In-Depth Studies

Operation Guardian of the Walls as a watershed moment in Hamas’ strategy for the “destruction of Israel,” as reflected in documents found by the IDF in the Gaza Strip

Israel considered Operation Guardian of the Walls (May 2021) a major success which severely damaged Hamas and strengthened Israeli deterrence. Statements by senior Israeli officials, including the prime minister, the defense minister and senior IDF officers, emphasized the blow to Hamas’ military capabilities, primarily the tunnel system (the so-called “tunnel system”) and claimed Hamas was unlikely to act against Israel for years; Hamas, however, held an opposing view and considered the operation, which it referred to as Operation Sword of Jerusalem, a significant achievement for the movement and a defeat for Israel. That was reflected in public statements by Hamas leaders in the days following the ceasefire, in which they declared a strategic victory and downplayed the extent of damage to their military capabilities. Leaders of the “resistance axis” also praised Hamas and its military wing; The sense of achievement also appeared in captured Hamas documents found during the Gaza Strip War. They included transcripts of conversations and written correspondence between Hamas leaders and senior figures in Iran and Hezbollah; Hamas’ perception of success in the operation bolstered the confidence of Yahya al-Sinwar, head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, who moved forward with military plans to implement the vision of “destroying Israel,” in coordination with other members of the “resistance axis,” even if Iran and Hezbollah were not actively involved; The documents reinforce the assessment, also evident from public statements, that Hamas regarded Operation Guardian of the Walls as a watershed moment in its future strategic plan for the conflict with Israel. Despite the proposal to promote a political move toward a temporary cessation of hostilities, the Hamas leadership under al-Sinwar focused on practical preparations for a major military operation, culminating in the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre, a step in realizing the movement’s long-term vision of “destroying Israel.” Read more...

Hamas’ strategy to destroy Israel: from theory into practice, as seen in captured documents

The idea that the very existence of the State of Israel ("the Zionist entity") is illegal and immoral has been ingrained in Hamas' worldview since its founding. However, for Hamas, aware of its military and political limitations, the issue of "the destruction of Israel" remained a vision for the future, while the movement focused on the narrative that "not losing is a victory."; After the Saif al-Quds campaign (Operation Guardian of the Walls) in May 2021, Hamas' approach began to shift, as the movement came to believe that the destruction of Israel had become a goal that could actually be achieved. The change was reflected in a series of public statements by Hamas leaders, although they could have been perceived on the Israeli side (and probably were) as boasts; Hamas documents taken from Gaza during the Gaza Strip War confirm what Hamas officials had publicly stated and indicate that the plan to eliminate the State of Israel had been regarded in recent years, especially after Operation Guardian of the Walls, by the Hamas leadership, especially Yahya al-Sinwar (as well as by its allies, Iran and Hezbollah), as executable and highly feasible in the near future. Those were not just empty words, they were backed by the development of practical plans and ongoing coordination between the elements of the "resistance axis." They felt Israel had become vulnerable while Hamas and other 'resistance' forces had grown stronger. The strategic shift by Hamas was not understood at all by Israel; In ITIC assessment, the severe blow suffered by Hamas and most elements of the "resistance axis" will probably push back the play to destroy Israel, returning it to the level of a vision for the future. In the long run, if Hamas recovers and receives support from Iran, it is not improbable that the movement could once again regard destroying Israel as a practical plan. Read more...

Turkey as a Center for Hamas Activity

Turkey, under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is one of Hamas' most important strategic allies. Turkey hosts senior Hamas figures, and provides political, diplomatic and propaganda support, as well as economic and humanitarian assistance, including during the Gaza war; Hamas has established one of its most important overseas centers in Turkey, primarily operated by prisoners released in the Gilad Shalit exchange deal of 2011. It uses Turkey to plan terrorist attacks and transfer funds to finance terrorist activities inside Israel, in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, and to raise and launder money in support of its terrorist operations, including the October 7, 2023, attack and massacre; Hamas documents seized by IDF forces in the Gaza Strip during the Gaza Strip War showed the relationship between Hamas and Turkey, including how Hamas used Turkey for terrorist activities against Israel; In ITIC assessment, given the Hamas operational infrastructure in Turkey, its deep involvement in terrorism and Turkey’s hostility toward Israel, Hamas will seek to strengthen and expand its ties with Turkey. The deportation of terrorists, particularly senior terrorists from Israel, to Turkey in particular, is likely to reinforce the Hamas operational base in Turkey and facilitate the rebuilding of its military wing and the return of released prisoners to terrorist activities. A Turkish aegis would strengthen the "external" Hamas leadership and increase Hamas terrorist activity outside Israel. Given Turkey’s location and its strained relations with Israel, Israeli security forces would face significant challenges in effectively countering Hamas infrastructure and activities in Turkey. Read more...

