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Iran

Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis (November 19-26, 2025)

Iran and the Shiite militias strongly condemned the targeted killing of Hezbollah’s acting chief of staff, Ali Haitham Tabatabai, in an Israeli attack in Beirut. They expressed solidarity with Hezbollah and stressed that the organization has a “right to take revenge.”; On the occasion of Lebanon’s Independence Day, the Iranian President emphasized his country’s support for Lebanon and its demand for Israel’s withdrawal from the country. The Iranian foreign minister expressed his willingness to respond to his Lebanese counterpart’s call for a direct meeting to resolve the differences between the two countries; In recent months, Iran and Hezbollah have reportedly managed to smuggle weapons and goods to Hezbollah through the port of Tripoli in northern Lebanon; The Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman condemned the IDF’s continued attacks in the Gaza Strip and accused Israel of ongoing violations of the ceasefire; The Iranian Foreign Ministry condemned the visit of the Israeli Prime Minister and other senior Israeli officials to southern Syria and called on the international community to force Israel to withdraw from the areas under its control in Syrian territory; “Iranian officials” claimed that Tehran has lost control over the Houthis and the militias in Iraq, who do not respond to Iranian requests. A senior Qods Force official was sent to Sana’a in an attempt to persuade the Houthis to increase cooperation.
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Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon (November 17-24, 2025)

The IDF eliminated Hezbollah's acting chief of staff, Haytham Ali Tabatabai, in a targeted attack on the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut. He was responsible for efforts to reconstruct the organization and replenish its arsenal. Hezbollah confirmed his death and the deaths of four other operatives, but did not explicitly threaten Israel, instead calling on Lebanese authorities to take an "appropriate response."; IDF forces continued attacking Hezbollah facilities in south Lebanon and the Beqa'a Valley and eliminated terrorist operatives as part of the ongoing activity against Hezbollah's presence in south Lebanon, which violates the understandings of the ceasefire agreement, and following the organization's attempts to reconstruct itself and replenish its arsenal. The forces attacked rocket launch sites and weapons depots, and eliminated eight terrorist operatives; Hezbollah continued to reiterate its dissatisfaction with the responses of the Lebanese government to Israel's continued attacks, and called on it to formulate a plan for "confronting the occupation."; Lebanon's President Aoun said he was prepared to participate in regional peace processes under the United States or UN auspices, while Prime Minister Salam accused Israel of being unwilling to negotiate and not adhering to the conditions of the ceasefire agreement; Despite the Lebanese government and army's claims that "progress was being made" in removing Hezbollah's presence from south Lebanon and implementing the state monopoly on weapons, a senior Hezbollah figure stated that the organization would not disarm and would not hand over its weapons to state authorities, but would preserve its military capabilities; UNIFIL began to reduce its forces in south Lebanon following the UN budget cut; The visit of the commander of the Lebanese army to the United States was reportedly canceled after he referred to Israel as "an enemy" and because of American dissatisfaction with the pace of Hezbollah's disarmament; According to reports, Hezbollah and Iran began using the port of Tripoli for smuggling weapons and goods because of the tightened oversight at the port of Beirut and at the international airport; The IDF attacked a Hamas training compound in the Ein al-Hilweh refugee camp, killing 13 Hamas terrorist operatives. The compound served Hamas in Lebanon as a training site and a location for preparing to carry out terrorist attacks against Israel. Hamas claimed Israel attacked a sports field where youths were present.
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UN Security Council Resolution 2803 for the Future of the Gaza Strip – Positions of Power Actors

On November 17, 2025, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 2803, which adopts the 20-point American plan for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and for "the day after."; The resolution endorses the establishment of a Board of Peace which will temporarily administer the Gaza Strip until control is transferred to the Palestinian Authority. It also approves the establishment of an international stabilization force, which will operate alongside a vetted Palestinian police force, in coordination with Israel and Egypt, to ensure the demilitarization of the Strip and the disarmament of "armed groups."; The resolution does not include an explicit commitment to a Palestinian state, but expresses hope for the creation of a "credible pathway" to Palestinian self-determination if the Palestinian Authority implements the required reforms; Hamas and the other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip rejected the resolution and warned that any international force that arrived in the Gaza Strip would be considered an "occupying force" if it attempted to disarm them. Iran and the Houthis subscribed to Hamas' position and claimed that the resolution was intended to serve Israeli objectives. The Palestinian Authority, however welcomed the resolution and expressed readiness to assume full responsibility for the Gaza Strip; In ITIC assessment, despite the importance of the Security Council resolution as an outline for a course for "the day after" in Gaza which includes full demilitarization and a stable, non-Hamas rule, it is a declarative step and it is unclear whether it can be implemented. In all probability, the refusal of Hamas and the other terrorist organizations to disarm, and the threat that they will regard the international force as an "occupying force," will increase friction between them and the foreign forces arriving in the Strip and lead to violent clashes which might also affect IDF forces. In addition, the uncertainty regarding the Palestinian Authority's ability to fully and credibly implement the required reforms and the absence of agreements between Hamas and Fatah regarding the identity of the technocratic management committee, alongside the inherent difficulty in establishing effective control and supervision over the Palestinian population, will create a vacuum in governance which will allow Hamas to continue securing its security and civilian governance in the Strip.
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Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis (November 12-19, 2025)

