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The Palestinian Islamic Jihad

Escalation of terrorist activity in Judea and Samaria Following the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip

Hamas' ambition was to turn Judea and Samaria into an arena for terrorism as part of the campaign to destroy Israel which began with the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. However, the counterterrorism actions taken by the Israeli security forces, which included the detention and elimination of thousands of wanted persons and terrorist operatives and the seizure of weapons prevented a wave of terrorism from Judea and Samaria; Following the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) began efforts to shift the center of the "resistance" to Judea and Samaria, encouraging attacks on Israeli security forces and settlers; Iran also continues its central role in efforts to turn Judea and Samaria into an active terrorist arena against Israel. A shipment of weapons from Iran was intercepted, which included powerful explosive charges and explosive-carrying drones; Qods Force operatives in Lebanon who were involved in the smuggling routes of weapons were eliminated; In ITIC assessment, after the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, with Iranian assistance, will direct a significant portion of their activity to Judea and Samaria to justify their existence by continuing the "resistance." The terrorist organizations will also try to exploit the return of the Palestinian issue to the global stage and the regional and international involvement in the Gaza Strip within the framework of the ceasefire to create pressure on Israel, provoking attacks which could escalate Israel's response in Judea and Samaria. Moreover, the return of hundreds of terrorist operatives from Israeli jails to Judea and Samaria will intensify the activity of the terrorist organizations, which will exploit the knowledge and experience of the released prisoners and the cooperative networks they built in prison.
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Spotlight on Terrorism – October 2025

During October 2025, fighting continued in the Gaza Strip and in Judea and Samaria, and the Houthi attacks continued from Yemen. On October 10, 2025, a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip went into effect, also pausing the Houthi attacks. The ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah was maintained despite IDF attacks on Hezbollah targets; The Gaza Strip: Until the ceasefire on October 10, the IDF continued attacking terrorist targets from the air and on the ground throughout the Strip, focusing on maneuvering inside Gaza City. Two IDF soldiers were killed. Eight rockets were fired at Israel. After the ceasefire began and IDF forces withdrew from parts of the Strip, the IDF continued enforcing the agreement against threats to its forces and in response to Hamas violations. Three IDF soldiers were killed. As part of the agreement, the twenty remaining live hostages held in the Gaza Strip were released, along with the bodies of seventeen murdered hostages from the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. Eleven bodies of murdered hostages remain in the Gaza Strip; Judea, Samaria, and Israel: There was one terrorist attack, compared to four the previous month; there were no casualties. Israeli security forces continued counterterrorism operations throughout Judea and Samaria, during which rockets were found, terrorist operatives planning attacks were eliminated, and a large shipment of weapons from Iran was seized; Lebanon: The IDF intensified its activity to prevent Hezbollah from violating the understandings of the ceasefire which went into effect on November 27, 2024, and against the organization's efforts to regain its military capabilities and restore its arsenal. More than twenty Hezbollah operatives were eliminated, including the logistics commander of the southern front headquarters and commanders and operatives from the Radwan Force. Hundreds of engineering vehicles and military infrastructures were destroyed; Syria: IDF forces prevented weapons from being smuggled into Israel and Lebanon from southern Syria; The Houthis: Until the Gaza ceasefire on October 10, the Houthis claimed responsibility for one ballistic missile attack on targets in Israel. The IDF spokesperson reported the interception of one ballistic missile and seven UAVs. The Houthis also claimed responsibility for an attack on a cargo ship in the Gulf of Aden, during which one crew member was killed. The Houthis announced the death of their chief of staff in an Israeli attack at the end of August 2025.
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Preparations for “the Day After” in the Gaza Strip: The Palestinian Organizations Meet in Cairo

On October 23 and 24, 2025, the Palestinian organizations met in Cairo at a conference sponsored by Egypt with Qatari and Turkish support, to formulate a unified Palestinian position, regarding the administration of the Gaza Strip and the disarmament of Hamas and other armed organizations in preparation for the next phase of the ceasefire. Most of the organizations sent representatives, including Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP): Fatah was not represented; According to the closing statement issued after the conference, the organizations agreed to continue the ceasefire, demanding the withdrawal of the IDF from the Gaza Strip, the lifting of the "siege," the opening of the crossings and the beginning of a reconstruction of the Strip. They agreed that the administration of the Strip would be transferred to a temporary committee of independent professionals in cooperation with Arab and international actors, along with an international committee for funding and supervision, and a temporary international force along the borders;  In addition to the conference, a meeting was held between a Hamas delegation, led by the head of the movement in the Gaza Strip, Khalil al-Hayya, and a delegation of the Palestinian Authority (PA), headed by the deputy chairman, Hussein al-Sheikh. The Egyptian intelligence chief also met separately with representatives of the organizations; Senior Hamas figures claimed the movement was committed to relinquishing control of the Gaza Strip and to reaching understandings with other Palestinian organizations regarding a joint vision for the ceasefire agreement, but would not state that Hamas was prepared to give up its weapons or to accept PA responsibility for the Strip. Fatah, however, said the PA had to assume responsibility for the Gaza Strip, including the administrative committee to be established to manage the territory and for maintaining security, and called on Hamas to act within the framework of the PLO; In ITIC assessment, the Palestinian organizations have realized that there is a narrow window of opportunity to form a national consensus and an interim framework acceptable to all sides, chiefly Hamas and Fatah. The outcome of the war and the pressure from the United States and the mediators have caused a cautious shift within Hamas toward relinquishing formal rule in favor of technocratic civil administration and elections, with the understanding that the proposed governance model, i.e., technocratic management under Arab and international oversight, would allow the movement to retain influence in the Strip. Hamas also understands that disarming would determine its fate, and in ITIC assessment, the movement will attempt to obscure and postpone the issue of disarmament within any future agreement. However, even if understandings are formally reached and the sides announce a joint decision without binding commitments or a practical plan for disarming the organizations, Israel will face a dilemma regarding the implementation of a full withdrawal, the opening of crossings and approval for Gaza's reconstruction.
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The future of Hamas’ weapons and its efforts to rebuild the military wing

