Hamas activity to restore its civilian governance In the Gaza Strip after the ceasefire

Dr. Igal Shiri and Elad Drori

Overview^[1]

• The ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip on October 10, 2025, allowed Hamas to demonstrate governance and all facets of a return to normal life, despite the massive destruction and dismantling of the civilian infrastructure in the Strip caused by the war which began on October 7, 2023.
• Hamas deployed police and security forces in areas evacuated by the IDF to restore public order, along with a campaign against “collaborators” and those involved in criminal activity and price gouging. Hamas government mechanisms and local authorities began working to repair the damage in fields including health, education, welfare and transportation.
• In ITIC assessment, despite the severe blow to Hamas’ civilian leadership and the destruction of civilian infrastructure in the Gaza Strip throughout the war, Hamas managed to quickly regain almost full control over the areas it held, activating government mechanisms and attempting to provide basic services, while also using force against the Gazans as a means of deterrence. Hamas understood that overt control of the Strip would deter the international community from transferring the funds required for reconstruction, delay the rebuilding of the Strip and could spark civilian unrest, and therefore signaled its willingness to transfer the civilian administration to a Palestinian technocratic government, while refusing to disarm. Nevertheless, Hamas’ absolute control over government institutions and the provision of services, including at the local level, will leave it with significant influence, even if an alternative body is established to manage the Strip in accordance with the second stage of the American plan.

Restoring Governance in the Gaza Strip on “The Day After”

• According to the 20-point American plan for the future of the Gaza Strip, a temporary transitional government, based on a non-political Palestinian technocratic committee, would manage the day-to-day affairs in the Strip, with Hamas excluded from governance and required to disarm (White House, October 9, 2025). However, in the first stage of the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, which went into effect on October 10, 2025, no mention was made of who would control the Gaza Strip, which was reserved for the second phase, which has yet to be negotiated. Hamas therefore moved quickly to exploit the vacuum and consolidate its civilian and security control.
• With the ceasefire, IDF forces withdrew from broad areas parts of the Gaza Strip, including Gaza City, the refugee camps of Jabalia, al-Nuseirat, al-Bureij, Beit Lahia, Deir al-Balah, and al-Mawasi in Khan Yunis, and redeployed along the “yellow line” inside the Strip (IDF spokesperson, October 10, 2025). Hamas hastened to reassert its security control by activating its security forces against local clans accused of collaborating with Israel or identified as power centers which might threaten the movement’s position. The security forces carried out raids and arrests, confiscated property and conducted public executions of “collaborators” in public in broad daylight.^[2]
• Hamas also operated rapidly to restore its civilian governance through its ministries and local authorities in areas remaining under its control. The Hamas government media information office claimed that within 24 hours of the ceasefire announcement, government ministries, agencies and teams had carried out more than 5,000 field operations, provided services and undertaken humanitarian tasks, including in the fields of health, rescue and relief, humanitarian aid and welfare services. Hamas claimed that although more than 8,000 government employees were killed during the war, the teams “continue to work with iron will and a high sense of responsibility toward our honorable people” (Telegram channel of Hamas government media information office, October 11, 2025).
• Hamas sought to justify the measures taken to enforce its governance despite the demands of the American plan. Hamas political bureau member Muhammad Nazzal claimed the movement’s presence on the ground was “essential” to protect aid convoys from “thieves and armed gangs.” He said they would remain on the ground during the interim period, which would be led by a “technocratic administration” (Reuters, October 17, 2025). Musa Abu Marzouq, deputy head of Hamas’ “foreign affairs office,” warned that excluding Hamas from governing the Gaza Strip “could lead to chaos and a security vacuum” (Al Jazeera, October 26, 2025). Meanwhile, “sources close to Hamas” claimed its actions were limited to providing urgent assistance and proposing suitable alternatives for the planned management committee, as well as maintaining security during the interim period (al-Akhbar, October 23, 2025).

