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The Completion of the First Phase of Hezbollah’s Disarmament

On January 8, 2026, the commander of the Lebanese army, Rodolph Haykal, informed the Lebanese government that the first phase of the state's monopoly on weapons had been successfully implemented south of the Litani River except for areas under IDF control; The government ministers opposed to Hezbollah demanded a schedule for continuing disarmament, while Hezbollah and Amal ministers conditioned progress on halting Israeli "violations." The government instructed the army to prepare a plan for disarmament north of the Litani River, but no schedule was set; Hezbollah did not directly relate to the army's announcement, reiterating its position that Lebanon in general and the organization in particular had fully implemented the ceasefire agreement, and Israel had to honor its commitments; Lebanon's president, prime minister and parliament speaker welcomed the announcement, noting that the army had to be provided with the tools required for its missions. Prime Minister Salam said the role of the "resistance" had ended with Israel's withdrawal from south Lebanon in 2000, and that today only the state and the army defended Lebanon; Hezbollah's political opponents were dissatisfied with the delay in disarming the organization, noting that made it difficult for the country to rehabilitate itself after the war. The Lebanese foreign minister met in Beirut with the Iranian foreign minister and made it clear to him that Hezbollah had to disarm in accordance with the government decision; Lebanon is apparently taking a time-out in implementing the state's monopoly on weapons. The first phase, south of the Litani River, is being represented as an achievement, but with no decision to move northward and an attempt to buy time with the argument that first Israel has to end its "violations" of the ceasefire agreement. In ITIC assessment, in the foreseeable future the army will expand its deployment in south Lebanon and make preparations for disarmament north of the Litani River, but without a binding schedule because of Hezbollah's lack of cooperation. In all probability, transitioning to the second phase will remain a declarative goal, dependent mainly on Israeli and international pressure and on an internal political consensus which has yet to ripen.
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Jihad Activity under the al-Sharaa Regime in Syria, a Potential Threat to Israel

The overthrow of the Assad regime in December 2024 and the rise of the new government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa (Abu Muhammad al-Julani) changed the map of Salafi-jihadist terrorism in Syria; Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (the strongest of the jihadist organizations which opposed the Assad regime) disbanded, along with its affiliated militias, which helped bring down the previous regime. Their operatives were integrated into the security forces of the new government, including foreign jihad fighters; A few jihad organizations which had cooperated with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham opposed the pragmatic positions of the new government and refused to integrate into its ranks. The most prominent example is the Saraya Ansar al-Sunna, which attacked the security forces and Alawite civilians; The regime change in Syria and the absence of a governmental or security presence across large parts of the country provided ISIS with an opportunity to reorganize and establish itself in the Syrian desert in the east of the country and to expand its activity into populated areas near Damascus and the regions of Aleppo, Homs and southern Syria. However, Syria's joining the United States-led international coalition helped reduce the number of the organization's attacks during 2025. Despite the hostile positions of the Salafi-jihadist organizations still active in Syria toward Israel, they have not attacked IDF forces deployed in southern Syria or against Israeli territory. However, the detention of an ISIS operative in southern Syria indicated the potential threat; In ITIC assessment, the growing cooperation between the Syrian regime and the international coalition will make the situation on the ground harder for ISIS, even though the organization will continue its efforts to establish itself in areas where the regime's control remains weak, such as the Syrian desert, and to attack Syrian security forces and civilian localities. Other jihad organizations opposing the regime may also attempt to undermine the stability of the al-Sharaa government. Given that the extra-establishment jihadist elements are focused on the internal Syrian arena, their desire to harm IDF forces or Israeli territory is in all probability a lower priority, although they may try to build facilities in southern Syria that would enable them to threaten Israeli interests in the future.
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Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis (December 31, 2025 – January 7, 2026)

The Iranian ambassador to Beirut rejected claims recently voiced in Lebanon against Iran and Iran’s Supreme Leader, arguing that the intensified media campaign is based on false accusations and lies; An Iranian commentary article claimed that Tehran seeks to strengthen Lebanon’s sovereignty rather than weaken the central government in Beirut, despite its support for Hezbollah; Iran reportedly has tightened oversight of the transfer of funds to Hezbollah and is determining priorities in resource allocation; The Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson criticized remarks by Syria’s finance minister regarding Damascus’ intention to demand compensation from Iran for damage incurred during the civil war and for Iran’s assistance to the Assad regime; The commander of the IRGC’s Qods Force reportedly paid a secret visit to Baghdad to meet with senior pro-Iranian Shiite militia figures; A senior Houthi official condemned the visit of Israel’s foreign minister to Somaliland and warned that any “Zionist” presence on Somali soil constitutes a military target; Reports indicated that the Houthis carried out missile launches toward the sea in preparation for a new confrontation with Israel. “Yemeni security sources” said that Qods Force officers and senior Houthi officials discussed possible responses in the event of a new Israeli-American attack on Iran; Iraq’s prime minister once again stressed the need to disarm the armed militias, but the militias’ Coordination Committee issued a counter-statement declaring that “the resistance’s weapons are sacred.”
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Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon (December 29, 2025 – January 5, 2026)

