Hezbollah

Reactions to the Hezbollah Rocket Attack on Majdal Shams

On July 27, 2024, Hezbollah launched a Falaq 1 rocket from south Lebanon at the Druze town of Majdal Shams in the northern Golan Heights. The rocket hit a soccer field and killed 12 children and teenagers, and injured more than 40 other people; Hezbollah initially claimed it had launched a rocket at the IDF base in the Hermon area, but then published a false statement denying any connection to the attack on Majdal Shams. In view of Israel's threats of a powerful response to the attack, Hezbollah warned it was prepared for a counterstrike, even if it led to an all-out war; In Lebanon, politicians avoided blaming Hezbollah. The Lebanese foreign minister proposed the establishment of an independent commission of inquiry to determine who was responsible for attacking Majdal Shams; Iran warned that an Israeli response could expand the arena of the war, and Syria accepted Hezbollah's claim that Israel was responsible for launching the rocket which hit Majdal Shams. The Druze community in Syria blamed Hezbollah and called for the organization to be punished; The international community condemned the attack on Majdal Shams. However, many of the condemnations avoided directly blaming Hezbollah for launching the rocket. Read more...

Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah, Lebanon and Syria (July 15 – 22 , 2024)

During the past week Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 44 attacks on military and civilian targets in northern Israel, including towns and villages which had not previously been attacked. The Lebanese Companies for Resistance to the Israeli Occupation and Hamas-Lebanon also claimed responsibility for attacks on military targets. Two IDF soldiers were wounded in the attacks, there was significant damage to property; Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked Hezbollah targets and operatives in south Lebanon and the Lebanon Valley, including the commander of a unit of the Radwan Force; Hezbollah announced that seven operatives had been killed in the attacks. The IDF also eliminated a senior terrorist operative who belonged to al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya and Hamas-Lebanon; Hezbollah and the "resistance axis" continued preparing for the possibility of a war; Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah secretary general, threatened to attack new cities, towns and villages in Israel in response to harm to Lebanese civilians, and promised Hezbollah would restore the settlements in south Lebanon; Syria: A Syrian businessman close to the regime and the "resistance axis" was killed in an attack attributed to Israel. Read more...

Spotlight on Iran (July 10 – 17, 2024)

Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian, speaking with Ismail Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, stressed that his government would place the Palestinian issue at the top of his list of priorities and would work to stop the war in the Gaza Strip; Qods Force commander visited several countries in the region and met with commanders and senior members of the “resistance front” to emphasize Iran’s continued support for the pro-Iranian axis; Acting Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri warned that if Israel tried to expand the war to other arenas, it would cause itself further damage and benefit the “resistance"; The Houthis in Yemen and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed joint responsibility for launching drones at a ship in the Mediterranean. In addition, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for three attacks of its own against targets in Israel. There has been no confirmation of the claims from other sources; The Houthis reported attacks against civilian vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The US Central Command confirmed two of the attacks, one of them against an Israeli-owned ship. There were no casualties, but damage was caused. In addition, the Houthis claimed responsibility for launching drones at Eilat. There has been no verification of the claim from other sources. Read more...

Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah, Lebanon and Syria (July 8 – 15 , 2024)

This past week, Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 43 attacks on military and civilian targets in northern Israel, compared to 47 attacks the previous week. For the first time since the beginning of the fighting, the Lebanese Companies for Resistance to the Israeli Occupation claimed responsibility for firing a rocket at Israel. Two civilians and a soldier were killed and eight soldiers and civilians were injured in the attacks, and property was damaged; Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked Hezbollah targets and operatives in south Lebanon and deep inside the country. Hezbollah reported that three of its operatives had been killed; According to reports, Hezbollah tightened the rules for securing information because of Israel's attacks on senior commanders and operatives; Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah gave four speeches in which he reiterated the organization's position that a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip would lead to an end to fighting on Israel's northern border and rejected the demand for the withdrawal of Hezbollah forces beyond the Litani River; A survey revealed that only 30% of Lebanese residents trusted Hezbollah, but support for Hezbollah's regional involvement among the non-Shi'ite communities increased; Syria: A Hezbollah operative responsible for the transfer of weapons was killed in an attack attributed to Israel on the Damascus-Beirut road. IDF forces attacked Syrian army targets in response to the launch of UAVs at Eilat and because Syria had violated the agreement for the separation of forces in the Golan Heights. Read more...

Considerable effort by Iran to emphasize the continued support for the “resistance front” following the election of President Pezeshkian

Following the election of Masoud Pezeshkian as president of Iran on July 5, 2024, there has been a marked effort by Iran to emphasize its commitment to continuing support for the “resistance front” it leads. This is apparently due to concerns among elements of the pro-Iranian axis in the region about the consequences of the election of the reformist-leaning president, especially in view of the ongoing Iranian-led regional campaign and the fear of a possible deterioration into an all-out confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah. There have been several expressions of the effort to demonstrate continuity in the policy of support for the pro-Iranian axis in the region: messages of support from the president-elect to senior members of the “resistance front; Qods Force commander Esmail Qaani’s visit to the region in recent days and his meetings with senior members of the “resistance front”; Iranian officials’ comments about continuity of regional policy based on the perception that strengthening the “resistance” is one of the permanent pillars of the Islamic Republic; commentaries in the conservative Iranian media presenting Pezeshkian’s messages of support for the leaders of the pro-Iranian axis as an expression of his commitment to them. Read more...

Hezbollah’s Policy for the Use of Force against Israel

On October 8, 2023, a day after the start of the war in the Gaza Strip, Hezbollah joined the fighting, opening another front on Israel's northern border. Its objective was to demonstrate solidarity with and to "support" Hamas in its war against Israel and to oblige Israel to invest combat and other resources on the northern border at the expense of fighting in the Gaza Strip; Hezbollah's policy of using force is based on its so-called "deterrent equation" of proactive attacks, attacks in response to IDF offensive activity, attacks on important Israeli targets and increasing the range of attack in response to Israeli attacks on the organization's sensitive targets; During the fighting, Hezbollah adjusted the "equation" with gradual escalation when it felt Israeli attacks had become disproportionate, usually during an escalation in the war in the Gaza Strip or following the elimination of senior Hezbollah commanders. The escalation included the use of more advanced weapons, the larger barrages of rocket launches and longer-range attacks; Meanwhile, Hezbollah is trying to preserve its "deterrent equation" even in the face of expanding the conflict should Israel initiate a ground operation in south Lebanon and to the point of an all-out war between Israel and Hezbollah. Read more...

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