Challenges Faced by Hezbolla after the November 27, 2024 ceasfire

Overview

• The Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement of November 27, 2024, which ended the fighting that began on October 8, 2023, placed Hezbollah at a crossroads, the most significant since the organization’s founding in 1982. Its situation was the result of the loss of its top leadership, primarily secretary general Hassan Nasrallah and his designated successor Hashem Safi al-Din, as well as commanders and thousands of operatives. In addition, key military-terrorist capabilities and infrastructure were destroyed and the organization’s status inside Lebanon was damaged.
• Despite Na’im Qassem’s appointment as Hezbollah secretary general and statements that the organization has recovered, reports indicated disagreements within the top ranks. There were demands for those responsible at all levels to be held accountable for the results of the fighting, and Hezbollah reportedly initiated an inquiry into military and intelligence failures.
• The ceasefire’s ban on Hezbollah activity in south Lebanon, together with continued IDF strikes to enforce the agreement and the deployment of Lebanese army forces south of the Litani, has made it difficult for Hezbollah to restore its capabilities. In addition, the fall of the Assad regime in Syria closed weapons-smuggling routes from Iran to Damascus Airport and overland into Lebanon, while the Lebanese government ban on flights from Iran and tighter controls at Beirut Airport have forced Hezbollah to seek alternative channels for smuggling arms and funds.
• The continued IDF presence in south Lebanon accompanied by ongoing airstrikes has challenged Hezbollah’s claim as the “defender of Lebanon.” Senior figures have placed responsibility on state institutions to end the Israeli “violations,” while warning that the “resistance”^[1] could lose patience. However, except for a single rocket launch targeting the Mount Dov area, there have been no further armed responses to Israel and the organization reiterates its commitment to the ceasefire. At present, Hezbollah is restrained and does not openly violate the ceasefire.
• Hezbollah’s weakened domestic position made it possible to end Lebanon’s political deadlock with the election of Joseph Aoun as president and the formation of Nawaf Salam’s new government. The organization backed the appointments, yet accused them of “weakness” in the face of Israeli “violations.” Moreover, Aoun and Salam’s commitment, under United States pressure, to advance a state monopoly on arms potentially threatens Hezbollah’s future as an armed organization.
• The severe damage to Hezbollah’s economic wing and blocked aid routes from Iran make it difficult for the organization to fully deliver on its reconstruction promises and cause friction with state institutions.
• In ITIC assessment, the challenges facing Hezbollah will force it to concentrate on rebuilding itself as a military and social organization and regaining its status at home, while trying to overcome the obstacles preventing the receipt of Iranian funds and weapons, a situation expected to exist for an extended length of time. Hezbollah leaders are likely to inflate the role of the “resistance” and harp on the organization’s civilian-reconstruction assistance to preserve their base within the Shi’ite community. Consequently, Hezbollah will probably avoid direct confrontation with Israel as long as IDF forces remain at the five positions in south Lebanon and airstrikes continue, though it may allow other groups or lone operatives to conduct “independent” actions. Hezbollah will also avoid friction with state institutions, especially regarding disarmament, to ensure that the parliamentary elections planned for May 2026 allow it to restore its domestic status. At the same time, disarming Hezbollah, especially south Lebanon, has gathered momentum in recent months, but American pressure on the Lebanese government to disarm the organization north of the Litani River as well could complicate President Aoun’s goal of resolving the issue through dialogue and without confrontation.

Employing Force after the Ceasefire

• For years, Hezbollah employed force which was based on its one-sided, self-defined “equation of deterrence,” which included initiating attack, attacking in response to an IDF offensive activity, and attacking targets in Israel and expanding the operational range in response to Israeli attacks damaged the organization’s important targets. During the fighting, Hezbollah adjusted its “equation of deterrence” through gradual escalation when it considered Israel’s attacks were no longer “proportional,” often during escalations in the Gaza Strip War or following targeted killings of Hezbollah commanders, or because of ground activity in south Lebanon and the deepening of aerial strikes in Lebanese territory. The escalation included the use of more advanced weapons, the number of rockets and missiles launched, and in the geographical range of attacks, including strikes on central Israel.^[2]
• The ceasefire agreement severely restricted Hezbollah, and especially problematic were the ban on its activity in south Lebanon, the demand to dismantle its military infrastructure south of the Litani River, and the severe blow to its leadership and military capabilities. Nevertheless, the organization promoted a “victory narrative,” claiming Israel had not succeeded in eliminating Hezbollah and the organization had prevented IDF forces from advancing deeper into south Lebanon. Hezbollah claimed it would continue to monitor IDF activity and that “our hands will remain on the trigger in defense of Lebanon’s sovereignty.” Hezbollah also claimed it was committed to continue the path of “resistance”^[3] with even greater determination (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 27, 2024).^[4]
• On December 2, 2024, Hezbollah launched two rockets at the Mount Dov area; the rockets fell in open areas. Hezbollah’s claim of responsibility called the rocket fire an “initial warning response” to the “Israeli enemy’s repeated violations of the ceasefire,” which included [alleged] “shooting at civilians,” airstrikes which killed civilians and the violation of Beirut’s airspace (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, December 2, 2024).
• Throughout the 60 days of the ceasefire, defined in the agreement as the period in which Israel would complete the withdrawal of its forces from Lebanese territory, Hezbollah continued to accuse Israel of “violations” because of the presence of IDF forces and the continuation of attacks. Hezbollah claimed it was committed to implementing the agreement, adding that the “resistance” was waiting patiently for the 60 days to end and was ready for action if the state did not take action against the “violations.” However, aside from the launches on December 2, 2024, Hezbollah took no further responsibility for attacks on Israeli targets:
  • Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem said acting in conjunction with state institutions was part of the “resistance” and Hezbollah would not give up its place. He claimed there was no contradiction between jihad, from an Islamic point of view, and the liberation of land, from a national point of view, and when Islam and the homeland merged, real power was achieved against “aggression.” He claimed the “resistance” would not abandon its goal of “liberating” Lebanon and supporting “Palestine,” He claimed the “resistance leadership of the resistance” would its timing, nature, methods and weapons (al-Manar, January 4, 2025).
  • Hassan Fadlallah, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said that they would give the agreement a chance for 60 days, but “our finger is still on the trigger.” He said if Israel did not withdraw after 60 days the government and the army should act against it, and if nothing was done, it would prove that the government was unable to defend Lebanon (al-Jadeed, December 18, 2024).
  • Ibrahim al-Mousawi, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, claimed Israel was taking “ownership of Lebanon” and destroying houses, and that the steadfastness of the “resistance” with the army and the people was what provided protection. He said they were giving the agreement a chance, but patience had its limits, and when the 60 days ended the government’s position had to be clear (Radio al-Nour, December 22, 2024).
  • Mahmoud Qamati, deputy chairman of Hezbollah’s political council, said the organization would “patiently respect” the ceasefire agreement for 60 days, but on the 61^st day the situation would change if “enemy” forces remained in Lebanese territory, in which case, Hezbollah would regard them as “occupation forces.” He claimed that all of Hezbollah’s military and rocket capabilities, as well as UAVs and battlefield combat capabilities, still existed, adding that the “resistance” was prepared and strong, and the United States and France had to understand that Hezbollah would not allow its red lines to be crossed and was prepared for all possibilities (al-Manar TV, December 30, 2024).

