Hamas’ Perception of Hezbollah’s Role in the Multi-Arena Hostilities as Reflected in Documents from the Gaza Strip
The election of Yahya al-Sinwar as head of Hamas' political bureau in the Gaza Strip in 2017 led to closer cooperation between Hamas and Hezbollah after years of tension. Al-Sinwar regarded Hezbollah not only as a role model for confronting Israel, but also as an intermediary for Iran and a way to make Hamas an integral part of a regional alliance; The Sword of Jerusalem operation in May 2021 provided the first opportunity to implement the strategic cooperation between Hamas and Hezbollah in a multi-front campaign. Hamas documents brought back by the IDF from the Gaza Strip contained details of bilateral coordination through a joint operations room which functioned throughout the hostilities, including the transfer of real-time intelligence and Hezbollah's authorization for Hamas to fire rockets from Lebanese territory; Hamas documents revealed how senior Hamas figures persuaded Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah to participate in the campaign designed to realize their vision of the "destruction of Israel", even if only partially, while Nasrallah was initially cautious position before eventually becoming willing to cooperate in the hostilities; Hamas' decision to launch its invasion of Israel on October 7, 2023 caught Nasrallah by off guard, forcing him to decide quickly how to respond to Hamas' call for assistance in the new war. Hezbollah entered the war a day later to "support the Gaza Strip" and conducted controlled fighting based on a unilateral "deterrence equation" consistent with the organization's interests until the escalation in September 2024; The Hamas documents reveal the Hamas leadership's understanding that Hezbollah's involvement would be a force multiplier in any hostilities against Israel, whether through intelligence cooperation, limited operations which would occupy IDF forces along the northern border and thereby ease the fighting in the Gaza Strip and other arenas, or full-scale involvement which could help realize the vision of the "destruction of Israel." At the same time, al-Sinwar and Deif's decision to launch the attack without informing Hezbollah in advance reflected their understanding that the organization had its own interests in the Lebanese arena and its commitments to Iran, as manifested by Hezbollah's operational concept during the war and statements by its senior figures.
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