Iran

Escalation of terrorist activity in Judea and Samaria Following the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip

Hamas' ambition was to turn Judea and Samaria into an arena for terrorism as part of the campaign to destroy Israel which began with the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. However, the counterterrorism actions taken by the Israeli security forces, which included the detention and elimination of thousands of wanted persons and terrorist operatives and the seizure of weapons prevented a wave of terrorism from Judea and Samaria; Following the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) began efforts to shift the center of the "resistance" to Judea and Samaria, encouraging attacks on Israeli security forces and settlers; Iran also continues its central role in efforts to turn Judea and Samaria into an active terrorist arena against Israel. A shipment of weapons from Iran was intercepted, which included powerful explosive charges and explosive-carrying drones; Qods Force operatives in Lebanon who were involved in the smuggling routes of weapons were eliminated; In ITIC assessment, after the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, with Iranian assistance, will direct a significant portion of their activity to Judea and Samaria to justify their existence by continuing the "resistance." The terrorist organizations will also try to exploit the return of the Palestinian issue to the global stage and the regional and international involvement in the Gaza Strip within the framework of the ceasefire to create pressure on Israel, provoking attacks which could escalate Israel's response in Judea and Samaria. Moreover, the return of hundreds of terrorist operatives from Israeli jails to Judea and Samaria will intensify the activity of the terrorist organizations, which will exploit the knowledge and experience of the released prisoners and the cooperative networks they built in prison. Read more...

Spotlight on Terrorism – October 2025

During October 2025, fighting continued in the Gaza Strip and in Judea and Samaria, and the Houthi attacks continued from Yemen. On October 10, 2025, a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip went into effect, also pausing the Houthi attacks. The ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah was maintained despite IDF attacks on Hezbollah targets; The Gaza Strip: Until the ceasefire on October 10, the IDF continued attacking terrorist targets from the air and on the ground throughout the Strip, focusing on maneuvering inside Gaza City. Two IDF soldiers were killed. Eight rockets were fired at Israel. After the ceasefire began and IDF forces withdrew from parts of the Strip, the IDF continued enforcing the agreement against threats to its forces and in response to Hamas violations. Three IDF soldiers were killed. As part of the agreement, the twenty remaining live hostages held in the Gaza Strip were released, along with the bodies of seventeen murdered hostages from the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. Eleven bodies of murdered hostages remain in the Gaza Strip; Judea, Samaria, and Israel: There was one terrorist attack, compared to four the previous month; there were no casualties. Israeli security forces continued counterterrorism operations throughout Judea and Samaria, during which rockets were found, terrorist operatives planning attacks were eliminated, and a large shipment of weapons from Iran was seized; Lebanon: The IDF intensified its activity to prevent Hezbollah from violating the understandings of the ceasefire which went into effect on November 27, 2024, and against the organization's efforts to regain its military capabilities and restore its arsenal. More than twenty Hezbollah operatives were eliminated, including the logistics commander of the southern front headquarters and commanders and operatives from the Radwan Force. Hundreds of engineering vehicles and military infrastructures were destroyed; Syria: IDF forces prevented weapons from being smuggled into Israel and Lebanon from southern Syria; The Houthis: Until the Gaza ceasefire on October 10, the Houthis claimed responsibility for one ballistic missile attack on targets in Israel. The IDF spokesperson reported the interception of one ballistic missile and seven UAVs. The Houthis also claimed responsibility for an attack on a cargo ship in the Gulf of Aden, during which one crew member was killed. The Houthis announced the death of their chief of staff in an Israeli attack at the end of August 2025. Read more...