• • Wafiq Safa, head of Hezbollah’s liaison and coordination unit, said responsibility for implementing the agreement now lay with the state, while the “resistance” would consider its options after the 60-day ceasefire period ended (al-Mayadeen, January 5, 2025).
• On January 26, 2025, when the 60 days ended, the decision was made to extend it until February 18, 2025, to allow Israel to complete its withdrawal. Although Hezbollah called it a “violation,” they continued to place the responsibility on state institutions and claimed the return of residents to villages in south Lebanon, which led to clashes with IDF forces, constituted the “popular resistance” (Lebanese media, January 26–27, 2025). Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem said Israel had to withdraw since the original 60 days had passed, adding that Hezbollah refused to accept an extension of even one day. He claimed the continued “occupation” in south Lebanon was “aggression” against Lebanese sovereignty and everyone was responsible for confronting the “occupation,” the people, the army, the state and the “resistance” (Radio al-Nour, January 27, 2025). On another occasion, he claimed Hezbollah had not spoken of “absolute victory,” fighting Israel was a campaign with losses and gains. Qassem said the “Islamic resistance” would remain, Hezbollah would remain and would never change its position, and the Lebanese people, together with the “resistance” and the army, would “liberate” Lebanon (al-Mayadeen, February 2, 2025).
• On February 18, 2025, the IDF completed the withdrawal of its forces, except for five commanding positions in south Lebanon near the Israeli border. Hezbollah called it “occupation” and continued to insist on Israel’s withdrawal from all Lebanese territory and the cessation of attacks, while continuing to place responsibility on state institutions for realizing those goals. Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem said they were giving the government an opportunity, but the “resistance” was prepared to take action. However, their statements gradually became more moderate:
  • In his speech at the funeral of Nasrallah and Safi al-Din, Qassem said that “the resistance will uproot the occupier, even if it takes time,” and “the resistance is ready, with its men and equipment, and will not agree to sit idly by while we are being killed.” At the same time, he emphasized that the organization would monitor the state’s diplomatic efforts (al-Manar, February 23, 2025).
  • In his speech during the events of the Iranian Global Jerusalem Day, Qassem admitted that the organization had “achieved what could be achieved” in confronting Israel and now it was Lebanon’s turn to take the reins and force the “occupation to withdraw.” He said the “resistance” operated where it felt it was needed, adding that the continued “occupation” was unacceptable (al-Manar, March 26, 2025).
  • After the IDF attack on the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in response to rocket fire into northern Israel, which according to Lebanese authorities was carried out by terrorists linked to Hamas, Qassem claimed Hezbollah was committed to the ceasefire agreement and had no involvement in the rocket fire. He said that if the Lebanese state did not stop the “violations” diplomatically, the “resistance” would turn to other options., claiming he had received “messages” from members of the “resistance” who were ready to carry out “sacrifice operations” (al-Manar, March 29, 2025).
  • In a speech in memory of senior Hezbollah official Mustafa Badr al-Din, Qassem acknowledged the presence of IDF forces in the five positions in south Lebanon, but claimed that the “resistance” had stopped Israel’s advance toward Beirut and Sidon. He added that Hezbollah would confront Israel with all “legitimate and possible resistance” methods, according to conditions and without threatening a military response (al-Manar, May 12, 2025).
• Such positions were also expressed by other Hezbollah spokesmen, but differences could be identified between supporters of the hardline approach and [so-called] “moderate” spokesmen:
  • After Israel decided to keep five forward positions inside Lebanon, Ibrahim al-Amin, editor-n-chief of Hezbollah’s daily al-Akhbar, said the organization did not take direct action but it was the state’s responsibility to stop the “Israeli harassment,” and the day was not far off when “the use of the rifle would return as a means to stop the occupation” (al-Akhbar, February 28, 2025).
  • Hassan Izz al-Din, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said that if the “enemy” continued to occupy territory, “we will shake the ground under its feet.” He called on the government to act through “resistance” to drive out the “enemy” (al-Nashra, March 1, 2025).
  • Hussein Jishi, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, claimed that the government’s diplomatic pressure was insufficient and the only reason the “resistance” did not respond was its commitment to the agreement and a desire to give the state an opportunity to take responsibility. He claimed “the enemy understands only the language of force” and “our people and our resistance will not remain silent much longer” (Balaa, March 10, 2025). On another occasion, he warned that “the only language to speak with the enemy is the language of resistance and weapons” and called to provide the army with all the necessary arms (Balaa, April 24, 2025).
  • Ihab Hamadeh, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said Hezbollah would continue the “resistance” and “adhere to it at the right time [sic],” adding that it would be difficult to confront the “occupation” through diplomatic means (al-Arabi, May 8, 2025).
  • However, Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid, chairman of Hezbollah’s political council, did not make direct threats, but claimed that Israel was not afraid of the “resistance’s” weapons, but of the man who carried the weapon. The said that the more that man fell, the stronger he became [sic] (al-Manar, May 3, 2025).
  • Mahmoud Qamati, deputy chairman of the political council, claimed that Hezbollah was showing restraint in order to “expose” Israel before the world. He added that Hezbollah did not want to continue the fighting and be dragged into war, but the “resistance” was prepared (al-Jazeera, April 2, 2025).
  • Hassan Fadlallah, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, noted the role of the state in dealing with the “Israeli violations,” but if it did not meet its responsibility, “the people” would lead the “resistance” (al-Mayadeen, March 17, 2025). On another occasion, he claimed the “resistance” in Lebanon, and especially in the south of the country, was strong and no one would overcome it. He added that Hezbollah would continue to work to achieve its goals and the “resistance was not measured by words but by deeds,” but refrained from making an explicit threat (al-Manar, April 27, 2025).
• Since the single shooting incident in December 2024, Hezbollah did not shoot at Israel or IDF forces in Lebanese territory, and was careful not to openly violate the ceasefire. That was reflected in Hezbollah’s lack of an armed response after the IDF attacked the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia three times during March and April 2025, contrary to Hezbollah’s equation of “Beirut equals Tel Aviv,” touted in the final stages of the fighting against Israel in October and November 2024.

The Internal Challenge

Hezbollah Reorganizes Its Leadership

• According to unofficial assessments, Hezbollah lost thousands of operatives fighting against Israel, including dozens at the leadership and command levels. Hezbollah officially published the names of 37 “martyred commanders,” among them secretary general Hassan Nasrallah and his designated successor, Hashem Safi al-Din, chairman of the executive council; the organization’s military commander Fuad Shukr; head of the operations directorate Ibrahim Aqil; commander of the southern front Ali Karaki; figures in the organization’s “political” leadership and mid-level commanders (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, February 25, 2025).

