazeera, December 18, 2023; The New York Times, August 24, 2024).
• In December 2023, Hamas announced the establishment of a new youth movement called the Pioneers of al-Aqsa Flood (tala’i’ tufan al-aqsa) in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, particularly the Ein al-Hilweh refugee camp. According to Hamas sources, the movement was established to serve as a “vanguard of the resistance which will take part in the liberation of Jerusalem and al-Aqsa Mosque.” In practice, the movement was intended to provide an organizational framework for ideological recruitment and the training of young Palestinians in the refugee camps in Lebanon as terrorist operatives who would act within Hamas against Israel from the Lebanese border, following the model of youth movements operated by other terrorist organizations.^[44]
• From the beginning of the war in the northern arena on October 8, 2023, when Hezbollah joined as “support” for the Gaza Strip, until the ceasefire on November 27, 2024, the Hamas military wing in Lebanon claimed responsibility for 13 attacks on Israel. The first were firing 15 rockets at the Western Galilee on October 10, 2023 and an infiltration attempt by three nukhba terrorists near Moshav Margaliot on October 14, 2023. The principal pattern of activity was the firing of concentrated rocket barrages at civilian and military targets, mainly in the Western Galilee but also at more distant targets, including firing 15 rockets at Haifa Bay on November 12, 2023. Hamas terrorists also attempted to infiltrate Israeli territory and shot at IDF forces near the border with Lebanon.
• Hamas also carried out joint attacks with the al-Fajr Forces, the military wing of al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya. In many cases, both movements issued their own notices concerning the same operatives killed in Israeli strikes. That is evidence of cooperation between the two movements, both branches of the Muslim Brotherhood, which intensified after the Hamas-aligned faction led by Muhammad Takkoush won the elections for al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya’s Shura council in September 2022. Reportedly, many senior operatives in al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya received their salaries directly from Hamas (Asas Media, September 20, 2022).
• By the ceasefire on November 27, 2024, the Hamas military wing had issued notices concerning 19 operatives killed in Israeli attacks in Lebanon, including the seven killed in the strike in Beirut on January 2, 2024, in which Saleh al-Arouri, Samir Fandi and Azzam al-Aqra were eliminated. Four other Hamas operatives were eliminated after the ceasefire, including Muhammad Shahin, head of the operations department of the Hamas branch in Lebanon (February 2025), and Hassan Farhat, commander of the Hamas western sector in Lebanon (April 2025). During the new hostilities which began between Hezbollah and Israel on March 2, 2026, Hamas announced that two of its operatives had been killed. On June 19, 2026, the death of Osama Qa’id, a resident of Taalabaya in the Beqa’a Valley, was reported during the fighting in south Lebanon. Although Hamas did not issue an official announcement, archival footage showed him speaking at a march wearing an Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades headband and draped in a Hamas flag. Calls of support for the Hamas military wing were also heard during hisfuneral.

     
Right: Senior Hamas operatives eliminated in Lebanon (Israeli Security Agency spokesperson, December 31, 2024). Left: Hamas posters in the Ein al-Hilweh refugee camp during the funeral of a Hamas operative (al-’Ahed, August 10, 2024)

• On March 22 and 28, 2025, rockets were fired twice at northern Israel in violation of the ceasefire agreement. An investigation by the Lebanese army and the security forces identified those responsible as Lebanese and Palestinians affiliated with Hamas (Lebanese army X account, April 18, 2025). An indictment was filed against nine people on charges of establishing an armed group with the aim of damaging the authority and prestige of the state, firing rockets at Israel, collecting medium and heavy weapons and military equipment, preparing additional operations which were not carried out for reasons “beyond their control” and possessing weapons, explosives and rockets. It was also noted that the defendants, most of them Lebanese and all Hamas operatives, had violated the measures taken by the Lebanese state regarding the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and exposed Lebanon to the danger of hostile actions (Lebanon Debate, May 5, 2025).
• On May 2, 2025, Lebanon’s defense council recommended that the government warn Hamas against using Lebanese territory for operations which threatened the country’s national security (al-Nashra, May 2, 2025). Following the decision, the head of Lebanon’s general security directorate, Major General Hassan Choucair, summoned the Hamas representative in Lebanon, Ahmed Abd al-Hadi, and warned him against actions that would undermine Lebanese sovereignty. In response, Abd al-Hadi announced he was prepared to hand over the four Palestinians wanted for launching rockets at northern Israel in late March 2025, including the planner of the rocket fire, and claimed the launches had been an “individual action” rather than the result of a Hamas decision. Hamas reportedly pledged not to violate Lebanese sovereignty in the future (al-Arabiya, May 3, 2025). In what appeared to be an effort to placate the Lebanese leadership, Hamas handed the wanted men over to the Lebanese army (Lebanese army X account, May 4–6, 2025).^[45]
• Following the Lebanese government’s August 2025 decision to disarm all armed non-state bodies to ensure the state’s monopoly on weapons, Fatah began handing over its weapons in the Palestinian refugee camps to the Lebanese army. Hamas, however, refused to hand over the medium and heavy weapons in its possession, claiming that the refugee issue should be resolved as a whole rather than by giving priority to disarmament over Palestinian rights. Chairman of the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee Ramez Dimechkie was disappointed by the Hamas position and stressed that as long as the organizations declared they operated under the protection of the state, they had to comply with its decisions. He said Hamas and its allies had to coordinate dates with the Lebanese army for handing over their weapons, as other PLO organizations had done (al-Sharq al-Awsat, December 31, 2025).^[46]

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2. The documents mentioned in this study are available for review in the archives of the Meir Amit Institute for Terrorism and Intelligence and the Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center (IICC).