Activities of Government Ministries and Agencies

Ministry of the Interior and National Security, Security and Police Forces

• The Hamas ministry of the interior and national security confirmed that its forces had been deployed in all areas from which “the occupation army” had withdrawn, stating that they would “work diligently to restore order and address the chaos…[of] the past two years.” It also called on citizens “to avoid any behavior that might endanger their lives” and to cooperate with the security forces (Hamas ministry of the interior Telegram channel, October 10, 2025).
• Subsequently, the ministry announced that between October 13 and 19 it was opening a “repentance window” and a[n alleged] general amnesty for people who had joined criminal gangs operating during the war, whose hands were not stained with blood and who had not participated in crimes against their own people, including killing. Those not involved in committing murder were urged to turn themselves in to the security forces to settle their legal and security status and permanently close their files (Telegram channel of the ministry of interior and national security in the Gaza Strip, October 12, 2025).
• On October 18, 2025, Hamas began assigning security roles to officers and appointing new district governors after some had been killed during the war. New commanders were also appointed to the police directorate and various security bodies. “Sources” reported that small temporary headquarters for police forces had been established to arrest thieves and resolve family disputes and various criminal issues (al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 18, 2025).
• Beyond the use of force against those accused of “collaboration” with Israel, the security forces also punished Gazans accused of criminal acts and traders accused of price gouging:
  • According to reports, in the al-Nuseirat refugee camp on October 18, 2025, an armed Hamas force killed Hisham Muhammad al-Saftawi, a Fatah operative who had been among the founders of the organization calling itself the Fatah Hawks during the first intifada and had served five years in an Israeli prison, later becoming an officer in the Palestinian Authority’s security services. The al-Saftawi clan demanded a public trial and punishment for all those involved in his death (Ouda TV Telegram channel, October 18, 2025; Amad, October 22, 2025). “Security sources” claimed Hisham al-Saftawi was wanted by police and security forces for several crimes before and during the war, including the robbery of the Islamic Bank at the al-Nuseirat junction, and he was killed while attempting to flee as security forces raided his home (Amsak ‘Ameel Telegram channel, October 18, 2025).
  • Media affiliated with the Hamas security forces published videos of Gazans publicly beaten after being accused of theft and fraud. On a channel which reports cases of looting and criminal offenses, a video of the breaking of a suspect’s legs was captioned, “A powerful scene, [a message] to anyone who dares to harm our security” (Amsak ‘Ameel Telegram channel, October 18, 2025).

• • The Khan Yunis police took responsibility for mistakenly shooting and killing a civilian during a law-enforcement mission in the al-Mawasi area of Khan Yunis (Telegram channel of journalist Yasser Adwan, October 19, 2025).
  • The Raad Force of “resistance^[3] security” announced that its personnel had conducted a “quality security operation” to deal with an armed gang that operated during the war and exploited the emergency situation to rob and loot. Fifteen members of the gang were arrested, and their weapons and equipment were seized in raids at various locations. The Raad Force said that “the hand of justice will reach anyone who dares exploit the post-war situation or undermine civilian security,” adding that it would continue apprehending “anyone who threatens the security of the homeland and society,” and would remain “the vigilant eye over the safety of civilians and the stability of society” (Shehab Agency, October 28, 2025).
  • The general investigations department of the Rafah Central District announced that a 35-year-old man had been arrested after firing into the air during a family wedding. During interrogation, he admitted shooting an Uzi weapon into the air. The statement said the weapon was confiscated and a criminal case was opened and transferred for further “legal proceedings” (Amsak ‘Ameel Telegram channel, October 29, 2025).
  • The ministry of the interior launched a campaign against black-market cooking gas dealers to “eradicate their greed and ensure the availability of gas to the public at the official price.” It was stated that all illegal sales points would be shut down, traders selling gas on the black market or at inflated prices would be arrested and prosecuted, and close monitoring of licensed cooking gas stations and outgoing quantities would be conducted to prevent diversion to the black market (al-Siyad Telegram channel, November 1, 2025).
  • The ministry of the interior ordered the closure of all shawarma [doner kebab] shops in the northern and southern parts of the Strip to ease rising meat prices. The ministry warned that anyone violating the regulations would “pay the price in accordance with the law” (al-Siyad channel, November 1, 2025).
• Hamas security and police forces claimed they were also securing the movement of humanitarian aid trucks inside the Strip. Khan Yunis police reported deploying forces from the Fresh Junction in the south to the al-Qarara port in the north, on both sides of the road, to “organize truck movement, prevent traffic congestion, and ensure the presence of security forces on the ground to prevent attacks on the convoys.” The Khan Yunis police department also warned against disrupting the passage of trucks and said anyone attempting to do so would face “the harshest penalties” (Khan Yunis Police Telegram channel, October 30, 2025). The Civil-Military Coordination Center, the headquarters of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) in Kiryat Gat, released videos of suspected Hamas operatives looting an aid truck on its way to northern Khan Yunis (CENTCOM X account, November 1, 2025).

