Hamas Criticism of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad Revealed in Seized Documents from the Gaza Strip

Dr. Igal Shiri and Dr. Hayim Iserovich

Overview^[1]

• Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) are the two leading terrorist organizations of the “Palestinian resistance,” whose objective is the “liberation of Palestine” through jihad against and the destruction of the State of Israel. However, while Hamas also emphasizes political and social activity, the PIJ focuses on armed “resistance”^[2] and is intransigent regarding political negotiations.
• The military wings of Hamas and PIJ have cooperated closely in wars and rounds of fighting against Israel, including during the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre and the subsequent war in the Gaza Strip, and together they operated a joint operations room with the other terrorist organizations in the Strip.
• Despite the cooperation, in several instances the two movements have disagreed, mainly due to PIJ’s independent rocket fire, which led to short rounds of fighting against Israel, contrary to the “controlled escalation” policy which Hamas tried to promote while making secret preparations for the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. Hamas documents brought back by the IDF from the Gaza Strip indicated that Hamas was displeased by the PIJ’s independent conduct.
• The documents also confirmed that many of the rockets fired at Israel by the PIJ fell inside the Gaza Strip, killing civilians and causing damage, which was also a serious problem for Hamas, despite its efforts to shift responsibility to Israel. According to the documents, a senior PIJ official admitted that the failures were caused by rockets assembled according to Iranian instructions.
• In an attempt to reduce the PIJ’s “rogue” actions, Hamas tried to impose its will on the PIJ and even subjugate the organization to its direct control. The documents included information regarding problems the PIJ caused the “resistance,” including immoral behavior and intelligence infiltration, and measures to ensure that the PIJ would act in accordance with Hamas’ interests at the political and military levels.
• The documents reveal a pragmatic and interest-based relationship between Hamas and the PIJ. Hamas views the PIJ as undisciplined and in need of constant control and supervision, while the PIJ seeks to gain public support by being more active against Israel. Although it is not known whether Hamas succeeded in fully implementing its plans to take over the PIJ, the war in the Gaza Strip showed that the two movements were able to overcome their differences and cooperate in dealing with Israel, including the deals to release the hostages. In ITIC’s assessment, although Hamas will ostensibly relinquish political control in the Gaza Strip as part of the second phase of the ceasefire agreement, both organizations can be expected to refuse to disarm and continue to attack Israeli security forces and civilians in accordance with the vision of a jihad war until the “annihilation of Israel.” However, if Hamas is pragmatic, in all probability the conflict between the two movements will resume and intensify, publicly as well.
• All the documents appear at the end of the study.

Background: Cooperation between Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad

• The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is the second largest and most important terrorist organization in the Gaza Strip. It was founded in 1981, inspired by the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and receives continuous and regular assistance from the regime in Tehran through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Qods Force, endeavors to liberate all “Palestine” through a holy war (jihad) and firmly opposes political negotiations. The PIJ carried out suicide bombing attacks after the Oslo Accords to subvert the process, and during the Second Intifada it was responsible for most of the suicide bombing attacks against Israel.
• After Hamas entered the Palestinian political arena in the 2006 Palestinian National Council elections, and especially since the movement took over the Gaza Strip in 2007, the PIJ has been required to adapt to Hamas’ interests, especially during interbellum periods of “calm” with Israel. Nevertheless, it has often carried out attacks and fired rockets contrary to Hamas’ position, possibly directed by Iran.
• However, the military wings of both organizations have maintained close cooperation, especially in fighting against Israel in the Gaza Strip. For example, in Operation Protective Edge, for the first time Hamas’ Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades and the PIJ’s Jerusalem Brigades were given joint responsibility for firing a barrage of Buraq 70 and M75 rockets at Tel Aviv (Tasnim News Agency, July 16, 2014).
• Starting in 2018, the two military wings also operated together in the joint operations room with the military wings of seven other Palestinian terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip, both in training and in clashes with Israel. Ayman Nofal, who was a member of the General Military Council of Hamas’ military wing and commanded the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades’ Central Battalion, confirmed that even in the fighting between Israel and the IDF in Operation Shield and Arrow (May 2013), they cooperated in the operations room, even though Hamas did not actively participate in attacking Israel.^[3]
• Although Hamas planned the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre without involving the other terrorist organizations, the PIJ’s military wing joined the invasion of Israeli territory and held Israeli hostages. Throughout the war, the PIJ leadership maintained close coordination with the Hamas leadership, especially regarding indirect negotiations with Israel, and the military wings held joint ceremonies to release hostages and jointly located murdered Israeli hostages after the ceasefire that went into effect on October 10, 2025.

     
Right: A Hamas military wing operative kisses an operative from the PIJ military wing at a ceremony to release female Israeli soldier hostages (Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, January 25, 2025). Left: A Hamas terrorist operative holds a picture of PIJ secretary general Ziyad al-Nakhalah at a ceremony to release IDF soldier hostages (The Jerusalem Brigades Telegram, January 30, 2025)

• The close relationship between Hamas and the PIJ is also reflected in the statements issued by each organization on the anniversary of the other organization’s establishment:
  • In a statement for Hamas’ 38^th anniversary on December 14, 2025, the PIJ leadership stated that the movement’s founding marked “a milestone in the history of jihad and the struggle [sic] of the Palestinian people,” it provided strength for the “resistance in Palestine” against “projects to destroy the Palestinian cause” and disturbed the sleep of the “entities” and its supporters. The PIJ also reaffirmed the “covenant of blood and brotherhood in jihad and struggle” between the two and their commitment to continue on the same path “which connects us to our brothers in Hamas and all the resistance forces” (PIJ media information office, December 14, 2025).
  • According to a statement issued by the PIJ leadership two years earlier, two months after the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades and the Jerusalem Brigades were partners in every aspect of “resistance” operations, led “fierce battles against the enemy” and achieved “national victories.” The PIJ affirmed the strength of relations and partnership with “our brothers and sisters” in Hamas, claiming the unity was strengthening and growing (PIJ media information office, December 14, 2025).
  • In a statement marking the 38^th anniversary of the founding of the PIJ on October 6, 2025, Hamas political bureau member Hussam Badran called the PIJ “a qualitative addition to the Palestinian national movement and a significant contribution to strengthening the comprehensive resistance.” Badran expressed “sincere pride” in “the clarity which unites the Jerusalem Brigades, the al-Qassam Brigades and all the branches of the Palestinian “resistance.” He stressed that the unity of position and joint coordination between Hamas and the PIJ would remain solid and continuous (Hamas Telegram Channel, October 6, 2025).