3. Terrorist attacks and jihad against Israel.

4. War to destroy Israel.

5. For further information, see al-Araby TV, May 13, 2025; Raafat Murra, Islamic Movements and Forces in Palestinian Society in Lebanon: Sources, Objectives and Achievements, Beirut: al-Zaytouna Centre, 2010 (in Arabic); Fatima al-Smadi, Iran and Hamas: From Marj al-Zuhur to al-Aqsa Flood: The Untold Story, Doha: Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 2024 (in Arabic).

6. They were expelled in response to the murder of three Israeli civilians in a stabbing attack in Jaffa carried out by two Hamas terrorists from the Gaza Strip in December 1990.

7. The expulsion was carried out following the abduction and murder of Border Police officer Nissim Toledano by a Hamas cell. The expulsion was supposed to last between a year and a half and two years, but the deportees were returned in stages to the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria within a year.

8. Eliminated in July 2024, while serving as head of the Hamas political bureau.

9. Eliminated in April 2004, while serving as Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip.

10. One of the Hamas founders and senior spokesmen, who was considered the Hamas "expert on Jewish affairs." See the December 2025 ITIC report, The Doctrine of Dr. Mahmoud al-Zahar, the Hamas “Expert on Jewish Affairs”.

11. Eliminated in February 2026.

12. Eliminated in September 2024.

13. For further information, see: Aviva Shabi and Roni Shaked, Hamas: From Belief in Allah to the Path of Terror, Jerusalem, Keter Publishing, 1994.

14. Eliminated in June 2025. See the January 2025 ITIC report, Activities of Saeed Izadi, Head of the Qods Forces’ “Palestine Branch,” Reflected in Captured Documents.

15. Source of terrorist attacks and violence against Israel.

16. This may refer to Ahmed Hamdan Abdullah, known as Abu al-Harith, a veteran operative in the Hamas military wing who operated from Lebanon as part of the West Bank Headquarters. He was killed in an Israeli strike in Beirut in March 2026.

17. Operation Protective Edge (The Eaten Chaff campaign, as Hamas called it) in July-August 2014, during which several rockets were also fired from Lebanon into Israeli territory.

18. Eliminated in September 2024, while head of the Hamas political bureau.

19. Eliminated in January 2024, while deputy head of the Hamas political bureau.

20. Currently the Hamas leader in Judea and Samaria, residing mainly in Turkey.

21. See the May 2021 ITIC report, Escalation from the Gaza Strip – Operation Guardian of the Walls – Summary.

22. Eliminated in July 2024.

23. Eliminated in March 2024.

24. See the April 2025 ITIC report, Operation Guardian of the Walls as a watershed moment in the Hamas strategy for the “destruction of Israel,” as reflected in documents found by the IDF in the Gaza Strip.

25. The term "Second Promise" (Wa’d al-Akhira) is taken from verse 7 of Surah 17 (The Night Journey), where it is translated as "the second time." According to Hamas, it refers to the campaign to destroy Israel and take control of "Palestine" and al-Aqsa Mosque.

26. Although Abu al-Walid is the nickname of Khaled Mashal, the leader of Hamas abroad, the content of the letter indicates that this was another senior Hamas figure residing in Qatar.

27. The body that oversees Hamas "resistance" activity in all arenas.

28. Abu Ruqayya is Izadi’s operations commander and coordinates activity between Hamas and Hezbollah on Izadi’s behalf.

29. Terrorist operatives

30. See the December 2021 ITIC report, The explosion of a weapons storehouse in the Burj al-Shemali refugee camp east of Tyre revealed the extent of the Hamas military presence in Lebanon.

31. Iran, Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Houthis in Yemen and the Shi'ite militias in Iraq.

32. The jihad to destroy and eliminate the State of Israel.

33. On April 6, 2023, during the Passover holiday, 34 rockets were fired from south Lebanon into Israeli territory, most of which were intercepted. There were no casualties. See the April 2023 ITIC report, Rocket Fire Targeting Israel.

34. See the May 2025 ITIC report, Khaled Mashal, the Hamas “external” leader, is a controversial figure, as documented in documents found by the IDF in the Gaza Strip.

35. Terrorist activity.

36. Eliminated along with Saleh al-'Arouri in an Israeli attack on Beirut in January 2024.

37. The "project" to destroy the State of Israel.

38. Head of the Hamas political bureau since July 2026.

39. Terrorist operatives.

40. Eliminated in May 2025, while head of Hamas’ military wing. See the May 2026 Amit Institute report, Elimination of Izz al-Din al-Haddad, Head of Hamas’ Military Wing: Reactions and Significance.

41. It may have been Azzam al-Aqra, a senior operative in Hamas’ military wing in Lebanon, whose aka was Abu Ammar. Al-Aqra, one of the founders of the military wing in Judea and Samaria, was among those deported to Marj al-Zuhur in December 1992, but chose to remain in Lebanon when the deportees were permitted to return. He was killed in the attack in which Saleh al-'Arouri and Samir Fandi were killed in Beirut on January 2, 2024 (al-Araby al-Jadeed, January 3, 2024).

42. Al-Kharaz was killed in an Israeli attack in Lebanon on November 21, 2023. See the October 2025 ITIC report, Arrest of Hamas Terrorist Cells in Europe: Hamas May Carry Out Attacks Abroad.

43. See the August 2024 ITIC report, The Organizations Assisting Hezbollah in Combat Against Israel.

44. See the December 2023 ITIC report, The Al-Aqsa Flood Pioneers A new youth movement established by Hamas in Lebanon to attack Israel.

45. See the June 2026 Amit Institute report, The Armed Palestinian Terrorist Organizations in Lebanon.

46. For further information, see the ITIC study from August 11, 2025, "The Lebanese Government’s Decision to Disarm Hezbollah – Positions of the Power Brokers"; the ITIC weekly publications (since May 2026, Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center), "Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon."

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