The Palestinian Authority (PA)

Hamas Criticism of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad Revealed in Seized Documents from the Gaza Strip

The military wings of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) have cooperated closely in wars and rounds of fighting against Israel, including during the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre and the subsequent war in the Gaza Strip, and together they operated a joint operations room with the other terrorist organizations in the Strip; Despite the cooperation, in several instances the two movements have disagreed, mainly due to PIJ's independent rocket fire, which led to short rounds of fighting against Israel, contrary to the "controlled escalation" policy which Hamas tried to promote while making secret preparations for the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. Hamas documents brought back by the IDF from the Gaza Strip indicated that Hamas was displeased by the PIJ's independent conduct; The documents also confirmed that many of the rockets fired at Israel by the PIJ fell inside the Gaza Strip, killing civilians and causing damage, which was also a serious problem for Hamas; In an attempt to reduce the PIJ's "rogue" actions, Hamas tried to impose its will on the PIJ and even subjugate the organization to its direct control. The documents included information regarding problems the PIJ caused the "resistance," including immoral behavior and intelligence infiltration, and measures to ensure that the PIJ would act in accordance with Hamas' interests at the political and military levels. The documents reveal a pragmatic and interest-based relationship between Hamas and the PIJ. Hamas views the PIJ as undisciplined and in need of constant control and supervision, while the PIJ seeks to gain public support by being more active against Israel. Although it is not known whether Hamas succeeded in fully implementing its plans to take over the PIJ, the war in the Gaza Strip showed that the two movements were able to overcome their differences and cooperate in dealing with Israel, including the deals to release the hostages. In ITIC’s assessment, although Hamas will ostensibly relinquish political control in the Gaza Strip as part of the second phase of the ceasefire agreement, both organizations can be expected to refuse to disarm and continue to attack Israeli security forces and civilians in accordance with the vision of a jihad war until the "annihilation of Israel." However, if Hamas is pragmatic, in all probability the conflict between the two movements will resume and intensify, publicly as well.
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The committee of Technocrats Who Will Manage the Gaza Strip

On January 14, 2026, Steve Witkoff, the American special envoy, announced the beginning of the second phase of the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip. Following that, the establishment of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza was announced, a Palestinian technocratic body intended to manage day-to-day affairs in the Strip in accordance with the American 20-point plan; Most of the committee's 12 members, headed by Dr. Ali Shaath, are affiliated with Fatah and the Palestinian Authority (PA), and some of them served in PA governments and public institutions. Committee members include Sami Nisman, a former official in Palestinian General Intelligence who was sentenced to imprisonment by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and Hana Tarazi, the only woman on the committee and a Christian lawyer specializing in Islamic law; The members of the committee are entrusted with establishing the Gazans' security, restoring essential services and fostering a society based on peace, democracy and justice. Committee chairman Shaath said its top priorities included providing shelter for residents and clearing rubble, and the cancellation of fees and taxes for Gazans and businesses in the Strip had already been ordered; Hamas claimed it was transferring governing authorities to the committee, while the PA noted the need to link institutions in the Gaza Strip with Judea and Samaria; In ITIC assessment, despite the committee's genuine desire to begin its operations, in all probability it will encounter difficulties in translating its vision into reality. First, Israel will prevent them from entering the Gaza Strip through the Rafah Crossing as long as the issue of the last murdered Israeli hostage is unresolved, forcing committee members to operate from Egypt. In addition, the degree of freedom of movement the committee will receive remains unclear, particularly in areas where Israel maintains security control. Moreover, despite Hamas' alleged willingness to transfer governance to the committee, it will have to rely on tens of thousands of employees who remain loyal to Hamas after nearly two decades of absolute Hamas control in the Strip. In such a situation, the committee will at best be able to carry out limited assistance and reconstruction activities, but most likely not to resolve core issues of control, security and demilitarization.
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Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (January 13-19, 2026)

