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In-Depth Studies

About 60% of the Gazans Classified as “Journalists” and Other Media Personnel Killed in the Gaza Strip War Belonged to Hamas and Other Terrorist Organizations

Media personnel are extremely important for Hamas during confrontations and wars with Israel, regarding them as part of their propaganda machine in the battle for hearts and minds and anti-Israeli incitement. The terrorist organizations, headed by Hamas, operate many affiliated media outlets in the Strip which spread their propaganda and disinformation; During the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre, some Hamas-affiliated journalists received advance notice of the attack, arrived at the border area and then entered Israeli communities near the border to broadcast live. Throughout the Gaza Strip War many journalists, authorized by Hamas, were observed closely covering combat zones; Since Hamas' attack and massacre on October 7, 2023 and throughout the Gaza Strip War (until November 30, 2025), the Hamas government media information office in the Gaza Strip has reported the deaths of 256 Palestinian media personnel, men and women. International organizations for the protection of journalists reported about 220 media personnel killed; According to information examined by the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center for the present study and the study published in February 2024, 266 individuals defined as "journalists and media personnel" were killed during the war in the Gaza Strip. The examination indicated that about 60% were members of or affiliated with terrorist organizations, primarily Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ); Prominent in the investigation was the finding that many had double roles, they were both military operatives and media personnel. That was particularly obvious in the cooperation between Hamas and Qatar's Al Jazeera network. Loyalty to a media outlet and a terrorist organization not only undermines trust in media personnel and the credibility of their reporting, but alters the status of journalists under international law and places them in danger, since military forces find it difficult to distinguish between journalists and military operatives.
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Hezbollah: One Year After the Ceasefire

November 27, 2025, marked one year since the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon went into effect, ending the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah which began on October 8, 2023; The results of the war and regional and internal geo-strategic developments in Lebanon over the past year put Hezbollah in the most complex situation it had experienced since its establishment, with the loss of its leadership and senior figures and thousands of field commanders and operatives, the continuation of targeted killings and damage to the organization’s infrastructure as part of the IDF’s efforts to enforce the ceasefire agreement, the halting of flights from Iran and the blow to smuggling routes and sources of funding, the Lebanese government's decision to implement the state’s monopoly over weapons, international pressure on Lebanon and criticism from within the Shi'ite community; Despite the difficulties, Hezbollah has shown itself eminently capable of adapting and rebuilding itself through organizational decentralization to improve the survivability of the leadership, reliance on continued Iranian support and the development of alternative methods for smuggling weapons and funds, manufacturing weapons itself, the preservation of its internal Lebanese political power base while strengthening the status of the organization and "the resistance"  among young Shi'ites in Lebanon; Throughout the year, Hezbollah’s senior figures changed their rhetoric. In the first months, they claimed commitment to the ceasefire and placed responsibility on state institutions to deal with [alleged] "Israeli violations." However, continued attacks and targeted killings, along with growing pressure on the government to disarm Hezbollah and begin negotiations with Israel, led Hezbollah to harden its defiant rhetoric and increase threats to "respond"  to Israel and take action against anyone who attempted to harm it within Lebanon, although it continued to maintain restraint and did not "respond" to Israel's attacks; The targeted killing of Hezbollah’s acting chief of staff, Haitham Ali Tabataba’i, underscored the dilemma facing Hezbollah, that is, threats of retaliatory action and the understanding that any response, especially if carried out unilaterally by Hezbollah, would have severe consequences for Lebanon in general and the organization in particular; In ITIC assessment, Hezbollah's ongoing efforts to rebuild its military capabilities and replenish its arsenal, the inability of the Lebanese armed forces to stop them and the Lebanese government’s failure to meet the deadlines it set for disarming Hezbollah and other armed militias, and the intensification of Israeli enforcement measures, may erode Hezbollah's caution and restraint and increase the risk of escalation, which would include a response targeting IDF forces or Israeli territory. Despite Hezbollah’s weakened state, it apparently still has sufficient power to deter the Lebanese government from any attempt to fully enforce on Hezbollah the state’s monopoly over weapons, while remaining the central power broker within the Shi'ite community without any significant opposition capable of challenging its position.
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Arrest of Hamas Terrorist Cells in Europe: Hamas May Carry Out Attacks Abroad