    
Right: Police forces escort an aid convoy in Khan Yunis (Khan Yunis Police Telegram channel, October 30, 2025). Left: Hamas operatives loot an aid truck (CENTCOM X account, November 1, 2025)

• To hinder Israeli security forces’ operations in the Gaza Strip during the ceasefire, Hamas security forces continued campaigns urging residents to maintain information security. The al-Harres (“guard”) Telegram channel of “resistance security” regularly issues messages warning against assisting “enemy propaganda,” including references to Israeli statements about the elimination of “resistance” leaders or “false achievements.” Gazans were urged to rely solely on official “resistance” announcements and to focus on “exposing the crimes of the IDF against civilians.” “Resistance security” also instructed “resistance” operatives to take precautionary measures, such as avoiding movement along fixed routes and restricting the use of electronic communication devices to “essential” matters (al-Harres Telegram channel, October 29–30, 2025).
• Mahmoud Bassal, spokesperson for civil defense in the Gaza Strip, reported that according to international organizations, the amount of unexploded ordnance in the Strip was estimated at 71,000 tons. He said there were unexploded missiles, ammunition and bombs, and their destruction required specialized engineering units, which did not exist in the Strip (Facebook page of al-Arabi TV, October 24, 2025). “Resistance security” and Hamas government security forces launched an operation to collect weapons, ammunition, explosives, rockets, and other equipment lost during the war. A public call was issued for anyone in possession of ammunition or other military equipment to hand it over to security points or “resistance” operatives “to maintain security and prevent vandalism” (al-Harres, October 18, 2025). A “resistance security officer” claimed they had lists of people holding weapons belonging to the “resistance” and called on anyone possessing such weapons who had not reported them to hand them in immediately. He added that anyone proven to have held weapons without reporting them would bear full responsibility according to “legal procedures” [sic] (al-Harres Telegram channel, October 18, 2025). Although Hamas claimed they were collecting unexploded ordnance for “the Gazans’ safety,” in all probability the move is a Hamas effort to rebuild its military wing despite the demand to disarm.^[4]

• Following the withdrawal of IDF forces from areas in the Strip, Hamas’ civil defense operatives began searching for missing persons under the rubble. Its spokesperson, Mahmoud Bassal, claimed that about 10,000 victims were trapped under the ruins and in the two weeks since the ceasefire took effect, 500 bodies had been recovered. He complained that they were unable to reach thousands more bodies due to the “occupation’s” refusal to allow the entry of heavy machinery (al-Aqsa TV, November 1, 2025). Hamas-affiliated media praised the civil defense forces, stating that they “do not rest for a moment, continuing their efforts day and night…to reach those beneath the ruins, assist families, and prevent danger to their lives” (al-Aqsa TV, October 2, 2025).

     
Right: Civil defense teams in Beit Lahia (Palestinian Media Center, October 26, 2025). Left: Support for the civil defense teams: “With minimal resources, civil defense teams break barriers for families” (al-Aqsa TV, November 2, 2025)

• The civil defense forces called on the international community [sic] to immediately begin reconstruction, allow the entry of heavy machinery for clearing roads and retrieving bodies, and open safe humanitarian corridors. It claimed that preventing the entry of engineering equipment aggravated the disaster and delayed the work of the forces, while thousands of families continued to suffer under harsh conditions. The civil defense forces also requested urgent logistical support and funding for the reconstruction of basic infrastructure, as well as “legal and humanitarian protection” for its teams, claiming willingness to cooperate with any international body to save lives and restore normality (Media Center Gaza, October 24, 2025).
• The civil defense forces also urged Gazans not to live in buildings damaged by IDF attacks, as some were unstable and could collapse. The warning followed the collapse of a house on al-Sana’a Street in Tel al-Hawa, a neighborhood in the southern part of Gaza City. It added that the risk would be increased by rain, soil erosion, and cracks in columns and walls. The forces advised the public to remain in shelters or tents, reinforce their tents, add plastic sheeting to prevent leaks during rain, and dig drainage ditches. Gazans were also told not to light fires inside closed tents and to keep fire sources at a distance (civil defense directorate Telegram channel, October 24, 2025).

