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UN Security Council Resolution 2803 for the Future of the Gaza Strip – Positions of Power Actors

On November 17, 2025, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 2803, which adopts the 20-point American plan for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and for "the day after."; The resolution endorses the establishment of a Board of Peace which will temporarily administer the Gaza Strip until control is transferred to the Palestinian Authority. It also approves the establishment of an international stabilization force, which will operate alongside a vetted Palestinian police force, in coordination with Israel and Egypt, to ensure the demilitarization of the Strip and the disarmament of "armed groups."; The resolution does not include an explicit commitment to a Palestinian state, but expresses hope for the creation of a "credible pathway" to Palestinian self-determination if the Palestinian Authority implements the required reforms; Hamas and the other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip rejected the resolution and warned that any international force that arrived in the Gaza Strip would be considered an "occupying force" if it attempted to disarm them. Iran and the Houthis subscribed to Hamas' position and claimed that the resolution was intended to serve Israeli objectives. The Palestinian Authority, however welcomed the resolution and expressed readiness to assume full responsibility for the Gaza Strip; In ITIC assessment, despite the importance of the Security Council resolution as an outline for a course for "the day after" in Gaza which includes full demilitarization and a stable, non-Hamas rule, it is a declarative step and it is unclear whether it can be implemented. In all probability, the refusal of Hamas and the other terrorist organizations to disarm, and the threat that they will regard the international force as an "occupying force," will increase friction between them and the foreign forces arriving in the Strip and lead to violent clashes which might also affect IDF forces. In addition, the uncertainty regarding the Palestinian Authority's ability to fully and credibly implement the required reforms and the absence of agreements between Hamas and Fatah regarding the identity of the technocratic management committee, alongside the inherent difficulty in establishing effective control and supervision over the Palestinian population, will create a vacuum in governance which will allow Hamas to continue securing its security and civilian governance in the Strip.
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Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis (November 12-19, 2025)

The Iranian Foreign Ministry expressed “deep concern” that the UN Security Council resolution adopting President Trump’s plan for the future of the Gaza Strip contradicts the Palestinians’ right to self-determination. It stressed that the international force in the Gaza Strip should only deal with implementing the ceasefire and bringing in humanitarian aid; The advisor to the Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament met in Tehran with senior Iranian government officials, headed by the Secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, the Foreign Minister, and the Speaker of the Majles. He expressed hope that Iran would be more present in dealing with the challenges facing Lebanon; Iranian officials congratulated Iraq following the parliamentary elections held in the country, in which the pro-Iranian militias increased their power; It was reported that Iran returned the IRGC Qods Force representative to Yemen to help the Houthis reorganize following the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and the Israeli strikes in Yemen. The UN Security Council extended sanctions on the Houthis and senior figures in the Houthi leadership and security forces by one year.
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Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (November 11-18, 2025)

IDF forces continued operating within the Yellow Line in the Gaza Strip to destroy tunnels and terrorist facilities, and eliminated terrorists who posed a threat. According to claims, in the month since beginning of the ceasefire, IDF forces destroyed more than 1,500 structures in the Gaza Strip; Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad returned the body of an Israeli civilian who had been murdered and kidnapped in the October 7, 2023 attack. The bodies of three murdered hostages remain in the Gaza Strip; Hamas continued to advance its civil and security governance in the Strip; Israel opened the Zikim Crossing for the entry of aid trucks, while the American Coordination Center reported that the daily average number of aid trucks had increased from 600 to 800 and that more than 40 countries and organizations were participating in the aid activity. Hamas and its media exploited the rain in the Gaza Strip to promote a "Gaza is sinking" narrative, while blaming Israel for the situation and calling on the international community to send assistance to the Strip; The UN Security Council passed a resolution adopting the American plan for a ceasefire and the rehabilitation of the Gaza Strip. Hamas condemned the resolution and warned that any international force operating in the Strip would be considered fighting alongside "the occupation." The Palestinian Authority (PA) welcomed the resolution and continued preparations to reassume responsibility for the Strip; The organizers of the Global Sunud (Perseverance) Flotilla, prevented from reaching the Gaza Strip by Israel in early October 2025, announced that they would dispatch a larger flotilla to the Gaza Strip in the coming months; Israeli security forces continued extensive activity in Judea and Samaria, eliminating terrorists and terrorist cells attempting to attack security personnel and civilians. Clashes continued between Jewish settlers and Palestinian residents during the olive harvest season; The chairman of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, announced that a delegation would arrive for talks at UNESCO for adapting the Palestinian curricula to international standards while preserving "the core of the Palestinian national consciousness."
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Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon (November 10-17, 2025)