• On October 29, 2024, Hezbollah announced that the Shura council had chosen Sheikh Na’im Qassem, who had served as deputy secretary general since 1991, to be the new secretary general. However, despite being one of Hezbollah’s founders, Qassem, unlike Nasrallah, is not charismatic, lacks military experience and was not a member of the Jihad council, which is responsible for the organization’s military activity.^[5]

• In recent months, reports were issued about appointments to key positions. Muhammad Raad, head of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, was reportedly appointed deputy secretary general, replaced as faction head by Hassan Fadlallah. Ali Da’moush, deputy chairman of the Executive council, was reportedly appointed chairman of the council to replace Safi al-Din (al-Nahar; al-Liwaa’; al-Hadath, December 29, 2024). However, Hezbollah denied the reports and said announcements about senior appointments would be issued only through the organization’s official channels and not by anonymous sources (al-‘Ahed, December 29, 2024).
• Muhammad Mahdi Nasrallah, son of Hassan Nasrallah, was also mentioned as Hezbollah’s possible future leader. He denied the speculations, claiming he did not want to be involved in the organization’s “military” activity or in politics, and intended “to focus on his religious studies” (Beirut International, January 11, 2025).
• The only official top-tier appointment so far, besides Qassem, was that of Yousef al-Zein, who was appointed media chief to replace Muhammad Afif, who was killed in an Israeli strike in Beirut on November 17, 2024 (al-‘Ahed, December 24, 2024).
• “French political commentators” said Hezbollah was reorganizing, but there was still no clear vision. They said Iran was directly involved in efforts to fill the vacant positions in Hezbollah’s military command, but Hezbollah might return to a clandestine military structure, similar to the situation in the 1990s, out of fear that Israel would again eliminate the command echelon (Le Figaro, March 2025).
• Despite the severe blow to the organization’s leadership, senior Hezbollah figures, especially members of its parliamentary faction, have rallied behind the message that Hezbollah is coping:
  • Hussein al-Hajj Hassan, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said that despite the attacks and threats, the organization had rehabilitated its leadership and the military at all levels. He said there were new regional challenges and Hezbollah was recovering quickly to face them (al-Manar, December 25, 2024).
  • Hassan Fadlallah, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, acknowledged that the organization suffered significant losses and had been exposed to a “massive earthquake,” but claimed Hezbollah would nether collapse nor surrender. He said sometimes the “resistance” chalked up victories and achievements, and sometimes there was pain and suffering. He claimed the “resistance” was strong especially in south Lebanon, and no one could overcome it, it would help “liberate” the country, it would not falter and would rebuild what had been destroyed (al-Manar, April 27, 2025).
• Lebanese media affiliated with the Hezbollah opposition published reports alleging internal tensions within the organization:
  • Lebanese Christian journalist Tony Boulos claimed Hezbollah was at an internal crossroads, a point of the possible defection or departure of some of its leaders because of internal disagreements. He said the struggle was between two opposing viewpoints which developed in Hezbollah’s leadership even before the November 2024 ceasefire: the conservative wing led by Wafiq Safa, head of the liaison and coordination unit, advocated retaining weapons at all costs, and the wing led by secretary general Qassem and faction head Raad, wanted a temporary ceasefire in order to reorganize the organization’s ranks and recover from the consequences of the fighting against Israel. The conservative wing reportedly accused its opponents of retreat and surrender to international pressure, while the conciliatory wing accused the other side of endangering the party’s fate and alienating its supporters. According to Boulos, “security officials” noted that the internal debate was not limited to issues of political or military tactics, but included relations with Iran and the question of whether to moderate them for fear of isolation. “Sources” noted that core disagreements also concerned the issue of disarmament and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, whether it was limited to the area south of the Litani River or to the entire country. Boulos noted a split within the military echelon between Khalil Youssef Harb, who was Nasrallah’s close adviser and thought to have been appointed to the position of military commander, and Abu Ali Tabatabai, thought to have taken command of the southern front (The Independent Arabia, March 24, 2025).
  • Hezbollah officials reportedly called on secretary general Qassem to hold elections for the seven members of the Shura council [the organization’s highest body] and to hold to account those who “were negligent” in the fighting against Israel, not only at the military-security level. However, the demand did not apply to the two senior council members, Qassem himself and faction head Raad. According to the report, one group in Hezbollah argued that the status quo should be preserved and that accountability should not be demanded from those responsible at the political and military levels, while for the first time in Hezbollah’s history, an opposing group called for full accountability and zero tolerance toward those who did not fulfill their duties as required, regardless of their status. One of the senior figures mentioned was Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyed, head of the political council, who was accused of being absent from Lebanon during the fighting. The report noted that among those calling for new elections were members of the Shura council and members of the jihad, executive and political councils, and the parliamentary committee. Thus it can be assumed that an attempt was made to formulate a compromise, whereby new elections would be held but only after a certain period of time and not immediately (an-Nahar, May 8, 2025).

Learning Lessons from the Fighting

• Senior Hezbollah figures confirmed that the organization was conducting an internal investigation to identify the failures which aided Israel during the fighting and to draw conclusions for the future:
  • Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem said that given the blows Hezbollah suffered in the fighting, the organization could not continue at the same pace in the security, military, political and cultural spheres. He said a comprehensive review of the previous stages had to be carried out to make it possible to move on to the next stage, but noted that the organization’s principles had not changed, foremost among them “the resistance,” and that all methods of implementing the principles were open to discussion and change, based on the results of review and reassessment (Ekhtebar, May 2, 2025).
  • Hassan Fadlallah, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, acknowledged that the organization had suffered significant losses and been exposed to a “massive earthquake,” but claimed they would not cause Hezbollah to collapse or surrender. He said the organization was conducting an internal investigation to examine how and why events occurred during the fighting as they had, adding that the conclusions might not be made public, but the goal was to learn the lessons of the past and avoid further risks in the future (al-Manar, April 27, 2025).
• According to reports, one of the central issues under examination was Israel’s intelligence penetration of Hezbollah (Spot Shot channel, May 15, 2025). The issue gained prominence following the arrest of Muhammad al-Hadi Saleh, a resident of the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut who was close to Hezbollah and was accused of selling information to Israeli intelligence, including coordinates of the movements of senior Hezbollah figures and operatives, thereby enabling Israel to carry out a large number of targeted killings. His arrest reportedly shocked Hezbollah’s inner circle because Saleh was the son of a senior figure in the organization’s elite Radwan Force and his brother was killed in the fighting with Israel. A “legal source” noted that the collaboration with Israel exposed since the beginning of the ceasefire had snowballed, and that following Saleh’s arrest there had been 21 defendants accused of collaborating with Israel, 13 Lebanese, six Syrians, and two Palestinians (al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 16, 2025).

The Challenge of Reconstruction and Rearmament

• Hezbollah has not yet formally revealed the extent of the damage to its manpower and military capabilities since the start of the fighting on October 8, 2023, although senior figures have admitted it was a “significant loss.” Ibrahim Mousawi, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said the organization suffered “severe blows” with the killing of operatives and leadership, and the destruction of a large part of its military capabilities (The Wall Street Journal, May 10, 2025).
• According to the IDF, during the operation which began on September 23, 2024 and included an escalation in airstrikes alongside ground activity in south Lebanon (starting October 1, 2024) the army attacked more than 12,500 Hezbollah targets, including more than 1,600 military command sites and more than a thousand weapons depots in south Lebanon, Beirut and the Beqa’a Valley. More than 2,500 terrorist operatives were eliminated, among them Hezbollah leaders and commanders at senior and junior command levels. IDF forces destroyed above-ground and underground military facilities in south Lebanon as far as the Litani River, and about 70% of the stock of UAVs and about 30 cruise missiles were destroyed (IDF spokesperson, November 28, 2024 and December 6, 2024).
• In the assessment of “sources familiar with Hezbollah’s activity,” the organization lost as many as 4,000 fighters during the fighting with Israel (Reuters, November 28, 2024). According United States intelligence agencies, Hezbollah lost more than half of its weaponry and thousands of fighters, bringing its military capability to its lowest level in decades (Reuters, December 5, 2024).
• However, unlike previous military confrontations with Israel, especially the Second Lebanon War, this time the challenges facing Hezbollah in rebuilding its military capabilities are greater due to internal developments in Lebanon, changes in the regional arena and the continued activity of the IDF.

