Marketing Terrorism

Spotlight on Terrorism – February 2026

During February 2026 the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip was maintained, while extensive counterterrorism activity continued in Judea and Samaria. The ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah remained in effect, despite IDF attacks on Hezbollah terrorist targets. On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel attacked Iran; the organizations of the "resistance axis" did not attack Israel during the first day; The Gaza Strip: The ceasefire that went into effect on October 10, 2025 continued. IDF forces attacked suspicious individuals who crossed the Yellow Line and eliminated terrorist operatives in response to ceasefire violations, including Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) commanders and terrorists involved in the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre; Israel, Judea and Samaria: There were no terrorist attacks. Israeli security forces continued counterterrorism activity in Judea and Samaria, eliminating or detaining terrorist operatives; Lebanon: The IDF continued attacking Hezbollah terrorist targets to prevent the organization from violating the ceasefire understandings of November 27, 2024 and to keep it from reconstructing its military capabilities and replenishing its arsenal. two Hamas terrorist operatives were eliminated in the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp and two Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) operatives were eliminated on the Lebanon-Syria border, and a senior figure in the al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya was detained; IDF forces continued to operate in southern Syria, and a weapons depot belonging to al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya was located; The Houthis have not attacked Israel or ships since the beginning of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Read more...

Hamas Media as Reflected in Documents Brought Back from the Gaza Strip

Hamas' media system is an extensive network which integrates overt and covert, formal and informal communication channels and targets diverse audiences. It serves as a propaganda and incitement tool in Hamas' battle for hearts and minds; Hamas documents brought back by the IDF during the Gaza Strip War showed that Hamas exercises full control, administratively, financially and strategically over its affiliated media outlets in terms of content and messaging, although such bodies are represented as independent, allowing Hamas to maneuver communicationally, diplomatically and militarily; The documents revealed that Hamas' media activity was based on an orderly, multi-year master program divided into 25 projects, each with quantifiable objectives, content production quotas, timetables and resource allocations; An important element of the program was a propaganda campaign to sabotage Israel's resilience by disseminating fake news, funding targeted advertisements for audiences in Israel, operating satirical pages to mock Israeli leaders and symbols, sowing doubts to demoralize the Israeli public; Hamas invests considerable resources in shaping an English-language narrative tailored to the West to mobilize legitimacy for the "resistance" and to defame and demonize the State of Israel; Internal audits reveal that Hamas' media outlets suffer from deficits, bad debts and poor asset management. The findings indicate absolute dependence on the transfer of funds from Hamas' coffers, including via Turkey; In ITIC assessment, the documents show that the affiliated media are at the core of Hamas' battle for hearts and minds, and make the information department particularly important in formulating media policy and managing all the media institutions operating in the service of Hamas, including those the organization does not define as officially affiliated with it. Read more...

Spotlight on Terrorism – January 2026

During January 2026, the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip remained in force, while counterterrorism operations continued in Judea and Samaria. The ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah continued, despite IDF attacks on Hezbollah targets; The ceasefire in the Gaza Strip that went into effect on October 10, 2025 continued. IDF forces attacked suspects who crossed the Yellow Line and eliminated terrorist operatives in response to ceasefire violations. The body of the last murdered Israeli hostage, held in the Gaza Strip since the October 7, 2023 terrorist attack and massacre, was returned, after which the transition to the second stage of the ceasefire agreement was announced. No rockets were launched into Israeli territory; Israel, Judea and Samaria: There was one terrorist attack, with no casualties. Israeli security forces continued counterterrorism operations throughout Judea and Samaria, during which wanted individuals and terrorist operatives who attacked IDF forces or planned attacks were eliminated and weapons were located; The IDF continued attacks on Hezbollah attempts to violate the understandings of the November 27, 2024 ceasefire and on the organization's reconstruction efforts. Nineteen Hezbollah terrorist operatives were eliminated; IDF forces continued to operate in southern Syria; The Houthis did not attack Israel or ocean-going vessels, in accordance with their plan not to attack once the Gaza Strip War ended. However, they threatened to resume attacks following alleged "Israeli violations" in the Gaza Strip and in Lebanon, and threatened to attack Israeli targets in Somaliland in the Horn of Africa; An attack on the Israeli embassy in Azerbaijan was prevented. Read more...

Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (February 3-10, 2026)

The IDF continued its activity within the Yellow Line in the Gaza Strip, locating and destroying terrorist facilities and weapons, some of which were concealed in UNRWA sacks, and eliminating terrorists who attempted to attack the forces. In response to ceasefire violations, during which an IDF officer was seriously wounded, terrorist targets in the Strip were attacked and terrorist commanders and operatives were eliminated; The Rafah Crossing was reopened in both directions for civilians and patients; The spokesperson for the Hamas military wing threatened Gazans collaborating with Israel, while Hamas continued to exercise civilian and security governance in areas under its control, as the entry of members of the Palestinian technocratic committee into the Strip has been delayed; Hamas leader "abroad" Khaled Mashal rejected the demand to disarm the "resistance" and reiterated the proposal for a hudna (extended ceasefire) of five to ten years; Pro-Palestinian activists announced their intention to launch a flotilla of 100 vessels at the end of March 2026 to "break the siege" of the Gaza Strip; The Palestinian Authority ministry of education denied claims it had made substantial changes to the curriculum dealing with the core of the Palestinian narrative, rather claiming was adapting the education system to UNESCO standards as part of reforms. Read more...

