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The Palestinian Authority (PA)

The Palestinian Authority prepares to administer the Gaza Strip after the war

Hamas' violent takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007 created a schism, the first of its kind, between the Palestinian Authority (PA) government in Judea and Samaria and the Hamas government in the Strip, initiating a continuing hostility between the sides despite attempts at reconciliation; The war that broke out with Hamas' attack and massacre of Israelis on October 7, 2023 provided the PA with an opportunity to reiterate its position that after the war, it should regain control of the Strip to create a geographic and political unity with Judea and Samaria ahead of the establishment of a Palestinian state. Senior PA figures stressed the position anew after the ceasefire that went into effect in the Gaza Strip in October 2025, and presented their own plans for the reconstruction of the Strip. Egypt and Qatar expressed support for the PA's position; Hamas voiced its reservations about the PA's return to the Gaza Strip, despite the movement's declaration that it would relinquish control of the Strip. However, after talks between senior Hamas and PA figures in Cairo, Hamas began to moderate its position and publicly support the appointment of a PA government minister to head the future Palestinian committee to administer the Strip. The most-heard name to head the committee is Dr. Amjad Abu Ramadan, the PA minister of health and former mayor of Gaza; In ITIC assessment, the PA can be expected to play a significant role in the committee for administering the Strip, despite Israel's public opposition and American ambiguity, as part of the understanding being formed by Fatah and Hamas, which seeks to demonstrate that it complies with the ceasefire terms. However, in all probability the dispute over the disarmament of Hamas and other "resistance" factions will continue, given Hamas' refusal to disarm, directly opposed to the PA position that it should hold a monopoly on weapons. Therefore, in ITIC assessment, the tension between Hamas and the PA will most likely persist and make it difficult to find a political solution which would enable progress in the efforts to rehabilitate the Strip.
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Preparations for “the Day After” in the Gaza Strip: The Palestinian Organizations Meet in Cairo

On October 23 and 24, 2025, the Palestinian organizations met in Cairo at a conference sponsored by Egypt with Qatari and Turkish support, to formulate a unified Palestinian position, regarding the administration of the Gaza Strip and the disarmament of Hamas and other armed organizations in preparation for the next phase of the ceasefire. Most of the organizations sent representatives, including Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP): Fatah was not represented; According to the closing statement issued after the conference, the organizations agreed to continue the ceasefire, demanding the withdrawal of the IDF from the Gaza Strip, the lifting of the "siege," the opening of the crossings and the beginning of a reconstruction of the Strip. They agreed that the administration of the Strip would be transferred to a temporary committee of independent professionals in cooperation with Arab and international actors, along with an international committee for funding and supervision, and a temporary international force along the borders;  In addition to the conference, a meeting was held between a Hamas delegation, led by the head of the movement in the Gaza Strip, Khalil al-Hayya, and a delegation of the Palestinian Authority (PA), headed by the deputy chairman, Hussein al-Sheikh. The Egyptian intelligence chief also met separately with representatives of the organizations; Senior Hamas figures claimed the movement was committed to relinquishing control of the Gaza Strip and to reaching understandings with other Palestinian organizations regarding a joint vision for the ceasefire agreement, but would not state that Hamas was prepared to give up its weapons or to accept PA responsibility for the Strip. Fatah, however, said the PA had to assume responsibility for the Gaza Strip, including the administrative committee to be established to manage the territory and for maintaining security, and called on Hamas to act within the framework of the PLO; In ITIC assessment, the Palestinian organizations have realized that there is a narrow window of opportunity to form a national consensus and an interim framework acceptable to all sides, chiefly Hamas and Fatah. The outcome of the war and the pressure from the United States and the mediators have caused a cautious shift within Hamas toward relinquishing formal rule in favor of technocratic civil administration and elections, with the understanding that the proposed governance model, i.e., technocratic management under Arab and international oversight, would allow the movement to retain influence in the Strip. Hamas also understands that disarming would determine its fate, and in ITIC assessment, the movement will attempt to obscure and postpone the issue of disarmament within any future agreement. However, even if understandings are formally reached and the sides announce a joint decision without binding commitments or a practical plan for disarming the organizations, Israel will face a dilemma regarding the implementation of a full withdrawal, the opening of crossings and approval for Gaza's reconstruction.
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Hamas Activity to Restore Security Governance in the Gaza Strip after the Ceasefire

The ceasefire in the Gaza Strip which began on October 10, 2025, provided Hamas with an opportunity to deploy its security forces in areas evacuated by the IDF and to demonstrate governance, despite the severe damage they suffered during the war; The Hamas security forces focused on fighting local clans accused of collaboration with Israel or identified as power centers which might threaten the movement's position in the Strip. The security forces carried out raids and arrests, confiscated equipment, and executed "collaborators" in full view of local residents; Hamas violence received support from the "resistance" [terrorist] organizations in the Gaza Strip and the umbrella organizations of clans which disowned the "collaborators" among them, but provoked angry reactions from the Palestinian Authority and the United States. However, Hamas claimed that their activity was intended to prevent "anarchy and chaos," but reportedly agreed to stop public executions; In ITIC assessment, as long as there is no actual change in the control of the Gaza Strip as part of the second phase of the ceasefire agreement, in which Hamas is supposed to relinquish power and disarm, the movement can be expected to continue using its security forces to attack any groups which might threaten it. The objective of using force, especially the executions, was to instill fear in the local population and ensure that Hamas retained influence even if it relinquished its governmental power centers. However, if fighting against Israel resumes, the militias and clans opposed to Hamas can be expected to take action to expand their areas of influence throughout the Strip.
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Spotlight on Terrorism – September 2025