The Ministry of Health

• When the ceasefire went into effect, Munir al-Bursh, director of the ministry of health in Gaza, claimed that the public health sector had been destroyed by the war. He said the ministry had a plan for reopening the hospitals, prepared with the World Health Organization, that included fuel, electricity, water, and medical supplies for 38 hospitals destroyed in the Strip, opening humanitarian corridors for direct supply, and sending medical delegations from abroad, including surgeons, pediatricians, psychiatrists and psychotherapists. He added that the ministry demanded support for field hospitals to ease the pressure caused by 17,000 residents who required urgent medical care. He also called for the repair of water and sewage networks to prevent epidemics and said there was a need for prosthetics, wheelchairs and other devices (Shehab Agency, October 11, 2025).
  • In recent days, many hospitals and health institutions in the Strip resumed operations:
  • The ministry of health in Gaza announced the reopening of registration for surgeries scheduled before the war or for people who needed surgery during it. It said the ministry could reschedule operations within its facilities or externally (ministry of health in Gaza Telegram channel, October 28, 2025).
  • Fadl Na’im, director of the al-Ahli Hospital in Gaza City, reported that medical teams were stabilizing and reorganizing services after two years of war. However, he added that despite the ceasefire, every new strike returned the situation to zero and forced hospitals back into extreme emergency conditions (Shehab Agency, October 29, 2025).
  • The al-Awda Hospital in the al-Nuseirat refugee camp announced that as of November 1, 2025, all medical services for women aged 15 to 49, including examinations, blood tests, medication, X-rays and ultrasounds, would be provided free of charge. The hospital would also continue to offer surgeries in all fields and free childbirth services to all Gazans. In addition, during November every newborn and every child hospitalized in the maternity ward would receive two packs of diapers and an additional gift package (Aid News–Gaza Telegram channel, October 29, 2025).
  • The al-Quds Clinic, operating under the Palestinian Red Crescent’s primary healthcare services, announced the renewal of vaccinations in its child health department at its previous location on the first floor of the al-Quds Hospital in Tel al-Hawa. Vaccinations would be given to newborns up to one week old, infants from one week to 18 months, and students in grades 1 to 9 (Tel al-Hawa neighborhood Facebook page, November 2, 2025).
• Nevertheless, Hamas’ public health system still reports severe shortages of equipment and supplies. Ahmed Na’im, director of the Hamad Hospital in Gaza City, said the hospital was struggling to operate after “occupation forces” had [allegedly] destroyed its two main generators, disabling medical equipment (Sunud News Telegram channel, October 18, 2025).
• Hamas also claimed that Israel’s closure of border crossings severely harmed patients. The Hamas government media information office director stated that about 500,000 surgeries could not be performed in Gaza, while 22,000 wounded and 10,000 cancer patients required treatment abroad, which was impossible as long as the crossings remained closed (Akhbar Gaza ala madar al-sa‘a Telegram channel, October 19, 2025).
• Muhammad Abu Salmiya, director of the al-Shifa Medical Center, said hundreds of patients would leave for treatment abroad once crossings reopened. He said Gaza City had about 2,000 amputees and around 5,000 cancer patients needing treatment outside the Strip. He added that deaths had occurred among kidney and chronic disease patients due to the [alleged] prevention of the entry of medical equipment, more than 3,000 people had lost their sight, and more than 1,000 had lost their hearing and required surgical intervention (Telegram channel of journalist Yasser Adwan, October 19, 2025).
• Meanwhile, despite the entry of humanitarian aid, Hamas continued to promote the “hunger narrative.” Dr. Ahmed al-Farra of the Nasser Medical Center claimed that despite the ceasefire, there was still child malnutrition in Gaza, with about 50,000 children affected. He claimed there was an acute shortage of medicine, equipment and formulas, and called for the full reopening of crossings and entry of advanced equipment and targeted treatments. He claimed that many children were already in stage three malnutrition, with long-term effects on cognition, development, and resilience, some of which could still be reversed with early treatment (Al Jazeera Mubasher, October 25, 2025).

The Ministry of Economy and Financial Activity

• After Gazans complained that traders were exploiting the situation to raise prices, the ministry of economy and its department of supply investigations instituted patrols to carry out inspections, identify offenders and bring them to trial. Traders were instructed to adhere to official price lists and cooperate with inspectors, and the ministry warned that violators would be punished (Palestinian Home Front Telegram channel, October 23, 2025). However, complaints about price gouging in markets and restaurants continued. The Amsak ‘Ameel Telegram channel, affiliated with the Hamas security services, also called on Hamas’ ministry of economy and government agencies to tighten supervision and take action against those raising prices without justification, saying that “it is unacceptable for Gazans to remain prey to greed and exploitation” (Amsak ‘Ameel Facebook page, October 29, 2025).
• After many months of bank closures across the Strip, the Palestinian monetary authority, part of the Palestinian Authority, announced a gradual return to activity with a limited number of branches opening first according to readiness, followed by others. The public was urged to continue using electronic payment methods (cards, wallets and apps) to facilitate transactions and reduce congestion. It also claimed that most bank branches had been destroyed or looted during the fighting, and the financial system had nearly collapsed; according to data from January 2025, only 3 of 97 ATMs were operational (alresala.net, October 19, 2025).
• The Bank of Palestine announced the reopening of its branches in Deir al-Balah and al-Nuseirat, and the al-Saraya branch in Gaza City (Hamza al-Masri Telegram channel, October 18 and 20, 2025). Nevertheless, Gazans reported a severe cash shortage which caused daily hardships. It was also reported that banking services remained limited and long lines formed outside branches (al-Arabi channel, October 20, 2025).

