Operation Breaking Dawn from the Palestinian Perspective

Overview

• After three days of confrontation with the Gaza Strip, on August 7, 2022, at 23:30, a ceasefire went into effect, ending Operation Breaking Dawn. Between August 5 and 7, 1,175 rockets were fired at Israel, 990 of which reached Israeli territory. The Iron Dome aerial defense system intercepted approximately 450 of them, with a success rate of about 97%. About 200 rockets fell inside the Gaza Strip or into the sea. The IDF attacked 170 Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) terrorist targets, killing 51 Palestinians including the PIJ commanders of the northern and southern Gaza Strip sectors and other senior organization figures. From Israeli perspective the IDF had struck the PIJ a crushing blow.
• The Palestinian media, the PIJ, Hamas and Iran reported the operation as a success for the Gaza Strip. However, several days after it ended and repairing the damage began, various elements in the Gaza Strip called the PIJ to account. They criticized the PIJ for attacking Israel on its own initiative, for its rocket misfires, which killed many Palestinian civilians and for the operation’s failure to achieve anything positive for the Gaza Strip. Apparently the Gazans did not support the PIJ’s actions, which were carried out at a time when they had economic reasons to preserve the calm (permits to work and conduct business in Israel). Many were of the opinion that the excuse for the attacks, the detention of a senior PIJ figure in Jenin (in the West Bank), was insufficient to bring another round of fighting to the Gaza Strip.
• On the other hand, the PIJ criticized Hamas for not taking an active part in the fighting, and threatened to leave the terrorist organizations’ joint operations room. In consequence, on August 22, 2022, representatives of the organizations’ military-terrorist wings held a meeting, after which they issued a statement claiming they had agreed to strengthen their common political and military actions. According to the statement, the joint operations room would continue to include representatives of all the organizations in the Gaza Strip and would conduct the confrontations with Israel (Shehab, Hamas Telegram channel, August 22, 2022).

