1. Home
  2. Countries
  3. The West

The West

Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon (January 5-12, 2026)

The IDF continued attacking Hezbollah targets in south Lebanon and in the Beqa'a Valley to enforce the ceasefire agreement of November 2024 and to prevent the organization's renewed military buildup. The forces attacked weapons depots above and below ground, launch sites and launchers, and eliminated five Hezbollah operatives. Hamas military sites in south Lebanon were also attacked; Aoun, the Lebanese president, maintained "cautious optimism" and said the risk of a large-scale war had been almost completely eliminated despite the continued Israeli attacks, noting that reaching understandings with Israel would be a significant step toward peace; The Lebanese army announced it had achieved "operational control" in the area south of the Litani River as part of the first phase of achieving a state monopoly on weapons, but the government has still not set timetables for the continued disarmament of Hezbollah. The Lebanese foreign minister claimed the Lebanese army would be capable of confronting Hezbollah if necessary; The Iranian foreign minister visited Lebanon and met with the country's leadership and with Hezbollah's secretary general. He said Iran wanted to strengthen bilateral economic and political ties and claimed that Tehran supported Hezbollah as a "resistance" organization but did not interfere in Lebanon's internal affairs; A member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament said an American attack on Iran would lead to wide-scale regional escalation; According to reports, mid-level Hezbollah officials have begun moving their families and assets out of Lebanon, mainly to Latin America.
Read more...

The Completion of the First Phase of Hezbollah’s Disarmament

On January 8, 2026, the commander of the Lebanese army, Rodolph Haykal, informed the Lebanese government that the first phase of the state's monopoly on weapons had been successfully implemented south of the Litani River except for areas under IDF control; The government ministers opposed to Hezbollah demanded a schedule for continuing disarmament, while Hezbollah and Amal ministers conditioned progress on halting Israeli "violations." The government instructed the army to prepare a plan for disarmament north of the Litani River, but no schedule was set; Hezbollah did not directly relate to the army's announcement, reiterating its position that Lebanon in general and the organization in particular had fully implemented the ceasefire agreement, and Israel had to honor its commitments; Lebanon's president, prime minister and parliament speaker welcomed the announcement, noting that the army had to be provided with the tools required for its missions. Prime Minister Salam said the role of the "resistance" had ended with Israel's withdrawal from south Lebanon in 2000, and that today only the state and the army defended Lebanon; Hezbollah's political opponents were dissatisfied with the delay in disarming the organization, noting that made it difficult for the country to rehabilitate itself after the war. The Lebanese foreign minister met in Beirut with the Iranian foreign minister and made it clear to him that Hezbollah had to disarm in accordance with the government decision; Lebanon is apparently taking a time-out in implementing the state's monopoly on weapons. The first phase, south of the Litani River, is being represented as an achievement, but with no decision to move northward and an attempt to buy time with the argument that first Israel has to end its "violations" of the ceasefire agreement. In ITIC assessment, in the foreseeable future the army will expand its deployment in south Lebanon and make preparations for disarmament north of the Litani River, but without a binding schedule because of Hezbollah's lack of cooperation. In all probability, transitioning to the second phase will remain a declarative goal, dependent mainly on Israeli and international pressure and on an internal political consensus which has yet to ripen.
Read more...

Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (December 30, 2025 – January 6, 2026)

IDF forces continued to operate within the Yellow Line in the Gaza Strip, eliminating terrorist operatives who posed a threat and exposing rocket launchers ready for firing at Israeli territory; Hamas condemned Israel's decision to halt the activity in the Gaza Strip of more than 30 international aid organizations; The consolidation of Hamas' civilian and security governance continued, opening schools and hospitals with assistance from Qatar and Turkey; Internal tensions were reported within the Hamas leadership following the formation of a new leadership in the Gaza Strip led by Ali al-Amoudi, one of Yahya al-Sinwar's close associates; Hamas continued to defy the Israeli and American demand that the movement disarm, claiming it was a ploy to prevent the transition to the second phase of the ceasefire agreement; The deputy chairman of the Palestinian Authority held talks in Egypt and Saudi Arabia for implementing the second phase of the agreement in the Strip. According to reports, the Authority's role at the beginning of the phase would be limited to managing the Rafah Crossing; Hamas in Judea and Samaria accused Israel of attempting to impose a new situation on the ground and called on all "factions" to formulate a "joint line of resistance."
Read more...

Potential Terrorist Threats to Israeli and Jewish Interests in Australia

On December 14, 2025, two Muslim terrorists, who according to assessments by the Australian authorities had been inspired by ISIS, shot participants at a Hanukkah event at Bondi Beach in Sydney. Fifteen people were killed; The attack was the culmination of a wave of antisemitism which has been directed at the Jewish community in Australia since the Hamas terrorist attack and massacre in Israel on October 7, 2023; The October 7 attack was followed by large demonstrations led by pro-Palestinian organizations and fueled a discourse of hatred and anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement, with broad support from the Muslim community in Australia. At protest demonstrations support was voiced for Hamas, despite its being designated a terrorist organization in Australia, alongside calls for the destruction of Israel; Australian authorities identified Iran as responsible for several antisemitic attacks, following which the Iranian ambassador was expelled and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was declared a terrorism-supporting entity; As the attack in Sydney revealed, figures associated with extreme Islamist worldviews, including Muslim preachers against whom no legal measures have been taken by the authorities, also play a prominent role; The expanding circle of threats against Israeli and Jewish interests in Australia poses a significant challenge for the country's authorities, who are attempting to balance the need to combat antisemitic incitement and the threats it fuels with the need to preserve liberal values, especially freedom of expression, religion and assembly for pro-Palestinian organizations protesting Israeli activity in the Gaza Strip. In ITIC assessment, as long as the authorities do not take concrete action against the promotion of antisemitic incitement, Hamas, Iran and global jihad organizations will find fertile ground in Australia for recruiting operatives who will turn antisemitic and anti-Israeli rhetoric into acts of violence like the Bondi Beach attack.
Read more...

Previous years bulletins

202620252024202320222021202020192018201720162015201420132012201120102009200820072006