Lebanese army Activity against Hezbollah’s Capabilities in South Lebanon

• Under the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon, the presence of “armed groups” (implicitly Hezbollah foremost among them) and military infrastructure not belonging to Lebanon’s official security forces is prohibited south of the Litani River. To that end, the Lebanese army is required to deploy in south Lebanon to dismantle all military facilities, confiscate all unauthorized weapons and take control of all unauthorized facilities involved in weapons production.
• According to reports, since the ceasefire went into effect, the Lebanese army has raided more than 500 Hezbollah positions south and north of the Litani River, as well as the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut (al-Hadath, April 29, 2025). An “official security source” stated that the Lebanese army had dismantled more than 90% of Hezbollah’s facilities south of the Litani (Agence France-Presse, April 30, 2025).

• Hezbollah consistently reiterates it is operating in coordination with the army. Reportedly, a few days after the ceasefire went into effect, Wafiq Safa, head Hezbollah’s the liaison and coordination unit, met with Lebanese army commander (and now president of Lebanon) Joseph Aoun and Ahmed Baakbaki, advisor to the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament. According to reports, the meeting was “excellent” and related to the relations between the Lebanese army and the “resistance,” and Safa and Aoun agreed to coordinate closely to implement the ceasefire agreement and Resolution 1701 in south Lebanon (Lebanon 24, December 13, 2024). According to a report of unclear reliability, Hezbollah secretly handed over to the Lebanese army a map of the organization’s sites where its weapons were hidden (al-Nahar, April 8, 2025).

Continued IDF Activity Against Hezbollah

• Even after the ceasefire went into effect, the IDF continued attacking Hezbollah terrorist operatives and the organization’s military-terrorist infrastructure because Hezbollah consistently violated the understandings between Israel and Lebanon and was trying to rebuild its military-terrorist capabilities and restore its arsenal. Most strikes focused on south Lebanon, where the agreement completely prohibits Hezbollah’s presence, and were aimed at Hezbollah operatives, including at the command level, and at existing military facilities or facilities being rebuilt. The IDF attacked sites containing rocket launchers and weapons, and an underground compound on the Beaufort ridge where Hezbollah’s rocket fire and defense array were managed. The IDF also attacked Hezbollah facilities in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut and the Beqa’a Valley, and routes Hezbollah used for smuggling on the Lebanon–Syria border.^[6] According to the IDF, since the start of the ceasefire, more than 140 terrorist operatives who posed a threat have been eliminated, and dozens of facilities and weapons have been attacked (IDF Spokesperson, April 23, 2025).

Attacks on Hezbollah’s Smuggling Mechanism

• Over the years, employing Unit 4400, responsible for the organization’s military-terrorist buildup and weapons transfer, and Unit 190 of Iran’s IRGC Quds Force, Hezbollah integrated a system to smuggle weapons, funds and technology to Hezbollah itself and other Iranian proxies, such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. The contraband was smuggled overland through Syria, by air from Iran to Syria and to Beirut International Airport, and by sea through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Suez to ports in Syria and Lebanon.^[7]
• During the fighting, the IDF took extensive action against Hezbollah’s smuggling system, mainly from the direction of Syria. They eliminated commanders and operatives of Unit 4400 and attacked overland and and underground crossing routes and military facilities used for smuggling through the Syria–Lebanon border. They continued after the ceasefire went into effect as part of efforts to prevent Hezbollah’s reconstruction, and carried out targeted killings, including Salman Nimr Jamaah, Hezbollah’s envoy to the Syrian Army (under the Assad regime), Hussein Ali Nasr, the deputy commander of Unit 4400, and Sayyed Reza Mousavi, a high-ranking Iranian Qods Force figure who was killed in an aerial attack attributed to Israel near Damascus on December 25, 2023. According to Iran, he was responsible for supporting the “resistance” front in Syria, and “without a doubt the Zionist regime will pay for the crime” (Fars, December 25, 2023). “Well-informed sources” noted that Mousavi was central in transferring Iranian Fateh surface-to-surface missiles to Hezbollah (Amwaj.Media, December 25, 2024).

       
Right: Unit 4400 figures eliminated during the fighting. Left: The route of an underground smuggling tunnel on the Syria–Lebanon border (IDF Spokesperson, November 25, 2024)

• In addition, regional and internal developments in Lebanon have made it difficult for Hezbollah to receive the Iranian weapons and funds it needs to reconstruct its military-terrorist capabilities.

Blocking Overland Smuggling Routes from Syria

• On December 8, 2024, rebel forces led by the Islamic-jihadi organization Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, under the leadership of Ahmed al-Sharaa (Abu Muhammad al-Joulani), took control of Damascus and overthrew the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.^[8] As a result, Iran lost its strategic depth against Israel and its ability to transfer weapons overland to Hezbollah.^[9]

The Power Groups in Syria after the Fall of the Assad Regime

• Al-Sharaa, who appointed himself the new president of Syria, accused Iran and Hezbollah of attacking Syrian civilians because of their cooperation with the Assad regime during the civil war and for turning Syria into a “distributor of wars and destruction.” He stated that the new regime would not allow the transfer of weapons through Syria, and accordingly, the security forces of the new Syrian regime foiled attempts to smuggle weapons into Lebanon, including rockets and UAVs.^[10]

      
Right: UAV parts confiscated on their way to the border with Lebanon (Syrian foreign ministry Telegram channel, January 17, 2025). Left: Grad rockets seized in the Homs area near the border with Lebanon (Syrian news agency al-Ekhbariya, May 12, 2025).

• Hezbollah and Iranian officials admitted the loss of the Syrian smuggling routes but tried to minimize the damage to the organization’s strategic capabilities:
  • Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem admitted that Hezbollah lost its military supply route because of the fall of the Assad regime. However, he claimed “the resistance” was flexible and that if the new regime did not allow the transfer of weapons, “the resistance” would look for other solutions (al-Manar, December 14, 2024).
  • Revolutionary Guards commander Hassan Salami admitted that all the [smuggling] routes had been closed, but claimed that the “resistance front” had become independent and was not dependent on Iran (ISNA, December 12, 2024). At a Revolutionary Guards conference, Salami said there were still ways to support the “resistance front” which were independent of Syria, and it was possible that the situation in Syria might change as well (ISNA, December 12, 2024).

Stopping Smuggling from Iran to Lebanon through the Beirut Airport

• Beirut International Airport served as a major station for smuggling weapons and money from Iran to Hezbollah via Mahan Air and other Iranian airlines (United States Department of the Treasury website, October 12, 2011, and May 24, 2018; Long War Journal, January 8, 2025). However, to implement the ceasefire agreement and in view of American pressure and Israeli threats, Lebanese authorities tightened security supervision at the airport:
  • On January 2, 2025, a Mahan Air plane was stopped at Beirut International Airport on the grounds that it was carrying money for Hezbollah. Reportedly, the plane was searched and a bag belonging to an employee of the Iranian embassy was confiscated after he refused to allow a search (al-Nahar, January 2, 2025). Lebanese Interior Minister Bassam Mawlawi confirmed that money and documents for the Iranian embassy in Lebanon had been found on the plane, but did not say whether they had been confiscated. He said it was a “routine procedure” to protect Lebanon and the Lebanese and to prevent new “aggression” against the airport (al-Arabiya and al-Nashra, January 3, 2025). Lebanese authorities reportedly began searching Iranian planes landing in Beirut as a result of pressure from President Biden’s special envoy Amos Hochstein (Sky News Arabia, January 3, 2025).
  • On February 12, 2025, the IDF spokesperson in Arabic announced that transfers of money from Iran to Hezbollah via civilian flights had been identified and the ceasefire oversight mechanism had been warned that Israel would not permit the transfers (Avichay Adraee’s X account, February 12, 2025). A day later, the flight of an Iranian passenger plane from Tehran to Beirut was cancelled after Beirut Airport authorities refused to authorize the landing (al-Akhbar, February 13, 2025). A “Lebanese security source” said that had Lebanon prevented the flight from landing following an American warning that Israel would attack the area. “The source” added that another flight scheduled to take off from Tehran on February 14 was canceled for the same reason (Agence France-Presse, February 16, 2025).
  • At the end of February 2025, Lebanese security arrested a Lebanese citizen who had arrived on a flight from Turkey carrying $2.5 million for Hezbollah. During questioning he admitted that on the night of February 27, 2025, he had flown from Beirut and landed in Istanbul at midnight. He went to the duty-free store where he met an Iranian and received the suitcase of money. He then returned to Beirut and the Iranian remained in Turkey (al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 28, 2025).