     
Right: Line outside a Bank of Palestine branch. Left: Inside the branch
(Raya News Agency Facebook page, October 20, 2025)

The Education System

• Since the beginning of the ceasefire, Hamas’ ministry of education and higher education (with the assistance of UNRWA, a major element in the education system in the Gaza Strip) has worked to return educational institutions in the Strip to normal functioning. UNRWA reported that over 8,000 teachers in Gaza were ready to help bring children back to school. The agency emphasized that as the largest humanitarian organization operating in the Strip, it had to be allowed to carry out its missions without hindrance, and given the long disconnection of Gaza’s children from schooling, it called for their return to classrooms as soon as possible (Gaza Mubasher Telegram channel, October 18, 2025). UNRWA added that it was providing in-person classes for over 25,000 children in the Strip and remote lessons for an additional 300,000 (UNRWA X account, November 2, 2025).
• According to an Al Jazeera report from Khan Yunis, students who had returned to school despite the destruction and lack of basic supplies were shown sitting on mats during class. A teacher named Omar al-Sabi said educational continuity was crucial, especially for mental well-being, and said about 90% of schools had been partially or completely damaged. A 9^th student named Yaman said she wanted to return to school and hoped to become a broadcaster or professor. A student named Rada said they were now at school without fear of bombings (Al Jazeera Mubasher, October 22, 2025).

.     
Right: Children at school in Khan Yunis sit on sand (Hamza al-Masri Telegram channel, October 23, 2025). Left: Studies resume at the al-Kamalia School in the al-Zeitoun neighborhood of Gaza City (Filastin al-‘An, November 2, 2025)

• Academic studies also gradually resumed. On October 25, 2025, classes opened at al-Azhar University (Ouda TV Telegram channel, October 25, 2025) and the Islamic University of Gaza, one of Hamas’ strongholds in the Strip,^[5] was undergoing renovations in preparation for reopening the new academic year with frontal lessons.

     
Right: Reopening al-Azhar University (Ouda Telegram channel, October 25, 2025). Left: Renovation work at the Islamic University (Facebook page of the faculty of medicine, Islamic University, October 31, 2025)

• The ministry of education and higher education announced that a temporary office would be opened to provide educational and administrative services in the al-Daraj neighborhood in eastern Gaza City. The ministry also reported that technical support teams in eastern Gaza and central districts continued to assist students and the public (Telegram channel of the ministry of education and higher education in the Gaza Strip, October 27–28, 2025).

The Ministry of Agriculture

• According to “Hamas sources,” agriculture in the Gaza Strip was almost completely destroyed, with only about 4,000 dunams (about 1,000 acres) of vegetables cultivated out of approximately 93,000, and that 94% of agricultural land was “ruined.” Current production was estimated at about 28,000 tons compared to roughly 405,000 tons previously. Losses in the agricultural sector were estimated at around $2.8 billion, and about 560 tons of food were entering the Strip daily, which was less than required (al-Quds, October 18, 2025). It was also claimed that 95% of fishing boats in the Strip had been destroyed and more than 200 fishermen had been killed, reducing the amount of fish caught to about 2% of prewar levels (Filastin al-‘An, October 19, 2025).

The Ministry of Transportation

• Hamas’ ministry of transportation announced a fixed taxi fare in Khan Yunis, and all rides within the district would cost three shekels (about 90 cents), a ride to Gaza Port would cost five shekels (about $1.50), and a ride to central Deir al-Balah would cost eight shekels (about $2.50). Passengers were asked to report any driver who charged more, photograph the vehicle number, and send it to the ministry or report it to police in the city center so that appropriate measures could be taken (Hai Tal al-Sultan Rafah Telegram channel, October 20, 2025).