Victory from the Palestinian Perspective

• As soon as the ceasefire was announced, the PIJ began constructing the narrative of its victory in what it called “Operation Unity of the Fronts,” i.e., Operation Breaking Dawn. Senior PIJ figure Khaled al-Batash said fighting stressed the unity of the fronts and that Israel efforts to separate the PIJ from its popular base had failed (al-Mayadeen TV, August 8, 2022). Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, and PIJ leader Ziyad al-Nakhalah spoke on the phone, agreeing that Israel’s strategy of “breaking the will” of the Palestinian people had failed, and stressing the unity of the “resistance” [Palestinian terrorist organizations] against Israel. Reportedly, they also spoke about ways to increase “resistance” activities [terrorist attacks] and joint coordination (Hamas website, August 8, 2022). Senior PIJ figure Ahmed al-Mudallal, whose son was killed in the same attack that killed the commander of the southern sector, admitted the fighting had been “fierce” and that the organization had lost a number of important military leaders (qudsna.com, August 22, 2022).
• An article in the Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese newspaper al-Akhbar described the events from a “PIJ perspective.” According to the article, on the first day the organization exploited the hours between 16:30 and 21:00 to organize its operatives and inform them that they would follow previously-prepared military plans. They restrained the operatives on the ground and did not allow them to respond individually. At 21:00 they launched the first barrage of rockets at the Israeli communities within a radius of 40 kilometers from the Gaza Strip (about 25 miles, the distance between the southern Gaza Strip and Beersheba, Israel’s largest southern city). The PIJ then escalated its “response,” which was supposed to include all the cities as far as far away as Tel Aviv, a radius of about 70 kilometers from the northern Gaza Strip (a little more than 42 miles), according to instructions from Ziyad al-Nakhalah.
• That evening “military wing operatives launched close to 400 rockets. The anti-aircraft units had to find ‘worthwhile’ targets near the border,” but Israel’s policy of “zero targets” and its previous deployment made that impossible. After the second blow of the killing of Khaled Mansour, commander of the southern Gaza Strip sector, “the forces quickly overcame their shock and reorganized. As soon as the funeral ended they began a massive retaliation, and at exactly 15:30 a large barrage of rockets was launched, and 200 were fired simultaneously at 58 ‘settlements’ and cities from those around the Gaza Strip to Tel Aviv, Ben-Gurion International Airport and the Netanya coast, a distance of 90 kilometers [55 miles] from the Gaza Strip” (al-Akhbar in Lebanon, August 9, 2022).
• “The Jerusalem Brigades [the PIJ’s military-terrorist wing] fought alone, sacrificing 12 operatives, all in targeted killings or on the battlefield, yet managed to continue and increase the pace of the rocket fire during 50 hours of fighting. In addition, they successfully neutralized the Iron Dome aerial defense system by flooding the skies with rockets. The operatives worked under extreme pressure and were able to reload the rocket launchers while Israel, with its advanced technology, was unable to locate them or keep them from firing, and no rocket launcher was hit. The artillery units worked seamlessly and were never in danger. In addition, if the campaign had been waged differently, the Kornet and anti-tank units would have played a significant role” (al-Akhbar, Lebanon, August 9, 2022).
• Iran also viewed the operation as a Palestinian achievement. Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, Iran’s foreign minister, spoke on the phone with Isma’il Haniyeh and told him the “resistance” [terrorist organizations] had achieved a great success in the most recent confrontation with Israel because it had again successfully withstood an enormous military power and within two days “forced it to reach a ceasefire and accept the resistance’s conditions.” Amir-Abdollahian praised Haniyeh for preserving the unity of the organizations. He said that what was important was that only part of the “resistance” had been involved in the confrontation, which by itself was an enormous achievement and showed how “weak and helpless” Israel was. Haniyeh thanked him for Iran’s support (IRNA in Arabic, August 9, 2022).
• During the Friday prayer, Nasser Abu Sharif, the PIJ representative in Iran, said that the PIJ would have not been victorious without Iran’s support, the only country which gave it aid and backup, and still continued supporting the “resistance in Palestine and Lebanon” [the Palestinian terrorist organizations and Hezbollah]. He claimed that during the most recent confrontation, the PIJ on its own had “frightened” Israel and “forced it to close half the country” (Maher, August 12, 2022).
• However, other opinions were voiced. For example, Ashraf Abu al-Houl, a senior Egyptian political commentator, said that despite Ziyad al-Nakhalah’s threats to renew the fighting, the organization had suffered heavy losses, including the deaths of several senior figures. In addition, the PIJ’s stocks of rockets had been hit. Another failure, he said, was its inability to convince Hamas to join the fighting because Hamas was responsible for the civilian population of the Gaza Strip and had different priorities (al-Ahram, Egypt, August 8, 2022).
• Somewhat later, criticism was also voiced within the Gaza Strip because the operation had ended with no tangible Palestinian achievements, arrangements or commitments. Muhammad Shehadeh, a political commentator and human rights activist, said the PIJ had nothing to show for the fighting and had given the residents of the Gaza Strip nothing at all. On the other hand, in the previous rounds Hamas had achieved ceasefires with genuine results for Gazans (al-Quds, August 18, 2022).
• The general public in the Gaza Strip also did not seem to support the PIJ’s actions, which caused economic damage (the freezing of permits to work and engage in business in Israel). There were also many who felt that the excuse for the fighting (the detention of PIJ figures Bassem al-Sa’adi) was insufficient to bring more destruction on the Gaza Strip. The daily newspaper al-Quds held an Internet public opinion poll, asking if the “resistance” [the PIJ] had achieved anything new in the most recent round of fighting, and 63% answered “No” (al-Quds website, August 24, 2022).

Palestinian Casualties

• During Operation Breaking Dawn 51 Palestinians were killed and several hundred were wounded. The Jerusalem Brigades, the PIJ’s military-terrorist wing, issued a mourning notice for 12 fatalities, all of them wing operatives. They included the commanders of the northern and southern sectors and several other senior operatives. Many of the Palestinians were killed by rockets which misfired and fell inside the Gaza Strip.

