Escalation of terrorist activity in Judea and Samaria Following the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip

Dr. Igal Shiri

Overview^[1]

• Hamas’ ambition was to turn Judea and Samaria into an arena for terrorism as part of the campaign to destroy Israel which began with the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. However, the counterterrorism actions taken by the Israeli security forces, which included the detention and elimination of thousands of wanted persons and terrorist operatives and the seizure of weapons prevented a wave of terrorism from Judea and Samaria.
• Following the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) began efforts to shift the center of the “resistance” to Judea and Samaria, encouraging attacks on Israeli security forces and settlers.
• Iran also continues its central role in efforts to turn Judea and Samaria into an active terrorist arena against Israel. A shipment of weapons from Iran was intercepted, which included powerful explosive charges and explosive-carrying drones; Qods Force operatives in Lebanon who were involved in the smuggling routes of weapons were eliminated.
• In ITIC assessment, after the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, with Iranian assistance, will direct a significant portion of their activity to Judea and Samaria to justify their existence by continuing the “resistance.” The terrorist organizations will also try to exploit the return of the Palestinian issue to the global stage and the regional and international involvement in the Gaza Strip within the framework of the ceasefire to create pressure on Israel, provoking attacks which could escalate Israel’s response in Judea and Samaria. Moreover, the return of hundreds of terrorist operatives from Israeli jails to Judea and Samaria will intensify the activity of the terrorist organizations, which will exploit the knowledge and experience of the released prisoners and the cooperative networks they built in prison.

Counterterrorism Activities in Judea and Samaria after the October 7, 2023 Attack and Massacre

• While planning of the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre, the late Yahya al-Sinwar, head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, viewed Judea and Samaria as a central arena in the “decisive” campaign against Israel, as revealed in Hamas documents brought back from the Gaza Strip by IDF forces during the war in the Gaza Strip:
  • In a letter Sinwar sent to the late Isma’il Haniyeh, head of the Hamas political bureau, on June 19, 2022, he presented three possible scenarios for the “unification of the arenas” initiated by the attack, each of which included “exploding the situation in the West Bank,” that is, igniting Judea and Samaria as a terrorist front.^[2]
  • In the instructions for beginning the campaign to invade and destroy Israel, which Sinwar handwrote on August 24, 2022, he said he was confident the invasion of Israeli territory would trigger a chain reaction that would include fighting from Judea and Samaria. He ordered the massacres to be documented to provoke “a fit of intoxication, madness and momentum among our people, especially among the residents of the West Bank, those ‘inside’ [Palestinians, that is, Arab citizens of Israel], Jerusalem and the entire Islamic nation, to spur them on to respond to calls to go out and revolt and sow fear and horror in the enemy.”^[3]
• To prevent the outbreak of terrorism in Judea and Samaria Hamas had hoped for, immediately after the start of the war on October 7, 2023, Israeli security forces launched extensive counterterrorism activities in Judea and Samaria, which included daily detentions of wanted persons and the elimination of terrorist cells and operatives, some of whom were about to carry out attacks, broad targeted raids to locate weapons, destroy explosive devices and bomb-making workshops and locate incitement and propaganda materials and funds for financing terrorism, including closing currency exchange offices. UAVs were also used for targeted eliminations, roads were exposed to reveal explosive charges, and cities, refugee camps and hospitals were surrounded.^[4]
• Several counterterrorism activities were conducted, focusing on northern Samaria, including operation Summer Camps in and around Jenin, operation Sun City in the Nur Shams refugee camp near Tulkarm and operation Moving Up in the al-Far’a refugee camp in the Tubas area which began at the end of August 2024, and operation Iron Wall which began on January 21, 2025, during which hundreds of terrorist operatives were eliminated, including senior figures in the organizations, giving the security forces operational control over the refugee camps (IDF spokesperson, May 7, 2025).^[5] According to the Palestinians, more than 600 houses have been destroyed in the Jenin refugee camp since the start of the operation in January 2025 and about 22,000 residents uprooted, in addition to the destruction of more than 600 houses in the Tulkarm and Nur Shams refugee camps and the uprooting of 5,000 families (Wafa, September 1, 2025; Hebron Mix Facebook page, October 30, 2025).^[6]

