In-Depth Studies

Hamas Media as Reflected in Documents Brought Back from the Gaza Strip

Hamas' media system is an extensive network which integrates overt and covert, formal and informal communication channels and targets diverse audiences. It serves as a propaganda and incitement tool in Hamas' battle for hearts and minds; Hamas documents brought back by the IDF during the Gaza Strip War showed that Hamas exercises full control, administratively, financially and strategically over its affiliated media outlets in terms of content and messaging, although such bodies are represented as independent, allowing Hamas to maneuver communicationally, diplomatically and militarily; The documents revealed that Hamas' media activity was based on an orderly, multi-year master program divided into 25 projects, each with quantifiable objectives, content production quotas, timetables and resource allocations; An important element of the program was a propaganda campaign to sabotage Israel's resilience by disseminating fake news, funding targeted advertisements for audiences in Israel, operating satirical pages to mock Israeli leaders and symbols, sowing doubts to demoralize the Israeli public; Hamas invests considerable resources in shaping an English-language narrative tailored to the West to mobilize legitimacy for the "resistance" and to defame and demonize the State of Israel; Internal audits reveal that Hamas' media outlets suffer from deficits, bad debts and poor asset management. The findings indicate absolute dependence on the transfer of funds from Hamas' coffers, including via Turkey; In ITIC assessment, the documents show that the affiliated media are at the core of Hamas' battle for hearts and minds, and make the information department particularly important in formulating media policy and managing all the media institutions operating in the service of Hamas, including those the organization does not define as officially affiliated with it. Read more...

Hamas Criticism of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad Revealed in Seized Documents from the Gaza Strip

The military wings of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) have cooperated closely in wars and rounds of fighting against Israel, including during the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre and the subsequent war in the Gaza Strip, and together they operated a joint operations room with the other terrorist organizations in the Strip; Despite the cooperation, in several instances the two movements have disagreed, mainly due to PIJ's independent rocket fire, which led to short rounds of fighting against Israel, contrary to the "controlled escalation" policy which Hamas tried to promote while making secret preparations for the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. Hamas documents brought back by the IDF from the Gaza Strip indicated that Hamas was displeased by the PIJ's independent conduct; The documents also confirmed that many of the rockets fired at Israel by the PIJ fell inside the Gaza Strip, killing civilians and causing damage, which was also a serious problem for Hamas; In an attempt to reduce the PIJ's "rogue" actions, Hamas tried to impose its will on the PIJ and even subjugate the organization to its direct control. The documents included information regarding problems the PIJ caused the "resistance," including immoral behavior and intelligence infiltration, and measures to ensure that the PIJ would act in accordance with Hamas' interests at the political and military levels. The documents reveal a pragmatic and interest-based relationship between Hamas and the PIJ. Hamas views the PIJ as undisciplined and in need of constant control and supervision, while the PIJ seeks to gain public support by being more active against Israel. Although it is not known whether Hamas succeeded in fully implementing its plans to take over the PIJ, the war in the Gaza Strip showed that the two movements were able to overcome their differences and cooperate in dealing with Israel, including the deals to release the hostages. In ITIC’s assessment, although Hamas will ostensibly relinquish political control in the Gaza Strip as part of the second phase of the ceasefire agreement, both organizations can be expected to refuse to disarm and continue to attack Israeli security forces and civilians in accordance with the vision of a jihad war until the "annihilation of Israel." However, if Hamas is pragmatic, in all probability the conflict between the two movements will resume and intensify, publicly as well. Read more...

The committee of Technocrats Who Will Manage the Gaza Strip

On January 14, 2026, Steve Witkoff, the American special envoy, announced the beginning of the second phase of the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip. Following that, the establishment of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza was announced, a Palestinian technocratic body intended to manage day-to-day affairs in the Strip in accordance with the American 20-point plan; Most of the committee's 12 members, headed by Dr. Ali Shaath, are affiliated with Fatah and the Palestinian Authority (PA), and some of them served in PA governments and public institutions. Committee members include Sami Nisman, a former official in Palestinian General Intelligence who was sentenced to imprisonment by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and Hana Tarazi, the only woman on the committee and a Christian lawyer specializing in Islamic law; The members of the committee are entrusted with establishing the Gazans' security, restoring essential services and fostering a society based on peace, democracy and justice. Committee chairman Shaath said its top priorities included providing shelter for residents and clearing rubble, and the cancellation of fees and taxes for Gazans and businesses in the Strip had already been ordered; Hamas claimed it was transferring governing authorities to the committee, while the PA noted the need to link institutions in the Gaza Strip with Judea and Samaria; In ITIC assessment, despite the committee's genuine desire to begin its operations, in all probability it will encounter difficulties in translating its vision into reality. First, Israel will prevent them from entering the Gaza Strip through the Rafah Crossing as long as the issue of the last murdered Israeli hostage is unresolved, forcing committee members to operate from Egypt. In addition, the degree of freedom of movement the committee will receive remains unclear, particularly in areas where Israel maintains security control. Moreover, despite Hamas' alleged willingness to transfer governance to the committee, it will have to rely on tens of thousands of employees who remain loyal to Hamas after nearly two decades of absolute Hamas control in the Strip. In such a situation, the committee will at best be able to carry out limited assistance and reconstruction activities, but most likely not to resolve core issues of control, security and demilitarization. Read more...