Implementation of the Lebanese Army’s Plan to Disarm Hezbollah: Status Report

In early October 2025, the commander of the Lebanese Army presented the government in Beirut with the first report on the implementation of Hezbollah’s disarmament plan, in accordance with the government’s August 2025 decisions on the state’s arms monopoly. The report was reportedly claimed that the Army would be able to complete the demilitarization of the area south of the Litani River by the end of 2025, on condition that IDF forces leave southern Lebanon; “Sources” claimed that the Army only acts against sites that have been reported to UNIFIL and to the Ceasefire Monitoring Committee for fear of clashing with Hezbollah, which could lead to civil war; The Lebanese leadership expressed its commitment to the implementation of the state’s monopoly on weapons and blamed Israel for the delays in implementing the plan due to the continued attacks and the presence of IDF forces in five points in southern Lebanon; Hezbollah leaders made it clear that they oppose disarming the organization. Nevertheless, Hezbollah reportedly requested guarantees in exchange for giving up the weapons.; It was reported that US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack would arrive in Lebanon and warn the heads of state that they have one last chance to enter direct negotiations with Israel on a timetable for Hezbollah’s disarmament, or Lebanon will be left without external support. The US Special Envoy’s Deputy for the Middle East met with senior Lebanese leaders and asked them to work to prevent the restoration of Hezbollah’s military capabilities; In the ITIC’s assessment, the Lebanese Army will continue its operations to collect weapons from the terrorist organizations, focusing on Hezbollah, and to deploy its forces, mainly in areas south of the Litani, aiming to finish this by the end of 2025. On the other hand, in Hezbollah’s strongholds north of the Litani, in the Beqaa and Beirut, the Lebanese Army will find it difficult to disarm the organization for fear of a confrontation that could escalate into civil war; In the ITIC’s assessment, Hezbollah will also continue to publicly oppose its disarmament, but may agree to partial disarmament, mainly in the region south of the Litani, in exchange for appropriate guarantees. At the same time, the Lebanese government will continue its efforts to persuade the international community, especially the American administration, to increase pressure on Israel to reduce its attacks and withdraw its forces from positions in southern Lebanon, fully or partially, to help convince Hezbollah to show greater flexibility on disarmament. However, if the US administration intensifies its use of leverage, such as withholding funds for reconstruction aid or granting a free hand to Israeli action in Lebanon, the Lebanese government may change its cautious position regarding dealing with Hezbollah. Read more...

Iran and the Continued Aid to the Axis of Resistance amid the Ceasefire in the Gaza Strip

The ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip was achieved at a time when Iran and the “Axis of Resistance” which it leads are facing significant challenges at home and in the region, especially in light of the weakening of the axis and the consequences of the “12-Day War” between it and Israel and the United States in June 2025; Senior Iranian officials expressed support in principle for the ceasefire agreement and claimed that Iran had supported every initiative aimed at ending the war over the past two years. However, they expressed doubts about Israel’s commitment to abide by the agreement. In addition, the officials stressed that the decision on the ceasefire was made exclusively by Hamas without any involvement from Tehran. Iran also rejected the invitation to participate in the peace summit in Sharm al-Sheikh, claiming that it could not participate with those who attacked it during the “12-Day War.”; Iran’s state media portrayed the end of the war as a strategic victory for Hamas and the Palestinians, who succeeded in putting the Palestinian issue back at the top of the global agenda, and as a severe defeat for Israel, which did not achieve its goals and was weakened militarily, economically, socially, and internationally; Before and after the ceasefire, senior officials and media outlets in Iran stressed that, despite the challenges and pressures facing the Islamic Republic and the pro-Iranian axis in the region, Tehran has no intention of abandoning its allies. They emphasized the importance of continuing the “resistance” and Iranian support for it. At the same time, Iran continues to deliver aid, including weapons, to its proxies in the region, including the terrorist organizations in Judea and Samaria, Hezbollah, and the Houthis; In the ITIC’s assessment, the end of the war in the Gaza Strip is not expected to bring about a significant change in Iran’s policy or put an end to its efforts to expand its influence in the Palestinian arena and to continue providing aid to Hamas and the other Palestinian terrorist organizations. In Tehran’s assessment, Hamas’ continued presence in the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria may also provide it with future opportunities to rebuild the movement’s capabilities and preserve some of Iran’s influence, despite the operational, logistical, and financial constraints that limit Iran’s continued support for the Palestinian terrorist organizations. At the same time, Iran is expected to continue its support for the other components of the “Axis of Resistance” in the region, first and foremost Hezbollah, which is in the midst of a recovery process despite the IDF’s attacks and the demand for the organization to disarm, and the Houthis, who are taking advantage of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip to continue acquiring weapons and improving their offensive capabilities. Read more...