• On October 30, 2017, IDF forces blew up a PIJ tunnel that penetrated into Israeli territory from the Khan Yunis area in the southern Gaza Strip, killing five PIJ terrorists, including senior commanders, and two Hamas nukhba terrorists (IDF spokesperson and Jerusalem Brigades website, October 30, 2017). Gazan journalist Yahya al-Yaqoubi published an article about the incident entitled, “Brothers in blood and comrades in arms!” He wrote that a rescue team from the al-Qassam Brigades rushed to rescue Jerusalem Brigades “fighters”^[4] who were trapped in the tunnel, and thus they died side by side. He said “brothers in arms” described the strength of the relationships between the “fighters” and “paints a beautiful picture in which the red blood that spilled from the veins of the martyrs east of Khan Yunis mixed.” He added that “the arena of blood unity may have been foreign to the Israeli occupation, which has always sought to separate the Palestinian people from its resistance, but it is not foreign to the Palestinian people” (Palestine Online, October 31, 2017).

• Hamas documents brought back from the Gaza Strip by IDF forces during war showed that despite the attempts of both terrorist organizations to show unity and cooperation, their relationship was complex. Along with a description of their “resistance” cooperation, the documents revealed Hamas’ criticism of the PIJ, especially regarding its independent positions, which were not consistent with Hamas’ interests, and the ways in which Hamas tried to subordinate the rebellious partner organization to itself.

Hamas Criticism of the PIJ

• Starting in 2018, the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip ramped up their violence against IDF forces and the State of Israel after more than the three and a half years of relative calm which followed Operation Protective Edge in the summer of 2014. Hamas applied pressure on Israel in order to promote its achievements, such as easing the “siege” or increasing economic aid. Hamas led several short rounds of escalation which included rockets fired at Israeli territory, including the central region and Beersheba, by the military wings of Hamas, the PIJ and other terrorist organizations.
• While the Hamas leadership promoted a policy of controlled escalation, raising and lowering the level of conflict in accordance with its interests, the PIJ was responsible for several rounds of escalation and rocket fire without Hamas involvement and apparently without its approval. The most notable examples were the round of fighting after the killing of the commander of the Jerusalem Brigades’ Northern Battalion, Bahaa Abu al-Atta (November 12-14, 2019); the rocket fire after the killing of an operative who tried to plant an explosive device near the security fence (February 23-24, 2020); Operation Breaking Dawn (August 5-7, 2022); and Operation Shield and Arrow (May 9-13, 2023).^[5]
• Publicly, Hamas and the PIJ showed a united front and were mutually uncritical even when the PIJ acted independently. For example, after Operation Shield and Arrow, the PIJ secretary general, Ziyad al-Nakhalah, said Hamas’ non-participation also had “positive” aspects because Israel attacked targets of “lower value,” and if the campaign had continued Hamas might have joined. Deputy Hamas leader “abroad,” Musa Abu Marzouq, said there was an “equation,” according to which if Hamas had participated, the “partial campaign” would have turned into a war, and it would be a long, different war and influence the situation the ground. He also claimed that the Israeli actions against the PIJ were intended to create division and separate the organizations, but the actual situation was different.^[6]

However, after Operation Breaking Dawn, Hamas’ lack of participation reportedly caused a rift, and the PIJ interpreted it as Hamas’ abandoning the idea of ​​joint activity and the operations room. According to a “senior PIJ figure,” because of Hamas’ lack of participation, the joint operations room no longer existed and had no meaning (al-Sharq, August 13, 2022).

• The issue of Hamas’ lack of involvement in Operation Breaking Dawn was raised in a meeting held on August 27, 2022 between a Hamas delegation – with the participation of the deputy head of the political bureau, Saleh al-‘Arouri (Abu Muhammad),^[7] the deputy head of the political bureau in the Gaza Strip, Khalil al-Hayya (Abu Osama), political bureau member Zaher Jabarin (Abu Islam) and Abu Osama (possibly a senior Hamas figure in Lebanon, Osama Hamdan) – and Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah,^[8] and the head of the Palestinian branch of the Iranian Qods Force, Muhammad Saeed Izadi (Hajj Ramadan).^[9] The meeting was summarized in a letter sent by the head of the Hamas political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh (Abu al-Abd), to the head of the political bureau in the Gaza Strip, Yahya al-Sinwar (Abu Ibrahim), on September 1, 2022.
• According to the document, Hamas did not hide its criticism that the PIJ “mobilized alone and escalated” the situation, thus leading to the assassination of the commander of the PIJ’s northern brigade in the Gaza Strip, Taysir al-Jaabari, and the beginning of the round of fighting. Hamas representatives explained to Nasrallah and Izadi that the movement had assisted the PIJ in various military and security fields and expressed Hamas’ desire for positive relations with the PIJ. They also praised the PIJ Secretary general, Ziyad al-Nakhalah (Abu Tareq), for his attitude towards Hamas throughout the conflict.

1 . The first topic: The latest confrontation with the Islamic Jihad (unity of arenas)

– A discussion was held which focused on the latest round in Gaza and the main sequence of events, and how the Islamic Jihad acted alone, which led to the killing of mujahid Taysir al-Jaabari. The circumstances surrounding the movement’s position were also clarified. What the [Hamas] movement had provided in several areas was explained, military, security and operational (on the ground) for the Islamic Jihad in the confrontation, while emphasizing the movement’s desire to maintain a positive relationship with the Islamic Jihad.

– The movement’s delegation praised Brother Abu Tareq’s conduct towards the movement at all stages of the confrontation, and the depth of the connection with the Islamic Jihad.

