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Spotlight on Terrorism: Lebanon and Hezbollah (November 1-10, 2025)

IDF forces attacked Hezbollah facilities and eliminated terrorist operatives as part of the continued activity targeting Hezbollah's presence in south Lebanon in violation of the understandings of the ceasefire agreement, and in view of the organization's efforts to renew its arsenal. The forces attacked facilities belonging to the organization's elite the Radwan Force and killed Hezbollah and Lebanon Battalion operatives. According to reports, Israel warned Lebanon it would intensify its attacks because the activity of the Lebanese army to disarm Hezbollah was insufficient; Lebanese leaders condemned Israel for continuing to attack. President Aoun said the attacks had to stop before Lebanon would enter negotiations with Israel; Hezbollah published an open letter rejecting outright any possibility of negotiations with Israel and making it clear that it would not relinquish the "right to resistance." A senior Hezbollah figure rejected the accusation that the organization was responsible for Lebanon's economic collapse and accused the government of corruption. Opponents of the organization attacked Hezbollah's position and said it endangered Lebanon, and reiterated that state institutions were responsible for decisions regarding war and peace; The commander of the Lebanese army presented the cabinet meeting with the monthly report on implementing the plan for a state monopoly of weapons and claimed "progress had been made" in disarming Hezbollah south of the Litani River toward the goal of reaching the target by the end of the current year; The United States Treasury Department reported that Iran had transferred $1 billion to Hezbollah since the beginning of 2025 and called on the Lebanese government to block Hezbollah's sources of funding. Reportedly, Hezbollah has expanded its drug trafficking and money laundering in Venezuela to help it cope with the economic challenge; Hezbollah commanders and operatives wounded in Israeli attacks reportedly underwent plastic surgery to conceal their identities; The first coordination meeting on Lebanon's reconstruction was held with the participation of representatives of the Lebanese government, members of parliament, the army and UNIFIL. A Hezbollah bloc member called on the government to place the issue of reconstruction at the top of its priorities.
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Hezbollah’s defiance, the instability of the ceasefire andattempts to promote an Israeli-Lebanese dialogue

On November 6, 2025, Hezbollah published an open letter to the Lebanese leadership and public. It claimed it had abided by the November 27, 2024 ceasefire agreement and added that the objective of demanding that Hezbollah disarm and the Lebanese begin negotiations with Israel was to weaken Lebanon. It also insisted that it would not give up the "right to resist" and was not required to obey government directives on issues of war and peace. Hezbollah secretary general Na'im Qassem and other senior figures expressed similar positions; The letter was prompted by IDF attacks to enforce the ceasefire, targeting Hezbollah's reconstruction efforts and Radwan Force capabilities, amid reports of the organization’s rearmament. Israel and the United States also warned that if the Lebanese army did not accelerate Hezbollah’s disarmament, the attacks could intensify in quality and quantity; To prevent escalation and resolve the disputes between Israel and Lebanon, the United States and Egypt proposed holding bilateral negotiations. Lebanese president Aoun stated that Lebanon had no choice but to engage in dialogue with Israel; Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, and a Hezbollah ally, opposed direct negotiations; Hezbollah’s open letter was another expression the organization’s defiance of efforts to disarm it, after previously expressing vague willingness to discuss possibly disarming "under certain conditions." However, Hezbollah has not issued the Lebanese government an ultimatum or explicitly warned Israel, reflecting the organization's continued restraint despite the IDF attacks. In ITIC assessment, Hezbollah’s continued military buildup, the Lebanese army’s weakness in preventing it and the intensification of Israel’s measures could wear down the restraint shown by all actors since the beginning of the ceasefire and increase the risk of a serious escalation toward the end of 2025, the deadline set by the Lebanese government for disarming armed militias in the country, including Hezbollah.
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Escalation of terrorist activity in Judea and Samaria Following the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip

Hamas' ambition was to turn Judea and Samaria into an arena for terrorism as part of the campaign to destroy Israel which began with the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. However, the counterterrorism actions taken by the Israeli security forces, which included the detention and elimination of thousands of wanted persons and terrorist operatives and the seizure of weapons prevented a wave of terrorism from Judea and Samaria; Following the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) began efforts to shift the center of the "resistance" to Judea and Samaria, encouraging attacks on Israeli security forces and settlers; Iran also continues its central role in efforts to turn Judea and Samaria into an active terrorist arena against Israel. A shipment of weapons from Iran was intercepted, which included powerful explosive charges and explosive-carrying drones; Qods Force operatives in Lebanon who were involved in the smuggling routes of weapons were eliminated; In ITIC assessment, after the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, with Iranian assistance, will direct a significant portion of their activity to Judea and Samaria to justify their existence by continuing the "resistance." The terrorist organizations will also try to exploit the return of the Palestinian issue to the global stage and the regional and international involvement in the Gaza Strip within the framework of the ceasefire to create pressure on Israel, provoking attacks which could escalate Israel's response in Judea and Samaria. Moreover, the return of hundreds of terrorist operatives from Israeli jails to Judea and Samaria will intensify the activity of the terrorist organizations, which will exploit the knowledge and experience of the released prisoners and the cooperative networks they built in prison.
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Spotlight on Terrorism – October 2025

During October 2025, fighting continued in the Gaza Strip and in Judea and Samaria, and the Houthi attacks continued from Yemen. On October 10, 2025, a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip went into effect, also pausing the Houthi attacks. The ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah was maintained despite IDF attacks on Hezbollah targets; The Gaza Strip: Until the ceasefire on October 10, the IDF continued attacking terrorist targets from the air and on the ground throughout the Strip, focusing on maneuvering inside Gaza City. Two IDF soldiers were killed. Eight rockets were fired at Israel. After the ceasefire began and IDF forces withdrew from parts of the Strip, the IDF continued enforcing the agreement against threats to its forces and in response to Hamas violations. Three IDF soldiers were killed. As part of the agreement, the twenty remaining live hostages held in the Gaza Strip were released, along with the bodies of seventeen murdered hostages from the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. Eleven bodies of murdered hostages remain in the Gaza Strip; Judea, Samaria, and Israel: There was one terrorist attack, compared to four the previous month; there were no casualties. Israeli security forces continued counterterrorism operations throughout Judea and Samaria, during which rockets were found, terrorist operatives planning attacks were eliminated, and a large shipment of weapons from Iran was seized; Lebanon: The IDF intensified its activity to prevent Hezbollah from violating the understandings of the ceasefire which went into effect on November 27, 2024, and against the organization's efforts to regain its military capabilities and restore its arsenal. More than twenty Hezbollah operatives were eliminated, including the logistics commander of the southern front headquarters and commanders and operatives from the Radwan Force. Hundreds of engineering vehicles and military infrastructures were destroyed; Syria: IDF forces prevented weapons from being smuggled into Israel and Lebanon from southern Syria; The Houthis: Until the Gaza ceasefire on October 10, the Houthis claimed responsibility for one ballistic missile attack on targets in Israel. The IDF spokesperson reported the interception of one ballistic missile and seven UAVs. The Houthis also claimed responsibility for an attack on a cargo ship in the Gulf of Aden, during which one crew member was killed. The Houthis announced the death of their chief of staff in an Israeli attack at the end of August 2025.
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Implementation of the Lebanese Army’s Plan to Disarm Hezbollah: Status Report