• • Lebanese Transportation Minister Faiz Rasmani confirmed that several attempts to smuggle money to Hezbollah through Beirut International Airport had been foiled, including the smuggling of the $2.5 million suitcase. He said airport security mechanism, commanded by a ranking army officer, was responsible for the operations and the airport was under the complete control of the state. He also claimed that no smuggling took place through the airport since everything entering or leaving Lebanon was inspected. Referring to the suspension of flights from Iran, which had been in effect since mid-February 2025, he said the ban was still in force and no negotiations were being held with the Iranians on the issue (al-Hadath, March 31, 2025).
  • Dozens of employees at Beirut Airport were reportedly fired on suspicion of ties with Hezbollah. Lebanese authorities installed new monitoring technologies throughout the airport to deal with smuggling. “Senior security officials” said the measures were part of a broader effort to reduce smuggling for Hezbollah and limit the organization’s influence. Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam claimed the state was dealing with smuggling in the most successful way in its history. A “security source” revealed that a recent attempt to smuggle 22.5 kg of gold to Hezbollah through the airport had been thwarted (Wall Street Journal, May 10, 2025).
• In light of the suspension of flights from Iran and the tightening of security measures at Beirut Airport, Hezbollah and Iran are reportedly looking for bypass routes:
  • “Western intelligence sources” revealed that since Israeli was monitoring Iranian airlines, Iranian diplomats were using foreign airlines to transfer money to Hezbollah, The diplomats were reportedly flying from Iran to regional countries with suitcases “full of cash,” and from there continued to Beirut on foreign flights (Sky News Arabia, January 22, 2025).
  • Before the suspension of flights from Iran to Lebanon, Israel complained to the ceasefire oversight committee that Iranian diplomats were transferring tens of millions of dollars to Hezbollah in suitcases through Beirut Airport and Turkish citizens were transferring cash to Hezbollah on flights from Istanbul to Beirut. Reportedly, some members of the oversight committee believed the claims were credible, and the complaints were forwarded to the Lebanese government for further action (Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2025). Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei claimed Israel was spreading rumors “to stop the reconstruction of Lebanon” (Tasnim, February 3, 2025).
  • Danny Danon, Israel’s ambassador to the UN, lodged a complaint with the Security Council on February 21, 2025, accusing Turkey of serving as a conduit for transferring money from Iran to Hezbollah, adding that Turkish flights landing in Beirut on February 7 and 9, 2025, were mentioned as carrying cash for the organization (Nordic Monitor, May 5, 2025).
  • According to assessments, the funerals of Hassan Nasrallah and Hashem Safi al-Din in Beirut on February 23, 2025, enabled money to be smuggled on flights from Iran and other countries. “Iraqi sources” reported that officials of the Popular Mobilization Forces, the umbrella organization of the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, had arrived in Beirut on a private plane belonging to Iraqi Airways bringing $4 million for Hezbollah (Sky News Arabia, February 22, 2025).
  • A “Western security source” said Hezbollah was smuggling weapons into Lebanon by sea. According to “the source,” Hezbollah effectively controlled the port of Beirut through a network of supporters in the customs authority and the monitoring mechanisms, operated by Wafiq Safa, head of Hezbollah’s liaison and coordination unit, to smuggle equipment, weapons and money without oversight. “The source” added that the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force was promoting the maritime smuggling to Lebanon, directly or through other countries, via Units 190 and 700 (al-Hadath, April 8, 2025). However, Lebanese Transportation Minister Faiz Rasmani claimed there was no evidence of Hezbollah smuggling through the port of Beirut, adding that security at the port was “under strict supervision” (Lebanon 24, April 9, 2025).
• Hezbollah denied the accusations of money smuggling through Beirut International or by sea. Mahmoud Qamati, deputy head of Hezbollah’s political council, said the organization had expected “lies and deception” about smuggling weapons and money to the airport or port and claimed “the resistance supplies its needs in its own ways” without violating the laws or state institutions (OTV channel, April 9, 2025). Wafiq Safa, head of Hezbollah’s liaison and coordination unit, rejected the “baseless accusations” (Radio al-Nour, April 18, 2025).

International Activity against Hezbollah

• The United States Treasury Department continued its sanctions on smuggling networks and financiers who assisted Hezbollah, part of efforts to make it difficult for the organization to recover after the fighting:
  • Sanctions were imposed on five Lebanese citizens and three companies they owned because of their involvement in a network which helped Hezbollah evade United States sanctions, including through the sale of Iranian oil for the Qods Force. The list included Mahasan Mahmoud Murtatha, the widow of Muhammad Ja’far Qasir, who had been the commander of the unit transferring weapons from Iran and its affiliates to Hezbollah in Lebanon (Unit 4400) until he was eliminated in an Israeli attack in October 2024; and Rashid Qassem al-Bazal, the brother of Muhammad Qassem al-Bazal, one of Hezbollah’s leading financiers who had been on the sanctions list since 2018 and had a $10 million reward on his head (United States Treasury Department, March 28, 2025).
  • Sanctions were imposed on two Hezbollah operatives, Me’in Daqiq al-Ameli, who was based in Iran, and Hassan Naame, and on two financial aides, Jihad Alami and Fadi Naame, for their involvement in coordinating money transfers to Hezbollah through donations from abroad. Al-Ameli had reportedly transferred cash to Hezbollah officials who worked directly with Nasrallah’s office, including Alami, who disbursed the funds
• In addition, the American State Department offered a reward of up to $10 million for information leading to the disruption of Hezbollah’s financial mechanisms in the Tri-Border Area in South America between Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay. Hezbollah has been active there for many years, it has operatives and supporters who launder money, traffic drugs and illegal diamonds, smuggle fuel, cigarettes and luxury goods, and counterfeit dollars, which brings millions of dollars into the organization’s coffers (Rewards for Justice website, May 19, 2025).