The Houthis-Israel Confrontation Following the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip

Following the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip the leader of the Houthis ordered a suspension of direct attacks on Israeli territory and vessels "identified with Israel" in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, as he had during the previous ceasefire at the beginning of 2025; According to the Houthi leadership, despite the cessation of attacks, they support the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and are monitoring Israel's implementation of the ceasefire. They threatened there would be "serious consequence" if Israel resumed fighting or violated the ceasefire; The Houthis used the mourning notices for the death of Chief of Staff Muhammad Abd al-Karim al-Ghamari, who was killed in an Israeli strike at the end of August 2025, to threaten retaliation and reiterate their commitment to continuing jihad against Israel; Since early October 2025 Yemeni forces opposing the Houthis have reported the interception of maritime and overland military shipments en route to Houthi-controlled areas, suspected of having been sent from Iran. The shipments contained weapons components, UAVs and other advanced equipment; In ITIC assessment, the Houthis will not resume their attacks and will respect the ceasefire as long as it continues. However, a renewal of fighting by Israel, whether initiated or in response to Hamas violations, could lead the Houthis to resume attacks on Israel. Likewise, an escalation in Lebanon or Judea and Samaria would provide the Houthis with a pretext to renew attacks to strengthen their position as leaders of the "resistance axis."Meanwhile, in all probability the Houthis will continue to smuggle weapons from Iran to strengthen their military capabilities. Read more...

The future of Hamas’ weapons and its efforts to rebuild the military wing

The American Twenty-Point Plan, which served as the basis for the ceasefire agreement to end the Gaza Strip War, explicitly stipulates that during the second phase Hamas and the other armed terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip will be required to disarm and the Strip will become a demilitarized zone; Senior Hamas figures made it clear that although they were committed to maintaining the ceasefire, they were not willing disarm the "resistance" until the establishment of a Palestinian state. They also reiterated that it was "a complex issue that had to be deliberated' within "a broader framework of general Palestinian understandings about the future of the Strip."; As after the previous rounds of fighting, and despite the demand that it disarm, Hamas quickly took advantage of the ceasefire to rebuild its military wing by collecting unexploded ordnance and ammunition left in the Gaza Strip after two years of war. In all probability, to restore its arsenal Hamas will use weapons smuggled across the Egyptian border via civilian drones and the entry of raw materials and dual-purpose equipment intended for the reconstruction of the Strip to manufacture weapons; In ITIC assessment, Hamas' unwillingness to relinquish the weapons of the "resistance" reflect its determination to continue the armed "struggle" against Israel under the pretext of a "legal and religious [sic] right to fight the occupation." Therefore, until a new, temporary administration is established in the Gaza Strip, Hamas can be expected to take advantage of the interim period to rebuild its military capabilities, with Iran also expected to continue backing Hamas by providing financial aid, supplying weapons, and transferring technical and other knowledge and training. The involvement of Qatar and Turkey, Hamas' allies, in shaping the "day after" in Gaza can be expected to obstruct the establishment of a temporary administration which could lead genuine, sincere efforts to limit Hamas' activity and disarm it. However, even if the temporary administration demonstrates determination, Hamas will continue to use its proven experience to adapt its military buildup processes to the changing situations on the ground. Read more...

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Iran

Exporting the Islamic Revolution was one of the Iranian Revolution’s original, basic objectives. Iran seeks regional hegemony and more than that – dominance of the Muslim world. To that end, Iran has developed a network of underground organizations and terrorist groups within Islamic (especially Shiite) communities in the Middle East and around the world, including Africa, Latin America, Asia and beyond. In the Middle East, Iran is leading an anti-American and anti-Israeli Shiite axis struggling against the Middle Eastern Sunni countries led by Saudi Arabia. The Iranian axis (the “Axis of Resistance”) includes Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and Bahrain. In these countries, Iran handles proxy organizations operating to promote Iran’s interests.

Israeli-Iranian relations had their ups and downs. During the reign of the Shah of Iran, the two countries were allied politically. After the revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Iran revoked its recognition of Israel and ended all official relations with it.

To implement its anti-Israeli policies, Iran has broadened its ties to the terrorist organizations operating against Israel. Iran instigates terrorist organizations, especially the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah, to attack Israel, and finances and arms both organizations. In recent years, large shipments of weapons from Iran have been intercepted as they were en route to the Palestinian terrorist organizations.

To promote its regional and global interests and aspirations, Iran is developing military nuclear capabilities. It is also developing long-range missiles and warheads which can reach Israel, the rest of the Middle East, and Europe.