Iran

Implementation of the Lebanese Army’s Plan to Disarm Hezbollah: Status Report

In early October 2025, the commander of the Lebanese Army presented the government in Beirut with the first report on the implementation of Hezbollah’s disarmament plan, in accordance with the government’s August 2025 decisions on the state’s arms monopoly. The report was reportedly claimed that the Army would be able to complete the demilitarization of the area south of the Litani River by the end of 2025, on condition that IDF forces leave southern Lebanon; “Sources” claimed that the Army only acts against sites that have been reported to UNIFIL and to the Ceasefire Monitoring Committee for fear of clashing with Hezbollah, which could lead to civil war; The Lebanese leadership expressed its commitment to the implementation of the state’s monopoly on weapons and blamed Israel for the delays in implementing the plan due to the continued attacks and the presence of IDF forces in five points in southern Lebanon; Hezbollah leaders made it clear that they oppose disarming the organization. Nevertheless, Hezbollah reportedly requested guarantees in exchange for giving up the weapons.; It was reported that US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack would arrive in Lebanon and warn the heads of state that they have one last chance to enter direct negotiations with Israel on a timetable for Hezbollah’s disarmament, or Lebanon will be left without external support. The US Special Envoy’s Deputy for the Middle East met with senior Lebanese leaders and asked them to work to prevent the restoration of Hezbollah’s military capabilities; In the ITIC’s assessment, the Lebanese Army will continue its operations to collect weapons from the terrorist organizations, focusing on Hezbollah, and to deploy its forces, mainly in areas south of the Litani, aiming to finish this by the end of 2025. On the other hand, in Hezbollah’s strongholds north of the Litani, in the Beqaa and Beirut, the Lebanese Army will find it difficult to disarm the organization for fear of a confrontation that could escalate into civil war; In the ITIC’s assessment, Hezbollah will also continue to publicly oppose its disarmament, but may agree to partial disarmament, mainly in the region south of the Litani, in exchange for appropriate guarantees. At the same time, the Lebanese government will continue its efforts to persuade the international community, especially the American administration, to increase pressure on Israel to reduce its attacks and withdraw its forces from positions in southern Lebanon, fully or partially, to help convince Hezbollah to show greater flexibility on disarmament. However, if the US administration intensifies its use of leverage, such as withholding funds for reconstruction aid or granting a free hand to Israeli action in Lebanon, the Lebanese government may change its cautious position regarding dealing with Hezbollah.
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Iran and the Continued Aid to the Axis of Resistance amid the Ceasefire in the Gaza Strip

The ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip was achieved at a time when Iran and the “Axis of Resistance” which it leads are facing significant challenges at home and in the region, especially in light of the weakening of the axis and the consequences of the “12-Day War” between it and Israel and the United States in June 2025; Senior Iranian officials expressed support in principle for the ceasefire agreement and claimed that Iran had supported every initiative aimed at ending the war over the past two years. However, they expressed doubts about Israel’s commitment to abide by the agreement. In addition, the officials stressed that the decision on the ceasefire was made exclusively by Hamas without any involvement from Tehran. Iran also rejected the invitation to participate in the peace summit in Sharm al-Sheikh, claiming that it could not participate with those who attacked it during the “12-Day War.”; Iran’s state media portrayed the end of the war as a strategic victory for Hamas and the Palestinians, who succeeded in putting the Palestinian issue back at the top of the global agenda, and as a severe defeat for Israel, which did not achieve its goals and was weakened militarily, economically, socially, and internationally; Before and after the ceasefire, senior officials and media outlets in Iran stressed that, despite the challenges and pressures facing the Islamic Republic and the pro-Iranian axis in the region, Tehran has no intention of abandoning its allies. They emphasized the importance of continuing the “resistance” and Iranian support for it. At the same time, Iran continues to deliver aid, including weapons, to its proxies in the region, including the terrorist organizations in Judea and Samaria, Hezbollah, and the Houthis; In the ITIC’s assessment, the end of the war in the Gaza Strip is not expected to bring about a significant change in Iran’s policy or put an end to its efforts to expand its influence in the Palestinian arena and to continue providing aid to Hamas and the other Palestinian terrorist organizations. In Tehran’s assessment, Hamas’ continued presence in the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria may also provide it with future opportunities to rebuild the movement’s capabilities and preserve some of Iran’s influence, despite the operational, logistical, and financial constraints that limit Iran’s continued support for the Palestinian terrorist organizations. At the same time, Iran is expected to continue its support for the other components of the “Axis of Resistance” in the region, first and foremost Hezbollah, which is in the midst of a recovery process despite the IDF’s attacks and the demand for the organization to disarm, and the Houthis, who are taking advantage of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip to continue acquiring weapons and improving their offensive capabilities. 
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The Houthis-Israel Confrontation Following the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip

Following the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip the leader of the Houthis ordered a suspension of direct attacks on Israeli territory and vessels "identified with Israel" in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, as he had during the previous ceasefire at the beginning of 2025; According to the Houthi leadership, despite the cessation of attacks, they support the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and are monitoring Israel's implementation of the ceasefire. They threatened there would be "serious consequence" if Israel resumed fighting or violated the ceasefire; The Houthis used the mourning notices for the death of Chief of Staff Muhammad Abd al-Karim al-Ghamari, who was killed in an Israeli strike at the end of August 2025, to threaten retaliation and reiterate their commitment to continuing jihad against Israel; Since early October 2025 Yemeni forces opposing the Houthis have reported the interception of maritime and overland military shipments en route to Houthi-controlled areas, suspected of having been sent from Iran. The shipments contained weapons components, UAVs and other advanced equipment; In ITIC assessment, the Houthis will not resume their attacks and will respect the ceasefire as long as it continues. However, a renewal of fighting by Israel, whether initiated or in response to Hamas violations, could lead the Houthis to resume attacks on Israel. Likewise, an escalation in Lebanon or Judea and Samaria would provide the Houthis with a pretext to renew attacks to strengthen their position as leaders of the "resistance axis."Meanwhile, in all probability the Houthis will continue to smuggle weapons from Iran to strengthen their military capabilities.
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The future of Hamas’ weapons and its efforts to rebuild the military wing

The American Twenty-Point Plan, which served as the basis for the ceasefire agreement to end the Gaza Strip War, explicitly stipulates that during the second phase Hamas and the other armed terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip will be required to disarm and the Strip will become a demilitarized zone; Senior Hamas figures made it clear that although they were committed to maintaining the ceasefire, they were not willing disarm the "resistance" until the establishment of a Palestinian state. They also reiterated that it was "a complex issue that had to be deliberated' within "a broader framework of general Palestinian understandings about the future of the Strip."; As after the previous rounds of fighting, and despite the demand that it disarm, Hamas quickly took advantage of the ceasefire to rebuild its military wing by collecting unexploded ordnance and ammunition left in the Gaza Strip after two years of war. In all probability, to restore its arsenal Hamas will use weapons smuggled across the Egyptian border via civilian drones and the entry of raw materials and dual-purpose equipment intended for the reconstruction of the Strip to manufacture weapons; In ITIC assessment, Hamas' unwillingness to relinquish the weapons of the "resistance" reflect its determination to continue the armed "struggle" against Israel under the pretext of a "legal and religious [sic] right to fight the occupation." Therefore, until a new, temporary administration is established in the Gaza Strip, Hamas can be expected to take advantage of the interim period to rebuild its military capabilities, with Iran also expected to continue backing Hamas by providing financial aid, supplying weapons, and transferring technical and other knowledge and training. The involvement of Qatar and Turkey, Hamas' allies, in shaping the "day after" in Gaza can be expected to obstruct the establishment of a temporary administration which could lead genuine, sincere efforts to limit Hamas' activity and disarm it. However, even if the temporary administration demonstrates determination, Hamas will continue to use its proven experience to adapt its military buildup processes to the changing situations on the ground.
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Instructions Given by Yahya al-Sinwar for the October 7, 2023 Attack and Massacre