The Electric Company

• Muhammad Thabet, the public relations officer of the Gaza Strip electricity company, said the electricity sector had lost about $728 million during the war. He said over 80% of Gaza’s electricity networks had been destroyed, as well as more than 80% of the company’s vehicles, 90% of its maintenance warehouses, and 70% of its facilities. He said the data covered only the electricity supply sector, excluding the heavy losses of the transmission and transformation sectors, and emphasized that they were preliminary estimates since company teams could not reach “red zones” to assess damage. He added that sixty company employees had been killed and more than a hundred wounded in the war.
• He reported that the company had formulated a three-stage recovery plan. The first would take two months and would include repairing the essential networks which provide power to shelters, hospitals, and water and sewage stations; the second, which would take six months, would focus on renovating the supply network in major cities and refugee camps to ensure relatively stable power to residential neighborhoods and public facilities; and the third, which would take three years, would restore the entire power system, from maintenance centers and warehouses to the technical infrastructure and operational offices completely destroyed in the war.
• Thabet added that the company urgently needed fifty mobile generators with a capacity of 500 kVA to supply electricity to shelters, 2,000 iron poles, 5,000 wooden poles, and 500 kilometers of low-voltage networks. It also required 400 kilometers of medium-voltage networks with accessories, three cranes, two excavators, ten engineering vehicles, and two lifting cranes for solid components and cable installation. He said some of these resources were already available in the company’s warehouses and in the energy authority in Judea and Samaria, but urgent assistance was needed to transfer them into the Strip to start reconstruction (Safa, October 18, 2025; al-Araby al-Jadeed, October 23, 2025).

The Water Authority

• The head of the Gaza Water Authority reported that the engineering facilities had almost completely collapsed and the entry of equipment and spare parts was ugently required for restoration. He claimed the generators could operate for only about six hours, after which there was a risk of a complete water supply shutdown. He added that the authority had appealed to the UN humanitarian envoy to allow the entry of equipment needed to operate water facilities, noting severe contamination from mixing between water and sewage channels, which increased the risk of disease outbreaks. He also warned that with the coming winter, neighborhoods in Gaza could face serious flooding if the drainage issue were not resolved, as eight pumping stations in Gaza City had been completely or partially disabled due to military maneuvers and sewage leakage into the aquifer (al-Arabi Telegram channel, October 18, 2025).
• Sa’ad Ali, director of the project management unit at the Gaza water authority, reported that the authority had restored the operation of 12 water wells, seven of them in Gaza City, and was organizing the supply of three desalination plants for northern Gaza. He added that they were distributing drinking water by tankers and repairing desalination and pumping stations, and the main obstacle to restoring the water network was the closure of crossings preventing the entry of essential equipment (Khan Yunis News and Updates Telegram channel, October 30, 2025).

The Judicial System

• The Sharia Court in Gaza City, which had been operating from a clinic in the al-Sheikh Radwan neighborhood, resumed work from the headquarters of the Sharia courts in Gaza City (al-Bureij Tajmana Telegram channel, October 20, 2025). According to reports, the Sharia Court in the Central District announced the renewal of activity in its original building in the al-Nuseirat refugee camp. The service was designated for residents of al-Nuseirat, al-Bureij, al-Maghazi, al-Zahra and displaced persons (al-Maghazi al-‘An Telegram channel, October 22, 2025).

The Ministry of Religious Endowments

• The ministry of endowments reported that hundreds of thousands of people in the Gaza Strip performed Friday prayers in a limited number of mosques, mainly in the northern and southern parts of the Strip. Most prayers took place in tents erected in place of destroyed mosques and in public squares. According to the ministry, at least 960 mosques were completely or partially destroyed during the war, while more than 200 others sustained various degrees of damage (al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 18, 2025).

     
Friday prayers in destroyed mosques in Khan Yunis
(Facebook page of al-Arabiya Palestine, October 17, 2025)

The Activity of Local Authorities in the Gaza Strip

The Northern Gaza Strip

• Jabalia: When the ceasefire went into effect, hundreds of displaced persons returned to Jabalia, living among the ruins, while others remained in the streets without shelter. Ra’ed Maqat, head of the health and environmental quality department of the Jabalia Municipality, said that about 80% of the city’s infrastructure had been destroyed. He stated that the municipality was currently operating in the early recovery phase despite a lack of resources and necessary equipment, and municipal teams were making great efforts to rehabilitate several wells to supply water. He stressed that the sewage network was in “catastrophic condition” after all pumps stopped working. In addition, all municipal vehicles and heavy equipment, including the main garage, had been destroyed, leaving the municipality unable to open roads or collect waste. He noted the municipality urgently needed heavy equipment and generators to operate wells and open roads so Gazans could reach their homes (al-Araby al-Jadeed, October 24, 2025).
• The Jabalia al-Nazla Municipality reported that about 20,000 tons of waste had been removed to clear the city’s streets, with the assistance of the Arab International Organization for the Reconstruction of “Palestine” and the Qatari Committee in the Gaza Strip, which supplied five excavators and five heavy trucks to remove and transport debris. The municipality’s reported it was making efforts to accelerate the recovery of Jabalia from the effect of the war (Jabalia al-Nazla Municipality Facebook page, November 1, 2025).