• At the meeting Hajj Ramadan claimed that the PIJ had not intended to start fighting or wage war, but only to declare a state of alert due to the arrest of the head of the PIJ in Jenin, Bassam al-Saadi; however, the situation escalated after al-Jaabari’s killing. Senior Hamas figures did not hide their rejection Hajj Ramadan’s claim, as they wondered how the PIJ did not intend to provoke a war if it allowed sniper fire and anti-tank missiles.

Hajj Ramadan presented a number of clarifications and explained that the Islamic Jihad did not intend to go to war, but only intended to raise the alert in response to the humiliating arrest of Bassam al-Saadi; however, matters took a turn after the elimination of al-Jaabari.

[Note in the document:] It is unacceptable to say that the Islamic Jihad did not intend to go to war while it was making a decision to carry out sniper operations and firing anti-tank Kornet missiles.

The PIJ’s Independent Actions

• The PIJ’s decision to shoot at IDF forces on the Gaza Strip border or to fire rockets and mortar shells into Israeli territory, which sometimes led to escalation and days of fighting, contravened the policy of controlled escalation Hamas tried to promote. Publicly, Hamas avoided criticism, but reports were sometimes issued about attempts to curb the PIJ’s independent actions. For example, in October 2020, a PIJ operative said a Hamas internal security force had arrested three PIJ military operatives in the northern Gaza Strip after they fired rockets at Israel, and photographs of rockets which were confiscated following the arrest were published (Agence France-Presse, October 23, 2020).
• The documents brought back from the Gaza Strip provided evidence of Hamas senior figures’ dissatisfaction with the conduct of the PIJ, which they saw as damaging the interests of the “resistance,” especially given Hamas’ desire to maintain relative quiet as part of preparations for the decisive campaign against Israel.
• According to the letter summarizing the meeting between Hamas representatives, Nasrallah and Izadi in August 2022, they discussed the dangers disagreement between Hamas and the PIJ on coordinated responses to Israeli activity, and the implications for popular support for the “resistance.” Hamas made it clear that the PIJ’s firing rockets without coordination and consensus would result in Israeli reactions that would both harm Hamas and weaken the positions of the “resistance.” Therefore, they stated that an agreement should be reached that no conflict with Israel would be launched without coordination between Hamas and the PIJ, and that joint responses to Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip, Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem should be determined in advance.

The occupation’s reactions to the rockets fired outside the national consensus, for which the Islamic Jihad bears responsibility in the vast majority of cases, were clarified. The reactions were directed against Hamas and Jihad sites and eroded the resistance’s capabilities. Instead of us chipping away at the occupation, the occupation is chipping away at the resistance.

The issues on which agreement is required:

– Agreement that any confrontation with the occupation will be carried out solely in coordination between Hamas and the Islamic Jihad.

– Agreement on the response to the occupation and its mechanisms from Gaza, in a way that will provide a response to the issues of Gaza, the West Bank, Jerusalem and its surroundings.

– The concept of unity of the arenas, the concept of integration and the exchange of roles.

• Furthermore, Nasrallah himself addressed Hajj Ramadan and said that the PIJ needed to rein in its operatives to reduce the burden on Hamas.

Sayyid [Nasrallah] said the following:

He expressed his joy and satisfaction over the agreement between Hamas and the Islamic Jihad and the progress towards mutual understanding.

He stressed the need to achieve mutual understanding on all the issues that were raised and agreed upon.

He addressed Hajj Ramadan and said, the duty and priority is for the Islamic Jihad to control its people so they do not get out of control, and that will ease the burden on the brothers in Hamas.

• In a document dated August 30, 2022, a senior Hamas figure named “Ahmed” [identity unknown] summarized the main points of the meeting he had with Akram al-Ajouri (Abu Muhammad), head of the PIJ’s military wing, two days earlier, following a meeting between the Hamas and PIJ delegations in Beirut.^[10] When “Ahmed” raised the issue of the PIJ’s rocket fire at Israel, al-Ajouri admitted that not all rockets fired during the time of the Northern Brigade commander, Bahaa Abu al-Atta (Abu Salim), had been approved by the leadership, but noted that they had its backing. He added that stopped after Abu al-Atta was eliminated in November 2019 and promised that it would not happen again.

Like the rockets during the elections in Israel under brother Abu Salim and the period after it. He laughed, showed embarrassment and said, I mean, not all of Abu Salim’s rockets were our decision. Then he qualified what he had said, adding Even though they were backed by the department. However, Abu Salim fell as a shaheed, may Allah have mercy on him, and we stopped and promise you that it will not happen. I told him that last Ramadan four months ago you gave an order to some of your people to fire rockets. He said in a weak voice, That’s not true, who did we give it to? I didn’t mention his name because I didn’t want to embarrass him in the meeting, and I told him, I will give you a report on that at the end of the meeting. I don’t want to dwell on that incident, we want to talk about the next ones. He told me, Tell your brother to calm down, I won’t do it, that is a promise from me.

• Al-Ajouri himself did not hide his displeasure that Hamas blamed the PIJ for every rocket that came out of the Gaza Strip, and was quick to make that claim to the Egyptians. “Ahmed” said that every time they blamed the PIJ, there had also been evidence of Hamas involvement.

A. He said, I am angry about the ongoing accusations against the Islamic Jihad without an investigation. As soon as a rocket is fired, the Egyptians call and say Hamas told them it was the Saraya [Jerusalem Brigades]. You accuse us immediately and inform the Egyptians and put us in an embarrassing situation. I told him, We did not accuse you without evidence. Either the man is one of yours, or the rocket bears your symbol, or the timer is yours, or the land [firing area] is yours. I have a detailed report on all the scenarios, which I will give you. He said, I understand that. And we discussed it (He meant to say, Why are you selling us to Egypt? We need to protect each other).

• In an attempt to justify the rocket fire, al-Ajouri criticized Hamas for investing in defense rather than offense, which in his opinion did not contribute to the “resistance.”^[11] “Ahmed” explained to him that investing in defense meant the IDF would refuse to launch a ground operation in the Gaza Strip because the number of soldier casualties would be high. Despite that, al-Ajouri claimed that more should be invested in the offensive.