• Local residents in the Gaza Strip were severely critical of the rocket misfires. In an article published in al-Akhbar, “resistance” [PIJ] sources claimed that rockets had misfired on previous occasions [possibly a hint that Hamas had the same problem in the past], and that human error had been taken into account. They also claimed an investigation had been begun to determine the circumstances of some of the events (al-Akhbar, August 18, 2022).
• the same sources noted a number of possibilities for the misfires (al-Akhbar, August 18, 2022):
  • The rockets misfired because of manufacturing defects, they were poorly stored in the launching pits, or had been influenced by soil conditions or the weather.
  • The rockets fell on houses in the Gaza Strip because they were intercepted by the Iron Dome aerial defense system before they had crossed the border from the Gaza Strip into Israeli territory.
  • “Collaborators with Israel had deliberately sabotaged them.”
  • Israel used a “new laser system” to intercept the rockets, change their trajectories or detonate them near the launching area.
• A PIJ source tried to explain the misfire in Jabalia by blaming the squad which had launched it. After they fired the rocket they tried to find shelter in a nearby mosque, but they were attacked by Israeli aircraft and that led to the civilian deaths. According to the source, since the beginning of the second intifada hundreds of rockets had fallen on local homes and only a few people were injured because “Allah was watching over them” (al-Akhbar, August 18, 2022).
• Al-Akhbar also accused Israel of trying to exploit the misfires to ruin the image of the “resistance,” especially the PIJ, in the eyes of the Gazan public, using “irresponsible” Palestinian media (al-Akhbar, August 18, 2022).
• According to an Agence France-Presse report also published in al-Quds, Gazans, especially on the social networks, issued veiled criticism of the PIJ’s conduct. Political commentator Muhammad Shehadeh said that the PIJ had tried to improve the range of its rockets and the impact of their warheads. However, their technology had not been precise and rockets which were supposed to have a range of more than 40 kilometers had mediocre technology and mechanics, which caused them to fall inside the Gaza Strip, frustrating and embittering the local residents (al-Quds, August 18, 2022).
• A Gazan, who refused to give his name because of “security concerns,” said he was home with his wife and children when he heard an explosion and looked outside. He saw the house next to his had been destroyed and several people had been killed, the result of a rocket which had been fired at Israel but fell inside the Gaza Strip. A woman from Jabalia said it was a war of mistakes from both Israel and the “resistance,” and she had seen a rocket fall on her neighbor’s house. She called on the “organizations in the Gaza Strip to be more precise” (al-Quds, August 18, 2022).

The Issue of the Detainees

•  After three says of fighting the Egyptian mediator, Israel and the PIJ announced a ceasefire, which went into effect of August 7, 2022, at 23:30. Egypt committed itself to attempting to secure the earliest possible release of two PIJ detainees, Bassem al-Sa’adi, the head of the PIJ in Jenin, whose detention was the excuse for the attacks, and Khalil al-Awawdeh, a PIJ administrative detainee who has been on a hunger strike since his detention (al-Jazeera, August 7, 2022).