Hamas Criticism of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad Revealed in Seized Documents from the Gaza Strip

The military wings of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) have cooperated closely in wars and rounds of fighting against Israel, including during the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre and the subsequent war in the Gaza Strip, and together they operated a joint operations room with the other terrorist organizations in the Strip; Despite the cooperation, in several instances the two movements have disagreed, mainly due to PIJ's independent rocket fire, which led to short rounds of fighting against Israel, contrary to the "controlled escalation" policy which Hamas tried to promote while making secret preparations for the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. Hamas documents brought back by the IDF from the Gaza Strip indicated that Hamas was displeased by the PIJ's independent conduct; The documents also confirmed that many of the rockets fired at Israel by the PIJ fell inside the Gaza Strip, killing civilians and causing damage, which was also a serious problem for Hamas; In an attempt to reduce the PIJ's "rogue" actions, Hamas tried to impose its will on the PIJ and even subjugate the organization to its direct control. The documents included information regarding problems the PIJ caused the "resistance," including immoral behavior and intelligence infiltration, and measures to ensure that the PIJ would act in accordance with Hamas' interests at the political and military levels. The documents reveal a pragmatic and interest-based relationship between Hamas and the PIJ. Hamas views the PIJ as undisciplined and in need of constant control and supervision, while the PIJ seeks to gain public support by being more active against Israel. Although it is not known whether Hamas succeeded in fully implementing its plans to take over the PIJ, the war in the Gaza Strip showed that the two movements were able to overcome their differences and cooperate in dealing with Israel, including the deals to release the hostages. In ITIC’s assessment, although Hamas will ostensibly relinquish political control in the Gaza Strip as part of the second phase of the ceasefire agreement, both organizations can be expected to refuse to disarm and continue to attack Israeli security forces and civilians in accordance with the vision of a jihad war until the "annihilation of Israel." However, if Hamas is pragmatic, in all probability the conflict between the two movements will resume and intensify, publicly as well. Read more...

Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (January 6-13, 2026)

IDF forces continued operating within the Yellow Line in the Gaza Strip, locating and destroying facilities and weapons, and eliminating terrorists who attempted to attack the soldiers. Following a failed rocket launch and other violations by Hamas, the IDF attacked terrorist facilities throughout the Strip and eliminated operatives from Hamas and other terrorist organizations. The Hamas military wing renewed its searches for the last murdered Israeli hostage in the Strip; There was anger among Palestinians over UNRWA's decision to fire hundreds of employees who were forced to leave the Gaza Strip during the war. The agency was accused of "supporting the occupation's plans"; An anti-Hamas militia operating within the Yellow Line claimed responsibility for killing a Khan Yunis police official and threatened to continue attacking Hamas operatives; Reportedly, elections for head of the Hamas political bureau were postponed because of the focus on negotiations for the second phase of the ceasefire agreement and in light of disagreements within the movement's leadership in the Gaza Strip; In preparation for announcing the members of the Peace Council and the technocrat committee which will manage the Gaza Strip, Hamas reiterated that it would dismantle its governing bodies. Fatah warned Hamas against attempting to prevent Palestinian Authority representation on the new administrative committee; Israeli security forces continued extensive counterterrorism activity in Judea and Samaria; an IDF soldier was wounded by gunfire in Nablus; Palestinian Authority chairman Mahmoud Abbas said the current year would be "the year of Palestinian democracy," with local and general elections and strengthening the rule of law. Read more...

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Marketing Terrorism

Terrorist organizations around the world have successfully exploited the media revolution of the past decade. They use state-of-the-art communications technologies to market terrorism to large target audiences around the world, disseminate their threats, promote their activities and recruit sympathizers and supporters. By marketing terrorism, they try to shape public opinion and influence the global political and media agenda.

One of the tools used extensively for marketing terrorism is the Internet. The Internet is an ideal means for marketing terrorism: it is decentralized, it cannot be controlled or restricted, it is not censored, and all those who wish to do so have access to it. From the perspective of terrorist organizations, their special structure makes communication via the Internet even more important and useful. The loose and fluid network of squads, units and sub-groups, which is characteristic of modern terrorist organizations, makes the Internet an ideal and essential tool for marketing terrorism and for communication between and within terrorist groups.

The use of the Internet for marketing terrorism, especially social networks, enables organizations to market terrorism and its messages without censorship restrictions, using the freedom of expression law, bypassing geographical barriers and evading the difficulties posed by various governments. Marketing terrorism through the Internet makes it possible to achieve several goals, including: to provide an explanation and justification for terrorist acts; to collect and transmit information; to empower the organization’s capabilities and shape its image; to recruit and train operatives and more.

Global jihad organizations, Hezbollah, and Hamas are salient examples of terrorist organizations that have had the wisdom to take advantage of the media revolution for terrorism marketing purposes. These organizations make extensive use of the media for terrorism marketing purposes in addition to terrorist activity on the ground.