Over the years, Hamas established a network across Europe, operating charitable societies and institutions to raise money for its civilian and military facilities in the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria, even though Hamas was put on the European Union's list of terrorist organizations as early as 2003. Hamas representatives in Europe carried out extensive propaganda activity, including early attempts to establish political parties; Only after the Hamas terrorist attack and massacre on October 7, 2023, and the pro-Hamas demonstrations throughout Europe, did European countries institute serious measures against Hamas, including outlawing the movement and shutting down its financial sources; In October 2025, three Hamas terrorist operatives were arrested in Germany on suspicion of preparing to attack Israeli and Jewish targets in the near or immediate future. In December 2023, four Hamas operatives were arrested in Germany and the Netherlands, suspected of being responsible for maintaining hidden weapons caches in Europe under the supervision of the movement's military wing branch in Lebanon; In ITIC assessment, the arrests indicate that for the first time, Hamas was planning to attack Israeli and Jewish targets on European soil. The arrest of the movement's operatives, some of whom were known to authorities as fundraisers, indicates Hamas' desire to exploit its fundraising and propaganda networks in Europe, especially in Germany and Austria, to carry out attacks, despite the efforts of European authorities to take action against the movement following the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. Hamas is liable to use people who participated in the pro-Hamas demonstrations in Europe in the past two years to attack Israeli and Jewish targets. Meanwhile, Hamas operatives are also liable to exploit the pro-Hamas demonstrations to establish parties which will seek to enter the political arena and increase Hamas and its supporters' efforts to influence public opinion and decision-makers in Europe.
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The Turkish IHH, which led the Mavi Marmara flotilla, operates in the Gaza Strip and is involved in its reconstruction

The Turkish IHH organization announced the launch of a project to clear rubble and open blocked roads in the Gaza Strip as part of reconstruction efforts, following the declaration of a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. The organization was involved in launching flotillas to the Gaza Strip, foremost of which was the Mavi Marmara flotilla which ended in a violent confrontation with IDF forces in May 2010 and the Global Sumud ("resilience''') flotilla, which was halted by the IDF in October 2025; The IHH is an NGO founded in 1992 and with close ties to the Turkish government. It promotes radical Islamist, anti-Israeli and anti-Western activity. Bülent Yıldırım, the head of the organization, has repeatedly made anti-Israeli and antisemitic statements; The IHH also has ties with Hamas and was outlawed in Israel in 2008 due to its involvement in a network of charity associations which raised funds for Hamas institutions abroad; This study is based on dozens of report issued about the IHH by the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (ITIC) since 2010. It summarizes the main aspects of the ties between the organization and Hamas and the central role Bülent Yıldırım plays, in cooperation with Hamas, in the campaign to delegitimize Israel; In ITIC assessment, the IHH's involvement in reconstruction activity in the Gaza Strip may be another way of strengthening Hamas' influence over affairs in the Strip even after the ceasefire goes into effect. The locating of Hamas headquarters in Turkey, which is one of the sponsors of the ceasefire agreement, and the ties between the movement and the IHH, may also provide Hamas with a direct channel for transferring funds and equipment to restore the military wing, under the cover of humanitarian aid. In addition, the direct connection between the IHH and the Turkish government, one of the signatories to the ceasefire agreement and an unreserved supporter of Hamas, gives the Turkish regime a foothold in the Gaza Strip and increases its regional influence on Israel's border.
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Documentary Evidence of Hamas-Al Jazeera Relations and Cooperation