• Since the end of the fighting the PIJ has been monitoring the detainees’ condition and has tried to secure their release. The heads of the organizations have appealed to Egypt to increase pressure on Israel, and note that as far as they are concerned, the operation will only end when the organization’s conditions have been met (al-Ghad, Sabaq24, August 13, 2022).
• PIJ spokesman Tareq Salami said the organization had been in contact with Egypt since the operation ended and had received “serious promises” from Egypt that Israel would release the detainees in the near future (al-Ayam, August 19, 2022). PIJ spokesman Da’ud Shehab said the organization’s position on the Egyptian mediator rested on two possible scenarios: either Egypt would announce it had not managed to convince Israel to implement the understandings or al-Awawdeh’s health would deteriorate and he would die. In either case, the PIJ would do what was necessary (al-Quds al-Arabi, August 18, 2022).
• Tor Wennesland, special UN envoy to the Middle East peace process, said that as part of the UN’s commitment to preserve calm in the Gaza Strip, a delegation had visited the Bassem al-Sa’adi in prison (Tor Wennesland’s Twitter account, August 10, 2022).
• The situation of the two detainees:
  • Bassem al-Sa’adi: On August 14, 2022, an Israeli military court extended his detention by six days. On August 21, 2022, Israel announced a further extension of five days and an indictment for incitement. Yasser Mazaher, PIJ representative to the “prisoners’ committee of the national Islamic forces in the Gaza Strip,” claimed Egypt had to take responsibility for the extension of al-Sa’adi’s detention by exerting pressure on Israel to release him to ensure continued calm in the Gaza Strip. He said the extension of al-Sa’adi’s detention was the beginning of the real battle between Egypt and Israel to preserve the ceasefire. He added that Israel had to meet the PIJ’s demand regarding the two detainees, otherwise the [rocket] attacks would be renewed. He said the Jerusalem Brigades and the PIJ would not remain inactive in the face of what was happening to Khalil al-Awawdeh and Bassem al-Sa’adi (Dunia al-Watan, August 11, 2022).
  • Khalil al-Awawdeh: On August 11, 2022, the Israeli media reported that his condition had deteriorated and he had been hospitalized and placed under guard. His wife, Dalal, who was allowed to visit him, claimed he had suffered irreversible damage. On August 19, 2022, the IDF Central Command froze his administrative detention order for the duration of his hospital stay. The Israeli Supreme Court rejected his appeal for release (Haaretz, August 22, 2022). Senior PIJ figure Khader Habib said Israel was fully responsible for his life, and that they were in continuous contact with the Egyptians for continuing mediation and exerting pressure on Israel (Sabaq24, August 11, 2022).
• On another occasion, Khader Habib claimed that without a doubt Israel began pushing the entire Middle East into a new, unavoidable wave of military conflict when its leadership, from Prime Minister Yair Lapid down to the lowest military commander, announced they would not meet the condition of the ceasefire to release Khalil al-Awawdeh and Bassem al-Sa’adi. He said the PIJ had reported Israel’s conduct to the Egyptians and their refusal to meet the conditions of the ceasefire, which was achieved through Egyptian mediation and with Egyptian guarantees. He said the “organizations” were monitoring Israel and would take a suitable position at a suitable time, in coordination with “other Palestinian forces.” He added that they had received promises and “indications” from the Egyptians that a security delegation would go to Tel Aviv in the near future to discuss the matter (al-Ayam, August 12, 2022).
• Senior PIJ figure Muhammad al-Hindi said Israel’s unwillingness to meet the conditions of the ceasefire, which included the release of the administrative detainees, exposed Israel’s true nature and forced the Egyptians to take responsibility (PIJ website, August 17, 2022).
• Given the continuing administrative detention of al-Awawdeh and al-Sa’adi, Zaher Jabarin, a member of Hamas’ political bureau, called Israel’s refusal “playing with fire” (IRNA in Arabic, August 22, 2022).

Assessing and Repairing the Damage to the Gaza Strip

• As soon as Operation Breaking Dawn ended an assessment of the damage began in the Gaza Strip. The ministry of public works and housing announced that 22 dwelling units had been completely destroyed, 77 had been partially destroyed and were unfit for human habitation, and 1,908 were partially damaged (Ma’an, August 13, 2022).

   
The Abu Thabet neighborhood in eastern Rafah after an Israeli attack (Facebook page of journalist Hani al-Sha’er, August 8, 2022).

• Adhem al-Bassouni, spokesman for the ministry of agriculture in the Gaza Strip, said that during the fighting the agricultural sector had suffered losses of $1 million (al-Ra’i News Agency, August 11, 2022). The chairman of the Gazan workers’ union said that losses of income incurred during the six days before and during the operation, when workers were prevented from leaving the Gaza Strip and entering Israel, totaled 18 million shekels (about $5.5 million) (workers’ union website, August 14, 2022).
• Muhammad Thabet, in charge of public relations for the Gazan electric company, said that after Israel restored the delivery of diesel fuel to the Gaza Strip, the supply of electricity returned to what it had been before Operation Breaking Dawn: eight hours of electricity with a two-hour power outage (Ultra Palestine website, August 11, 2022).

   
Fuel arrives at the Gaza Strip power plant (Right: Facebook page of journalist Hani al-Sha’er, August 8, 2022; Left: Twitter account of photojournalist Hassan Aslih, August 8, 2022).