• Beit Lahia: Beit Lahia municipal teams began repairing streets and schools (Hamza al-Masri Telegram channel, October 15, 2025). UN World Food Programme (WFP) teams operating heavy equipment were also working to clear and repair roads to reopen them for humanitarian aid deliveries and civilian movement (WFP Arabic X account, October 19, 2025).

     
Right: Beit Lahia municipal teams (Hamza al-Masri Telegram channel, October 15, 2025).
Left: WFP teams repairing roads (WFP Arabic X account, October 19, 2025)

Gaza City

• Gaza Mayor Yahya al-Sarraj said the IDF’s withdrawal from the city revealed immense destruction. Neighborhoods were filled with the ruins of houses, mosques, schools, and facilities, obstructing vehicle movement and access for displaced persons. The destruction was especially severe in the al-Sabra, Tel al-Hawa, al-Shuja’iyya and Sheikh Radwan neighborhoods. He said about 300,000 housing units had been damaged and there was an urgent need for 100,000 new units in the coming months, as well as road clearing, temporary housing, food and medical supplies, fuel and generators, and the restoration of water, sanitation and cleaning services. It was reported that since the start of the ceasefire, about 500,000 displaced persons had returned to northern Gaza, and the atmosphere was “a mix of tears and joy” (Al Jazeera Mubasher, October 11, 2025). Al-Sarraj added that the city’s sewage system had been severely damaged and large amounts of sewage had leaked across the city, warning of an environmental disaster due to contamination of groundwater (al-Arabi Telegram channel, October 18, 2025).
• Al-Sarraj said the municipality had begun work immediately after the ceasefire announcement, prioritizing the reopening of main roads and streets to facilitate the return of displaced persons from the south to the north and to allow residents access to their homes, health facilities and services. He stated that the task was the current top priority and had accelerated with the entry of Qatari aid through the Qatari Reconstruction Committee. He estimated that reopening all city roads would take one to two months (al-Arabi channel website, October 14, 2025).
• Gaza Municipality spokesperson Husni Mahana said about 85% of the city’s infrastructure had been directly or indirectly damaged. He said the municipality was currently using an emergency plan to manage the early recovery stage, focusing efforts on reopening main and secondary roads, repairing water and sewage lines, and removing debris from residential areas. He said the municipality had prepared an infrastructure restoration plan based on humanitarian and service priorities, in cooperation with international and donor organizations. However, he said the municipality faced significant obstacles caused by shortages of equipment and funding, adding that most of the municipality’s vehicles and equipment had been destroyed during the war, while others were out of service due to age and lack of spare parts. He stressed the need to allow the entry of heavy machinery, vehicles, and sufficient fuel to resume humanitarian work and public services. He added that municipal teams were working with available equipment to reactivate wells and pumps and repair water and sewage networks, but fuel and material shortages were delaying efforts. He said the municipality also faced major challenges in waste collection and disposal due to the destruction of dumpsites and roads and the blockage of access to the main dump in Juhar al-Dik to the east of the city. He added that the return of the displaced depended on housing availability, even temporary, and the municipality’s ability to restore basic services properly (al-Araby al-Jadeed, October 24, 2025).

     
Right: Clearing rubble in the Sheikh Radwan neighborhood market (Gaza Municipality Facebook page, October 16, 2025). Left: Map of roads reopened by municipal teams (marked in green) as of October 18, 2025 (Gaza Municipality Facebook page, October 20, 2025)

• The Gaza Municipality also reported that its teams were working to clear the accumulation of more than 260,000 tons of waste in streets and dumpsites in the city center, despite limited means (Gaza Municipality Facebook page, October 29, 2025).