The president of the United States announced the launch of the second phase of the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip and presented the bodies that will oversee implementation of the agreement and rehabilitation of the Strip, among them representatives of Qatar and Turkey; Dr. Ali Shaath, former deputy minister in the Palestinian Authority government, was appointed to head the committee of technocrats which will manage the Gaza Strip on a day-to-day basis and stated that the goal was "to support the Gazans and wipe away the children's tears."; Hamas claimed it was willing to transfer management of the Strip to the committee, but remained adamantly opposed to the demand to disarm it and the other terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip; IDF forces continued operating within the Yellow Line in the Gaza Strip, located and destroyed terrorist facilities and weapons, and eliminated terrorists who attempted to attack the forces. After exchanges of fire with a terrorist cell in Rafah, prominent terrorist operatives from Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad were attacked; Hamas security forces in the Strip accused the Palestinian Authority of supporting "collaborator gangs" operating in areas under Israeli control; Israeli security forces continued counterterrorism activity throughout Judea and Samaria and launched a wide-scale operation in southern Hebron.
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Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (January 6-13, 2026)

IDF forces continued operating within the Yellow Line in the Gaza Strip, locating and destroying facilities and weapons, and eliminating terrorists who attempted to attack the soldiers. Following a failed rocket launch and other violations by Hamas, the IDF attacked terrorist facilities throughout the Strip and eliminated operatives from Hamas and other terrorist organizations. The Hamas military wing renewed its searches for the last murdered Israeli hostage in the Strip; There was anger among Palestinians over UNRWA's decision to fire hundreds of employees who were forced to leave the Gaza Strip during the war. The agency was accused of "supporting the occupation's plans"; An anti-Hamas militia operating within the Yellow Line claimed responsibility for killing a Khan Yunis police official and threatened to continue attacking Hamas operatives; Reportedly, elections for head of the Hamas political bureau were postponed because of the focus on negotiations for the second phase of the ceasefire agreement and in light of disagreements within the movement's leadership in the Gaza Strip; In preparation for announcing the members of the Peace Council and the technocrat committee which will manage the Gaza Strip, Hamas reiterated that it would dismantle its governing bodies. Fatah warned Hamas against attempting to prevent Palestinian Authority representation on the new administrative committee; Israeli security forces continued extensive counterterrorism activity in Judea and Samaria; an IDF soldier was wounded by gunfire in Nablus; Palestinian Authority chairman Mahmoud Abbas said the current year would be "the year of Palestinian democracy," with local and general elections and strengthening the rule of law.
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Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (December 30, 2025 – January 6, 2026)

IDF forces continued to operate within the Yellow Line in the Gaza Strip, eliminating terrorist operatives who posed a threat and exposing rocket launchers ready for firing at Israeli territory; Hamas condemned Israel's decision to halt the activity in the Gaza Strip of more than 30 international aid organizations; The consolidation of Hamas' civilian and security governance continued, opening schools and hospitals with assistance from Qatar and Turkey; Internal tensions were reported within the Hamas leadership following the formation of a new leadership in the Gaza Strip led by Ali al-Amoudi, one of Yahya al-Sinwar's close associates; Hamas continued to defy the Israeli and American demand that the movement disarm, claiming it was a ploy to prevent the transition to the second phase of the ceasefire agreement; The deputy chairman of the Palestinian Authority held talks in Egypt and Saudi Arabia for implementing the second phase of the agreement in the Strip. According to reports, the Authority's role at the beginning of the phase would be limited to managing the Rafah Crossing; Hamas in Judea and Samaria accused Israel of attempting to impose a new situation on the ground and called on all "factions" to formulate a "joint line of resistance."
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Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon (December 29, 2025 – January 5, 2026)

The IDF continued attacking Hezbollah targets to enforce the November 2024 ceasefire agreement and to prevent the organization's renewed military buildup. The forces attacked a Radwan Force training compound and eliminated two Hezbollah operatives; Hezbollah's secretary general called for arming the Lebanese army so it could confront "enemies" and expressed pride in the organization's ties with Iran; The president of Lebanon expressed cautious optimism about preventing renewed escalation, reportedly stemming from his understanding that for the time being, the American president and the Israeli prime minister had agreed not to carry out large-scale attacks in Lebanon because they were focused on the possibility of taking action against Iran; The Lebanese prime minister said the weapons Hezbollah would hand over to the state would not be thrown into the sea or transferred to Israel. According to reports, the commander of the Lebanese army is expected to announce the completion of the first phase of disarmament south of the Litani River at a cabinet meeting on January 8, 2026, although "Lebanese military sources" admitted that Hezbollah had not fully withdrawn from the area; Iran has reportedly increased oversight of the transfer of funds to Hezbollah and is setting priorities for resource allocation; Criticism was voiced in Lebanon over Hamas' refusal to hand over its medium and heavy weapons to the Lebanese army, after Fatah handed over large quantities of weapons in the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp.
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