• The Hamas administration reported its intention to help repair the damages. On August 12, 2022, Isma’il Haniyeh reported that Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani, Qatar’s foreign minister, announced Qatar had agreed to send money and finance the rebuilding of houses and structures that had been destroyed (Hamas website, August 12, 2022). The Qatari Red Crescent reported it would provide $1.1 million worth of humanitarian assistance to the Gaza Strip (al-Andalou News, August 9, 2022).
• The Palestinian social networks reported the PIJ had announced it was committed to rebuilding the houses that had been destroyed by the end of the year. The organization would also pay reparations of up to $1,000 to the owners of houses that had been destroyed, $400 would be paid for every Gazan who had been wounded and the families of those who had been killed would receive a monthly salary (Rased al-Mayadeen Telegram channel, August 10, 2022). Khaled al-Batash, a member of the PIJ’s political bureau, said the organization’s security force had given instructions that all the killed and wounded be related to equally, and the families of all be supported (PIJ website, August 15, 2022).
• Wa’el Abu Muhsen, media director for Hamas’ charitable institutions in the Gaza Strip, said that during the six days after the fighting they had provided a variety of services worth more than $820,000 to the residents of the Gaza Strip (alresala.net, August 13, 2022).

Help from the PA government

• The PA government ordered the relevant ministries to deal with repairing the damages in the Gaza Strip. They were asked to map the damages, provide supplies, give psychological aid and counseling to children, have the local municipalities’ fund provide aid for repairing building that had been destroyed and ask human rights and humanitarian institutions to intervene with the Israelis to enable the delivery of medical equipment sent by the ministry of health in Ramallah (Wafa, August 8, 2022).
• Mai al-Kayla, PA minister of health, announced the delivery of drugs and medical equipment worth two million shekels (a little more than $600,000) to the Gaza Strip. She also said the hospitals in the PA were open to receive the wounded from Gaza (Dunia al-Watan, August 13, 2022).

   
The shipment being transferred to a truck from the ministry of health’s warehouse in Nablus (ministry of health in Ramallah Facebook page, August 11, 2022).