IDF forces attacked Hezbollah facilities in south Lebanon and in the Beqa'a Valley and eliminated operatives of the organization as part of ongoing activity against Hezbollah's presence in south Lebanon, in violation of the ceasefire understandings and because of the organization's renewed attempts to regain its strength and rebuild its arsenal. A rocket launching site and facilities for the production and storage of strategic weapons were attacked, and a Hezbollah operative who also served as a school principal was eliminated; Hezbollah secretary general Na'im Qassem threatened a possible response to the continued Israeli attacks. Another senior Hezbollah figure warned that Israel would achieve nothing with a new war in Lebanon or an escalation and "any aggression will be met with confrontation."; Senior Lebanese government officials reiterated their support for opening negotiations with Israel which would lead to the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the regulation of the border, and accused Israel of continuing "aggression." It was reported that American officials who visited Lebanon concluded that there was no chance of progress and the American administration would allow Israel to carry out a powerful and brief attack on Hezbollah without sliding into a broad war. The aide to the speaker of the Lebanese parliament visited Iran and said he hoped it would stand by Lebanon "in the face of the challenges before us."; UNIFIL protested to Israel over the construction of a new security wall, claiming it penetrated Lebanese sovereign territory. The IDF denied UNIFIL's claims of deliberate gunfire at a UN force in south Lebanon; The Lebanese army reportedly refused Israel's demand to conduct searches for Hezbollah weapons in private homes in south Lebanon for fear of confrontation with operatives of the organization and its supporters. A senior Hezbollah figure claimed the organization had the right to refuse external pressures to disarm; Given the growing pressure from the American administration to block Hezbollah's funding, Lebanon's central bank announced there would be tighter supervision on unauthorized institutions and illegal money transfers. Hezbollah warned that it would respond to an attempt to disrupt the activities of the al-Qard al-Hasan Association, the organization's economic arm.
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Iran Assists Hezbollah’s Post-Ceasefire Reconstruction

The United States Treasury Department reported that Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) had transferred approximately $1 billion to Hezbollah since the beginning of the year to reconstruct the organization's military capabilities in the wake of the war against Israel. Since the war ended in late November 2024, Iran has also continued to smuggle weapons to the organization and interfere with the Lebanese government's efforts to disarm Hezbollah. As a result, a senior American delegation urged the Lebanese leadership to accelerate action against the sources of Hezbollah's funding; The fall of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024 and the flight ban imposed by the Lebanese government on Iran since February 2025 disrupted the land and air routes used by Iran to transfer weapons, technological assistance and funds to Hezbollah. Iran and Hezbollah subsequently found other avenues, including smuggling through Turkey and Iraq, by sea and through currency-exchange agencies. They also continue to rely on smuggling networks along the Syria-Lebanon border, despite Syrian and IDF efforts to block them; The Iranian embassy in Beirut denied the information provided by the American government, but throughout the war in the Gaza Strip and after the ceasefire Iranian officials made clear that they continue to support Hezbollah, as they do other members of the "resistance axis." Hezbollah secretary general Na'im Qassem also publicly thanked Iran for its "massive" assistance; The American disclosure of the financial aid transferred by the IRGC to Hezbollah, along with the exposure of smuggling methods, showed that Iran and Hezbollah had found ways to overcome the challenges of geopolitical changes in Lebanon and the Middle East since the ceasefire in late November 2024, and how difficult it was to dent the 40-year cooperation between Tehran and the Lebanese organization. In all probability Iran will continue to support and fund Hezbollah's military and civil reconstruction in order to preserve its status within the Shi'ite community and in Lebanon, and to prevent Israel and the Lebanese authorities from weakening or neutralizing Iran's most important strategic arm in the Middle East. The absence of more decisive action by the international community in general and by the Lebanese government in particular, to eliminate Hezbollah's funding sources and block smuggling routes, will allow Iran and Hezbollah to continue transferring funds and weapons with little disruption.
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Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis (November 1—12, 2025)

The Iranian Foreign Ministry strongly condemned the extensive attacks carried out by the IDF in Lebanon. Iranian media warned of Israel’s intention to conduct a large-scale operation against Hezbollah in Lebanon and threatened a harsh response from Hezbollah and the “resistance front” in case of such action; The US Department of Treasury has stated that Iran has transferred one billion dollars to Hezbollah since the beginning of 2025. The Iranian Embassy in Beirut rejected the American claims; Iranian Majles Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf called for a firm stance against Israel and for exacting a price from countries seeking to normalize relations with it. The Houthi leader accused the United States of being complicit in the Israeli “aggression” in the Gaza Strip even after the ceasefire. The Houthi chief of staff sent a letter to Hamas’ military wing, praising its victory over “the strongest empires.”; Iran has reportedly increased the supply of weapons, including missiles, to pro-Iranian Shiite militias in Iraq, in preparation for the possibility of a resumption of hostilities between Iran and Israel. It was also reported that the IRGC encourages major Shiite militias to integrate into Iraq’s political system while at the same time supporting smaller militias so they can continue military activity within the “resistance front.”; Mexican security forces thwarted an IRGC attempt to assassinate Israel’s ambassador to Mexico. Iran strongly denied the report; Senior Houthi officials warned they are preparing for a new round of fighting against Israel and confirmed they have suspended their attacks against Israel and against vessels in view of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip; The Houthis claimed to have uncovered an espionage network operating on behalf of a “joint operations room” of Israel, the United States, and Saudi Arabia, which had been collecting intelligence on Houthi military and security infrastructure as well as senior government officials.
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