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Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon (November 24 – December 1, 2025)

The IDF continued attacking Hezbollah targets in south Lebanon to enforce the ceasefire agreement, which prohibited the organization's presence south of the Litani River. The IDF reported that in the year since the ceasefire, more than 370 terrorist operatives, most of them from Hezbollah, had been eliminated and there had been approximately 1,200 targeted ground operations to destroy terrorist infrastructure and damage the organization's military- capabilities; Hezbollah warned that the organization would respond to the elimination of its acting chief of staff, Haitham Ali al-Tabataba'i, and accused the Lebanese government of weakness. They also repeated Hezbollah's opposition to negotiations with Israel and claimed that meeting the demands would be "surrender."; The prime minister of Lebanon said that the state was in a "one-sided war of attrition" and accused Israel of delaying the withdrawal of its forces from south Lebanon on the pretext of Hezbollah's presence, even though its technological capabilities allowed it to monitor the situation without a presence on the ground. He also criticized the delay in implementing the decision on the state's monopoly on weapons and stressed that Hezbollah's weapons did not bring deterrence or victory; A newspaper affiliated with Hezbollah claimed that Lebanese officials were surprised by the position of the Egyptian foreign minister, who demanded Hezbollah be disarmed and warned of a large-scale Israeli operation by air and land; To dispel criticism of its handling of Hezbollah's disarmament, the Lebanese army invited journalists to visit a Hezbollah tunnel located in south Lebanon and claimed that Israel had not provided proof that Hezbollah was smuggling weapons; Hezbollah denied claims that a human breach of the organization had enabled the targeted killings of senior figures, but the organization has reportedly limited the use of smartphones and taken additional security measures after the killing of al-Tabataba'i
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IDF Operation in Beit Jinn amid Efforts to Promote Terrorism Against Israel in Southern Syria

On the night of November 27-28, 2025, IDF fighters operated in the village of Beit Jinn in southern Syria as part of an arrest operation against Al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyya terrorist operatives who were planning attacks against IDF forces and Israeli territory. In the ensuing exchange of fire, six IDF soldiers were wounded and about 20 terrorist operatives were eliminated; Al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyya is a Sunni Islamist movement that is the offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood in Lebanon. The movement has a close ideological connection with Hamas and cooperates with Hezbollah, and its military wing operatives took part in the campaign against Israel in Lebanon after the October 7, 2023 attack. After the incident in Beit Jinn, the movement denied any involvement and claimed that it operates only in Lebanon; The Syrian regime condemned the “aggression” in Beit Jinn and called it a “war crime.” Senior regime officials accused Israel of wanting to destabilize the country and stressed that the “civilians” would defend themselves “by all means”; The exposure of the terrorist infrastructure in Beit Jinn indicates a renewed establishment of terrorist elements affiliated with Iran and its proxies in southern Syria. In the ITIC’s assessment, the continuation of Israeli counterterrorism activity against terrorist threats in southern Syria, alongside the Syrian regime’s inability to impose its authority on the various elements operating in the area due to the Israeli demand to demilitarize the area, may lead to continued attempts by armed organizations to establish themselves and carry out attacks against IDF forces and Israeli territory.
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Hezbollah: One Year After the Ceasefire

November 27, 2025, marked one year since the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon went into effect, ending the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah which began on October 8, 2023; The results of the war and regional and internal geo-strategic developments in Lebanon over the past year put Hezbollah in the most complex situation it had experienced since its establishment, with the loss of its leadership and senior figures and thousands of field commanders and operatives, the continuation of targeted killings and damage to the organization’s infrastructure as part of the IDF’s efforts to enforce the ceasefire agreement, the halting of flights from Iran and the blow to smuggling routes and sources of funding, the Lebanese government's decision to implement the state’s monopoly over weapons, international pressure on Lebanon and criticism from within the Shi'ite community; Despite the difficulties, Hezbollah has shown itself eminently capable of adapting and rebuilding itself through organizational decentralization to improve the survivability of the leadership, reliance on continued Iranian support and the development of alternative methods for smuggling weapons and funds, manufacturing weapons itself, the preservation of its internal Lebanese political power base while strengthening the status of the organization and "the resistance"  among young Shi'ites in Lebanon; Throughout the year, Hezbollah’s senior figures changed their rhetoric. In the first months, they claimed commitment to the ceasefire and placed responsibility on state institutions to deal with [alleged] "Israeli violations." However, continued attacks and targeted killings, along with growing pressure on the government to disarm Hezbollah and begin negotiations with Israel, led Hezbollah to harden its defiant rhetoric and increase threats to "respond"  to Israel and take action against anyone who attempted to harm it within Lebanon, although it continued to maintain restraint and did not "respond" to Israel's attacks; The targeted killing of Hezbollah’s acting chief of staff, Haitham Ali Tabataba’i, underscored the dilemma facing Hezbollah, that is, threats of retaliatory action and the understanding that any response, especially if carried out unilaterally by Hezbollah, would have severe consequences for Lebanon in general and the organization in particular; In ITIC assessment, Hezbollah's ongoing efforts to rebuild its military capabilities and replenish its arsenal, the inability of the Lebanese armed forces to stop them and the Lebanese government’s failure to meet the deadlines it set for disarming Hezbollah and other armed militias, and the intensification of Israeli enforcement measures, may erode Hezbollah's caution and restraint and increase the risk of escalation, which would include a response targeting IDF forces or Israeli territory. Despite Hezbollah’s weakened state, it apparently still has sufficient power to deter the Lebanese government from any attempt to fully enforce on Hezbollah the state’s monopoly over weapons, while remaining the central power broker within the Shi'ite community without any significant opposition capable of challenging its position.
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Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis (November 19-26, 2025)

