In-Depth Studies

Turkey: Center for Hamas Leadership and Coordination

Since 2003, the ties between Hamas and Erdoğan's Turkey have grown stronger and have been manifested by Turkey's hosting senior movement figures, political and diplomatic support and economic and humanitarian assistance; Hamas also turned Turkey into an important foothold from which it directs attacks on Israeli targets and raises funds to finance terrorist activities; During the last several months, the Hamas leadership had begun transferring its organizational activity from Qatar to Turkey for "security" reasons and due to the consequences of the war in Iran; Coordination between the Hamas and the Turkish leaderships increased regarding the continued implementation of the agreement, despite Turkey's status as guarantors of the agreement and mediators. Read more...

Khalil al-Hayya Elected to Chair Hamas political bureau – Insights and Reactions

Khalil al-Hayya is the new chairman of Hamas after defeating Khaled Mashaal; Hamas declared that all members of the movement and its institutions stood behind al-Hayya, while Iran and the "resistance axis" praised his election as "a proof of the victory of the resistance"; Al-Hayya, a native of Gaza City, joined Hamas when it was established in 1987 and was chairman of the movement's faction in the Palestinian National Council. He had been Yahya al-Sinwar's deputy in the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip since 2017 and, following al-Sinwar's elimination, became Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip; Al-Hayya was a member of the Hamas delegations which conducted indirect negotiations with Israel over hostage deals and has headed the negotiating team since the outbreak of the war following the October 7, 2023 terrorist invasion and massacre. He also survived several attempts to kill him and four of his sons died in Israeli strikes; Al-Hayya is expected to continue al-Sinwar's ideological line, especially "resistance" and close relations with Iran. Read more...

Hamas’ Perception of Hezbollah’s Role in the Multi-Arena Hostilities as Reflected in Documents from the Gaza Strip

The election of Yahya al-Sinwar as head of Hamas' political bureau in the Gaza Strip in 2017 led to closer cooperation between Hamas and Hezbollah after years of tension. Al-Sinwar regarded Hezbollah not only as a role model for confronting Israel, but also as an intermediary for Iran and a way to make Hamas an integral part of a regional alliance; The Sword of Jerusalem operation in May 2021 provided the first opportunity to implement the strategic cooperation between Hamas and Hezbollah in a multi-front campaign. Hamas documents brought back by the IDF from the Gaza Strip contained details of bilateral coordination through a joint operations room which functioned throughout the hostilities, including the transfer of real-time intelligence and Hezbollah's authorization for Hamas to fire rockets from Lebanese territory; Hamas documents revealed how senior Hamas figures persuaded Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah to participate in the campaign designed to realize their vision of the "destruction of Israel", even if only partially, while Nasrallah was initially cautious position before eventually becoming willing to cooperate in the hostilities; Hamas' decision to launch its invasion of Israel on October 7, 2023 caught Nasrallah by off guard, forcing him to decide quickly how to respond to Hamas' call for assistance in the new war. Hezbollah entered the war a day later to "support the Gaza Strip" and conducted controlled fighting based on a unilateral "deterrence equation" consistent with the organization's interests until the escalation in September 2024; The Hamas documents reveal the Hamas leadership's understanding that Hezbollah's involvement would be a force multiplier in any hostilities against Israel, whether through intelligence cooperation, limited operations which would occupy IDF forces along the northern border and thereby ease the fighting in the Gaza Strip and other arenas, or full-scale involvement which could help realize the vision of the "destruction of Israel." At the same time, al-Sinwar and Deif's decision to launch the attack without informing Hezbollah in advance reflected their understanding that the organization had its own interests in the Lebanese arena and its commitments to Iran, as manifested by Hezbollah's operational concept during the war and statements by its senior figures. Read more...

The disclosure of the names of fallen military operatives by Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad confirms the Amit Institute’s Research findings on the double roles of “journalists” in the Gaza Strip

Since the beginning of 2026 the military wings of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) have regularly reported the names of hundreds of commanders and operatives killed during the war in the Gaza Strip since October 7, 2023, including after the ceasefire which went into effect in October 2025; The publication of the names provides official organizational confirmation that individuals who during the war were allegedly "journalists" and "media personnel" in fact belonged to the military media units of the military wings of Hamas and the PIJ or to other units within the other organizations; The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (now the Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Research Institute) published two comprehensive studies, one in February 2024 and the other December 2025, examining the identities of 266 Palestinians killed in the Gaza Strip who were alleged to have been journalists and media personnel. The findings, based on open-source material, showed that about 60% belonged to the military wings or were affiliated with terrorist organizations, primarily Hamas and the PIJ; The current study shows that commanders and operatives whose names have been disclosed by Hamas and the PIJ in recent months had already appeared in the Information Center's special studies as individuals claimed to have been media personnel but who in fact unquestionably belonged to the military wings of the two organizations. Read more...

The Deception Plan Practiced by Hamas before the October 7, 2023 Attack (Including documents from the Gaza Strip)

In addition to the military planning for the October 7, 2023 terrorist attack, Hamas used a plan to deceive and mislead Israeli intelligence and decision-makers into thinking the movement did not want a confrontation; An analysis of information in the Amit Institute's possession and based on Hamas documents captured in the Gaza Strip during the Gaza Strip War, found the following elements: Avoidance of direct confrontation with Israel while containing tactical incidents; Creation of the false impression that the Hamas leadership was focused on its internal affairs and the economic situation in the Gaza Strip; Conducting a series of "routine" joint exercises with the other organizations in the Gaza Strip; The renewal of violent incidents along the border; Deception was central to Hamas' strategic preparations for the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. In Amit Institute assessment, the combined elements of the plan were intended to create the false impression that Hamas had been deterred, especially since Operation Guardian of the Walls in May 2021, and that it neither wanted nor was capable of launching an offensive attack on Israeli territory. Ultimately, the plan successfully misled Israel’s security establishment and decision-makers, who believed Hamas had indeed been deterred and was focused on governance in the Gaza Strip and improving the Gazans' living conditions, and its public military exercises were nothing more than a demonstration of strength. Read more...

The Israel-Saudi Arabia Normalization: A motive for the October 7, 2023 terrorist attack and massacre reflected in documents from the Gaza Strip

Hamas documents brought back by IDF forces from the Gaza Strip during the Gaza Strip War showed that the Hamas leadership closely monitored the progress of normalization contacts between Israel and Saudi Arabia from their inception and regarded the entire process as a real danger and a strategic threat which contradicted its worldview; On the eve of the October 7, 2023 terrorist attack and massacre, the Hamas leadership decided that as part of efforts to prevent normalization, action should be taken to escalate tensions and ignite the situation in Judea and Samaria and Jerusalem, while emphasizing the message of a "danger to al-Aqsa Mosque." Al-Sinwar declared that an unconventional move had to be made which would rattle Israel and halt the process; In Amit Institute assessment, Hamas regarded the progress of normalization as a fatal blow to the Palestinian cause which would weaken the movement and diminish its role in the "resistance axis." Hamas attempted to fight the process in various ways and divided its efforts among various areas. Yahya al-Sinwar led the struggle against normalization and believed that igniting the situation on the ground and using the narrative of a "threat to al-Aqsa" as an accelerant could achieve the desired results. However, as time passed, he concluded that the only alternative was to undertake an unconventional course of action to halt the normalization process, which he believed was approaching maturation. Read more...

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