B. He said, I sent a message to Brother Abu Khaled [Muhammad Deif] through Brother Abu Salim five years ago, a message about your heavy investment in the defensive effort at the expense of the offensive effort, and that it was not in the best interest of the project. Why did you do that? I told him, There were two parallel efforts, defensive and offensive, with a clear investment in the defensive effort as part of the view of securing Gaza as a base for the “resistance” and preventing the possibility of breaking it with a ground campaign. Indeed, we achieved the goal. Today, the Israeli army opposes a ground campaign and is maneuvering to use it as a last resort, and has told the political echelon there would be 700 deaths if it invaded Gaza. That did not come from a vacuum, it is a result of the defensive effort. What the “resistance” is experiencing today in Gaza is a result of the defensive effort and also of investment in offensive activity. He said, So the purpose of the defensive plan was deterrence? I told him, That’s right, and we may not use our defensive compounds and tunnels at all, but without them, Gaza would not be secure as a base for resistance.” He said: That’s a correct right view, what’s important is that we invest in the attack.

• At the end of the document, “Ahmed” said he was impressed that al-Ajouri had spoken honestly about the desire to avoid firing rockets without permission and that the PIJ wanted Hamas to help them deter the young Gazans. “Ahmed” proposed pressuring the PIJ to hand over to Hamas those who had carried out the rocket fire without the approval of the organization’s leadership. He also proposed acting to neutralize the possibility of the PIJ’s violating the agreements, especially if PIJ leader al-Nakhalah pressured the operatives in the Gaza Strip to respond to events in Judea and Samaria.

5. Regarding the uncontrolled rocket fire, he is clearly telling the truth, and wants us to help him deter the Islamic Jihad operatives. Therefore, we need to use his what he said to pressure the Islamic Jihad to hand over its members if there is rocket fire without a decision, and to impose a deterrent punishment on those who do so.

6. Regarding the rockets that are fired according to a decision, it seems that he does not want to disobey us, or not coordinate with us, but there is no guarantee of that, especially if operatives in the West Bank are embarrassed and there is pressure from al-Nakhalah to activate Gaza. Therefore, I recommend monitoring the behavior of the [Islamic] Jihad, if there is any event that requires intervention on their part, then we should take the initiative and propose ideas such as issuing a statement on behalf of the joint [operations room], or sending a threat through intermediaries or other ideas.

• On September 13, 2021, Assam [identity unknown] sent a Hamas figure named Abu Ahmed al-Amoudi a periodic intelligence report, in which he summarized the information collected regarding the PIJ’s military wing. According to the report, in light of the escape of six Palestinian security prisoners from Gilboa Prison in Israel,^[12] the commander of the PIJ’s Northern Brigade instructed his operatives to prepare 30 Grad rockets, noting that there could be “rogue” rocket firing if Israel harmed the prisoners. A rocket from the southern Gaza Strip was also detected “contrary to the agreements,” but it was claimed that the PIJ denied any connection.

A. In the context of the increased combat readiness of the Jerusalem Brigades and the threat of Islamic Jihad secretary general Ziyad al-Nakhalah and his decision to strike the “occupied cities” in the event that the enemy attacks the prisoners who escaped from Gilboa Prison, on September 7, the artillery in the north [of the Gaza Strip] prepared and deployed 30 Grad rockets “made locally and internationally,” in accordance with the decision of senior commander Taysir al-Jaabari. The [night] harassment group is planning to fire rockets outside the national consensus without obtaining the approval of the company leadership in the event of abuse of prisoners. The Jerusalem Brigades evacuated their sites and production workshops for fear that the Zionist enemy would attack them.

B. On September 10, the Jerusalem Brigades fired a rocket in violation of the national consensus from areas east of the Rafah district on the orders of the deputy commander of the Rafah Brigade’s artillery, Khalil Lutfi Abu Jazar. After examining the issue with the company coordinator in Rafah, he denied their connection to the incident.

The Failed Rocket Attacks

• On October 17, 2023, an explosion occurred in a parking lot near the al-Ahli hospital in Gaza City. After the Palestinians claimed it was an Israeli attack which caused hundreds of deaths, the IDF released photographs and a transcript of a conversation it had intercepted between two Hamas operatives, in which they said it was a PIJ rocket that apparently caused the explosion. One of the speakers said the fragments were of locally produced rockets which did not resemble Israeli missiles. It was also noted that “as soon as it [was fired], something went wrong and it fell on them” (IDF spokesperson, October 18, 2023; Israeli media, October 17-19, 2023).
• The documents showed Hamas was troubled by the PIJ’s failed rocket attacks which killed and injured Gazans. “Ahmed” noted that in his meeting with al-Ajouri, the issue of “rockets falling on civilians” was raised, and al-Ajouri implied that Hamas was also participating in the public campaign of blaming the PIJ. However, he did not deny that the rockets fired by the PIJ had killed and wounded Gazans, but said, “We are at war, and even if a thousand are killed by friendly fire, that is the price of war.” According to al-Ajouri, they were rockets manufactured according to plans received from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and that many of them were destroyed and others were placed near the border to reduce the risk of harm to civilians.