About 60% of the Gazans Classified as “Journalists” and Other Media Personnel Killed in the Gaza Strip War Belonged to Hamas and Other Terrorist Organizations

Media personnel are extremely important for Hamas during confrontations and wars with Israel, regarding them as part of their propaganda machine in the battle for hearts and minds and anti-Israeli incitement. The terrorist organizations, headed by Hamas, operate many affiliated media outlets in the Strip which spread their propaganda and disinformation; During the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre, some Hamas-affiliated journalists received advance notice of the attack, arrived at the border area and then entered Israeli communities near the border to broadcast live. Throughout the Gaza Strip War many journalists, authorized by Hamas, were observed closely covering combat zones; Since Hamas' attack and massacre on October 7, 2023 and throughout the Gaza Strip War (until November 30, 2025), the Hamas government media information office in the Gaza Strip has reported the deaths of 256 Palestinian media personnel, men and women. International organizations for the protection of journalists reported about 220 media personnel killed; According to information examined by the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center for the present study and the study published in February 2024, 266 individuals defined as "journalists and media personnel" were killed during the war in the Gaza Strip. The examination indicated that about 60% were members of or affiliated with terrorist organizations, primarily Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ); Prominent in the investigation was the finding that many had double roles, they were both military operatives and media personnel. That was particularly obvious in the cooperation between Hamas and Qatar's Al Jazeera network. Loyalty to a media outlet and a terrorist organization not only undermines trust in media personnel and the credibility of their reporting, but alters the status of journalists under international law and places them in danger, since military forces find it difficult to distinguish between journalists and military operatives. Read more...

Hezbollah: One Year After the Ceasefire

November 27, 2025, marked one year since the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon went into effect, ending the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah which began on October 8, 2023; The results of the war and regional and internal geo-strategic developments in Lebanon over the past year put Hezbollah in the most complex situation it had experienced since its establishment, with the loss of its leadership and senior figures and thousands of field commanders and operatives, the continuation of targeted killings and damage to the organization’s infrastructure as part of the IDF’s efforts to enforce the ceasefire agreement, the halting of flights from Iran and the blow to smuggling routes and sources of funding, the Lebanese government's decision to implement the state’s monopoly over weapons, international pressure on Lebanon and criticism from within the Shi'ite community; Despite the difficulties, Hezbollah has shown itself eminently capable of adapting and rebuilding itself through organizational decentralization to improve the survivability of the leadership, reliance on continued Iranian support and the development of alternative methods for smuggling weapons and funds, manufacturing weapons itself, the preservation of its internal Lebanese political power base while strengthening the status of the organization and "the resistance" among young Shi'ites in Lebanon; Throughout the year, Hezbollah’s senior figures changed their rhetoric. In the first months, they claimed commitment to the ceasefire and placed responsibility on state institutions to deal with [alleged] "Israeli violations." However, continued attacks and targeted killings, along with growing pressure on the government to disarm Hezbollah and begin negotiations with Israel, led Hezbollah to harden its defiant rhetoric and increase threats to "respond" to Israel and take action against anyone who attempted to harm it within Lebanon, although it continued to maintain restraint and did not "respond" to Israel's attacks; The targeted killing of Hezbollah’s acting chief of staff, Haitham Ali Tabataba’i, underscored the dilemma facing Hezbollah, that is, threats of retaliatory action and the understanding that any response, especially if carried out unilaterally by Hezbollah, would have severe consequences for Lebanon in general and the organization in particular; In ITIC assessment, Hezbollah's ongoing efforts to rebuild its military capabilities and replenish its arsenal, the inability of the Lebanese armed forces to stop them and the Lebanese government’s failure to meet the deadlines it set for disarming Hezbollah and other armed militias, and the intensification of Israeli enforcement measures, may erode Hezbollah's caution and restraint and increase the risk of escalation, which would include a response targeting IDF forces or Israeli territory. Despite Hezbollah’s weakened state, it apparently still has sufficient power to deter the Lebanese government from any attempt to fully enforce on Hezbollah the state’s monopoly over weapons, while remaining the central power broker within the Shi'ite community without any significant opposition capable of challenging its position. Read more...

Arrest of Hamas Terrorist Cells in Europe: Hamas May Carry Out Attacks Abroad

Over the years, Hamas established a network across Europe, operating charitable societies and institutions to raise money for its civilian and military facilities in the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria, even though Hamas was put on the European Union's list of terrorist organizations as early as 2003. Hamas representatives in Europe carried out extensive propaganda activity, including early attempts to establish political parties; Only after the Hamas terrorist attack and massacre on October 7, 2023, and the pro-Hamas demonstrations throughout Europe, did European countries institute serious measures against Hamas, including outlawing the movement and shutting down its financial sources; In October 2025, three Hamas terrorist operatives were arrested in Germany on suspicion of preparing to attack Israeli and Jewish targets in the near or immediate future. In December 2023, four Hamas operatives were arrested in Germany and the Netherlands, suspected of being responsible for maintaining hidden weapons caches in Europe under the supervision of the movement's military wing branch in Lebanon; In ITIC assessment, the arrests indicate that for the first time, Hamas was planning to attack Israeli and Jewish targets on European soil. The arrest of the movement's operatives, some of whom were known to authorities as fundraisers, indicates Hamas' desire to exploit its fundraising and propaganda networks in Europe, especially in Germany and Austria, to carry out attacks, despite the efforts of European authorities to take action against the movement following the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. Hamas is liable to use people who participated in the pro-Hamas demonstrations in Europe in the past two years to attack Israeli and Jewish targets. Meanwhile, Hamas operatives are also liable to exploit the pro-Hamas demonstrations to establish parties which will seek to enter the political arena and increase Hamas and its supporters' efforts to influence public opinion and decision-makers in Europe. Read more...

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