The IDF continued attacking Hezbollah targets to enforce the November 2024 ceasefire agreement and to prevent the organization's renewed military buildup. The forces attacked a Radwan Force training compound and eliminated two Hezbollah operatives; Hezbollah's secretary general called for arming the Lebanese army so it could confront "enemies" and expressed pride in the organization's ties with Iran; The president of Lebanon expressed cautious optimism about preventing renewed escalation, reportedly stemming from his understanding that for the time being, the American president and the Israeli prime minister had agreed not to carry out large-scale attacks in Lebanon because they were focused on the possibility of taking action against Iran; The Lebanese prime minister said the weapons Hezbollah would hand over to the state would not be thrown into the sea or transferred to Israel. According to reports, the commander of the Lebanese army is expected to announce the completion of the first phase of disarmament south of the Litani River at a cabinet meeting on January 8, 2026, although "Lebanese military sources" admitted that Hezbollah had not fully withdrawn from the area; Iran has reportedly increased oversight of the transfer of funds to Hezbollah and is setting priorities for resource allocation; Criticism was voiced in Lebanon over Hamas' refusal to hand over its medium and heavy weapons to the Lebanese army, after Fatah handed over large quantities of weapons in the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp.
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Spotlight on Terrorism – December 2025

During December 2025 the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip continued, which also led to a halt in the Houthi attacks. Counterterrorism activity in Judea and Samaria continued. The Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire remained in force, despite IDF attacks on Hezbollah targets; The Gaza Strip: The ceasefire of October 10, 2025 remained in force. IDF forces attacked suspects who crossed the Yellow Line and eliminated terrorist operatives in response to ceasefire violations, including Ra'ad Saad, one of the senior operatives in the Hamas military wing; Israel, Judea and Samaria: Six terrorist attacks were carried out in which two Israeli civilians were killed and eight IDF soldiers were wounded. Israeli security forces continued counterterrorism activity in Judea and Samaria; The IDF continued attacks to prevent Hezbollah from violating the ceasefire understandings of November 27, 2024 and to prevent the organization from reconstructing its military capabilities and replenishing its arsenal. Nine Hezbollah terrorist operatives were eliminated, one of whom was also serving in the Lebanese army, and an operative of Iran's Qods Force and one from the Amal Movement were eliminated; IDF forces continued operating in southern Syria, detained an ISIS operative and confiscated weapons; The Houthis did not attack Israel or shipping in the Red Sea, and have not since the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip went into effect. They also announced the deaths of senior figures killed in United States attacks in early 2025; Two Muslim terrorists suspected of being affiliated with ISIS carried out a shooting attack at a Hanukkah event at Bondi Beach in Sydney, killing 15 people.
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Potential Terrorist Threats to Israeli and Jewish Interests in Australia

On December 14, 2025, two Muslim terrorists, who according to assessments by the Australian authorities had been inspired by ISIS, shot participants at a Hanukkah event at Bondi Beach in Sydney. Fifteen people were killed; The attack was the culmination of a wave of antisemitism which has been directed at the Jewish community in Australia since the Hamas terrorist attack and massacre in Israel on October 7, 2023; The October 7 attack was followed by large demonstrations led by pro-Palestinian organizations and fueled a discourse of hatred and anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement, with broad support from the Muslim community in Australia. At protest demonstrations support was voiced for Hamas, despite its being designated a terrorist organization in Australia, alongside calls for the destruction of Israel; Australian authorities identified Iran as responsible for several antisemitic attacks, following which the Iranian ambassador was expelled and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was declared a terrorism-supporting entity; As the attack in Sydney revealed, figures associated with extreme Islamist worldviews, including Muslim preachers against whom no legal measures have been taken by the authorities, also play a prominent role; The expanding circle of threats against Israeli and Jewish interests in Australia poses a significant challenge for the country's authorities, who are attempting to balance the need to combat antisemitic incitement and the threats it fuels with the need to preserve liberal values, especially freedom of expression, religion and assembly for pro-Palestinian organizations protesting Israeli activity in the Gaza Strip. In ITIC assessment, as long as the authorities do not take concrete action against the promotion of antisemitic incitement, Hamas, Iran and global jihad organizations will find fertile ground in Australia for recruiting operatives who will turn antisemitic and anti-Israeli rhetoric into acts of violence like the Bondi Beach attack.
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