Iran and the Shiite militias strongly condemned the targeted killing of Hezbollah’s acting chief of staff, Ali Haitham Tabatabai, in an Israeli attack in Beirut. They expressed solidarity with Hezbollah and stressed that the organization has a “right to take revenge.”; On the occasion of Lebanon’s Independence Day, the Iranian President emphasized his country’s support for Lebanon and its demand for Israel’s withdrawal from the country. The Iranian foreign minister expressed his willingness to respond to his Lebanese counterpart’s call for a direct meeting to resolve the differences between the two countries; In recent months, Iran and Hezbollah have reportedly managed to smuggle weapons and goods to Hezbollah through the port of Tripoli in northern Lebanon; The Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman condemned the IDF’s continued attacks in the Gaza Strip and accused Israel of ongoing violations of the ceasefire; The Iranian Foreign Ministry condemned the visit of the Israeli Prime Minister and other senior Israeli officials to southern Syria and called on the international community to force Israel to withdraw from the areas under its control in Syrian territory; “Iranian officials” claimed that Tehran has lost control over the Houthis and the militias in Iraq, who do not respond to Iranian requests. A senior Qods Force official was sent to Sana’a in an attempt to persuade the Houthis to increase cooperation.
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Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon (November 17-24, 2025)

The IDF eliminated Hezbollah's acting chief of staff, Haytham Ali Tabatabai, in a targeted attack on the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut. He was responsible for efforts to reconstruct the organization and replenish its arsenal. Hezbollah confirmed his death and the deaths of four other operatives, but did not explicitly threaten Israel, instead calling on Lebanese authorities to take an "appropriate response."; IDF forces continued attacking Hezbollah facilities in south Lebanon and the Beqa'a Valley and eliminated terrorist operatives as part of the ongoing activity against Hezbollah's presence in south Lebanon, which violates the understandings of the ceasefire agreement, and following the organization's attempts to reconstruct itself and replenish its arsenal. The forces attacked rocket launch sites and weapons depots, and eliminated eight terrorist operatives; Hezbollah continued to reiterate its dissatisfaction with the responses of the Lebanese government to Israel's continued attacks, and called on it to formulate a plan for "confronting the occupation."; Lebanon's President Aoun said he was prepared to participate in regional peace processes under the United States or UN auspices, while Prime Minister Salam accused Israel of being unwilling to negotiate and not adhering to the conditions of the ceasefire agreement; Despite the Lebanese government and army's claims that "progress was being made" in removing Hezbollah's presence from south Lebanon and implementing the state monopoly on weapons, a senior Hezbollah figure stated that the organization would not disarm and would not hand over its weapons to state authorities, but would preserve its military capabilities; UNIFIL began to reduce its forces in south Lebanon following the UN budget cut; The visit of the commander of the Lebanese army to the United States was reportedly canceled after he referred to Israel as "an enemy" and because of American dissatisfaction with the pace of Hezbollah's disarmament; According to reports, Hezbollah and Iran began using the port of Tripoli for smuggling weapons and goods because of the tightened oversight at the port of Beirut and at the international airport; The IDF attacked a Hamas training compound in the Ein al-Hilweh refugee camp, killing 13 Hamas terrorist operatives. The compound served Hamas in Lebanon as a training site and a location for preparing to carry out terrorist attacks against Israel. Hamas claimed Israel attacked a sports field where youths were present.
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UN Security Council Resolution 2803 for the Future of the Gaza Strip – Positions of Power Actors

On November 17, 2025, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 2803, which adopts the 20-point American plan for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and for "the day after."; The resolution endorses the establishment of a Board of Peace which will temporarily administer the Gaza Strip until control is transferred to the Palestinian Authority. It also approves the establishment of an international stabilization force, which will operate alongside a vetted Palestinian police force, in coordination with Israel and Egypt, to ensure the demilitarization of the Strip and the disarmament of "armed groups."; The resolution does not include an explicit commitment to a Palestinian state, but expresses hope for the creation of a "credible pathway" to Palestinian self-determination if the Palestinian Authority implements the required reforms; Hamas and the other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip rejected the resolution and warned that any international force that arrived in the Gaza Strip would be considered an "occupying force" if it attempted to disarm them. Iran and the Houthis subscribed to Hamas' position and claimed that the resolution was intended to serve Israeli objectives. The Palestinian Authority, however welcomed the resolution and expressed readiness to assume full responsibility for the Gaza Strip; In ITIC assessment, despite the importance of the Security Council resolution as an outline for a course for "the day after" in Gaza which includes full demilitarization and a stable, non-Hamas rule, it is a declarative step and it is unclear whether it can be implemented. In all probability, the refusal of Hamas and the other terrorist organizations to disarm, and the threat that they will regard the international force as an "occupying force," will increase friction between them and the foreign forces arriving in the Strip and lead to violent clashes which might also affect IDF forces. In addition, the uncertainty regarding the Palestinian Authority's ability to fully and credibly implement the required reforms and the absence of agreements between Hamas and Fatah regarding the identity of the technocratic management committee, alongside the inherent difficulty in establishing effective control and supervision over the Palestinian population, will create a vacuum in governance which will allow Hamas to continue securing its security and civilian governance in the Strip.
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