During September 2025 fighting in the Gaza Strip and counterterrorism activity in Judea and Samaria continued. The ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah continued despite IDF strikes on Hezbollah targets. The Houthis continued attacking Israeli territory; The IDF continued aerial and ground attacks on terrorist targets throughout the Strip and began a ground maneuver inside Gaza City. Ten IDF soldiers were killed. Commanders and operatives in the military wings of Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and other terrorist organizations were eliminated, including operatives involved in the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre, and operatives who held hostages. An attempted strike on the Hamas leadership in Qatar failed. Five rockets were fired at Israeli territory during September; There were four terrorist attacks compared with one in August; six Israeli civilians and three IDF soldiers were killed. Israeli security forces continued counterterrorism operations across Judea and Samaria, during which rockets were found and a network operating under the direction of Hamas' headquarters in Turkey was exposed; The IDF continued operations against Hezbollah's violations of the ceasefire which went into effect on November 27, 2024, and against the organization's attempts to reconstruct its military capabilities. At least 13 Hezbollah operatives were eliminated, including one involved in directing terrorism from Syria and another operating in the Iranian Imam Hussein Division, and military facilities were attacked. An operative from the Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese Brigades for Resistance to the Israeli Occupation was eliminated; Suspects planning to attack IDF forces in southern Syria were detained, and weapons and missile depots were attacked; The Houthis claimed responsibility for 26 ballistic missile and UAV attacks on Israel. The IDF spokesperson reported the interception of nine ballistic missiles and 12 UAVs, with additional missiles disintegrating en route to Israel; three UAVs hit Eilat, Israel's southernmost city, and Ramon Airport, injuring more than 20 people. The IDF attacked Houthi regime targets in Yemen twice.
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Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (September 16-29, 2025)

IDF forces continued to operate further inside Gaza City and continued aerial attacks on terrorist targets above and below ground and the targeting of terrorist operatives, including those involved in the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. At least 750,000 Gaza City residents responded to IDF calls and moved to humanitarian areas in the south of the Strip despite threats and attempts by Hamas to prevent them. Six IDF soldiers were killed in the fighting; The United States president proposed a 21-point plan to end the war and secure the release of all hostages. Hamas denied it had received a new proposal and repeated its previous demands; Reports indicated the establishment of new militias operating against Hamas in various areas of the Gaza Strip, some in cooperation with Israel. Hamas security forces executed "collaborators" and promised protection to those who surrendered; The Global Sumud (Resilience) Flotilla is advancing with more than forty vessels and hundreds of activists in an attempt to "break the siege" of the Gaza Strip; Two IDF soldiers were shot and killed at the Allenby crossing by a Jordanian terrorist, and an IDF soldier was killed in a vehicular ramming attack in Samaria. Israeli security forces continued counterterrorism operations in Judea and Samaria and located rockets in the Ramallah and Tulkarm areas; Speaking before the UN General Assembly, Palestinian Authority chairman Mahmoud Abbas called for Hamas to disarm and promised that the "Palestinian state" would be demilitarized. Hamas condemned the speech and accused him of promoting the "Zionist narrative."
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Reactions to the Wave of Recognition of a Palestinian State

About ten countries, including France, Britain, Canada and Australia, announced their recognition of a Palestinian state, bringing the number of countries recognizing "Palestine" to 159 of the 193 UN member states. The announcements came after the UN General Assembly adopted the "New York Declaration," which supports advancing the two-state solution as the basis for ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; The Palestinian Authority welcomed the recognition and called for practical steps which would enable the establishment of the state of "Palestine." Hamas said that the recognition was the result of the October 7, 2023 attack and the organization would continue with armed "resistance." However, Palestinian Internet users doubted that the wave of diplomatic recognition would end the war in the Gaza Strip or improve the humanitarian situation; In the United States, the countries that recognized a Palestinian state were condemned, while in Italy and Germany it was called a premature step which would not advance negotiations to end the war and resolve the conflict. According to the Arab world, recognition gave Palestinians hope for realizing their rights; In ITIC assessment, adopting the New York Declaration and the additional recognition of a Palestinian state are a cognitive achievement for the Palestinians after the Palestinian issue had been pushed to the sidelines in recent years, and strengthen Hamas' arguments about the "historical importance" of the October 7, 2023 terrorist attack and massacre. However, the actual establishment of a Palestinian state is still in the distant future because of Israel's control of territory and resources, the weakness of the Palestinian Authority and its support for terrorism, in addition to the security situation in the Gaza Strip and Hamas' continued terrorist activity. American opposition to the recognition of a Palestinian state and its ability to veto a Security Council resolution to establish a Palestinian state leave the current move at the declarative level.
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