We discussed the issue of rockets hitting civilians, a problem that needs to be addressed. He expressed his deep frustration with the public campaign against them on this issue, and implied that Hamas was participating in it. He said, We are at war, and if a thousand are killed by friendly fire, that is the price of war. I told him, First of all, we are not part of the campaign against you. The campaign comes from the residents of Gaza. There are 2 million Facebook accounts in Gaza, and they all behave like operatives. Your rockets are hitting people’s homes in broad daylight, and that has happened repeatedly, so people are furious with you. You should know that we do not control public opinion in Gaza. As for the thousand people killed by friendly fire, that would be understandable if it was beyond our control, without our prior knowledge that a correctable malfunction could lead to deaths. But if we had prior knowledge, then those thousand deaths are the responsibility of whoever kills them. I added, The rocket problem became clear during the 2014 war [Operation Protective Edge]. He replied, I know. I told him, They were killed in the 2014 war, and in the Bahaa Abu al-Atta round [Operation Black Belt in 2019], and in Sword of al-Quds [Operation Guardian of the Walls], and in the last campaign. The problem is known and we have been talking about it with you since 2019. He said, What you said is true, we take blueprints from the brothers in the [Revolutionary] Guards and use them in Gaza, and there are problems with them. I am careful to address them. Two years ago we opened a workshop where hundreds of rockets were processed and a many were destroyed. That includes the turnover of 1.5 tons of perchlorate [a chemical compound used as an oxidizer in rocket fuel]. We have a certain type that is problematic, I told the guys to place it in the border areas, it will reach the Israelis or it will fall on the border. After the campaign, I asked for data on what was left and decided to destroy it. I told him that the brothers in Qassam had proposed establishing a joint committee to deal with the matter, and they were ready. He said, Good. I told him, Your brothers in Gaza did not respond. He said, It is not within their authority, and in any case we will study the matter.

(The main point is that they are very much influenced by the campaign against them, and they believe that we have exposed them out of recognition of their mistake. They have ways to deal with it now in cooperation with the Guards.)

•  Among the documents was a report of failed PIJ rocket-firing incidents during the November 2019 round of fighting (Operation Black Belt, which began following the assassination of the PIJ’s Northern Brigade commander, Bahaa Abu al-Atta). The report documented the rocket hits, including times, locations, casualties and damage, and the type of rocket. For example, on November 12, 2019, a “locally produced” rocket exploded in a civilian home in Jabalia al-Nazla in the northern Gaza Strip, killing one person and injuring others. In another incident on the same day, a locally manufactured Buraq 70 rocket exploded in the apartment of the Human Rights Committee in the Rimal neighborhood across from the Legislative Council, causing extensive damage.

     

     
Document 4: Report on failed PIJ rocket fire in the November 2019 round of fighting, undated

Hamas’ Plans to Take Over the PIJ

• Hamas was not content with criticizing the PIJ, which it saw as not only a possible threat to its policy of “controlled escalation” but also to its status within the “resistance” and Gazan society. According to the documents, Hamas took action to impose its will on the PIJ and subordinate it to its direct control.
• According to a document from September 2020 entitled “A plan to gain control over the Islamic Jihad,” the objective was to gain control over the activities and decisions of the Islamic Jihad’s military echelon in order to ensure unity in the confrontation with the “Zionist enemy.” The document noted that the activities of the Islamic Jihad field operatives did not align with the statements of the organization’s political leadership and included incidents of sniping and rocket fire “outside of consensus,” which was causing “damage to the unity of the resistance on the ground.” It also stated that the Islamic Jihad’s actions forced the “resistance” to enter rounds of escalation that affected “central projects of the resistance to accumulate strength and repel aggression.”

The general objective:

Controlling the behavior and decisions of the military echelon of the Islamic Jihad in Palestine, in a way that will bring about unity of decision on the battlefield with the Zionist enemy.

The problem:

The recent period has been marked by a gap between the behavior of the Islamic Jihad at the political level and its measures on the ground, through the carrying out of numerous sniping operations and rocket fire outside the consensus, which has caused damage to the unity of the resistance on the ground.

It has also harassed the enemy with limited confrontations, which forced the leadership of the resistance to enter into several rounds of escalation which have affected major projects of strengthening and confronting aggression.

• According to the document, which does not have official stamps and may have been only a draft proposal, Hamas had already achieved a certain intelligence control over the PIJ’s military wing, but since the organization was not meeting its obligations to Hamas, it was necessary to increase intelligence control and take control of decision-making and execution centers at the various levels of command. To that end, a committee should be established, which would be directly subordinate to the Hamas leader. Its members would be representatives from the movement’s leadership office, Hamas mechanisms and experts who would take control of the centers of power of the Jerusalem Brigades. The committee would collect all the necessary information and formulate a plan, with a timetable not exceeding a year, but the main objectives should be achieved within just four months.
• The document also suggested that the committee include the deputy commander of military intelligence, the deputy commander of the general security mechanism and the commanders in Hamas’ intelligence services responsible for human resources (HUMINT). That meant Hamas regarded the mission as an intelligence-counterintelligence challenge, which would also be achieved by recruiting agents within the ranks of the PIJ’s military wing.

The change:

Establishing a committee of the movement mechanisms, experts and the office of the movement chairman whose goal is to take control of the Jerusalem Brigades’ centers of power, and which will be directly subordinate to the movement chairman.

Practical steps:

1. Examining all the information available about all the movement mechanisms and departments.

2. Collecting the necessary information and completing all existing information.

3. Formulating a plan based on an examination of the information.

4. Setting a timetable for the plan, which will not exceed a year, with control over the central centers of power in decision-making achieved in the first four months.

• Hamas formulated detailed plans for ways in which the movement could strengthen its control over the PIJ, both politically and militarily. A document dated July 1, 2021, sent from the Islamic and national organizations department in Hamas’ internal security forces of the Hamas ministry of the interior to the director of the general activities department (whose name was not given), presented a “proposal of a vision for strengthening communication channels with the Islamic Jihad movement.” It outlined the problematic points of the PIJ’s activities and the possibilities for strengthening bilateral coordination. According to the document, the move was necessary because the PIJ was suffering from a “crisis of unrest” in its relations with Hamas caused by regional and internal factors, resulting in “embarrassment for Hamas.”

Regarding the above the Islamic Jihad is one of the main movements which make up the Palestinian spectrum, in light of its reputation in “resistance activity” and its Islamic nature. Current data indicate a crisis and lack of coherence in relation to the Hamas movement in Islamic jihad circles based on several factors, some regional and others internal, and their impact on the organization’s ideological, political, military, and security makeup. That has caused Hamas embarrassment at the foreign and domestic levels. Therefore, we present to you a vision for strengthening the channels of communication with the Islamic Jihad movement.