Activities of Saeed Izadi, Head of the Qods Forces’ “Palestine Branch,” Reflected in Captured Documents

Saeed Izadi, aka Hajj Ramadan, heads the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps' (IRGC) Qods Force Palestine Branch, which is responsible for liaising with Palestinian terrorist organizations, primarily Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), to attack Israel; Hamas documents seized by the IDF during the Gaza Strip War exposed Izadi’s critical role in building the "resistance axis", during the period leading up to the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre, in accordance with the plans of former Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani, under Iranian leadership and in partnership with Hezbollah, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ); The documents reveal the problems which arose over the years in connecting the partners and building the axis, as well as how Izadi met the challenges; In ITIC assessment Izadi will continue to be a central figure in Iran’s efforts to rebuild the "resistance axis," particularly Hamas and Hezbollah, following the war against Israel and the overthrow of the Assad regime in Syria. In all probability Izadi and the Palestine Branch will focus on smuggling weapons into Judea and Samaria and providing funding. They will also focus on attacks inside Israel, including attempts to assassinate senior Israeli figures in revenge for the damage to "resistance axis" organizations and the Israeli strike on Iran in October 2024. Read more...

Iran in the Face of Regional Developments: Challenges, Responses and Possible Courses of Action

The dramatic developments in the Middle East in recent months, mainly Israel’s military achievements vis-à-vis Hamas and Hezbollah and the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, have significantly weakened Iran and the “resistance front” that it leads and pose significant challenges to it, first and foremost the damage to Tehran’s ability to influence the region. These challenges join a series of other challenges facing the Islamic Republic, mainly the deepening of the economic crisis, the consequences of the Israeli attack at the end of October 2024, and the return of Donald Trump to the White House; In light of the recent regional developments, Iran is trying to downplay the seriousness of the situation, emphasizing its capabilities and the capabilities of the “resistance front” to overcome the challenges and continue to act in light of the new circumstances, thanks in part to the ability of Iran’s regional proxies to produce weapons themselves, Highlighting Israel’s failure to realize its goals in the war, both in the Gaza Strip and in Lebanon, and presenting the ceasefire in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip as a victory for the “resistance front” and a strategic failure for Israel, Emphasizing Iran’s continued support for the “resistance,” as it is a central pillar of the Islamic Republic’s policy; In the ITIC’s assessment, Iran has no intention of backing down from its efforts to maintain its regional status and continue its support for the “resistance front.” At the same time, it appears that Iran will examine how to make the necessary adjustments and find possible solutions to the limitations and constraints it faces in the main arenas in which it operates. Read more...

Weapons Used by Hezbollah Against Israel, October 8, 2023 to November 27, 2024

Between October 8, 2023, when Hezbollah first attacked Israel "to support" the Gaza Strip during the Hamas terrorist attack and massacre which began the previous day, and the ceasefire which went into effect on November 27, 2024, the organization used a wide range of weapons to attack Israeli civilian and military targets. It used various types of rockets, ballistic missiles, UAVs, anti-tank missiles, artillery shells and surface-to-air missiles; Hezbollah deployed its forces in such a way that each escalation saw the introduction of new weapons intended to increase the range, effectiveness and intensity of its attacks on Israel; The vast majority of the weapons were manufactured in Iran and Russia and smuggled to Hezbollah via direct flights from Iran or convoys passing through Syrian territory. the organization also produced its own weapons; This study reviews the weapons used by Hezbollah beginning on October 8, 2023; The variety of weapons used by Hezbollah reflected the organization's advanced military capabilities acquired in the years between the Second Lebanon War in 2006 and the start of the fighting in October 2023, as well as its operational capabilities against Israel, both near the border and in its ability to threaten targets deep within Israel. Despite the extensive damage inflicted by the IDF on Hezbollah's weapons capabilities during the current conflict, in ITIC assessment the organization still possesses capabilities and knowledge which will enable it to continue posing a threat unless it is completely disarmed throughout Lebanon. Read more...

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