How Hamas perceived Israel’s rounds of deterrence, according to a document found in the Gaza Strip
A document prepared by the center for military and strategic studies of Hamas' military wing, dated September 9, 2023, which was brought back from the Gaza Strip by the IDF during the war, analyzed Israeli policy regarding the rounds of fighting in the Gaza Strip since Hamas seized control in 2006; According to the document, for many years Israel relied on a strategy of preemptive strike, but the strengthening of the "resistance" movements led by Hamas and Hezbollah, which could obstruct Israeli capabilities, led Israel to shift to short rounds of fighting of limited intensity; In the assessment of the document's authors, since Israel failed to achieve its objectives in Operation Cast Lead, foremost of which was overthrowing Hamas rule, it moved to presenting vague objectives alongside a focus on managing the conflict and preserving deterrence, with the objective of weakening Hamas without defeating it; Operation Guardian of the Walls in May 2021 is defined as a formative event in which Hamas deviated from the pattern of the previous rounds by linking the Gaza Strip to events in Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria and by rousing Israeli Arabs to "resistance."; In the authors' assessment, Israel did not abandon the idea of a preemptive strike, particularly given the failure of Operation Guardian of the Walls, but was not in a position to build a new equation of deterrence. Therefore, it focused on conflict management, risk management and neutralizing threats. Accordingly, the recommendation to the Hamas leadership was to prepare for a new opening strike which would trigger another round of fighting, but also to initiate an unexpected confrontation that would break the recurring pattern and make Israel's leadership uncertain; In ITIC assessment, the study is part of the effort by Hamas' intelligence apparatuses to provide the movement's top decision-makers with a full strategic understanding of Israel's perception and conduct, at a time when they were in the final stages of planning the decisive attack against Israel. The picture emerging from the study, according to which Israel is not interested in overthrowing Hamas rule and is focused on limited rounds with known outcomes, together with the recommendation by the document's authors to act in an unexpected manner, confirmed al-Sinwar and Deif's confidence that the attack and massacre would be successful, and which were carried out on October 7, 2023, less than a month after the document was written.
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