Hezbollah in the Internal Lebanese Arena

A Weakened Hezbollah Enables a President to Be Elected and a Government to Be Formed

• An important challenge for Hezbollah resulting from the fighting was the weakening of its status in the internal Lebanese arena. Previously, Hezbollah’s political power had allowed it to block the election of a new president for Lebanon since the end of Michel Aoun’s term in October 2022, and as a result it was also impossible to appoint a permanent new government and to promote essential reforms while living conditions for the population deteriorated. However, after the elimination of Nasrallah and Safi al-Din, even before the ceasefire, an international effort led by the United States and Saudi Arabia took advantage of Hezbollah’s perceived weakness to promote the election of a new president and break the deadlock in Lebanese politics (Wall Street Journal, October 9, 2025; al-Hurra, October 12, 2024).
• On November 28, 2024, one day after the ceasefire went into effect, Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, announced an ad hoc parliamentary session for January 9, 2025, to elect the new president. Hezbollah expressed support for the candidacy of Suleiman Frangieh, the head of the Marada Movement, as it had done in previous presidential votes. However, Frangieh’s unwillingness to continue his candidacy forced Hezbollah to change its position. Four days before the vote, Wafiq Safa, head of Hezbollah’s liaison and coordination unit, said the organization would not veto any candidate, including Lebanese army commander Joseph Aoun, only Samir Geagea, the head of the Lebanese Forces, since it “might lead to a civil war” (al-Jadeed, January 5, 2025).
• In the parliamentary vote on January 9, 2025, Aoun received 71 votes, fewer than the required two-thirds majority of 86 votes. After a round of consultations, a second round of voting was held and Aoun was elected with 99 votes (al-Nashra, January 9, 2025). Muhammad Raad, leader of Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said the organization has not supported Aoun in the first round to indicate that Hezbollah was the guardian of the Lebanese national consensus (al-Nashra, January 9, 2025).

• “Knowledgeable sources” said that before the second round of voting, representatives of the factions of the “Shi’ite duo” [Hezbollah and Amal] met with Aoun, and reached understandings enabling the “duo” to support Aoun’s candidacy. They reportedly agreed that Resolution 1701 had no connection to Resolution 1559, and the limits of Resolution 1701 were south of the Litani River only, the “Shi’ite duo” would have a central role in forming the next government, guarantees would be given regarding the finance ministry and future appointments in the judicial system, the army, and the security services, and guarantees would be given regarding reconstruction processes, including securing international funding and grants (al-Manar, January 10, 2025).
• Aoun’s election paved the way for the formation of a new government. On January 13, 2025, after consultations with parliamentary factions, Aoun announced that Nawaf Salam, president of the International Court of Justice in The Hague, would form the new government (Lebanese presidential office X account, January 13, 2025). Muhammad Raad, leader of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said his faction had not chosen any representative for the premiership, rather, Hezbollah had taken a positive step by supporting Aoun’s election, but “the outstretched hand had been cut off.” He said the organization would wait “calmly and wisely” out of concern for the national interest, but would continue to monitor government activity “to expel the occupier from our land” (Radio al-Nour, January 13, 2025). Reportedly, during a meeting held by President Aoun and representatives of Hezbollah’s faction, the delegation was dissatisfied because the alleged agreement had not been honored, whereby interim prime minister Najib Mikati was to receive the permanent appointment (al-Nashra, January 13, 2025). It was further reported that the “Shi’ite duo” believed it had been subjected to a “serious political deception” (al-Arabiya, January 13, 2025).
• On February 8, 2025, after three weeks of consultations, Salam announced the formation of the new government, which was divided according to sectarian quotas. Despite American pressure not to include Hezbollah, Hezbollah and Amal received five portfolios: Health Minister Rakan Nasser al-Din and Labor Minister Muhammad Haydar, affiliated with Hezbollah; Finance Minister Yassin Jabber, Environment Minister Tamara al-Zein, and Administrative Development Minister Fadi Makki, affiliated with Amal (al-Mayadeen, February 8, 2025).^[11]

• According to reports, in return for receiving the finance and four other portfolios, Hezbollah and Amal agreed in practice to give up the right to veto (“blocking third”) which had enabled them to block reforms (Reuters, February 8, 2025; Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 12, 2025). Hassan Izz al-Din, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament claimed that the organization had not been an obstacle to forming the government. He said everyone who had thoughts of eliminating Hezbollah or excluding it from the government had realized that the Shi’ites were “rooted in the homeland and belonged to the people and the state” (al-Nashra, February 10, 2025).
• Another indication of Hezbollah’s weakness in the new government was that for the first time in 25 years, the “resistance clause,” which had been based on Hezbollah’s “army-people-resistance” formula, was not included in the government’s guidelines. Instead, it was written that “Lebanon has the right to defend itself in accordance with the UN Charter, and it is its responsibility to act to maintain its security and its borders” (Lebanese government website, February 8, 2025).

Tensions over Implementing the Ceasefire

• Since the ceasefire went into effect at the end of November 2024, Hezbollah repeatedly noted that state institutions should ensure Israel completed its withdrawal from all of Lebanon and stopped its airstrikes, since the agreement had been reached between Israel and Lebanon. The demand was heard more frequently after the election of President Aoun, and especially after the appointment of the permanent government under Salam, when Hezbollah did not hide its frustration over the continuation of the Israeli “violations:”
  • After the formation of the government, Ali Fayyad, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said the new Lebanese government had to ensure Israel’s withdrawal from all of Lebanese territory. He claimed any “enemy” presence, “even the size of a fingertip,” was “occupation” and had to be “resisted.” He claimed Hezbollah would work in cooperation with the Lebanese government, but warned that if the government’s efforts failed the situation would have to be reassessed and alternatives considered, and if there was no choice, the “Lebanese would have to take national responsibility” (al-Manar, February 9, 2025).
  • Hassan Fadlallah, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said that while Hezbollah was giving the state the opportunity to take responsibility, it had not dealt with any of the “problems” caused by Israel. He said that “the Israeli enemy” was Lebanon’s enemy and the struggle against it was a national struggle (al-Manar, March 2, 2025). On another occasion, he said Hezbollah believed the state should accept its role and decide on going to war. He said the government had to lead to “the liberation of the lands,” the cessation of the attacks, the return of the prisoners and the preservation of national sovereignty, whether diplomatically, through the media, or “by other means” (al-‘Ahed, March 5, 2025).
  • Ibrahim al-Amin, editor-in-chief of Hezbollah’s daily al-Akhbar, wrote that the grace period of President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam had ended. They had been appointed, he wrote, only because of pressure from Saudi Arabi and the United States, which wanted normalization between Lebanon and Israel, but normalization was impossible since Israel “had not eliminated the resistance.” According to al-Amin, there was a covert agreement that allowed Israel to continue its “aggression,” while Lebanon would not be able to “resist.” He claimed that the public was not satisfied with the president and the government, and day by day, protests against them would increase (al-Akhbar, March 27, 2025).
  • Hussein Jishi, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, called on the president of Lebanon, the government and the state institutions to meet their commitments and protect the Lebanese. He said they advocated building a strong state capable of defending its citizens, and when the state was unable to do so, the people and “the resistance” had the right to use “all available means” to defend themselves. He added that although several months had passed, they had not seen a positive result from the diplomatic efforts to prevent the “daily aggression of the enemy” (Lebanese News Agency, April 2, 2025).
  • Ihab Hamadeh, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said “the Israeli occupation” was not abiding by the agreements and had violated them more than 3,000 times. Hamadeh attacked the Lebanese government and calling it “weak and unable to deter Israel.” He said Hezbollah would continue with “resistance” and “adhere to it at the right time,” claiming it would be difficult to deal with the “occupation” through diplomatic means (al-Arabi, May 8, 2025).