After Operation Guardian of the Walls (or "The Sword of Jerusalem Battle," as Hamas calls it) in May 2021, the Hamas leadership, led by Yahya al-Sinwar, leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, began planning a campaign to realize the vision of "the destruction of Israel."; In addition to the Hamas leadership's strategic coordination with Iran and Hezbollah, al-Sinwar personally participated in planning the terrorist attack and massacre carried out by the organization's military wing; A document handwritten by al-Sinwar in August 2022, which was found by the IDF in the Gaza Strip, detailed his instructions, from the deceptions in the weeks before the invasion to the conduct of invasion itself, based on the understanding that the Israeli defense measures along the border would not be able to stop the waves of attacking terrorists; According to the document, al-Sinwar kept the plan secret from the other terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip, intending to involve them only in subsequent waves after Hamas had secured control of Israeli territory; Al-Sinwar expressed his confidence that the Hamas offensive would lead to a multi-front campaign involving Israeli Arabs, Judea and Samaria, and east Jerusalem, as well as an invasion of Israel's north by Hezbollah; A central part of the document is dedicated to the psychology of the attack, with al-Sinwar's explicit instructions to document Hamas terrorist operatives indiscriminately slaughtering civilians, trampling soldiers' bodies, burning residential neighborhoods, and blowing up tanks. The documentation of the atrocities was intended not only for internal use but was planned as a psychological tool to shock and terrorize the Israeli public and send a message of power to "resistance" operatives in the region; The document shows al-Sinwar's control over all the details of the invasion as it was carried out during the early hours of the attack on October 7, 2023. In ITIC assessment, al-Sinwar was not content with a large-scale terrorist attack or with sending a message but aspired to a complete strategic change on the ground through prolonged physical control of command centers, communication hubs, and IDF bases to leverage Israel's initial confusion and establish a new reality before the IDF or the international community could respond.
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Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis (September 17—30, 2025)

In his speech at the UN General Assembly, the Iranian President accused Israel of committing “genocide” in the Gaza Strip and declared that the “Greater Israel” plan expresses the true intentions of the “Zionist regime.” The Houthi leader in Yemen accused the Arab countries of making a “strategic mistake” due to their continued ties with Israel; Hardline media in Iran expressed reservations about European countries’ recognition of the “State of Palestine,” arguing that such recognition is not enough to bring about a change in the Palestinians’ situation or to end the “Zionist occupation.”; Ali Larijani, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, arrived in Lebanon to participate in the commemoration ceremonies marking the first anniversary of the targeted killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. He stressed Iran’s continued support for Hezbollah but made it clear that it does not interfere in Lebanon’s decision-making. Before Larijani’s visit, the Lebanese government refused to allow two Iranian planes to land in Beirut ahead of the anniversary events; The Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman responded to the Syrian President’s remarks that the severing of relations between the two countries is not permanent and said that Iran is ready to renew ties with Damascus but is not in a hurry to do so; The Houthis claimed responsibility for nine attacks against targets in Israel using ballistic missiles and drones. Two drones exploded in Eilat, injuring at least 20 people. In response, the IDF attacked Houthi military targets in Sana’a; The Houthis reportedly improved their own capabilities in the production of drones and long-range missiles and are preparing for the possibility of a ground raid into Israeli territory; A Dutch-flagged cargo ship was attacked in the Red Sea and caught fire. Two crew members were injured; The United States has added four pro-Iranian militias in Iraq to the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The militias are preparing amid concerns about an Israeli attack; A Syrian militia claimed responsibility for an explosion near an IDF post in southern Syria, in which an IDF reserve officer was seriously wounded. 
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