In early October 2025, the commander of the Lebanese Army presented the government in Beirut with the first report on the implementation of Hezbollah’s disarmament plan, in accordance with the government’s August 2025 decisions on the state’s arms monopoly. The report was reportedly claimed that the Army would be able to complete the demilitarization of the area south of the Litani River by the end of 2025, on condition that IDF forces leave southern Lebanon; “Sources” claimed that the Army only acts against sites that have been reported to UNIFIL and to the Ceasefire Monitoring Committee for fear of clashing with Hezbollah, which could lead to civil war; The Lebanese leadership expressed its commitment to the implementation of the state’s monopoly on weapons and blamed Israel for the delays in implementing the plan due to the continued attacks and the presence of IDF forces in five points in southern Lebanon; Hezbollah leaders made it clear that they oppose disarming the organization. Nevertheless, Hezbollah reportedly requested guarantees in exchange for giving up the weapons.; It was reported that US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack would arrive in Lebanon and warn the heads of state that they have one last chance to enter direct negotiations with Israel on a timetable for Hezbollah’s disarmament, or Lebanon will be left without external support. The US Special Envoy’s Deputy for the Middle East met with senior Lebanese leaders and asked them to work to prevent the restoration of Hezbollah’s military capabilities; In the ITIC’s assessment, the Lebanese Army will continue its operations to collect weapons from the terrorist organizations, focusing on Hezbollah, and to deploy its forces, mainly in areas south of the Litani, aiming to finish this by the end of 2025. On the other hand, in Hezbollah’s strongholds north of the Litani, in the Beqaa and Beirut, the Lebanese Army will find it difficult to disarm the organization for fear of a confrontation that could escalate into civil war; In the ITIC’s assessment, Hezbollah will also continue to publicly oppose its disarmament, but may agree to partial disarmament, mainly in the region south of the Litani, in exchange for appropriate guarantees. At the same time, the Lebanese government will continue its efforts to persuade the international community, especially the American administration, to increase pressure on Israel to reduce its attacks and withdraw its forces from positions in southern Lebanon, fully or partially, to help convince Hezbollah to show greater flexibility on disarmament. However, if the US administration intensifies its use of leverage, such as withholding funds for reconstruction aid or granting a free hand to Israeli action in Lebanon, the Lebanese government may change its cautious position regarding dealing with Hezbollah.
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Iran and the Continued Aid to the Axis of Resistance amid the Ceasefire in the Gaza Strip

The ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip was achieved at a time when Iran and the “Axis of Resistance” which it leads are facing significant challenges at home and in the region, especially in light of the weakening of the axis and the consequences of the “12-Day War” between it and Israel and the United States in June 2025; Senior Iranian officials expressed support in principle for the ceasefire agreement and claimed that Iran had supported every initiative aimed at ending the war over the past two years. However, they expressed doubts about Israel’s commitment to abide by the agreement. In addition, the officials stressed that the decision on the ceasefire was made exclusively by Hamas without any involvement from Tehran. Iran also rejected the invitation to participate in the peace summit in Sharm al-Sheikh, claiming that it could not participate with those who attacked it during the “12-Day War.”; Iran’s state media portrayed the end of the war as a strategic victory for Hamas and the Palestinians, who succeeded in putting the Palestinian issue back at the top of the global agenda, and as a severe defeat for Israel, which did not achieve its goals and was weakened militarily, economically, socially, and internationally; Before and after the ceasefire, senior officials and media outlets in Iran stressed that, despite the challenges and pressures facing the Islamic Republic and the pro-Iranian axis in the region, Tehran has no intention of abandoning its allies. They emphasized the importance of continuing the “resistance” and Iranian support for it. At the same time, Iran continues to deliver aid, including weapons, to its proxies in the region, including the terrorist organizations in Judea and Samaria, Hezbollah, and the Houthis; In the ITIC’s assessment, the end of the war in the Gaza Strip is not expected to bring about a significant change in Iran’s policy or put an end to its efforts to expand its influence in the Palestinian arena and to continue providing aid to Hamas and the other Palestinian terrorist organizations. In Tehran’s assessment, Hamas’ continued presence in the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria may also provide it with future opportunities to rebuild the movement’s capabilities and preserve some of Iran’s influence, despite the operational, logistical, and financial constraints that limit Iran’s continued support for the Palestinian terrorist organizations. At the same time, Iran is expected to continue its support for the other components of the “Axis of Resistance” in the region, first and foremost Hezbollah, which is in the midst of a recovery process despite the IDF’s attacks and the demand for the organization to disarm, and the Houthis, who are taking advantage of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip to continue acquiring weapons and improving their offensive capabilities. 
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