The Al Jazeera network, controlled by Qatar's ruling family, is one of the most prominent media outlets in the Arab world. For years, it has promoted radical Sunni Islam agendas, including those of Hamas; During the Gaza Strip War, Al Jazeera gave Hamas' political and military leadership a platform for conveying their messages and promoted Hamas' psychological warfare by showing videos of hostages, exclusive broadcasts of "ceremonies" for the release of hostages and pictures of Hamas terrorists attacking IDF forces in the Gaza Strip. Meanwhile, the network systematically ignored anti-Hamas protests in the Gaza Strip; Hamas documents brought back from the Gaza Strip by IDF forces showed that the cooperation and media coordination between Hamas and Al Jazeera were neither random nor isolated but systematic, organized and continuous. They showed Hamas' transfer of coverage guidelines and instructions to the network's management to influence its editorial policy on issues related to the movement and established a secure phone line between the movement's military emergency operations room and Al Jazeera; The documents showed that many journalists who worked for Al Jazeera in the Gaza Strip were simultaneously operatives in Hamas' military wing. Some of them accompanied the waves of infiltration into Israeli territory during the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre; Research indicates that for years, especially during the Gaza Strip War, Hamas regarded Al Jazeera not merely as a media platform for reporting and message transmission but as an integral part of the movement's propaganda, de-legitimization of Israel, and psychological warfare machine- Even after the announcement of the ceasefire agreement, Al Jazeera continues to provide extensive coverage of Hamas and its messages while emphasizing both the movement's survival and the high price the war exacted from Israel. Continued cooperation between Hamas and Al Jazeera is also evident in the exclusive coverage granted to the network's correspondents and their access to locations where hostages and bodies are transferred to the Red Cross.
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The “Resistance Axis” and the Israel-Iran War

Iran's use of the proxy organizations throughout the Middle East which compose "resistance axis," is one of the central tenets of Iran's national security doctrine and has motivated its regional activity since the Islamic Revolution. A primary goal in constructing the "resistance axis" was to deter Israel from attacking Iran's nuclear facilities and to provide an immediate response in the event of such an attack; Israel's attack on Iran on June 13, 2025, found the "resistance axis" organizations in crisis after nearly two years of combat, during which many leaders and thousands of operatives were eliminated and their military capabilities were severely damaged. Throughout the 12 days of the Israel-Iran War, during which the Islamic Republic's nuclear facilities were attacked and dozens of commanders and nuclear scientists were eliminated, the proxy organizations took virtually no offensive action against Israel and the United States. Instead, they issued statements of support for Iran and condemnation of Israeli and American attacks, while threatening they would intervene in the fighting if circumstances changed; Iran's leadership has yet to respond to the proxy organizations' lack of action during the war, but senior figures in Tehran have stated that the Islamic Republic remains committed to supporting the "resistance axis" until the "struggle against Israel" has been completed; From the perspective of the "resistance axis," the elimination of Mohammad Saeed Izadi (Hajj Ramadan), the head of the Palestine branch of the Revolutionary Guards' Qods Force, was critical. He was the key figure in Iran's ties with the Palestinian terrorist organizations and with Hezbollah, and played a role in preparing for the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre; The results of the Israel-Iran War will have an impact on the proxy organizations in the immediate future. The United States, Qatar, and Egypt have increased efforts to advance a ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip and the release of the hostages, exerting greater pressure on Hamas; Hezbollah is struggling to rebuild its military-terrorist capabilities, has been forced to halt payments to homeowners affected by the fighting with Israel, and is facing increasing pressure to disarm; the issue of dismantling the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq has resurfaced; and the Houthis, who remain the only active "support arena," are attempting to raise their status within the "resistance axis," including by improving their military-terrorist capabilities with Iranian assistance; In ITIC assessment, Iran will now be forced to invest significant resources to rebuild the military capabilities damaged in the Israeli attacks and in stabilizing its military and security apparatus after the elimination of dozens of commanders. Despite the declarations of continued support for the "resistance axis," Iran will struggle to provide the scale of support for its proxies which existed before October 7, 2023. In all probability the elimination of Izadi will have a substantial impact on the continued financial and military support received by the proxy organizations because of his many years of experience. The proxies will also try to adapt to new, unprecedented concessions regarding their military capabilities.
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