• The document presented a number of “security risks” caused by the PIJ’s activities, including violating the “national consensus” regarding rocket fire without coordination or forcing “new equations” with the “enemy,” which caused the “occupation” to attack the assets of the “resistance,” most of which belonged to Hamas; “deviations” by PIJ operatives regarding Hamas and the “legitimate government” in the Gaza Strip, in a manner that threatened the stability of security in the Strip; fear that PIJ operatives would join “deviant thought” organizations, i.e., extremist Islam, and transfer military information to them; the divisions within the PIJ made it vulnerable to infiltration by “Zionist,” “global” and “Palestinian” intelligence agencies and to the takeover of the organization’s centers by “elements from Ramallah” and elements affiliated with the Fatah movement; opposition by elements within the PIJ leadership to strengthening ties with Hamas while attempting to portray the PIJ as the “single organization” responsible for the interests of the “resistance.”

Security risks related to the Islamic Jihad movement:

• Violation of the national consensus, whether by planning to fire rockets contrary to the consensus without coordination with the joint chiefs of staff [sic] or by forcing new equations using the slogan of harassing the enemy, after which the occupation attacks resistance capabilities, especially of the Hamas movement.
• The establishment of internal conflicts, clashes and offenses by members and operatives of the Islamic Jihad, at the internal organizational level and in offenses against the law, against Hamas and the legitimate government in Gaza, which threatens the stability of security within the Gaza Strip.
• The division and disintegration of the Islamic Jihad movement make it easy prey and vulnerable to the infiltration of Zionist, global and Palestinian intelligence agencies, which led to many incidents (bombing of police stations, violation of the consensus, the break-in at the mosque in Khan Yunis, communication problems, etc.) which caused many organizational conflicts.
• The infiltration of Ramallah authority [Palestinian Authority] operatives into the ranks of the Islamic Jihad and their takeover of centers in the organization exacerbated internal disputes. That was done by using the language of weapons, incitement in the media with baseless accusations and a refusal to coordinate militarily.
• Exploiting the disputes with the Hamas movement for internal incitement among their operatives and commanders against the movement.
• It has become clear that certain levels of religious and military command reject the policy of strengthening relations with the Hamas movement by coordinating activities and uniting efforts, and are attempting to highlight the uniqueness of Islamic Jihad as a single organization that looks after the interests of the resistance, while reinforcing the policy of distrust in the Hamas leadership. Those commanders are trying to increase their influence on the joint operational command and show the Jihad movement as unique in the resistance.
• Weakening the “resistance project.”
• The possibility of increasing the influence of operatives with roots in the Fatah movement, especially those with high ranks in the security apparatus, and imposing a situation leading to the exploitation of some of them for dubious purposes.
• The possibility that Islamic Jihad and Jerusalem Brigades operatives will be drawn to currents of “deviant thought” [extreme Islam], which means that those groups will be able to take advantage of the organizational and military experience of Islamic Jihad operatives.
• There has been an increase in sales of weapons, rockets and military equipment by the Brigades’ operatives and their trading in the arms market.
• The possibility of widespread security breaches by Zionist intelligence or hostile security apparatuses, which exploit the economic crisis, internal problems and a low sense of belonging among some people, which constitutes a serious security threat.

• Hamas’ military wing would be responsible for relations with the PIJ’s military wing. The plan of action would direct meetings of the leadership of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades’ military council with permanent figures from the Jerusalem Brigades’ military leadership; establish joint committees to strengthen communication channels and deal with “deviations;” obtain information about every development and decision made within the Jerusalem Brigades; and use “temptations,” such as gifts and benefits, or holding joint training sessions including brainwashing which would give Hamas control over the PIJ operatives. In addition to identify the PIJ leaders and their close associates, and those who opposed Hamas.

Dealing with the Islamic Jihad movement, which is military, [will be] carried out by the brothers in the military wing, the shaheed Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, as part of monitoring the strengthening of communication channels with the Islamic Jihad movement through an action plan based on several elements:

• Holding direct meetings of the leadership of the military council (Hamas) with certain permanent figures in the leadership of the Jerusalem Brigades’ military council by establishing joint committees from the movement and government mechanisms (internal security), with the objective of strengthening military and security communication channels to unite efforts and deal with the gradually accumulating violations.
• Influencing the decision-maker within the Islamic Jihad movement by monitoring the entire course of events and decisions within the group, and by strengthening the connection with the centers of power in the organization through “containment” or “solicitation” to take over the organization’s centers according to a prepared plan.
• Investing in human, technical, communication and military tools through the media to strengthen trust within the organization’s corridors and get rid of the incitement rooted within the Islamic Jihad by:

1) Visits to national, movement and personal events, and showering them with gifts and offerings to seduce them and gain their sympathy.

2) Providing allied leaders with material and moral support.

3) Providing training and exchanging information to brainwash them and control their subconscious.

4) Carrying out a classification process for PIJ leaders and identifying those close to them to act against them, and identifying opponents [of Hamas] to weaken or contain them through a long-term strategic policy.

• The document examined the PIJ’s activities in various areas and suggested ways to coordinate them with the interests of Hamas. On the political level, it was noted that the PIJ was working to strengthen cooperation with Hamas but still maintained independence in decisions. In addition, Hamas had concerns that the alliance with Iran was leading to changing the PIJ’s identity to an “alternative organization,” which affected its decisions and coordination with Hamas. Therefore, the recommendations were to help the PIJ adapt their vision to Hamas policy, promote joint solidarity activities, establish permanent committees at the political bureau level and provide a media platform for PIJ leaders to express positions common with Hamas.
• The document recommended deepening ties with the PIJ’s foreign leadership, since they were responsible for the organization’s involvement in the Iranian-Syrian alliance. The importance of the relationship with secretary general Ziyad al-Nakhalah and with the head of the Supreme Council, Akram al-Ajouri, was particularly noted, to ensure that good relations with Hamas would continue even if there were internal disagreements between the two because of policy differences.

Deepening relations with Islamic Jihad leaders abroad because of their control of the organization linked to the Iranian-Syrian alliance, and especially with the commander of the Supreme Council/ Akram al-Ajouri and the secretary general/ Ziyad Al-Nakhalah, despite the differences in their opinions and policies, to ensure the continuity of good relations even in times of worsening disagreements between them.