The Iranian Foreign Ministry expressed “deep concern” that the UN Security Council resolution adopting President Trump’s plan for the future of the Gaza Strip contradicts the Palestinians’ right to self-determination. It stressed that the international force in the Gaza Strip should only deal with implementing the ceasefire and bringing in humanitarian aid; The advisor to the Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament met in Tehran with senior Iranian government officials, headed by the Secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, the Foreign Minister, and the Speaker of the Majles. He expressed hope that Iran would be more present in dealing with the challenges facing Lebanon; Iranian officials congratulated Iraq following the parliamentary elections held in the country, in which the pro-Iranian militias increased their power; It was reported that Iran returned the IRGC Qods Force representative to Yemen to help the Houthis reorganize following the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and the Israeli strikes in Yemen. The UN Security Council extended sanctions on the Houthis and senior figures in the Houthi leadership and security forces by one year.
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Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon (November 10-17, 2025)

IDF forces attacked Hezbollah facilities in south Lebanon and in the Beqa'a Valley and eliminated operatives of the organization as part of ongoing activity against Hezbollah's presence in south Lebanon, in violation of the ceasefire understandings and because of the organization's renewed attempts to regain its strength and rebuild its arsenal. A rocket launching site and facilities for the production and storage of strategic weapons were attacked, and a Hezbollah operative who also served as a school principal was eliminated; Hezbollah secretary general Na'im Qassem threatened a possible response to the continued Israeli attacks. Another senior Hezbollah figure warned that Israel would achieve nothing with a new war in Lebanon or an escalation and "any aggression will be met with confrontation."; Senior Lebanese government officials reiterated their support for opening negotiations with Israel which would lead to the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the regulation of the border, and accused Israel of continuing "aggression." It was reported that American officials who visited Lebanon concluded that there was no chance of progress and the American administration would allow Israel to carry out a powerful and brief attack on Hezbollah without sliding into a broad war. The aide to the speaker of the Lebanese parliament visited Iran and said he hoped it would stand by Lebanon "in the face of the challenges before us."; UNIFIL protested to Israel over the construction of a new security wall, claiming it penetrated Lebanese sovereign territory. The IDF denied UNIFIL's claims of deliberate gunfire at a UN force in south Lebanon; The Lebanese army reportedly refused Israel's demand to conduct searches for Hezbollah weapons in private homes in south Lebanon for fear of confrontation with operatives of the organization and its supporters. A senior Hezbollah figure claimed the organization had the right to refuse external pressures to disarm; Given the growing pressure from the American administration to block Hezbollah's funding, Lebanon's central bank announced there would be tighter supervision on unauthorized institutions and illegal money transfers. Hezbollah warned that it would respond to an attempt to disrupt the activities of the al-Qard al-Hasan Association, the organization's economic arm.
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Iran Assists Hezbollah’s Post-Ceasefire Reconstruction

The United States Treasury Department reported that Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) had transferred approximately $1 billion to Hezbollah since the beginning of the year to reconstruct the organization's military capabilities in the wake of the war against Israel. Since the war ended in late November 2024, Iran has also continued to smuggle weapons to the organization and interfere with the Lebanese government's efforts to disarm Hezbollah. As a result, a senior American delegation urged the Lebanese leadership to accelerate action against the sources of Hezbollah's funding; The fall of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024 and the flight ban imposed by the Lebanese government on Iran since February 2025 disrupted the land and air routes used by Iran to transfer weapons, technological assistance and funds to Hezbollah. Iran and Hezbollah subsequently found other avenues, including smuggling through Turkey and Iraq, by sea and through currency-exchange agencies. They also continue to rely on smuggling networks along the Syria-Lebanon border, despite Syrian and IDF efforts to block them; The Iranian embassy in Beirut denied the information provided by the American government, but throughout the war in the Gaza Strip and after the ceasefire Iranian officials made clear that they continue to support Hezbollah, as they do other members of the "resistance axis." Hezbollah secretary general Na'im Qassem also publicly thanked Iran for its "massive" assistance; The American disclosure of the financial aid transferred by the IRGC to Hezbollah, along with the exposure of smuggling methods, showed that Iran and Hezbollah had found ways to overcome the challenges of geopolitical changes in Lebanon and the Middle East since the ceasefire in late November 2024, and how difficult it was to dent the 40-year cooperation between Tehran and the Lebanese organization. In all probability Iran will continue to support and fund Hezbollah's military and civil reconstruction in order to preserve its status within the Shi'ite community and in Lebanon, and to prevent Israel and the Lebanese authorities from weakening or neutralizing Iran's most important strategic arm in the Middle East. The absence of more decisive action by the international community in general and by the Lebanese government in particular, to eliminate Hezbollah's funding sources and block smuggling routes, will allow Iran and Hezbollah to continue transferring funds and weapons with little disruption.
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