Tensions over Disarming Hezbollah^[12]

• Another factor challenging Hezbollah and creating tension with the new leadership is the issue of disarmament. In his inaugural speech, Aoun declared that he would work to realize the state’s monopoly on arms throughout Lebanon, a position also included in Salam’s government guidelines. Aoun and Salam’s position, as well as of other figures in the Lebanese leadership, was to ensure the state’s monopoly on weapons vis-à-vis all armed groups in Lebanon, first and foremost Hezbollah and not only south of the Litani River, given increasing pressure from the United States administration. Morgan Ortagus, United States special envoy to Lebanon, said Hezbollah’s disarmament had to be “absolute and comprehensive” throughout Lebanon, not only south of the Litani River (al-Madan, May 20, 2025).
• However, the Lebanese leadership emphasized that they wanted to reach agreements with Hezbollah through dialogue, and hoped it would be possible to resolve the issue without violent confrontations. President Aoun said the current focus was on weapons south of the Litani River, although any weapons depot discovered north of the river was also being dealt with. He said Hezbollah had the right to participate in political life as it represented a political constituency, but only the state could hold weapons, and Hezbollah had no choice but to accept the state’s concept and its institutions and to understand that the state protected it and would be responsible in the event of a confrontation with Israel (YouTube channel of the program “The Last Word” with Lamis al-Hadidi on ON, May 18, 2025).
• The broadest support in the Lebanese political system for Hezbollah’s disarmament comes from the Christian National Forces Party, whose representatives in the government, headed by Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji, noted it was a vital interest for Lebanon. Party parliament members called for giving Hezbollah an ultimatum of six months to hand over its weapons and to use force if it refused.
• Although Hezbollah had initially expressed willingness to cooperate with the Lebanese army in implementing the ceasefire south of the Litani River, it rejected giving up its weapons, especially north of the river. However, while inflating the role of “the resistance” to preserve Hezbollah’s status among its supporters, they began to “moderate” their rhetoric and claimed willingness to engage in dialogue with the government on a “national defense strategy,” which in their view would preserve “the resistance,” in coordination with the army and state institutions for the benefit of the Lebanese people. Hezbollah’s main criticism was directed at Foreign Minister Rajji, considered the government’s most vocal supporter of disarming the organization. After Rajji accused Hezbollah of responsibility for the destruction and losses in the fighting and said they justified disarmament, Ibrahim al-Mousawi, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, accused Rajji of “giving the enemy freedom to continue its crimes” and of “damaging the national interest.” He said Hezbollah had hoped that the foreign minister would do the minimum required of him as part of his national responsibility, but he was “going too far with his fabrications” (al-‘Ahed, March 20, 2025).

Nabih Berri, Senior “Shi’ite duo” Figure

• The developments in the Lebanese political arena revealed the status of Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, as the senior member or the “Shi’ite duo” after the death of Hezbollah’s secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, who had been the dominant figure, despite their friendship and cooperation of nearly three decades. For example, immediately after the ceasefire went into effect, Berri announced the convening of the session to elect the president. He also reportedly agreed with Aoun that a “serious” discussion on the issue of weapons would take place only after the withdrawal of the “enemy” from Lebanon and the cessation of the attacks and “violations,” in accordance with the “Shi’ite duo’s point of view” (al-Madan, April 25, 2025).

• Journalist Nada Andraos wrote that Berri assumed the leadership of the Shi’ite community after Nasrallah’s death, when Hezbollah was struggling and uncertain despite the appointment of the new secretary general, Na’im Qassem. She noted that Berri and Nasrallah had bridged between Amal’s national outlook and Hezbollah’s loyalty to Iran, and now it remained to be seen if the Shi’ite public in general, and Hezbollah’s support base in particular, would gravitate toward Berri’s position, and whether a leadership would arise within Hezbollah that could bridge the gaps. She wrote that Berri apparently did not yet have a partner like Nasrallah, who would allow the Shi’ites to return “to the security and embrace of the state and the homeland” (al-Madan, February 22, 2025).

Hezbollah’s Involvement in Lebanon’s Civilian Reconstruction

• Another significant challenge for Hezbollah, vis-à-vis both its support base in Lebanon’s Shi’ite community and the government, is the issue of Lebanon’s reconstruction. In his first speech after the ceasefire, Hezbollah’s secretary general Na’im Qassem said the organization would assist in the reconstruction and in providing shelter for the displaced, and would cooperate with the government and the assisting states (al-Manar, November 29, 2024). On another occasion, he said Hezbollah was committed to reconstruction and shelter, consistent with the promise of Hassan Nasrallah. He reiterated that Hezbollah would cooperate with the government and the state, saying that the houses destroyed would be rebuilt at the expense of the Lebanese government with Hezbollah’s assistance. He also claimed Hezbollah had already paid $57 million for reconstruction, most of it donated by Iran (al-Manar, December 5, 2024).
• On December 30, 2024, Ali Damoush, deputy chairman of Hezbollah’s executive council, presented a two-part reconstruction plan: the renovation and provision of shelter for the displaced, and the full reconstruction of houses and housing units. He promised that every family which had lost its home in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia would receive $14,000 for a year’s rent and every family in another area of Lebanon would receive $12,000. He claimed the necessary funding would come from Iran, adding that while Hezbollah was working on a reconstruction plan, the state also had to fulfill its obligations to the citizens since it was a national project (al-Nashra, December 30, 2024).
• In the period that followed, Hezbollah worked to highlight its reconstruction activities, which were led by Jihad al-Bina Association,^[13] to demonstrate its commitment. Hussein Khair al-Din, an engineer who holds the reconstruction portfolio in Jihad al-Bina, reported that immediately after the beginning of the ceasefire, 27 centers were established throughout Lebanon to map the damage and within five months the mapping had been completed, which he described as “miraculous.” He stated that 348,321 housing units had sustained only internal damage but were still standing on their foundations and their ceilings remained intact; about 6,000 housing units required only structural rehabilitation; about 12,000 buildings, constituting about 40,000 dwelling units, had been completely destroyed. He said rent for a year had been paid for those whose houses were destroyed, in addition to $8,000 for the purchase of furniture. He claimed that about 80% of the owners of the 348,000 units which sustained internal damage had already received compensation and the rest were expected to receive it soon. However, he admitted there were also many challenges, such as the enormous scope of the damage in more than 450 communities across wide areas of Lebanon, a shortage of computers and other technical equipment, the need to train a large number of engineers to fill out damage assessment forms and deal with the residents, and the psychological pressure of the displaced, each of whom expected that his damage would be assessed first (al-‘Ahed, April 24, 2025).

• The al-Qard al-Hassan Association, Hezbollah’s financial arm is responsible for disbursing compensation. To reduce the extent of the damage incurred in the fighting, days after the beginning of the ceasefire Hezbollah announced that the offices and branches of the association had resumed operations despite the direct strikes they sustained (al-Sharq al-Awsat, December 5, 2025).
• However, on January 29, 2025, the Association announced it was delaying compensation until February 10 due to unspecified “technical reasons” (Lebanon 24, January 29, 2024). “Sources” reported the delay was a consequence of the enormous financial losses Hezbollah had suffered and Israel’s destruction of most of its branches, headquarters and warehouses. They added that the destruction of its cash, jewelry and other assets had plunged it into a financial crisis worse than the 2006 war, and it was unable to pay compensation. “Well-informed sources” added that Hezbollah was surprised by the extent of the damage and the number of families affected and in need of compensation (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 31, 2025). On March 31, 2025, the Association announced compensation would again be delayed, this time until April 15, as part of preparations for the second stage after 75% of the value of the compensation had been disbursed in the first stage (Lebanon Debate, April 12, 2025).