• The IDF counterterrorism activities were successful, indicated by data showing a significant decline in terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria. In 2024, 113 terrorism-related events were recorded, 90 of them carried out by Palestinian attackers from Judea and Samaria. In contrast, during the first nine months of 2025, there were 31 terrorism-related events, 22 of them carried out by Palestinian terrorists from Judea and Samaria:^[7]
  • Attempts to manufacture and launch rockets: On September 16, 2025, an improvised rocket was discovered in the village of Na’ima in the Ramallah area. It had neither a warhead nor standard explosive material (IDF spokesperson, September 16, 2025). Three days later, Israeli security forces in the Ramallah area detained three terrorist operatives suspected of attempting to launch the rocket. Dozens of rockets were found in the building where the three were detained, including two rockets intended for launch without a warhead, dozens of explosive devices and explosive materials, as well as a lathe for manufacturing rockets (IDF spokesperson, September 19, 2025). Israeli security forces located 15 rockets in various stages of production in the village of Bitunia, and explosive devices, weapons, explosives and other weapons prepared and collected by members of the cell were seized (IDF spokesperson, October 1, 2025). Another rocket was also found in Tulkarm, although it probably belonged to a different terrorist cell (IDF spokesperson, September 23, 2025).
  • According to an op-ed in the Hamas-affiliated Shehab news agency, the rocket fired from the village of Na’ima was “one of a growing number of attempts to expand the rules of engagement [sic] from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank,” and reflected a desire by local elements “to impose new intelligence and security equations on the occupation” (Shehab news agency, September 19, 2025).
  • Local manufacture of weapons: Finding the lathe for producing rockets showed that terrorist operatives in Judea and Samaria were relying on the local manufacture of explosive devices. Six lathes for the manufacture of weapons were also found and seized in Hebron (IDF spokesperson, October 31, 2025).

     
Lathes for producing weapons in Hebron (IDF spokesperson, October 31, 2025)

Terrorist Activity and Incitement in Judea and Samaria after the Ceasefire in the Gaza Strip

• On October 10, 2025, the ceasefire went into effect in the Gaza Strip. Hamas immediately claimed that Judea and Samaria would continue to be a leading “resistance” arena because of “Israeli policy and settler attacks on Palestinians:”
  • Zaher Jabarin, a member of the Hamas political bureau and head of Hamas in Judea and Samaria, gave a speech in which he said Judea and Samaria were an integral part of the overall “campaign,” and claimed that continued Israeli policy would lead to escalation rather than calm. He claimed that “what the West Bank is subjected to in terms of annexation, settlement expansion and attempts to Judaize Jerusalem” would ignite a “powder keg” in the area (Hamas’ Telegram channel, October 16, 2025).
  • Hamas said that the growing number of attacks by “the occupation and settlers in the West Bank will not break the will of the people and their steadfastness in their land,” and would only “add fuel that will ignite rage and expand its scope in the West Bank.” Hamas called on Palestinians in Judea and Samaria to “use force in confronting” attacks by settlers (Hamas’ Telegram channel, October 18, 2025).
  • Khalil al-Hayya, head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, claimed that “the West Bank is under the dominance of settlement, annexation and erosion” and the Palestinians were paying a heavy price. Therefore, he asked “how can the occupation be confronted other than with ‘resistance’?” (Al Jazeera, October 26, 2025).
• The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) also intensified its psychological warfare and propaganda to escalate terrorist activity from Judea and Samaria. It issued a notice claiming that the organization’s military wing, which until then had focused on northern Samaria, had begun to expand southward with the establishment of the Ramallah Brigade, and claimed “it is only the beginning.” Other notices included, “In Nablus, the lions did not leave their den;” the Tubas battalion issued one reading “Ready!” in Hebrew and Arabic, with a picture of a terrorist operative aiming a weapon; another claimed that “The West Bank will continue to burn and our rifles will not move from the enemy’s chest” (Telegram channel of the Jerusalem Brigades in Judea and Samaria, October 15-November 2, 2025).

• Subsequently, a “territorial commander” in the PIJ’s military wing also claimed responsibility for an operation in which the unit’s intelligence allegedly “extracted a great deal of valuable information” from three downed IDF UAVs, including information on command and control positions, assembly sites and “information that cannot be exposed at this stage.” The “commander” claimed the Jerusalem Brigades exploited the information to carry out attacks (Quds agency, October 29, 2025).

• October 2025 data from the Palestinian media center Me’ata, which monitors the “struggle against the occupation”^[8] in Judea and Samaria, noted an attempt to escalate “resistance” actions against Israel, at least at the popular level, following the enthusiasm for the release of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli prisons as part of the ceasefire agreement and the release of live hostages. According to the center, 356 “popular resistance actions” were documented in Judea and Samaria and east Jerusalem, including 24 “qualitative actions”: 16 incidents of planting and detonating explosive devices, mainly in the Jenin and Tubas areas, six shootings and exchanges of fire, one attempted vehicle ramming attack and damage to a military vehicle, 332 popular confrontations that included rock-throwing, demonstrations, and attacks with Molotov cocktails and fireworks. One hundred and one incidents occurred in Nablus and 73 in Ramallah. In comparison, during September 2025, 302 events were documented (36 “qualitative actions” and 266 “popular uprising actions”), while in August 2025, 263 events were documented (18 ” qualitative actions” and 245 “popular uprising actions”) (Me’ata Telegram channel, November 4, 2025).