The American Twenty-Point Plan, which served as the basis for the ceasefire agreement to end the Gaza Strip War, explicitly stipulates that during the second phase Hamas and the other armed terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip will be required to disarm and the Strip will become a demilitarized zone; Senior Hamas figures made it clear that although they were committed to maintaining the ceasefire, they were not willing disarm the "resistance" until the establishment of a Palestinian state. They also reiterated that it was "a complex issue that had to be deliberated' within "a broader framework of general Palestinian understandings about the future of the Strip."; As after the previous rounds of fighting, and despite the demand that it disarm, Hamas quickly took advantage of the ceasefire to rebuild its military wing by collecting unexploded ordnance and ammunition left in the Gaza Strip after two years of war. In all probability, to restore its arsenal Hamas will use weapons smuggled across the Egyptian border via civilian drones and the entry of raw materials and dual-purpose equipment intended for the reconstruction of the Strip to manufacture weapons; In ITIC assessment, Hamas' unwillingness to relinquish the weapons of the "resistance" reflect its determination to continue the armed "struggle" against Israel under the pretext of a "legal and religious [sic] right to fight the occupation." Therefore, until a new, temporary administration is established in the Gaza Strip, Hamas can be expected to take advantage of the interim period to rebuild its military capabilities, with Iran also expected to continue backing Hamas by providing financial aid, supplying weapons, and transferring technical and other knowledge and training. The involvement of Qatar and Turkey, Hamas' allies, in shaping the "day after" in Gaza can be expected to obstruct the establishment of a temporary administration which could lead genuine, sincere efforts to limit Hamas' activity and disarm it. However, even if the temporary administration demonstrates determination, Hamas will continue to use its proven experience to adapt its military buildup processes to the changing situations on the ground.
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Spotlight on Terrorism – September 2025

During September 2025 fighting in the Gaza Strip and counterterrorism activity in Judea and Samaria continued. The ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah continued despite IDF strikes on Hezbollah targets. The Houthis continued attacking Israeli territory; The IDF continued aerial and ground attacks on terrorist targets throughout the Strip and began a ground maneuver inside Gaza City. Ten IDF soldiers were killed. Commanders and operatives in the military wings of Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and other terrorist organizations were eliminated, including operatives involved in the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre, and operatives who held hostages. An attempted strike on the Hamas leadership in Qatar failed. Five rockets were fired at Israeli territory during September; There were four terrorist attacks compared with one in August; six Israeli civilians and three IDF soldiers were killed. Israeli security forces continued counterterrorism operations across Judea and Samaria, during which rockets were found and a network operating under the direction of Hamas' headquarters in Turkey was exposed; The IDF continued operations against Hezbollah's violations of the ceasefire which went into effect on November 27, 2024, and against the organization's attempts to reconstruct its military capabilities. At least 13 Hezbollah operatives were eliminated, including one involved in directing terrorism from Syria and another operating in the Iranian Imam Hussein Division, and military facilities were attacked. An operative from the Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese Brigades for Resistance to the Israeli Occupation was eliminated; Suspects planning to attack IDF forces in southern Syria were detained, and weapons and missile depots were attacked; The Houthis claimed responsibility for 26 ballistic missile and UAV attacks on Israel. The IDF spokesperson reported the interception of nine ballistic missiles and 12 UAVs, with additional missiles disintegrating en route to Israel; three UAVs hit Eilat, Israel's southernmost city, and Ramon Airport, injuring more than 20 people. The IDF attacked Houthi regime targets in Yemen twice.
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Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis (September 17—30, 2025)

In his speech at the UN General Assembly, the Iranian President accused Israel of committing “genocide” in the Gaza Strip and declared that the “Greater Israel” plan expresses the true intentions of the “Zionist regime.” The Houthi leader in Yemen accused the Arab countries of making a “strategic mistake” due to their continued ties with Israel; Hardline media in Iran expressed reservations about European countries’ recognition of the “State of Palestine,” arguing that such recognition is not enough to bring about a change in the Palestinians’ situation or to end the “Zionist occupation.”; Ali Larijani, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, arrived in Lebanon to participate in the commemoration ceremonies marking the first anniversary of the targeted killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. He stressed Iran’s continued support for Hezbollah but made it clear that it does not interfere in Lebanon’s decision-making. Before Larijani’s visit, the Lebanese government refused to allow two Iranian planes to land in Beirut ahead of the anniversary events; The Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman responded to the Syrian President’s remarks that the severing of relations between the two countries is not permanent and said that Iran is ready to renew ties with Damascus but is not in a hurry to do so; The Houthis claimed responsibility for nine attacks against targets in Israel using ballistic missiles and drones. Two drones exploded in Eilat, injuring at least 20 people. In response, the IDF attacked Houthi military targets in Sana’a; The Houthis reportedly improved their own capabilities in the production of drones and long-range missiles and are preparing for the possibility of a ground raid into Israeli territory; A Dutch-flagged cargo ship was attacked in the Red Sea and caught fire. Two crew members were injured; The United States has added four pro-Iranian militias in Iraq to the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The militias are preparing amid concerns about an Israeli attack; A Syrian militia claimed responsibility for an explosion near an IDF post in southern Syria, in which an IDF reserve officer was seriously wounded. 
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