• The document shows that Hamas had expressed considerable concern about the PIJ’s organizational and moral conduct, for example due to cases of lack of discipline among operatives, punishment “on paper,” incitement and “wrong organizational preaching” that harmed relations with Hamas. Therefore, it was proposed that the PIJ be assisted to resolve its urgent problems on the ground and to jointly monitor security infiltrations in the organization.

Second: The organizational level

• Organizational problems and disputes with the Hamas movement of a military and ideological nature have emerged in most districts of the Gaza Strip due to the increase in incitement and incorrect organizational preaching according to a certain policy that prevents recourse to the language of dialogue and understanding.
• An increase in cases of violations and offenses by Islamic Jihad and Jerusalem Brigades operatives (selling military equipment – stealing equipment – moral offenses – violations in the field).
• Disciplinary measures within the Jihad are characterized by confusion, despite the firm decisions to dismiss many offenders, after which they are returned to their positions at once, within a policy of retaining members and organizational protection, which contributes to the fact that security sanctions are imposed only formally.
• A growth of deviant thinking or communication with Ramallah has been identified among many Islamic Jihad members, which leads to organizational confusion and serves the goals of hostile elements seeking to harm the security of the Gaza Strip.
• Personal influence within the Jerusalem Brigades’ organizational structure has a prominent place and there is circle which is subject to personal influence, maintaining certain connections and lines of communication (a system of quotas – organizational pockets).

Mechanisms for increasing organizational coordination:

• Increasing coordination in the field with the brothers in the Islamic Jihad to solve urgent problems by strengthening continuous and direct communication.
• Monitoring security infiltrations within the Islamic Jihad through joint security committees while taking steps gradually to prevent clashes and conflicts.
• Increasing ties with certain influential figures within the Jerusalem Brigades to increase positive influence.
• Handling offenses of some of the Jerusalem Brigades members through direct coordination and law enforcement.

• It was noted that publicly, the PIJ’s military wing was careful to strengthen the relationship with their colleagues in Hamas, but there were still cases of “personal or intentional deviations” which resulted in attacks on Israel in violation of the agreements. To reduce that and strengthen the relationship, it was proposed to hold joint demonstrations and maneuvers, exchange information and strengthen the relationship, especially with senior figures in the military wing who opposed the movement’s policy.
• According to the document, the PIJ had been suffering from an economic crisis since Iran was forced to reduce its support because of the American blockade. Therefore, they recommended emphasizing that Hamas assist the PIJ financially, directing the movement’s charitable institutions to help needy PIJ operatives, and even identifying commanders and operatives who were in financial distress to provide them with support which would bring them closer to Hamas.

Fourth: The financial aspect:

The Islamic Jihad movement is currently experiencing a severe financial crisis after Iranian financial support was reduced due to the American embargo on Iran.

Ways of exploiting the financial crisis:

• Present the movement’s role [Hamas] as contributing to the financial support of the Islamic Jihad, in a way that will help increase bilateral trust.
• Instruct the movement’s affiliated institutions and the zakat [charity] committees to increase their attention to Islamic Jihad operatives whose financial situation is difficult.
• Monitor commanders and operatives who complain about their difficult financial situation and provide them with special financial support to increase their closeness.

 

• Another point raised in the document was the PIJ’s concern that its operatives would be recruited by other organizations, and it was noted that the PIJ’s internal security mechanism had conducted investigations regarding the operatives’ ties to Hamas or its internal security. Therefore, it was proposed to involve the security apparatus of the Jerusalem Brigades in the investigations, and at the same time to infiltrate the PIJ’s security apparatus.
• The conclusion was that implementing the plan might make it possible to achieve a political alliance between the parties which would reduce the possibility of disputes, and in that way the influence of other elements within the PIJ, such as Fatah or extremist organizations, would be reduced.

Expected scenarios:

Achieving political alliance directly and increasing trust between the movements, which will strengthen consensus on all national issues.

Reducing the influence of others within the Islamic Jihad such as (the Fatah movement and the security apparatus, with deviant thinking).

• A document from the general security forces in Hamas military intelligence dated September 19, 2021 presented another plan for approaching and expanding the Islamic Jihad movement to cover all Hamas and PIJ frameworks and bodies in all regions and in all key areas shared by the two organizations. It was noted that the plan should be conducted gradually and that the PIJ leadership should be updated on Hamas’ intention to approach the organization.

• The general goal of the plan:
  • Strengthening the rapprochement project with the Jihad movement, and translating all agreements between the two movements into a plan for action which will include all the frameworks and bodies of the two movements at the regional level and the level of central portfolios with shared authority.

• The document proposed starting cooperation at the regional level, with oversight of the coordination of activities being carried out by the national relations committee with the assistance of a representative from general security. Among the proposals for strengthening the relationship were holding meetings at the level of local leaderships and in mosques and holding joint activities such as rallies and processions, activities in mosques, sports activities and educational activities.
• According to the document, Hamas’ political wing should develop communication channels with the PIJ political wing and publish joint announcements and leaflets, organize joint political activities and coordinate political positions with it regarding the issues at hand. Regarding propaganda, the proposals included publication of articles and writings on behalf of the leadership in both movements’ media outlets, formulation of a common “national” narrative, promotion of a unified media language and formulation of joint campaigns on social networks.

• Regarding security cooperation, the recommendation was that the general security mechanism and Hamas’ intelligence service work to create a “positive image” of unity among the movement’s operatives, prepare joint situation assessments regarding issues in the Palestinian and regional arenas, cooperate with their colleagues in various special investigations, help develop the general security mechanism’s security system and provide it with a response if necessary, such as information and technology issues.

• Additional Hamas documents brought back from the Gaza Strip had examples of the implementation of Hamas’ plans to strengthen the connection with and control of the PIJ, including Hamas’ intelligence infiltration. On June 22, 2021, “Abu Assam” sent an intelligence report to Abu Ahmed al-Amoudi, stating that in accordance with Akram al-Ajouri’s directive, the PIJ’s military wing was working to establish a unified military force with other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip, including the al-Mujahideen Brigades and the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades (the military wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine), making it a body parallel to the joint operations room, out of fear that Hamas would force a truce agreement with Israel.
• The report also noted that the PIJ was facing an organizational crisis as dozens of activists had resigned or refused to accept their salaries due to cutbacks. In addition, it was stated that the PIJ had received checks totaling $5.8 million, with most of the amount being transferred to the person in charge of the financial file, Muhammad Hassan Hamid.