Khan Yunis and Rafah

• “Palestinian sources” reported that Khan Yunis had turned to ash, resembling a maze of collapsed buildings, shattered streets, and skeletal concrete frames. The area was described as “nearly empty of people, cars, or sound, a silence amid fears that victims remained buried beneath the rubble” (Al Jazeera Mubasher, October 12, 2025).
• Khan Yunis Mayor Dr. Alaa al-Din al-Bitta said more than 85% of the city had been destroyed, leading to the near-total collapse of humanitarian services. He added that there were about 400,000 tons of debris in the city, with hundreds of thousands more within residential neighborhoods. He said the municipality had begun sending teams to clear roads but faced severe difficulties due to a lack of equipment and heavy vehicles. According to him, the IDF destroyed more than 206,000 meters of the city’s road network (82% of the total) and about 296,000 meters of the water network. Additionally, 36 wells were out of service, with only a few operating partially; three main water reservoirs had also been destroyed; about 130,000 meters of the sewage network (68%) were damaged; two major wastewater treatment stations near the European Hospital east of the city had been destroyed, and three others were partially damaged.
• He added that waste collection in the city had ceased, forcing the municipality to establish temporary waste sites in western Khan Yunis, within populated areas, where about 350,000 tons of waste accumulated near shelters and displaced people’s homes. In addition, 136 parks, gardens, and public squares had been destroyed, along with 66 municipal facilities and damage to 200,000 meters of street lighting networks, leading to their complete outage (Qatari News Agency, October 17, 2025). He said the municipality needed 500 new vehicles to remove the massive amounts of debris, claiming almost all the municipality’s machinery, equipment,and bulldozers had been destroyed, and the remaining vehicles were outdated and incapable of clearing debris or reopening roads (Filastin al-‘An Telegram channel, October 17, 2025).

     
Right: Khan Yunis municipal teams clearing debris to reopen roads (Alaa al-Bitta’s Facebook page, October 13, 2025). Left: Municipal teams repairing the sewage network (Khan Yunis Municipality Facebook page, October 20, 2025)

• Al-Qarara: On October 10, 2025, teams from the al-Qarara municipality began clearing debris and reopening main roads, and repairing sewage and water networks. They also began operating the municipality’s water desalination plant (al-Qarara Municipality Facebook page, October 16–27, 2025).
• Mayor Bassam Sharab said the town had become a disaster area, with the municipality completely paralyzed and unable to provide basic services. He said 95% of homes had been flattened, and all aspects of life, including public facilities, roads, water, electricity, communications, schools, mosques and municipal vehicles, had been destroyed. He added that residential neighborhoods had turned into piles of rubble, making it difficult for residents to locate their homes. The mayor urged residents to remain where they had taken refuge and not return, as the area lacked basic services and infrastructure and some parts were still classified as “red zones” under IDF control (al-Qarara Municipality Facebook page, October 14, 2025).
• Bani Suheila: Emergency teams from the Bani Suheila Municipality began clearing debris and reopening main roads on October 18, 2025, despite “a severe lack of equipment” (Bani Suheila Municipality Facebook page, October 18, 2025).

The Central Gaza Refugee Camps

• Since Israeli hostages were held in the central camps area, the IDF avoided a wide-scale maneuver, resulting in less destruction compared to other parts of the Strip, allowing life to return to normal more quickly. Markets were full of fruit, vegetables, milk and dairy products, and prices dropped sharply, with a kilogram of tomatoes, potatoes, onions or cucumbers selling for five shekels (about $1.50) (Filastin Telegram channel, October 24, 2025). However, many complaints reportedly reached the municipalities of al-Nuseirat, al-Bureij, al-Maghazi and Deir al-Balah demanding that stall owners in markets be forcibly removed due to price gouging (al-Siyad Telegram channel, October 20, 2025).
• The al-Nuseirat Refugee Camp Municipality reported extensive reconstruction efforts, including maintenance of water supply lines, among them the Israeli Mekorot company’s line; road repair works; cleaning the Wadi Gaza valley ahead of winter; and drilling a well to supply water to 8,000 residents. The municipality also destroyed one ton of spoiled garlic as part of a joint food safety program with Hamas’ ministry of health (al-Nuseirat Municipality Facebook page, October 20–November 1, 2025).

    
Right: Repairing the Mekorot water line in the al-Nuseirat refugee camp. Left: Cleaning the Wadi Gaza valley (al-Nuseirat Municipality Facebook page, October 22 and 26, 2025)

• Deir al-Balah municipal teams urged residents living in tents along the seashore to move away due to risk of flood, which could endanger their lives (Deir al-Balah Municipality Facebook page, October 29, 2025).

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] For further information, see the October 2025 ITIC report, Hamas Activity to Restore Security Governance in the Gaza Strip after the Ceasefire.
^[3] "Resistance:" Hamas and the other Palestinian terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip with the objective of destroying the State of Israel.
^[4] For further information, see the October 2025 ITIC report, The future of Hamas’ weapons and its efforts to rebuild the military wing.
^[5] For further information, see the September 2020 ITIC report, The Islamic University of Gaza, A Hamas Stronghold, Has Been Supported by the EU for Years.

Related Articles