• On October 18, 2025, two IDF soldiers were injured when terrorist operatives threw an explosive device during operational activity in Tubas (IDF spokesperson, October 18 and 24, 2025). Hamas claimed the attack was “proof the resistance in the West Bank will not be broken and will not disappear despite the occupation’s attempts to neutralize it through suppression, arrests, security measures and checkpoints” (Hamas Telegram channel in Judea and Samaria, October 18, 2025).

Iranian Involvement in Fomenting Terrorism in Judea and Samaria

• Iran has played an active role in efforts to escalate terrorist activity since Iran’s leader, Ali Khamenei, called to arm the “resistance” in Judea and Samaria during a speech marking World Jerusalem Day on June 23, 2014. Until the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, the Qods Force operated an extensive network for smuggling weapons and transferring funds to terrorist operatives from Syria, and from Lebanon via Jordan, including after the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. The smuggling included rifles and pistols, and advanced weapons, such as anti-tank missiles, mines and assault rifles.^[9]
• Before and after the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip went into effect, Iranian officials and regime media said Tehran was determined to continue supporting its proxies in the Middle East as part of the “resistance axis,”^[10] including Palestinian organizations.^[11] That was demonstrated when the IDF foiled a shipment of advanced weapons intended for terrorist operatives in Judea and Samaria which had been sent by the IRGC special operations department and the Qods Force’s special operations unit. The shipment included 15 anti-tank rockets, 29 Claymore anti-personnel mines, four drones, two of which had payload-delivery capability, hand grenades, machine guns and pistols (Shin Bet and IDF spokespersons, October 8, 2025.
• In addition, attempts to smuggle weapons via the Jordanian border continue. On November 4, 2025, IDF forces seized a drone that crossed from Jordan into Israeli territory carrying ten pistols and other weapons (IDF spokesperson, November 4, 2025.

• Israeli security forces also eliminated Lebanese Qods Force terrorist operatives who played key roles in the smuggling route from Iran to Judea and Samaria. On July 3, 2025, the IDF eliminated Qassem Salah al-Husseini, a Lebanese operative who acted on behalf of Qods Force and maintained connections with Syrian and Lebanese traders for smuggling to the northern front and to Judea and Samaria (IDF spokesperson, July 3-4, 2025; on July 11, 2025, Muhammad Shaib was eliminated. He was a Lebanese operative who gave the Qods Force guidance and was involved in smuggling weapons into Israeli territory and Judea and Samaria for terrorist attacks (IDF spokesperson, July 11, 2025.

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] For further information, see the March 2025 ITIC report, Hamas’ strategy to destroy Israel: from theory into practice, as seen in captured documents
^[3] For further information, see the October 2025 ITIC report, Instructions Given by Yahya al-Sinwar for the October 7, 2023 Attack and Massacre
^[4] For further information about IDF operations in Judea and Samaria, see the publications of the IDF spokesperson, the weekly publication of the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, and the monthly summary of terrorist activity in the various arenas.
^[5] Operation Iron Wall began in Jenin and the Jenin refugee camp on January 21, 2025, and gradually expanded to Tulkarm and the Tulkarm and Nur Shams refugee camps, to the Tubas and Tamun area and the al-Far’a camp in the northern Jordan Valley, and to Nablus and its refugee camps. For further information, see the ITIC report, Escalation and Thwarting of Terrorism in Northern Samaria
^[6] The Palestinian Authority security forces also arrested wanted persons and neutralized explosive charges meant to attack IDF forces. For further information, see the December 2024 ITIC report, PA Security Forces Operate Against Armed Terrorists in the Jenin Refugee Camp
^[7] For further information, see the weekly ITIC reports, Spotlight on Terrorist and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, and the monthly summary of terrorist activity in the various arenas.
^[8] Terrorist attacks.
^[9] For further information, see the December 2024 ITIC report, Captured documents reveal how Iran smuggles weapons via Syria and Jordan
^[10] Iran, Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Houthis in Yemen and the Shi'ite militias in Iraq, all of whose objective is the destruction and elimination of the State of Israel.
^[11] For further information, see the October 2025 ITIC report, Iran and the Continued Aid to the Axis of Resistance amid the Ceasefire in the Gaza Strip

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