The Issue of Hamas’ Lack of Involvement in the Fighting

• Hamas did not actively participate in the fighting. Publicly, the PIJ tried to justify Hamas, but in reality the organization was disappointed. Al-Akhbar, quoting “knowledgeable sources” after the targeted killing of Tayseer al-Jaabari, reported that the PIJ wanted other organizations to act as well and particularly did not want to give Israel the privilege of focusing its intelligence and security efforts only on PIJ, which could cause it serious losses and damage. According to the “sources,” the PIJ held three simultaneous meetings with Hamas, one in the Gaza Strip, one in Beirut and one in Tehran, but Hamas did not agree to involve its military-terrorist wing in the operation (al-Akhbar, August 9, 2022).
• Some PIJ figures tried to make a point of Hamas’ not participating in the fighting. Senior PIJ figure Khaled al-Batash said in an interview that the confrontation was with the entire Palestinian people, and Hamas had supported the PIJ with communications and logistics, and had played an important role in “securing the home front” (aljazeera.net, August 13, 2022).
• PIJ spokesman Tareq al-Salami said they had gone into “Operation Unity of the Fronts” with a united Palestinian position, and there had been coordination among military wings of the national and Islamic organizations. However, he said most of the “military action” had been carried out by the PIJ because of the killing of their military commanders. Hassan Abdo, a PIJ-affiliated political commentator, said Hamas had played an important role in the efforts to reach a ceasefire. He added that Hamas’ lack of participation in the fighting had given the PIJ an opportunity to demonstrate its military capabilities, which most of the Palestinian public were unfamiliar with, since they thought the PIJ was a small organization with fewer military capabilities than Hamas (al-Monitor, August 12, 2022).
• Muhammad al-Hindi told the Turkish Arabic-language TRT channel that emphasizing Hamas’ lack of participation was a poor attempt to cause a dispute between the PIJ and Hamas, but relations with Hamas had only strengthened. He said it was not the first engagement [with Israel] nor the last, and they fought with “only some of the Palestinian organizations,” and in this case instance the PIJ was sufficient to lead it “on behalf of the Palestinian people” (Safa, August 8, 2022).
• “Palestinian sources” reported that the PIJ had been surprised by Hamas’ position and regarded it as a “stab in the back.” According to the “sources,” the PIJ did not want to wage a pubic confrontation with Hamas, but had announced it was withdrawing from the joint operations room of the Palestinian organizations (al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 19, 2022). Senior PIJ figure Ahmed al-Mudallal claimed the assertions were untrue and the PIJ had good relations with Hamas and the other Palestinian organizations, adding that coordination with them and Hamas continued (Sabaq24, August 21, 2022). Hamas was also criticized for prioritizing daily life, such as the Israeli permits, over political interests (Saudi Arabian al-Sharq website, August 13, 2022).
• In reality, according to the Saudi Arabian website Asharq News, the confrontation in the Gaza Strip caused a rupture in the relations between Hamas and the PIJ. The PIJ interpreted Hamas’ position as abandoning the idea of joint activity and the joint operations room, which united the military wings of all the organizations under the leadership of Hamas’ military wing. It also claimed the activities of the joint operations room were currently frozen. A senior PIJ figure said that Hamas’ lack of participation in the confrontation caused the joint operations room to collapse and it no longer had any importance. Hamas and PIJ sources reported efforts to repair the break and reconstruct the joint operations room, but did not minimize the influence of the dispute on future Hamas-PIJ relations (al-Sharq website, August 13, 2022).
• Talal Awkal, an al-Ayam political commentator in the Gaza Strip, said he did not think Hamas’ lack of participation would lead to tension with the PIJ because the PIJ was not considered a Hamas rival, but rather a “resistance” [terrorist] organization which operated only against Israel (al-Monitor, August 12, 2022).
• Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem denied the reports of disputes, stressing the strength of Hamas’ relations with the PIJ at different levels, claiming they coordinated at high levels in many areas. He claimed that during the most recent “escalation” there had been continuous contacts between Hamas and the PIJ regarding political, military and security issues. He also claimed that when the “escalation” began the joint operations room called it a response to the killing of senior PIJ operatives. He said that after the operation ended senior Hamas and PIJ figures met to ensure, reinforce and develop their joint actions, adding that the joint operations room would be continued and developed (Dunia al-Watan, August 13, 2022).
• According to Iyad al-Qara, a Hamas-affiliated political commentator, Hamas did not join the PIJ because it did not think the “escalation” would be linked to national issues, such as Jerusalem, which had pushed Hamas into initiating Operation Guardian of the Walls in May 2021. He said the PIJ had entered into Operation Breaking Dawn for reasons linked to the demand for the release of its detainees, which did not commit Hamas to join a military confrontation with Israel. Hamas, he claimed, had given the PIJ the freedom to choose how to respond to the killing of its military commanders. He said Hamas’ lack of participation had divided the Palestinian street because some people thought Israel had deliberately attacked the PIJ. That was why there had been popular demands for Hamas to intervene and stop the killing of PIJ leaders and operatives. Others thought Hamas intervention would complicate the situation because Hamas was the largest “resistance” organization with more posts and facilities Israel could attack, which could have led to a longer military involvement (al-Monitor, August 12, 2022).
• Senior Hamas figures admitted there had been differences of opinion with the PIJ regarding the rationale and timing of the confrontation. They claimed the PIJ’s conducting an armed confrontation with Israel because one man on the West Bank had been detained was unacceptable, regardless of his status. According to Hamas, Israel continued detaining Palestinians in the West Bank and they could not be stopped by threatening an attack from the Gaza Strip, as the PIJ had done. As for the timing, Hamas claimed the atmosphere of elections in Israel made the government more aggressive towards what it regarded as provocation from the Gaza Strip, using it as a way to make political capital and score points against rivals. Some of the Hamas leadership thought that the PIJ, by threatening to attack Israel after the detention of Bassem al-Sa’adi without first consulting with Hamas, wanted to represent itself as the “spearhead of the resistance.” They mentioned the atmosphere of political rivalry between Hamas and the PIJ for leadership of the “armed resistance” [violence and terrorist attacks targeting Israel] even though externally they pretended they were allies (al-Sharq website, August 13, 2022).

• Given the reports about the tension between the two organizations, on August 22, 2022, a meeting was held of the leaderships, including their military-terrorist wings. After the meeting a joint statement was issued claiming they had discussed their relations and agreed to strengthen their joint political, military and security work. They stressed that “the path of resistance” [the obliteration of the State of Israel] was their strategic choice, they would not abandon it and it would continue with full coordination. In addition, the joint operations room of the Palestinian organizations would continue to include representatives from all the organizations in the Gaza Strip and conduct the confrontation with Israel, and they would work to strengthen its role (Shehab, Hamas Telegram channel, August 22, 2022).

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