• Lebanese accused Hezbollah of compensation payments which were inconsistent with the extent of the damage. A man named Hassan Shahrour reported that before the fighting he had a workshop he had built in his home, but the attacks damaged the house, the ceiling and the walls. He said Hezbollah representatives had surveyed the damage but in compensation he received only $215, even though an engineer and experts who inspected the damage on his behalf stated that repairs would cost $2000 (Facebook page of al-Hadath Lebanon, December 23, 2024). According to Khair al-Din, the statements about Hezbollah’s bankruptcy and its inability to pay the compensation were untrue and he promised that “our people do not have to worry” (al-‘Ahed, April 24, 2025).
• In addition to noting its achievements, Hezbollah accused the government of obstructing reconstruction:
  • Hezbolla secretary general Na’im Qassem accused the government of “impoverishing” the Lebanese by not promoting plans and timetables for reconstruction, and claimed that Hezbollah had been forced to fulfill the role of the state when it provided shelter to more than 50,000 residents and renovated more than 332,000 buildings (al-Manar, April 28, 2025).
  • Hassan Fadlallah, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said there was a need for a “real” state which was responsible for its citizens and warned that “silence, hesitant functioning, indifference to what is happening in the south and negligence regarding reconstruction” were creating a gap between the people and the state. He wondered how the state sought to be the sole authority when it was not fulfilling its responsibilities (al-Manar, April 27, 2025).
  • Hussein Khair al-Din, the engineer coordinating the reconstruction portfolio in Jihad al-Bina, said the government was responsible for renovation, removal of debris and construction, but it was engaged only in removing debris and was slow in dealing with other areas (al-Manar, April 1, 2025).
• The tension between Hezbollah and the state institutions also increased as a result of international pressure to take action against Hezbollah and to prevent funds from entering from Iran. Lebanon reportedly received a formal message from the United States stating that any aid or loans received to help rebuild the country from the damage of the fighting were conditional on the state’s declaring the establishment of an official fund under independent management to handle the money. The fund had to have a mechanism which would prevent Hezbollah from access (al-Akhbar, February 18, 2025). Lebanese Foreign Minister Yousef Rajji said the United States special envoy to Lebanon, Morgan Ortagus, had informed the state that there would be no reconstruction or international aid before weapons north and south of the Litani River had been eliminated (al-Sharq al-Awsat, March 10, 2025).
• Hezbollah strongly criticized the Lebanese government for its refusal to accept the “billions of dollars” Iran had offered for Lebanon’s reconstruction. Hezbollah claimed the Lebanese government refused the aid in fear of American sanctions, and instead “chased” only $250 million from the World Bank “despite the humiliating conditions its receipt entailed.” Hezbollah called on its supporters to participate in its online campaign, “Reconstruction is an obligation, not a choice,” whose objective was “to prevent the United States from achieving by peaceful means what Israel failed to achieve by war” (SIMIA, Hezbollah’s social media monitoring unit , May 10, 2025).

• Another factor expected to exacerbate the tension and make it difficult for Hezbollah to fund reconstruction and to restore its military-terrorist capabilities is the future of al-Qard al-Hassan Association. The government is under increasing pressure from the American administration and Hezbollah’s political opponents to act against the Association, which currently operates outside the Lebanese banking system, as part of the economic reforms required for the receipt of international aid for reconstruction. The Association’s future was also reportedly raised in the informal talks between Hezbollah and the state on the issue of weapons, and Hezbollah was informed that American pressure was increasing. In response, Hezbollah expressed a willingness to hold discussions on any issue to help the state without causing an uproar, but noted that al-Qard al-Hassan had eased the burden on the citizens and had expanded its activity only because the sanctions had undermined confidence in the Lebanese banks (al-Akhbar, May 15, 2025). According to a different report, although there were calls for the final dismantling of al-Qard al-Hassan, it was unlikely to happen and there was a possibility of integrating the Association into the official banking sector as an Islamic bank, but under supervision. However, a “legal source” admitted that the issue of regulating the Association’s activity, its integration or its closure was complicated and involved economics, law and politics (al-Madan, April 22, 2025).
• So far, despite the challenges, Hezbollah has apparently kept its power base. In May 2025 municipal elections were held in Lebanon for the first time since 2016, the first test for Hezbollah’s status in the Shi’ite public after the fighting and in the shadow of reconstruction.^[14] The results showed that the Development and Loyalty list, shared by Hezbollah and Amal, won in all the councils in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia, in dozens of councils in the Beqa’a Valley, and in all 80 municipalities in the Baalbek-Hermel governorate, including in the city of Baalbek, where the candidates of the joint list defeated their rivals by a margin of more than 6,000 votes. Journalist Faisal al-Ashmar, writing on Hezbollah’s al-‘Ahed news site, noted that despite attempts to “distort Hezbollah’s image and spread lies, the ballot boxes were filled with love and support for Hezbollah.” He said the real test was the parliamentary elections expected next year, which would show the connection between Hezbollah and its environment (al-‘Ahed, May 20, 2025).
• Ibrahim al-Amin, editor-in-chief of Hezbollah’s daily al-Akhbar, noted that the organization had chosen a strategy of implementing policy changes linked to maintaining influence and cohesion within its immediate environment, that is, the Shi’ite community. Therefore, the results of the elections in Mount Lebanon, the north of the country, the Beqa’a Valley and Beirut fulfilled their purpose since the supporters of the “resistance” in all those areas had prevented the penetration of “anti-resistance views” into positions of influence. However, in rare criticism of Hezbollah by al-Amin, he argued that the organization had been wrong not to remain neutral in the municipal elections held in Beirut [on May 18, 2025] and to join the Beirut Unites Us list with the Christian Phalange and Lebanese Front parties. He said Hezbollah had recruited additional votes only from the Shi’ite population to compensate for the deficit in support among the Sunnis, and thus had sent a negative message to most of Beirut’s population, while the Christian parties in the list, which he called “the minions sponsored by the United States and Saudi Arabia,” were quick to disavow ties with Hezbollah and as soon as the polls closed declared that they had not cooperated with it. He said Hezbollah might not view the developments as mistakes, but to solve the problems it had to start by addressing the public and then by renewing confidence in the idea that Hezbollah truly cared about reform and change (al-Akhbar, May 21, 2025).

1. Hezbollah and the Palestinian terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon.

2. For further information, see the July 2024 ITIC report, Hezbollah's Policy for the Use of Force against Israel.

3. Anti-Israel terrorism and violence.

4. For further information, see the December 2024 ITIC report, The Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire Agreement The Lebanese Point of View

5. For further information, see the November 2024 ITIC report, Sheikh Na’im Qassem, Hezbollah’s Newly – Appointed Secretary General.

6. For further information, see the weekly ITIC reports, "Spotlight on Terrorism – Hezbollah and Lebanon."

7. For further information, see the December 24, 2024 ITIC report, Captured documents reveal how Iran smuggles weapons via Syria and Jordan.

8. For further information, see the December 2024 ITIC report, The Power Groups in Syria after the Fall of the Assad Regime.

9. For further information, see the January 2025 ITIC report, Iran in the Face of Regional Developments: Challenges, Responses and Possible Courses of Action.

10. For further information, see the weekly ITIC reports, "Spotlight on Syria."

11. The ministers do not belong to the Hezbollah or Amal factions in the Lebanese Parliament.

12. For further information, see the May 2025 ITIC report, Lebanese Positions on Disarming Hezbollah.

13. The Jihad al-Bina Association, a branch of the Iranian Jihad al-Bina organization, is one of Hezbollah’s leading social institutions. For further information, see the jule 2019 ITIC report, Jihad al-Bina Association in Lebanon: A Hezbollah social foundation engaged in construction and social projects among the Shiite community, being a major component in Hezbollah’s civilian infrastructure.

14. The fourth and last round of elections was held in south Lebanon, Hezbollah's main stronghold in Lebanon, on May 24, 2025,

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