A. number of financial transfers reached the Islamic Jihad movement between June 1 and 17, totaling approximately $5.8 million, as follows: Two financial transfers totaling $3.68 million went to the director of financial portfolios, Muhammad Hussein Hamid, two transfers totaling $1.01 million went to Muhammad Fuad Ghanem, a transfer totaling $1.02 million went to Mahmoud al-Husayna, a transfer totaling $20,000 went to Muhammad Faiz al-Hasni, and a transfer totaling $252,000 went to Khalil Samir al-Hasni.

B. The movements and efforts of the Jerusalem Brigades, led by commanders Iyad al- Husni and Khaled Mansour under the direction of the head of the military department, Akram al-Ajouri, were monitored. Their efforts were intended to establish a joint force from several military factions (the Jerusalem Brigades, the Nasser Abu al-Halal Brigades, the Al-Mujahideen Brigades, National Resistance Battalions, Abu Ali Mustafa Battalions) under the leadership of the Jerusalem Brigades. The Brigades thereby seek to create a body parallel to the “resistance” joint operations room, claiming that Hamas wants to reach a détente with the occupation after Operation Sword of Jerusalem [Operation Guardian of the Walls], and Hamas will impose this agreement on the military factions.

• In the intelligence report that “Assam” sent to al-Amoudi on September 13, 2021, he said the PIJ’s surveillance system in Gaza was planning to request training on operating drones and preventing their hostile takeover. He reported that the PIJ had sent 13 operatives to Iran and that training rounds were planned in Iran and Lebanon.

F. The Jerusalem Brigades have resumed sending their members for training abroad. On August 20, 13 operatives from the northern region traveled to Iran. There are plans to send additional groups of operatives to Lebanon and Iran starting in September of this year and until January 2022. Currently, the process of selecting the names of the candidates and preparing their travel documents and arrangements is underway.

G. The information and surveillance unit in the Gaza Brigade intends to ask the al-Qassam Brigades to train its operatives on operating small drones and on the technical matters that al-Qassam uses to prevent the enemy from taking control of them. The unit is awaiting the arrival of a drone costing $9,000.

• Hamas also used its ties with Qatar’s al-Jazeera to influence how the network covered the PIJ. In a document sent by “Osama” from Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades military intelligence on December 4, 2022, he described the military content and a series produced by the Jerusalem Brigades’ Combat Information Unit. According to the document, the content had been produced under the leadership of the organization’s Military Council member and commander of the Northern Sector, Khalil al-Bahatini, and its objective was to glorify the work of the PIJ’s military wing. The document contained personal instructions to the network’s well-known journalist, Tamer al-Mashal, regarding an episode that Al Jazeera planned to dedicate to the military capabilities of the Hamas military wing as part of the program “More Than Meets The Eye,” the instructions included a demand to coordinate precise versions and details with Hamas’ military information unit before broadcasting the program, and to avoid exaggerating the rocket capabilities of the PIJ’s military wing in the coverage of its activities during Operation Breaking Dawn, especially in light of the failed rocket fire that hit civilians.

2. The military information unit should contact the journalist Tamer al-Mashal to inform him that there will be restrictions on his program with the Jerusalem Battalions in the following way:

A. Emphasizing the unity of the resistance in the Gaza Strip

B. Emphasizing accuracy and relevance in the Jerusalem Brigades’ versions. The military information command should be contacted before the program is broadcast to check for accuracy.

C. The Jerusalem Brigades’ rocket capabilities should not be exaggerated, especially because in the August round [of confrontation], the rockets fell on civilians. Likewise, it should not be confirmed that the Jerusalem Brigades were the ones who carried out the first strike on Tel Aviv.

3. When publishing propaganda materials for the Jerusalem Brigades, a media directive should be issued to Hamas social media activists to avoid critical discourse about the functioning and capabilities of the Jerusalem Brigades in a way is critical of the strengthening of the resistance’s capabilities, but rather work should be done to channel that to creating a supportive atmosphere for the movement to develop “resistance” activity in Gaza.

1. Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.

2. Anti-Israel terrorism and violence.

3. See the ITIC report, Hamas terrorist Ayman Nofal explains the workings of the Palestinian organizations' joint operations room in the Gaza Strip

4. Terrorist operatives.

5. See the January 2019 ITIC report, Palestinian Violence and Terrorism Against Israel, 2018: Data, Nature and Trends; the January 2020 report, Palestinian Terrorism, 2019: Overview and Trends; the February 2021 report, Trends in Anti-Israeli Palestinian Terrorism, 2020; the January 2022 report, Palestinian Terrorism, 2021: Summary, Types and Trends; the August 2022 report, Escalation in the Gaza Strip – Summary of Operation Breaking Dawn (August 5-7, 2022); the January 2023 report, Palestinian Terrorism Against Israel, 2022: Methods, Trends and Description; and the May 2023 report, Palestinians Killed during Operation Shield and Arrow in the Gaza Strip – Findings and Analysis.

6. See the June 2023 ITIC report, Hamas terrorist Ayman Nofal explains the workings of the Palestinian organizations’ joint operations room in the Gaza Strip

7. Eliminated on January 2, 2024.

8. Eliminated on September 27, 2024

9. Eliminated on June 21, 2025. See the January 2025 ITIC report, Activities of Saeed Izadi, Head of the Qods Forces’ “Palestine Branch,” Reflected in Captured Documents.

10. In the upper right-hand corner there is a hand-written note from Marwan Issa (Abu al-Baraa) head of the military wing, to Yahya al-Sinwar. ↑

11. The destruction of Israel.

12. See the September 2019 ITIC report, Palestinian reactions to the escape of six terrorists from Israel’s maximum security Gilboa prison.

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